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ART. I.—CHRISTIANITY AND THE SERVICE
OF MAN.

The Service of Man: an Essay towards the Religion of the Future. By JAMES COTTER MORISON. (London, 1887.)

SIX months ago we noticed this work in an article upon 'Substitutes for Christianity.' But we deferred to future consideration¹ the only portion of the subject which is worked out by Mr. Morison with any degree of completeness: we mean his strictures on the moral influence of Christianity. This is not the most important part of the case in itself. If Mr. Morison had indeed offered us what his title promised, a constructive essay towards the religion of the future, it would have been of little moment to consider his criticisms on the religion of the past. A religion for which there is really room and demand will displace its predecessors not so much by criticism as by its own positive power. Christianity, for example, though ready when occasion came to show the moral defects of Judaism and heathenism, placed little dependence on such negative arguments; and rightly, for controversies would have contributed but little to its success if it had not displayed a positive power to give better employment to the religious faculties than these faiths had provided, and to furnish better support to the moral necessities of souls and of societies than they. If Christianity had been less emphatic or less successful in its negations than its affirmations, it would have beckoned in vain either to Jew or to heathen. Its reasonings would not of necessity have gone for nothing, but they would, in spite of whatever protests on their own part, have taken their place with the philosophies of pure religious scepticism which were prevalent at the time. And such is

¹ *Church Quarterly*, vol. xxiv. p. 379.

the proper classification of Mr. Morison's so-called 'essay towards the religion of the future.' Were his clear-sightedness equal to the goodwill and earnestness which we cheerfully ascribe to him, he would not have given an affirmative title to a negative book. A man who cannot read the lives of Agnes Jones and Sister Dora without tears,¹ and who allows that 'the mass of Englishmen are not yet satisfied in their hearts that an improved substitute for Christianity can be found,'² must have some sympathy with positive religious wants, and a conception of the unearthly power which a religion must exert. He must know that even if religion, as positivism tells us, be constructed out of earthly materials, it must, in order to deserve its name, lift itself for human imagination above the everyday circle of common pleasures and pains. This was what Comte in his *Catechism of Positive Religion* tried to enable it to do. And he failed. The balloon, instead of rising, fell flat upon the ground, and there remains. And what right, we ask, has Mr. Morison to entitle a work, which admits an utter inability to produce a religion, by the name of 'an essay towards the religion of the future'? The Unionists accuse Mr. Gladstone of asking the nation to destroy the existing constitution while he declines to produce the scheme which is to replace it. But Mr. Morison demands greater confidence still, for he pronounces Christianity already moribund or dead, and writes a book to dry the tears of its mourners by the assurance that, after all, it is no great loss; and at the same time he not only offers no substitute, but declares it impossible to devise one. 'When we are asked what religion we propose to substitute in place of the old one now threatened with extinction, the answer is that no such pretension is entertained for a moment. Religions are organic growths, and are no more capable of fabrication than animals or plants.'³ An essay showing that Westminster Abbey is falling to pieces, and that there is no reason to regret it, could only by a great stretch of language be called an essay towards the reconstruction of that ancient building.

Enough said, however, about the religion of the future towards which Mr. Morison's title promises help while his work declines to give any. We proceed to the proper subject of this article, which is the negative criticism of Mr. Morison upon the moral value of Christianity. Although this criticism is of no value for constructing the religion of the future, it is nevertheless of interest to Christians who believe that, so far

¹ *The Service of Man*, p. 232.

² *Ibid.* p. 51.

³ *Ibid.* p. 248.

from being moribund or dead, their religion never showed more life than at present.

Yet the question of the moral value of Christianity is one on which a humble believer cannot enter with a light heart. It is, we sorrowfully allow, a matter not beyond argument. When we study the moral effects of Christianity, whether in Christian populations at large or in our own lives, it is useless to claim that they are adequate to what might be expected from the moral powers and aids which the religion proclaims. Virtues existed and still exist among unbelievers, and vice in appalling volume exists among Christians. Christianity has not hindered the growth and propagation even of forms of vice which are peculiar to Christian nations, and which the heathen must learn from them: such as the drunkenness of England. Considering what the helps to morality are which Christianity asserts to exist, it ought to have been impossible for a serious person like Mr. Morison to doubt its moral value. But it is not impossible; and when under his guidance we enter upon this inquiry we feel so little disposition to dismiss his arguments as preposterous that, on the contrary, we need to scrutinize them carefully and weigh the principles on which they rest.

Now a defect in Mr. Morison's book almost as serious as the want of any hint of the alternative religion which he presages is the absence of any statement of the philosophical basis on which his work rests. His building wants, not only the roof, but the foundation. Positivism is assumed throughout the volume without ever having been asserted beforehand. And, before we submit Christian morals to the judgment of positivism, it is necessary we should consider the qualifications of positivism to do the office of a judge. It is impossible that one who lays down his laws on a positivist basis can form the same estimate of facts and characters, we do not say as a Christian, but as one who even doubts whether positivism be true. The essential principle of positivism is this: that 'in the final, the positive state, the mind has given over the vain search after absolute notions, the origin and destination of the universe and the causes of phenomena, and applies itself to the study of their laws—that is, their invariable relations of succession and resemblance.'¹ The intervention of God in human things is, by this philosophy, absolutely excluded as a notion which our faculties do not enable us to entertain. And whatever conceptions of this sort have

¹ *Comte's Positive Philosophy*, by Martineau, vol. i. p. 2.

been held by men in time past, present themselves to the philosophical observer of to-day as not true, nor even as conceivably true, considered as theories of the reality of things. Now, a man who holds this philosophy must inevitably be influenced by it in his conception of the facts of man's moral history. Supernatural intervention is not to him a *vera causa*; he will not allow it to be even a possible account of moral phenomena. And he for whose mind God exists even as a remote suspicion or distant imaginable influence in things, will find in a very large department of the moral life of individuals and of the race, that he differs from the positivist, not merely upon the character of the facts, but upon the question what were the facts. For instance: Mr. Morison says that 'Strauss, F. Ch. Baur, Keim, and Hausrath have made the early history of Christianity at least as intelligible as other scholars have made the early history of Rome' (p. 32). Now these are authorities whose proposed solutions of the problem are inconsistent with one another, and each of them testifies that none of the others are satisfactory. The wholesale citation of them simply shows the foregone conclusion in Mr. Morison's mind that there is a natural explanation of the rise of Christianity. He thinks there is such an explanation, and therefore believes that somebody must have given it. Even an unbeliever in miracle ought in candour to allow that the natural explanation of Christianity has not yet been found, sure as he may be that there is one. But one to whom the supernatural presents itself as in any way possible will be still more ready to pronounce the claim to have found the 'natural and regular' solution a gross exaggeration. None of the competing explanations is natural except to those who are antecedently convinced that a natural one exists. The very same thing is true in its degree of all the moral phenomena which Mr. Morison considers, and of multitudes of facts, inward and outward, which are of everyday occurrence in our moral lives. The most rigorous proof of positivism as a philosophy of human life and history is requisite before we can assume that the facts are of that purely natural character which Mr. Morison takes for granted. We do not believe that society is prepared to follow him in the assumption. Whatever unformed tendencies to materialism the age may display, the rigorous acceptance of Mr. Morison's philosophy is so uncommon that scarce a handful of thoroughgoing adherents to it could be found.

And this is the more important because the positivist's moral judgments of the facts will differ as much as his decision

what were the facts, from that of the most hesitating believer. For instance: with all Mr. Morison's appreciation of religion, his grudging estimate of the service of man rendered by the martyrs is, that by martyrdom 'no benefit is ever supposed to be conferred by men, except, perhaps, the example left for imitation by others' (p. 204). But what greater benefit can possibly be conferred on mankind than an example of constancy to the faith that is in us? Mr. Morison would see it at once in the case of Giordano Bruno. Even on special positivist principles the man who dies for a theological faith, when a theological faith is that for which the world is fit, is advancing truth in the very highest sense which the philosopher knows, and rendering to men the greatest service conceivable. Mr. Morison's low view of the social benefits of martyrdom proves, what we might well have anticipated, that, however fair a positivist may wish to be, it is impossible that his moral estimate can agree with that of those whose faith is spiritual. Let the positivist say what he will of including the beliefs of the past in a general view of the necessary progress of the race, and of retaining their noble characteristics in the better religion of the future, he cannot, now that he has left them behind, regard them as anything but errors and delusions. And the tears with which he reads of the beautiful characters they produced are not tears of triumphant sympathy, but of eternal farewell to the thoughts and feelings by which such fruits are yielded.

'The speculative interest,' says Mr. Morison, 'pales before the momentous practical interest of the crisis. A transfer of allegiance from one set of first principles to another, especially on subjects relating to morals and conduct, cannot be effected without considerable loss of continuity and order by the way' (p. 9).

He is right; but we fear that we differ from him on the very meaning of this word 'morals'; and though our allegiance in morals is to be transferred from one set of first principles to another, that cannot change the meaning of the term 'morals' to us, nor the essential conditions for which principles of morals must provide. You may alter your whole way of living and the nature of your food, but you cannot change the original meaning of health and disease, nor the nature of nourishment. It is in our own individual lives that we meet the experience which gives those words their meaning wherever we use or hear them; we are incapable of substituting any other meaning of health and disease, of pain or pleasure, for that which we find in our own nature. It is so with morality. Morals and

morality are words to which a meaning is given by what we find in our own experience, and unless we can give ourselves other minds than those we possess, we are incapable of attaching to them any other import than that which is thus given to us. And what is this meaning? It is that of a conflict and a choice. If there were not a better and a worse, a higher and a lower, either of which we may conceivably pursue, and between which we choose, morals and morality as we now understand them would have no existence for us. Let the reader consider if he is not compelled to understand the words so; we have no doubt at all of our own incapacity to understand them otherwise. Every application and combination of the words implies conflict and choice. Moral evidence, moral sanctions, good morals, bad morals, immoral, non-moral—all have reference to the progress or the results, to the presence or the absence, of conflict and choice. Whenever a process goes on in our mind or in our body in which cause and effect are directly and peremptorily connected, leaving no room for conflict or choice, then we consider the term morality inapplicable; there is nothing either moral or immoral in the growth of the hair or the beating of the heart. These invariable sequences are, indeed, never unconnected with morality; there is room for choice and conflict as to the manner in which we submit to or use the unchangeable laws of our life; but when it appears that any law of our life is unchangeable, or, as we say, physical or natural, it is removed *ipso facto* from the sphere of morality.

This seems to us obviously true; and it ought not to be denied even by a positivist. Even if, in some point of view higher (or lower, as the case may be) than that of ordinary practice our life and acts could appear to us as phenomena linked together by 'invariable relations of succession' in a series which human will cannot change, it would still be undeniable that in practice conflict and struggle present themselves as inward facts of which we cannot cease to be conscious; and to this consciousness, be it delusion or not, morality is attached and cannot be disunited from it. Therefore, direct teaching and assistance given to men in carrying on this conflict and making this choice is alone proper to be called moral teaching or moral help. Yet the aspect in which Christianity is habitually treated by Mr. Morison is that of a cause operating among the forces of nature, not that of an element in the moral conflict of man.

The way in which religion is connected with morality is this—that all the faculties on which the maintenance of

morality and its growth depend seek further and higher applications than this world can give them. Love is a powerful agent of morality, and so is hope, and so is fear, and so is conscience; but the world cannot supply us with objects of love sufficiently universal or lasting or attractive to dominate the whole nature of all men at all times. Nor are the objects of hope and fear, or the light for the conscience, which the world presents great or real enough to supply all that morality wants. We do not make little of what this life has to offer in any of these respects, nor depreciate its use and power in morality. But the general agreement and experience of men is that what life offers is not enough. It requires extension. The moral faculties must be well attached above to enable the weaving of our moral life to go on. If they hang loose it cannot proceed, and even the part of the web which seemed already complete, the moral habits already formed, may be loosened again and fall into confusion. How to find some means of attaching the faculties which give the moralizing power to something well above the ordinary life is the problem for those who cast away the aid for this purpose which Christianity has afforded to millions.

The problem is not that of providing a satisfactory object of the religious sentiment. For our part we consider the term religious sentiment a very poor expression indeed of man's faculty of religion and his need of it. He needs religion, not sentimentally, but morally. Without religion no one has yet found the secret which Jesus Christ knew: how to teach, not merely something about morality, but morality itself. To teach us about pleasure and pain is a different thing from teaching us to feel them; to teach us what beauty and ugliness are is a different thing from teaching us to feel what is beautiful and what is not. Aristotle has taught us a good deal about virtue, but Jesus has taught virtue. And we are sorry to say that Mr. Morison must not only renounce for his book the claim to have proposed a religion for the future but also the claim to have given us any help to virtue. He has said a good deal about the service of man, but nothing which imparts a new stimulus to enlist in it. Man in search of a religion which will help him to be good resembles one who seeks a physician for some malady of his own or in his household. He feels in himself an evil element to be expelled and a recuperative power which requires to be aided and helped. Lectures on medicine give him little help; he wants a doctor. If there be but one in the place, the patient will require very strong proof of his insufficiency before he

refuses to employ him. He will naturally say that those who depreciate the physician should provide a better or hold their tongues. To be sure, a physician might conceivably be so bad that it would be better to trust to nature than to employ him. But as it is conceded in medicine and in morals that nature wants aid, and is not enough of itself, this is not a doctrine which men will be very forward to accept. But then, it is urged, your physician has in a very large number of previous cases failed to effect cures. Well, we should answer, it may be so. But we have always in such cases to consider, not only the skill of the doctor, but also the subject and the circumstances: failures may come through the strength of a disease or disobedience to orders, even though the medical skill was the greatest that could be displayed.

We cannot limit the conflict and choice in which we seek moral help, to the service of man. The sphere of morality extends over all active life and into every relation which we hold to any one or any thing, whether in the outward visible life or the inward and spiritual. Everywhere throughout this field there is room for a higher and a lower, for a right and for a wrong. And to prove that the service of man is not the whole of morality, we need only ask whether our relations to man are the only relations that exist for us. The answer obviously is that they are not. We bear relations also to ourselves, to other creatures besides man, and above all to the source of our being, were it even an unconscious or unknowable source. But the service of man is so large a part of morality, and affords so complete an example of the action of moral principle, that we feel no disposition to raise any question with Mr. Morison upon this ground. We proceed, then, to consider his inquiry into the value of Christianity as a help in this service, with the understanding that reason and nature compel us to conduct the investigation not as philosophers considering an abstract question, but as men seeking assistance in our moral struggle.

Mr. Morison's introductory chapter treats of the universal change and decay of all human handiwork, religion among the rest. Mr. Spencer begins his *First Principles* by similar reflections; only that what strikes him most is the proof which the obstinate permanence of religion, in spite of the constant change in its form, affords of the fact that religion is a necessary part of man's mental furniture. It is true that the religion which Mr. Spencer believes in is the formless religion of the unknowable; but to our minds it is demonstrably impossible for a man to have a religion without in

some sense knowing its object and giving it a form for his thought. And we apply his argument to show that the determination of man to have a religion proves that there must be a true and permanent form of religion. The changes of man's astronomical notions do not prove—though a rash scepticism might easily think that it did prove—a true and permanent astronomical belief to be an impossibility; but the reverse. And if there is to be a final and permanent form of religion, Christianity holds the field as a claimant to the description. But even if Christianity were to fall, it is a perfectly unauthorized assumption of Mr. Morison that the transition would be 'from theology to positivism, from the service of God to the service of man,' or that if we 'honestly take our side and admit that the Civitas Dei is a dream of the past,' our alternative would be to realize that *Regnum Hominis* which Bacon foresaw and predicted.' Bacon, as Mr. Morison must be well aware, predicted no kingdom of man erected on the ruins of the kingdom of God. He must know that this *Regnum Hominis* of which positivists dream is rejected, not only by Christians, but by agnostics and believers in the unconscious, comprehending the larger mass of modern unbelief. And reason good why it should be rejected. Neither in the aggregate nor individually does man possess any qualities enabling him to fill a throne from which God is to be displaced.

The second chapter is devoted to the Decay of Belief. It contains many things which a Christian must recognize as true and lament as evidence of a loss of faith on the part of many among us; other things which he must regard as a divine call to examine his own creed and to cast out of it anything which the course of thought and inquiry have proved erroneous. But every symptom which Mr. Morison names might be conceived, not only to show itself for a season but even to abide and continue in a man's mind without leading to the rejection of Christianity. It was really not worth his while to mention Dr. Clarke's mistakes about the history of creation. Does he mean to say that the correction of these imperils our belief in a creator? Can he possibly imagine that belief in design is got rid of when we recognize the existence of useless and meaningless organs? One case such as that of the human eye, for the unguided development of which the geologic periods do not afford time, is more than sufficient to outweigh the doubts of design which any amount of useless organs suggest. We do not suppose Mr. Morison's argument against miracles that they would be far

more useful now than at the time they are presumed to have been done will weigh much with anyone who reflects what errors and disasters we should be led to in worldly matters if we took for granted that we had a right to prescribe to nature how and when she will work her wonders. Mr. Morison has more than once repeated in his book that the Christian conception of God bears marks of the tyranny and misery of the times in which the creeds were settled. This theory has nothing whatever to recommend it except the positivist presumption that man is dominated by the circumstances of the period in which he lives. The largest and most important part of the period during which Christian theology developed was no period of tyranny and misery, but one of great peace and good government. And even had it been otherwise, the evidence is abundant that Christians lived in a sphere of faith so absorbing and so apart from the world that its events could have little influence on the course of their thoughts. It is, indeed, true that frightful things have been said about hell torments, and bloodthirsty notions on propitiation and atonement have been imagined. But even when widely spread they have formed part of the Church's changing attire, not limbs of its body; and the wisest theologians with the mass of Christian people have ever felt they knew little of the future life, while the propitiation of an angry Deity is a travesty of the atonement. Mr. Morison would consider it highly absurd in anyone to identify positivism with the particular notions of the section who adopt the religion of Comte. Much less should Christianity and its moral influence be held responsible for the utterances of Boston. The same is to be said of the extreme predestinarian theology which Mr. Morison, by a large assumption, attributes to St. Paul; and what is it, after all, in comparison to what Mr. Huxley calls the Calvinism of nature which remains when theology is surrendered?

Mr. Morison derides the assertion that the objections now made to Christianity are all old. They may not be old in their form, but so long as a substitute for Christianity is not provided the state of the argument remains essentially unaltered from what it was in Butler's time. The old sovereign, he thinks, admits that she has been discrowned. It will be time enough for Mr. Morison to make so extravagant an assertion when he has succeeded in discovering a pretender to the crown. Even then, as experience shows, the result would probably be that the claimant would be speedily put to death by his own followers. But as it is the case stands thus: Not

one of the theories either of physical science or of Biblical criticism has succeeded in proving anything inconsistent with a belief in Christianity so real as to dominate the life. It is admitted that Christianity has attractions so great that unbelievers hasten to compliment it; and the more respectful attitude of religion to unbelief is more than equalled by the bearing of unbelief to religion. It is admitted that a man must have religion, and that none better than Christianity is produced. 'Lord, to whom shall we go?' is the utterance, not of sentiment, but of necessity; and if, under such circumstances, belief decays, can we either justify the process or rejoice at it? What is to be done with men's religious faculties during the interval between the demolition of the old religion and the preparation of the new? Like the disbanded troops of a fallen government, they will infallibly do mischief unless they are employed.

But, to say truth, this decay of belief is something which we cannot wholly believe. Particular objections to religion, or particular religious conclusions, are only of importance as elements in the general state of our minds. And the general state of the mind of our society does not seem to us less favourable to religion than that of Butler's time, but far more so. The positive work of religion in our society is immeasurably greater than it was then: is this consistent with decay? What we do perceive is that there are a larger number of persons among us living so artificial a life, either of over-stimulated intellect or of over-pampered desires, that we cannot trust them to display the spiritual wants of human nature in a healthy form. Mr. Morison himself believes, as we see by his preface, that there is much in the constitution of modern society which is unhealthy and doomed to fall. Can he, then, regard the religious conclusions of this society (were they what he believes them to be) as marks of the steady irreversible progress of the human soul?

In the next chapter Mr. Morison propounds the question, Why men hesitate. He rejects, as we should expect from his honesty, the solution of the question which attributes the still remaining power of religion in England to mere conservatism. The true reason is found, he thinks, first in a certain slow-footed sureness in the national character; and, secondly, in the fact that Christianity has been of late so inoffensive to dissidents. Agnosticism has had a fair stage to propound its substitute for the Gospel, without any of the adventitious favour which would have resulted from an attempt to persecute it. Not being succoured by any enthusiasm derived from

the Englishman's love of liberty and fair play, and being thrown back upon such enthusiasm as properly belongs to its own inherent merits, agnosticism has proved entirely unable to evoke any enthusiasm at all; and we think Mr. Morison might have very truly added that, of all forms of agnosticism, that which is called positivism is entitled to the lowest depth of deadness among these abortions, each of which is proclaimed as the religion of the future, but never becomes anybody's religion in the present. And so there is really no claimant but Christianity to the longing which men have for a Deity who has some capacity for sympathy with them, and for a religion which shall help their morality. Mr. Morison is right enough: those are true reasons why men hesitate; and they are likely to hesitate long. But his account of the merely negative attitude which he supposes our nation to hold towards Christianity, is obviously incorrect. Christianity not only holds its own as an object beloved a little for old habit's sake, and because no rival is at hand, but makes reactions, reconquers lost ground, forces more men to weep and pray and deny their pleasure in many a small parish in England, than agnosticism or positivism has ever done in the whole world, or ever will do to the end of time. The office of destruction, which Mr. Morison assumes in the absence of any power of rivalry, is not a lofty one; but as he has chosen it we shall carefully consider what he has to urge. He promises to inquire (1) If religion has really been in the past the solace and consolation it is asserted to be; (2) Whether Christianity is such a stay and support to morality as it is said to be; and (3) Whether an outbreak of crime and debauchery may be expected on the disappearance of the established theology. We cannot find that the third head is dealt with; but the two first are treated at large.

The first point is not of prime importance in itself. The true contest will never turn upon the amount of the spiritual pleasure of religion. Christianity did not win its converts by appeals to their desire for happiness, but by setting itself before them as truth. And the individual or generation which comes to retain its Christian profession only for the sake of consolations has *ipso facto* ceased to believe. But though consolation is not the first gift of Christianity, nor the first aim of Christians, yet it comes to them without being aimed at. He that loseth his life shall find it; and the same Lord who came not to send peace but a sword proclaims, 'My peace I give unto you.' Herein Christ's religion corresponds entirely with the nature of the human soul, which never finds

happiness except in self-forgetfulness, and never makes happiness its object without losing it through the self-remembrance which the effort implies. If Mr. Morison had recollected this first principle of human nature, he would not have found in the self-depreciations and confessions of ill-desert which Christians make, a reason for doubting the consolations of the Gospel. A man should not take it upon him to gauge the benefits which Christianity confers while he is unable to understand the characteristic nature of the comfort which it gives. And, indeed, if we were judging Mr. Morison merely as a literary critic, we should consider him to be pronouncing sentence on his own powers of insight when he finds in Thomas à Kempis's confession, 'Lord, I am not worthy of Thy consolation,' a proof that the sinner finds no consolation in religion. Is it possible that anyone should read the *Imitatio* and doubt whether the writer has found consolation through the very depth of his self-humiliation, and relief through the very greatness of his spiritual pain; bearing about him in his body, like St. Paul before him, the dying of the Lord Jesus that the life also of Jesus might be manifest in his mortal flesh?

This blindness to the power of the Cross to turn that which, to the unbeliever, must be sheer unrelieved pain into happiness, is one defect which we note in this chapter of Mr. Morison's work. A second, to be sure, is found in the general defect of the whole book—namely, the absence of any consideration of the alternative. For, to say that the consolations of Christianity are small is evidently insufficient unless you can prove that the consolations which would remain if Christianity were absent are greater. And Mr. Morison makes no attempt to show this. If all the fears and all the cruelties and all the self-deceptions and useless self-tortures which have ever been inflicted in the name of Christianity were removed, would the human race be necessarily in a blissful or even in an indifferent state of mind? Would no anxieties about a future of which nothing can be known; no shrinking from extinction; no disappointment at the shortness and futility of a life which ends in death, sum up any *per contra* to be set against the pains of asceticism and of Calvinism? And will the religion of the future, when the time comes for it to be born, be a religion which brings with it pure pleasure and no pain? If so, we prophesy that it will be too mawkish for the taste of mankind, in whose life pain and labour are so seated that the religion which cannot make them the means of hope and peace can have neither hope nor peace

to give. This is our second criticism on the chapter ; but the third is more important than either.

Mr Morison in professing to estimate the consolations of Christianity claims to except from them all that complacent conviction of acceptance and favour with God in which the presumptuous dwell. The true Christian peace, he says, 'is subject to painful interruptions and almost in exact proportion with the growth of a watchful and tender conscience does the liability to such eclipses increase.' 'The proud content of the Pharisee can never be put to the credit of religion' (p. 59). We allow Mr. Morison his claim without hesitation and without deduction. All is not Israel which is of Israel, and many comforts which exist under Christianity and pretend to be Christian belong, not to Christianity, but to human nature, and sometimes to its lower elements. That is part of the condition of struggle in which moral life consists: that one of the weapons which evil uses is to deceive us with the appearance of good. Moreover we shall extend the range of Mr. Morison's demand, and shall concede that not only in respect of evil things like Pharisaism, but of many good things too, we must be careful not to claim for Christianity that which belongs essentially to human nature. The chastity and honesty of the northern races was discernible before they were Christian, and Christianity can but claim to have offered a faith congenial to such good tendencies and improved and extended them and protected them from the decay which would otherwise have overtaken them. All through the history of early Christianity we have to consider, not one force or power, but two: the gospel and the nature of man; and we must not attribute to the one that which really belongs to the other. Agreed: Mr. Morison has a right to all the advantage which this obvious truth can give him, and it will involve no small deduction from many a claim which has been advanced on the part of religion.

But it is equally obvious that the principle should be applied the other way also. Mr. Morison has no right to deduct the happiness of Pharisees from the joys of religion on the ground that it belongs not to religion but nature, and then to attribute to religion all the suffering which has been inflicted in its name. Why may not the sufferings of Jacqueline Pascal, the terrors and cruelties of Boston's prophecies of woe to come, and the morbid symptoms of Bunyan's spiritual life as well proceed from tendencies of human nature, erroneously attributing their work to religion, as the pride and self-satisfaction of Diotrephe. That you are not to attribute

to religion all that is done or felt in its name would seem to us too obvious for mention if it were not that the principle is so habitually forgotten in the work before us.

Mr. Morison commences his consideration of the supreme subject of Christianity and Morals with an extraordinary instance of wrongheadedness. He quotes Paley as admitting that the teaching of morality was not the primary design of the gospel. The scope of Christianity considered as a revelation was to influence the conduct of human life by establishing the proof of a future state of reward and punishment, thus supplying motives, not rules ; sanctions, and not precepts. Whatever Paley's merits, there is something grotesque in resorting to him instead of Christ and His apostles for a description of the design of Christianity. But it is unnecessary to insist upon this, because Paley himself is wholly misrepresented when Mr. Morison founds upon his words the notion of a supernatural morality substituting itself for that which concerns this world. That Paley, of all men, should be presented as abandoning the sphere of everyday duty for one of transcendental reference is, indeed, a discovery in exposition. Paley, as even these words show, and as the chapter which they are taken from proves at large, considers Christian morality to be exquisitely adapted to the wants of life and the performance of all social duties ; while the sanction of the life to come adds the same sort of impulse to the due performance of these duties that the prospect of mature life does to the diligent education of boys. In the one case as in the other it is possible that human error may pervert the proper lesson which the prospect of the future impresses. There is such a thing as other-worldliness among the so-called religions, just as there is such a thing as the premature apeing of manhood among boys. But you might as well say that the knowledge that they are ever to grow up injures the general performance of boyish duty as that the knowledge of a future life, as Christianity presents it, injures the performance of our earthly obligations. Christians have, indeed, failed in these too often, but always because they forgot the Christian view of the future, never because they remembered it. We should have thought it impossible for anyone who expected attention from persons who had read the New Testament to write that 'Salvation in the next world is the object of the scheme, not morality in this ; and although the two objects may occasionally coincide, it is only a casual coincidence.' On the contrary, if Christ tells us true, salvation is not to be had in the next world without morality in this ; and the connexion of the two is as

close and as essential as that of the crop with the sowing. 'Be not deceived: God is not mocked. Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he reap.' 'If a man say I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar. Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer, and ye know that no murderer hath eternal life abiding in him.' If Mr. Morison will call to mind how the Lord represents Himself as inviting those on His right hand to enter the kingdom because in doing good to men they had been unawares doing good to Him, he will perceive how every power of the spiritual world and every expectation of the future is brought by the religion of Christ to bear upon the duty of man to man. The fact is that all the revelations of the life to come which Christianity makes are couched in terms derived from the highest moral experiences of this world. They cannot be understood except by those for whom earthly duty has a meaning; and it is therefore in the nature of things impossible that they should overshadow earthly duty. Perfect purity and love can have no charm except for those who enjoy purity and love here; and how can the hope of the perfect degree check us in the practice of the imperfect? The foundation truth of Christianity—namely, the manifestation of the Son of God in an earthly life—is fitted immeasurably to emphasize the importance of this life and all its relations and duties; and the whole teaching of the New Testament follows out with unvarying consistency this primary conception.

But Mr. Morison proceeds, not merely to give more or less plausible reasons for holding that the doctrine of all Christians in the final result is antinomian and positively immoral, but to prove the assertion by the most authoritative utterances of representative Christian doctors (p. 93). The way in which he proves it is by placing the Christian requirement of faith in Christ in opposition to that of a virtuous life as made by those who are not Christians; and he offers some very strong statements out of the writings of various divines to show the power of faith and repentance to avert the personal punishment of a bad life, and send the seducer triumphantly to heaven, while the victims of his temptation depart to destruction everlasting. We should be wasting time if we were to criticize the expressions of particular divines; we join issue on the general question of the moral tendency of forgiveness of sins offered through Christ.

On this point we must as usual note, in the first place, the advantage which Mr. Morison derives from the total omission of any alternative. Yet it is only common reason to remember that this unnamed alternative is, not a future life in which

sins shall be more fairly punished than the forgiveness of sins allows them to be under Christianity, but the total omission of a future life at all. Now if all the offers of *novæ tabulæ*, if all the remissions of punishment for sin however heinous, which have ever been made in the name of Christ were massed together and urged to the exclusion of every threat which Christianity sets on the other side, they could not equal, or come near to equalling, the clean erasure of all sentence against crime which disbelief in a future state brings with it. For if the one offers future joy and the other only extinction, this difference is altogether lost in the fact that one makes its offers conditional upon the truth and reality of a repentance and a faith which every day's sin renders less likely of attainment, while the other presents its absolution in the absolute and indiscriminate form of a physical fact, and assures, not merely the trembling wretch in terror about his own soul, but the bold sinner into whose heart no repentant misgiving has ever entered, that there is nothing whatever to fear. On what sanctions does Mr. Morison depend for the maintenance of virtue among men when Christianity shall have vanished? Is it upon the innate good principles of human nature encouraged by society for its own wellbeing? These principles of good exist under Christianity, with the additional power which is given them by the approval of God and the prospect of a future life; and that they would be sufficient without either of these beliefs behind them is something which Mr. Morison may choose to believe, but which he cannot prove, because it has never been tried in any society whatever. Will he depend upon the fear of physical pain, mental trouble, or social censure brought to bear upon those who are accessible only to fear? These deterrents exist equally under Christianity: the two latter of them organized and strengthened by the religion with helps the substitute for which in positivism we cannot easily discover. So that on a fair comparison of the two systems, the only foundation which we can discover for the indictment of immoral tendency which Mr. Morison brings against the Christian doctrine of forgiveness of sins is that it holds out a hope, very strictly guarded and conditioned, of a remission of future punishments, none of which, under Mr. Morison's system, would have any existence in any case, under any circumstances, for anybody at all.

So much on the comparative question. But we must add something upon the doctrine of forgiveness of sins in its positive relation to morality. We venture to say that this doctrine, which, when asserted in the name of Jesus and in

relation to the future life, Mr. Morison regards as inimical to morality, is nevertheless one which he himself will accept in the more limited sphere to which his belief confines him. Humanity is the new king who is to fill the throne of our deposed Lord. Now, does humanity forgive? Is it a duty with humanity to forgive? Does humanity find that forgiveness, duly applied, is a help towards morality or a hindrance to it? These questions must all be answered in the affirmative. Dead nature applies its stern laws without remission. But living man classes the duty of forgiveness among those which are demanded of him by his own best-developed moral nature and among the agencies most powerful in promoting a heartfelt service of humanity among those who would otherwise have been its enemies. It is not merely the Epistles of St. Paul or the history of the life of Christ which informs us that a sinner under the letter of the law feels himself bound down and committed to sin. Nature and experience teach the same. His past claims him, and as he has begun so he must continue; that which his deity, be it God or Humanity, considers him to be, that he must be. And the news of release from this bondage is to him the spring of a changed life, in which freedom will be used, not for selfishness, which has been found to be misery, but for loving and grateful service.

But what of the absolution of the dying sinner: what of the penitent thief? Those are the extreme instances, and every great moral principle has its extreme instance, from which those who believe in it must not shrink. The principle works among men on a large scale, and must not be judged of in extreme cases alone. But we maintain the moral duty and moral power of forgiveness to be so great in human dealings, and so undeniable, that it would be the part of the priest of humanity, utterly disbelieving a future state, to convey to a dying offender against every social obligation, upon reasonable proof of his true repentance, the forgiveness of humanity for his crimes; for if forgiveness was refused, humanity would feel that it had been untrue to its own duty, and the moral power of the great principle of the forgiveness of the repentant would be impaired among the human race at large. If we be right in this, it is precisely the case of the penitent thief, except that Jesus, as the true priest of humanity, instead of a subjective absolution in the memory of those who shall hear of his sin and, with it, of his sorrow, his faith, and his love, has a paradise to promise in which the forgiveness of his fellow-men and of his God shall be felt and enjoyed.

Does this alter the moral tendency of the act of forgiveness, or must we suppose that humanity would only convey its absolution to its repentant child on the supposition that the rite would bring him no real benefit of which he could be conscious?

The case of Zaccheus offers us a more ordinary instance of the operation of the principle. 'Lord, behold the half of my goods I give to the poor'—there is a servant of humanity converted from the service of self by the free use of the principle of forgiveness. For the Son of Man treats him as a friend while yet he has done to man nothing but injury. Would the priest of humanity use the same treatment in the same case; and if he did not, would the omission be favourable to morality or against it?

When Mr. Morison enlarges on the moral injury of forgiveness he precisely reproduces the objections of the Pharisees to the dealings of the Lord with publicans and sinners. He has something to say for himself, and so had they. The principle of forgiveness is easily capable of abuse. It would be abused if it were ever taught to be effective on the performance of 'an act of contrition' (p. 110), if that ambiguous phrase of Mr. Morison's is to be taken to mean a merely formal and outward expression of sorrow. But neither Christ nor His Church ever conveyed His forgiveness on such terms, and if ever it has been and men have supposed themselves to receive it without loving much in return, their self-deception is due, not to Christianity, but to human nature.

The long chapter upon 'Morality in the Ages of Faith' does not seem to us to require a lengthened answer. It is founded on the supposition that an age in which there is no formal and doctrinal opposition to Christianity must be an age in which the principles of Christianity have been completely tested, and in which every moral characteristic of the time may be attributed to the religion. And so room is found for a number of unedifying stories from French memoirs and similar sources which display, indeed, a very defective morality, but never one which would have been acknowledged as excusable even by the Christianity of the time, much less by Christianity in its purity. No one knows better than Mr. Morison how many facts are to be set on the other side. But we need not urge this. Phenomena so limited as those which he mentions would hardly seem of much use even to those who regard the moral history of man as a series of periods in each of which one principle, theological, metaphysical, or positive, rules supreme and is answerable for

everything. They are of slighter value still to those who regard the moral history of man as essentially and by the very nature of things a history of struggle, in which you have no right to attribute to one of the contending powers that which really belongs to the other. You have no right to attribute to a physician the maladies of a patient who has not followed his prescription, more especially if there be also a doubt whether the apothecary has made up the prescription rightly. Nor is the case at all changed though he has been the sole medical attendant, and though the sick man has made a mighty parade of respect for him. No doubt these records are sad deductions from the *degree* of moral influence which we might have expected such a religion as Christianity to exert among men, but as examples of the *nature* of the moral influence of Christianity they are worth nothing. And it is in the latter aspect that Mr. Morison uses them. They show that the flesh is very powerful against the spirit, and that bad habits are hard to change in races or in men. But we knew all this before: we experience it in its degree in ourselves; and if it had not been the case, Christianity as a religion of redemption could never have had a place in the world. And, after all, nothing is thereby proved against the moral tendency of Christianity when truly tried.

Mr. Morison proceeds to consider what Christianity has done. But we do not trust the guidance of a writer who considers the moral phenomena under the preconceived idea that society is an organism. No doubt a true meaning for that phrase, as for most others which able men have used, may be found. But organism is a word which derives its associations and its meaning from the physical world. And when it is applied to the moral world the result is very likely to be the total expulsion from it of every characteristic which can properly be called moral. Organisms (as we know them, and apart from the creative acts which originate them) develop and work according to one unbroken course of physical causation. Various physical laws play upon them, indeed, and there is action and reaction between them and their environment. But the laws which play upon them are uniformly physical, and the course of ascertainable causation is never broken. Now, we grant the moral life to be so connected with the physical that if we were to set about proving to ourselves that our own moral life is determined by our constitution and our circumstances, like the life of a limpet or a mussel, we should be able to bring under our theory a very large number of the facts of our state. But some facts, and

those the most important, would be omitted. The theory would belong to that most dangerous class of falsehoods, the half-truths. It would fail in truth at every successive moment of action, for there struggle and choice are facts which it is fatal to neglect. And as the lives of men are made up of these successive moments of action, and society is made up of the lives of men, the organism theory of society in its moral aspects is sure to be imperfect. Accordingly we find Mr. Morison's account of what Christianity has done most unsatisfying. His notion of the forces which have worked in Christian society is far too simple to be true, and he displays a constant tendency to attribute too much to material circumstances. In his account, the influence of the Christian religion itself loses at once its complexity and its spirituality, and is squared and simplified and materialized to suit the requirements of positivism. Could any view be more shortsighted than that which represents Christianity as, at any period of its history, not to say during the whole of it, 'a consistent and determined enemy of human liberty' (p. 189). Human liberty and human obedience have with equal distinctness received encouragement and correction from Christianity. Each principle has been equally abused by human nature, sometimes in the name of religion and sometimes without reference to religion. But no system of teaching that has ever existed, or shows the hope of ever existing, among men has encouraged and restrained the alternate duties of resistance and submission with the same fairness and effectiveness as the Christianity of the New Testament and of those ages of the Church when Christianity had its way, and the earthly tendencies to which positivism would surrender human nature were restrained.

When Mr. Morison comes to the speculative influences of Christianity he attributes to it a power of cultivating and developing saintliness which has no equal in any other creed or philosophy. But this, in his opinion, is so far from proving its beneficial influence upon mankind that it goes rather the other way. 'It would be as rational to say that the poetry of Shakespeare, the music of Beethoven, and the geometry of Lagrange were accessible to all men. The genuine saint is a moral genius of a peculiar kind' (p. 197). And Mr. Morison illustrates the remark from various personages of Christian history: as St. Louis, Sir Thomas More, Pascal, Mother Margaret Hallahan, Sister Dora, Agnes Jones. 'But the mass of commonplace people who go to church or chapel, who are neither very good nor very bad, neither exception-

ally clever nor stupid, the enormous middle class of mediocrities, fairly just, conscientious, and kind-hearted, can it be denied that they are constantly deterred from embracing a serious view of life's duties just because a standard of such exalted perfection is proposed to them that they know it is no use attempting to reach it?' (p. 228). If 'this could not be denied' it would be a sad and antisocial conclusion. It would be bad news for the service of man, for humanity and for the religion of humanity, that any excellence in individual members should be harmful instead of beneficial to the whole.

But it will strike everyone who reflects for a moment that the illustration by which Mr. Morison denotes the singularity of great saints is very ill adapted to his estimate of their use in the service of man. For the poetry of Shakespeare, the music of Beethoven, and the geometry of Lagrange *are* accessible to all men. Thousands upon thousands, though devoid of the original power of these magnates, are able to respond to their initiative, and be raised thereby to a mental level which they could not otherwise have reached. And through the instrumentality of these recipients of the divine gifts of genius, the civilizing and uplifting influence is spread even among those who are incapable of direct contact with the original source; so that all society, even down to its dullest members, is the better for the appearance in the world of a great poet, thinker or artist. We appeal to all rational observers to say whether the same thing is not still more plainly true of the appearance of a great saint. He is the man of soul, and he appeals to sympathies more universal and more capable of practical extension than the men of mind. To be sure, indolence may make his greatness an excuse, just as an idle girl might refuse to learn her music because she has no hope of being a female Beethoven. But this is a wholly abnormal and unnatural result, and is over-balanced ten-thousand-fold by instances on the other side. We cannot recognize in Mr. Morison's view of the discouragement of ordinary goodness by extraordinary one single word of truth.

When he regards the phenomenon of saintliness in itself and apart from its effects on other people, he attributes everything to natural endowments. Agnes Jones, Sister Dora, and Mother Margaret were 'simply women of extraordinary genius' (p. 222). No doubt their natural powers were great: but that these natural powers are, as Mr. Morison says, 'just the simple fact of the matter' we utterly disbelieve.

There is not one of them, nor one of all the other saints of all the Christian centuries—or even of the heathen saints—who would have given this account of their character or their career. Religion in their own view was no separable accident, but an essential element in their being; the restraint of defects which might have led them wholly astray and their stimulant and guide in the use of all their powers. It is absurd to disregard the testimony of their own consciousness. And the fact that natural powers had so much to do with their achievements only leads us to believe that there have been thousands more over whom religion has had the same influence as it had over them, who for want of equal powers to work with have never become known to history, but whose humble efforts have contributed in like manner, though not in like degree, to the service of man.

But Mr. Morison's 'simple fact of the matter,' though we consider it far too simple to be really the fact of the matter, convinces us beyond question of one thing—that his own expectations of a religion of the future are wholly unreal. For, consider what a religion in any possible conception must be, and what reason anybody can have for expecting the arrival of a new religion or the capacity of man to receive it. A religion cannot be identical with the exercise by human beings of their natural endowments. That we have without religion. A religion, whatever it be, must be something beyond this; and the reason why we are led to expect or desire the existence of a religion among men can be no other than this, that religion even in inferior forms has always existed among men and has been found of use. Now, here we have Mr. Morison tracing the very best instances of devotion of which he knows, and those apparently most closely connected with religion, to natural endowments, religion being a mere superfluous addition without importance for any useful end. What room, then, or what need can we suppose that there is for a religion of the future? What are the faculties truly belonging to man or of any use in his organization in which he proposes to found it? If an agitator were to devote himself to destroying an existing government, with great professions that some day or other a new one would be set up; and if we found the same man tracing the best indications of peace and order which the country presented to the family affections of the people, the government being pointedly declared to have nothing to do with it, we should rightly infer that, whatever he might profess, he was really an enemy of all government.

But with all his admiration for the saintly benefactors of

the sick, Mr. Morison is of opinion that 'if the question is of diminishing human suffering, these pious workers did not take up the problem with any full sense of its magnitude; did not begin high enough up in their efforts to stop the stream of evil and pain.' For they did not use the method of science. 'Have all the self-sacrifices of all the Doras and Sisters of Mercy in the world spared mankind a tithe of the suffering which has been prevented by vaccination?' (pp. 233, 4). Quite true. And it is also quite true that the material arrangements of nature, the growth of corn, and the fall of rain, the uses of heat and the power of steam make a greater difference in man's outward condition than any moral dispositions either in himself or his fellows can do. Whoever can ally himself with any physical law enlists a giant in his service. But whatever blessing to man may come in this way goes to the account of nature, not of man. The discoverer of some new secret of nature may be actuated by the purest or the meanest motives in his research and in his publication of the results, or he may come upon the precious fact by mere chance. It is all the same: the moral qualities used in the discovery do not make the slightest difference in the effects of the discovery upon man. But every physical discovery as well as every physical fact already known is part of the subject-matter about which man's moral nature is employed. Every such fact is submitted to man with the question, How will he use it? And the manner in which he uses it, though not as striking from a material point of view, yet is more important in reference to his real happiness and the elevation of his nature than the fact itself. The kindness and the self-devotion which have been exercised upon those sick of the smallpox, before as well as since vaccination, are more important by far to man than the degree of prevalence of the disease. It is a moral duty for those whom God has endowed with scientific faculties to use these faculties for their desired end. But to tell devoted nurses that for the diminishing of human suffering they ought to begin higher up and invent scientific methods for the cure of disease, is a proposal which only requires to be stated in order to reveal its absurdity. Devoted nurses have a moral duty in respect to scientific inventions: that, namely, of using them to the utmost for the good of their patients, and praising God for them in their own hearts. Mother Margaret was morally wrong in the jealousy of scientific progress which Mr. Morison records. If, indeed, it had been reasonable in her to expect that when men built such structures as the Britannia Bridge, they would

begin to think they had no need of God, we could well have justified her. But it ought not to be reasonable to expect that men will do that which it is entirely unreasonable in them to do. Now, nothing can be more unreasonable than the pride of modern science; and the best scientific men have been wholly free from it. Modern inventions, great as they are, do not approach, in importance to man's life, the ancient ones whose inventors are forgotten in the distant past. Sails were a greater forward step in their day than railways, and the presumption and defiance of the gods, which Horace ascribes to the earlier inventors, is quite as well justified as similar feelings would be in the later. 'Nil mortalibus arduum est; cælum ipsum petimus stultitia.' How could the self-confidence of some modern scientists be better expressed? But, 'What hast thou that thou didst not receive?' is a question as applicable to the highest exercises of intellect as the lowest; and if we remember the impotence of science to change the essential conditions of man's life on earth, or the nature of his mental and spiritual being, the shortness of its reach is more conspicuous than its triumphs. It would seem to us a kind of insanity to deny that in the calm regard of reason there is as much room for God and for faith in God within the circle of man's experience as ever there was.

We have now come to the end of Mr. Morison's criticisms upon the moral tendencies of Christianity. It but remains for us to notice in the brief space which is at our disposal the very slight attempts at constructive treatment of the moral problem which he makes in the chapters upon the Service of Man and the Cultivation of Human Nature. As to the cultivation of the body and the mind we have no great difference with him; and Christianity adds a value both to body and mind which no system which ends with this life can produce. But in that of the heart, which he rightly calls the most important sphere of cultivation, Mr. Morison believes that the first necessity is to adopt the theory of determinism and surrender the belief in the closely-related doctrines of divine grace and human free will. It must strike every reader that divine grace has often, and with great show of argument, been represented as the ally of determinism and the enemy of human free will, and Mr. Morison has himself, in a former passage, advanced the existence of Calvinism as a reproach. Nevertheless (while declining the controversial term free will) we agree with him in believing that the reality of man's will as a cause and the doctrine of grace stand or fall together. The will is an essentially mysterious power in ourselves and

leads us straight to the higher mystery of God's existence and His inward connexion with us. But we are totally at issue with Mr. Morison in the supposition that determinism can be even conceivably a complete theory of man's moral life, far less a practical truth for his action. For, give to man's circumstances and his constitution the very highest value you can conceive as determining his acts; let law be supposed to rule him both within and without: how can you enable him to make any use of this information unless you endow him with the power to choose the system of influences to which he shall subject himself. Even the word determinism itself, the chosen term of the opponents of will, is hardly consistent with the theory it is supposed to express; for the universal sense of mankind attaches a different meaning to the phrase 'I determine' from that which is applicable to inanimate things, as when we say that the fall of a stone is determined by the forces exerted on it. You cannot get rid of the special element in human determinations which we call will; and the presence of this element is a practical fact of commanding importance for human agents themselves and for all who have to do with them. Human life cannot pass an hour without recognizing it. But it does not mean lawlessness, for will has its own laws and must act according to the laws of the sphere of things in which it acts.

The word grace expresses the fact that in God we have to do with a power like that which will is in human beings. Mr. Morison always talks of grace as if it were a capricious interference with the laws of man's being, rendering it impossible to count upon causes producing their proper effects; but this is no more true than it is to give a similar account of human will. We all know that in dealing with will we have to do with a living power acting by living laws. And the doctrine of grace extends the same belief to God; for the encouragement and for the warning of all those who regard the blessing and the danger, the love and the fear, which come from serving a living master instead of inanimate law.

But with the sentiments which he expresses we cannot wonder that Mr. Morison declares 'the sooner the sense of moral responsibility is got rid of the better it will be for society and moral education' (p. 293). Let this be a warning to those who dabble in unbelief without reflecting how far it may lead them. Religion vanishes from Mr. Morison's programme only in company with the primary moral conceptions on which life, solitary and in society, has been everywhere built. His declaration may seem sufficiently courageous; yet to us it is

obvious that the abolition of moral responsibility ought to carry him further still, to the total disuse of the terms moral and morality, right and wrong; for they all belong to the same system, and carry the same implications as the word responsibility which he repudiates. How, then, does he propose to deal with the bad? Here is his method. The bad man has no conscience; he acts after his malignant nature. The fear of sharp punishment may deter him from evil-doing and quell his selfish appetites; but he will not be converted to virtue by our telling him he has moral responsibility, that he is a free agent to choose good and evil, and that he ought to choose the good. His mind is made up to choose the bad. But society, knowing its own interests, has a right to exclude him from its fellowship; not only to prevent and punish his evil actions, but 'to suppress him in some effectual way and, above all, prevent his leaving a posterity as wicked as himself' (p. 294). Here, then, is the moral education of mankind wholly assimilated to the breeding of horses and dogs. Our sense of the absurdity of the proposal shall not prevent us from saying that legislation might well interfere with the propagation of hereditary diseases. But conceive the attempt to treat 'the bad man' in this fashion. The euphemism "suppress him in some effectual way" reminds us of the forms with which the Inquisition handed over the heretic to the secular arm. Obviously the only way of effectually suppressing him would be to exterminate him; so that the altruistic part of the community must employ itself in exterminating the egoistic. Extermination of others has not usually been supposed the proper expression of altruistic sentiments, and they might well become depreciated in the process. Nor are we sure that they would run the less danger of corruption in these Bartholomew massacres of the bad, because the bad would be suppressed without any sense on anybody's part that they were responsible for their badness, and with the full admission that moral indignation is no more applicable to them than it is to bad cabbages grown in bad ground from bad seed. We greatly fear that morality will have to proceed upon its present principle for a long time to come; for if the process of suppression were attempted in the present proportions of the bad to the good, it might well happen that the bad would resist in a formidable manner, and a contest for the suppression of badness might arise bloodier and larger than any ever waged for the suppression of heresy, even the Thirty Years' war itself.

Much difficulty also arises in knowing at what stage of

people's existence it can be known whether they belong to the class which ought to be suppressed. For, on the one hand, we are told that in teaching morality 'we can only be successful with the apt scholars, those who have a foundation of good instincts on which to work' (p. 298); while, on the other hand, Mr. Morison informs us that 'selfishness in children can be cultivated to any extent' (p. 303). If a child with good instincts has had his selfishness cultivated to a large extent, are you to exterminate him before he propagates his breed: will his children be the children of his good instincts or of his cultivated selfishness?

But Mr. Morison's suppression of the bad is inconsistent with the theory of evolution. According to evolution all morality, even the most altruistic, had its original root in the pleasures and pains of the self; and altruistic persons are merely those who have been improved into feeling pleasure and pain through the joys and sorrows of others. Yet, in Mr. Morison's scheme, the recurrence of the original type from which all morality has sprung, in the shape of persons whose pleasures and pains are not of a highly improved and altruistic character, is to be looked upon as warranting despair of improvement and demanding effectual suppression. But, indeed, as we read these speculations so utterly out of connexion with the experience either of the present or the past, it seems to us that we Christians are the true positivists, and that Mr. Morison is a wild idealist.

Christianity teaches us not to despair of anyone. It gives us in the person and in the promises of Jesus a system of motives for the individual life which operates upon every egoistic principle that exists in us, from the lowest fear of punishment to the longing for spiritual communion with perfect goodness. It develops egoism into altruism by every argument of example, duty, and prudence. It attaches infinite value to every human soul and body, from the highest to the lowest; interests us in all men as the redeemed brethren of Jesus; and gives us that hope of divine help in dealing with them, and of an eternal result from our labours, without which we should so often faint and shrink from the task as not worth while, or as hopeless of result. It does not come before us as a physical force exercised upon human history in despite of human wills. But we do not want a force to overcome the will, a process which we know well would be inconsistent with the conditions of our existence. The will is powerful and yet so ill provided with motives and with helps to produce a good effect that without grace it is a blind giant.

In what degree the world may have cast aside this system of divine aid, so perfectly adapted to human nature, we do not know, nor do we think Mr. Morison can know. Still less can we know how far the little good that appears to be done by men apart from Christ is really due to the impulse which He gave, still working, even on those who reject Him, through the society in which they live. But these speculations about what others are doing are of little value to those who are in earnest in their own moral life. If all men else accepted Him, it would be the duty of any man who could not conscientiously believe, to decline their example and reject Him. And if all men else rejected Him, it would still be our duty to confess Him if our consciences tell us how we need Him, and how He supplies our need. And for our parts we think that those who cast Him off for a moral system which contradicts the first principles of morals, and for a religion the slightest hint of which cannot be produced to us, are making a mistake which we earnestly hope will be forgiven to themselves because of their human liability to error, but of the disastrous results of which to the morals of mankind we feel as sure as we do of the ill effects of poison, however conscientiously administered.

We have never read a sentence more suggestive of the strength of the Christian position than the opinion pronounced by a very able literary organ, that Mr. Morison's work is the ablest attack on Christianity that has of late appeared. This is certainly so far true that, in assailing the moral power of our religion, he has chosen that point of attack where if infidels cannot make a breach, all their efforts elsewhere will be useless. But if this be the best assault on the moral power of Christianity which a very able, well-informed, and earnest unbeliever can deliver, we have little cause to fear that the claims of any rival moral power will ever displace it in the faith of mankind. Christians may be untrue to their own faith and fall from it into pure negation; but the service of man which will ever draw them from that of Christ is not true service, but that poor servitude to man's earthly nature which brings degradation alike to those who render and to those who receive it.

ART. II.—DEACONS AND SECULAR EMPLOYMENTS.

1. *The Extension of the Diaconate.* A Paper read at the Ripon Diocesan Conference, 1880. By the Rev. C. H. SALE. (Boroughbridge.)
2. *The Revival of a True Working Diaconate in the Church of England.* A Paper read at the St. Albans Diocesan Conference, 1881. By the Rev. JOHN W. IRVINE. (London.)
3. *Chronicle of Convocation of Canterbury for the Sessions of February 1884 and May 1887.* (London.)
4. *Extension of the Diaconate.* A Speech delivered in the Lower House of the Convocation of Canterbury, July 8, 1887. By the Rev. HENRY TWELLS, M.A. (London.)

THE 'revival' or 'restoration of the diaconate' has been for some years past an attractive watchword, and that on two intelligible grounds. It appeals to those who look back with reverence to antiquity, and desire, in the spirit of a great Anglican saint, the 'supply of what is lacking' in our conformity to primitive standards. It appeals, perhaps yet more forcibly, to those who are deeply sensible of the present need for extended spiritual ministrations, in order to meet the immense demand which is made upon the Church by the ever-increasing growth of the population. Then, when persons are told that we have 'practically lost an order of Christian ministry,' and that if we could regain it, and set its forces at work, we should substantially provide for this demand, and so far be vindicating our Church's claims to keep a hold both on the past and on the present, to stand in the old paths and yet to be equal to any new emergencies, it is both right and natural that attention should be secured. But then comes the question—How? Forthwith many earnest speakers answer—By allowing men of zeal, piety, and sufficient theological knowledge to become deacons without looking onward to the presbyterate, and at the same time to be independent of official stipend through other sources of income—to speak plainly, by retaining their secular occupations. As far as we know, it was Dr. Arnold who first started this idea; and accordingly he was quoted by Mr. Irvine in 1881 as having written 'forty years ago'—

'The first step towards the restoration of the Church seems to be the revival of the order of deacons, which might be effected without any other change in our present system than the repeal of all laws, canons, or customs, which prohibit a deacon from following a secular calling, which confer upon him any civil exemptions, or subject him to any civil disqualifications. The Ordination service, with the subscription to the Articles, would remain perfectly unaltered; and, as no deacon can hold any benefice, it is manifest that the proposed measure would in no way interfere with the rights and duties of the order of presbyters or priests. . . . But the benefit would be enormous if we could have a large body of deacons, the ordained ministers of the Church, visiting the sick, managing charitable subscriptions, and sharing with the presbyters in those strictly clerical duties which now, in many cases, are far too much for the health and powers of the strongest. Yet a still greater advantage would be found in the link between the clergy and the laity by the revival of an order appertaining in a manner to both.'

Mr. Irvine also refers to another expression of Dr. Arnold's mind on this point contained in a letter to the late Dean Stanley, dated February 27, 1839: 'It seems to me that a great point might be gained' (i.e. towards the restoration of the true idea of the Church) 'by urging the restoration of the order of deacons, which has been long, *quoad* the reality, dead.' And Dr. Arnold proceeded to say: 'In large towns many worthy men might be found to undertake the office out of pure love, if it were to be understood to be not necessarily a step to the presbyterial order, *nor at all incompatible with lay callings*.'¹

Mr. Irvine also appeals to the authority of Archdeacon Hale, who for several successive years had brought his 'careful study to bear upon the subject.'

We need not dwell on the question how far it would be desirable to allow men, in certain circumstances, to receive 'deacon's orders,' as Nicholas Ferrar did, without any intention of proceeding to the presbyterate, but at the same time with the purpose of devoting themselves, as he did, to clerical duty. There would, indeed, be a certain degree of unreality, so far as such persons were concerned, in the concluding words of the prayer in the Ordination Service, beginning, 'Almighty God, Giver of all good things;' for they, by supposition, would not expect nor ask to be 'called unto the higher ministries in the Church.' A correspondent of the *Guardian* endeavoured to meet this difficulty by a suggestion that it existed as much for deacons who looked forward to the presbyterate, but had no expectation of attaining to 'mitre

¹ Stanley's *Life of Arnold*, ii. 146.

and crosier.' Apparently it had not occurred to him that there was more than one form of ministration which belonged to priests and not to deacons. Of course, the clause in our collect is a rendering of the old words, 'dignisque successibus de inferiori gradu per gratiam tuam capere potiora mereantur.'¹ And it might be said that the received interpretation of 1 Tim. iii. 13 implies that the deacon ought to prepare himself for the presbyterate. This interpretation was apparently adopted by St. Chrysostom, and certainly by Hilary the Deacon, if he be the author of the commentaries once ascribed to St. Ambrose—'Poterunt digni fieri sacerdotio.' But it is open to the objection that, if St. Paul had meant, 'they earn their promotion,' he could have expressed himself more clearly; and, for ourselves, we should rather take *βαθμὸν καλὸν* to signify that 'excellent standing' or position in the eyes of the Church, which a good deacon would secure.² Doubtless many of the ancient deacons, like many Eastern deacons at present, made the diaconate a lifelong calling; and if any thought it best to do so, they might be left to their own judgment. Nor would we say anything against that form of 'extension of the diaconate' which would confine itself to the case of persons willing to serve the Church in that order, dispensing with stipend on the ground of independent income. If any such persons, whether country gentlemen or retired professional men, should give evidence of a genuine vocation, and of a clear purpose to live as ordained men and not as laics, we do not see that any objection could be raised against their admission to the diaconate, on the understanding that they did not, at least at present, intend to ask for promotion to the priesthood. The only plan with which we are now concerned is that which has become associated substantially with the name of Mr. Sydney Gedge; the proposal that men who have already committed themselves to some reputable secular calling should, by due repeal of Canon lxxv.,³ and of any statute embodying a similar restriction, be allowed to become deacons *and* to retain their temporal employment. We will take up the story of this 'Arnoldian' scheme, as it may be called, from the February of 1884, when a reference

¹ Compare the Coptic formula, 'Ut dignus sit alterius gradus majoris isto.' Morinus, *De Sac. Ordin.* ii. 444.

² This view seems to be taken in the Greek Ordinal. See Goar, *Eucholog.* p. 250.

³ This canon, however, only restrains clergy from 'base or servile labour.' See Walcott's note in his edition of the Canons, p. 108. Compare a form of protestation framed by Parker and other bishops, Cardwell, *Doc. Ann.* i. 331.

was made to it in the Upper House of the Convocation of Canterbury. That House was considering the report of a committee upon the appointment of 'lay readers,' which had been directed to take up also the question of 'an enlargement of the diaconate.' The report of the committee, presented by the Bishop of Bangor as chairman, contained these words:—

'Your Committee have carefully considered the various proposals for a permanent diaconate and for a subdiaconate; but they are not prepared to recommend the establishment of either of these.'

The Committee, as was evident from the Bishop of Bangor's speech in presenting the report, had definitely before them what we have called the Arnoldian proposal. They had held a conference with a committee of the York Convocation, a majority of whom were then in favour of allowing the persons in question, after being ordained deacons, 'to continue in the exercise of their secular profession' (*e.g.* as medical men or barristers), 'devoting to the service of God in His Church such time and energy as remained when the claims of that profession had been satisfied,' but without prejudice to their subsequently offering themselves for the priesthood, and therewith, as a matter of course, undertaking to devote themselves entirely to its duties. The debate turned chiefly on the subject of 'lay readers;' but on February 15 the Bishop of Winchester proposed the following resolution on the diaconate:

'This House is of opinion that, in view of the overwhelming need of increase in the number of the ministry, and the impossibility of providing sufficient endowments for the purpose, it is expedient to ordain to the office of deacon men *possessing other means of living*, who are willing to aid the clergy gratuitously, provided that they be tried and examined according to the preface to the Ordinal, and, in particular, be found to possess a competent knowledge of the Holy Scriptures, of the Book of Common Prayer, and of theology in general; provided also that they be in no case admitted to the priesthood unless they can pass all the examinations which are required in the case of other candidates for that office, and that they shall have devoted their whole time to spiritual labour for not less than four years, unless they are graduates, before they present themselves for these examinations.'

The Bishop added that—

'he should have liked to add another clause, but would not propose it, as he thought it would not meet with the same approbation as the resolution in the form in which he had moved it.'

That clause was—

'If it should prove that the supply of ministers is still insufficient,
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it will be expedient to obtain from Parliament an alteration of the present law so far as it affects the question :'

that is, a repeal of legal restrictions on the exercise of a secular calling by men in Holy Orders.

The resolution, it will be observed, confined itself to general language. It was passed unanimously. Had the 'clause' been inserted into it, the result would obviously have been different. The Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol¹ said that 'there could be no serious objection in the mind of any reasonable person to the resolution, if the clause was *not* added,' whereupon the Bishop of Winchester distinctly explained that 'he did *not* include that clause in the resolution.' If he had not frankly read the clause to the House, as representing what he personally would wish to see adopted, the resolution, as it stood, might have been interpreted as intending to favour the proposal now before us. It cannot now be so interpreted. What we see is, that the prelates of the province of Canterbury accepted the resolution as *not* committing them to any approval of the combination of a secular calling with 'deacons' orders.' It was accepted by the Convocation of York in the ensuing April.

To come to the proceedings of the last two years. At the London Diocesan Conference, March 3, 1886, it was unanimously agreed that the diaconate should be extended, and made more efficient, by 'the admission to it of such suitable and duly qualified persons as are *not* excluded by law ; but *that nothing should be done to reduce the order in the public mind to the level of a lay ministry.*' We beg our readers' attention to this resolution. It distinctly declined to recommend a change in the law, such as would allow deacons to follow secular employments ; and it uttered a pointed warning against whatever might tend to assimilate a deacon to a layman. At the Chichester Diocesan Conference in October 1886, a motion affirming the desirableness of an extension of the diaconate was carried, the mover including within the proposal 'the admission to that order of men of mature age, who had *perhaps* retired from the active practice of a secular profession—though he did not insist on this condition—and who would be content to remain permanently as deacons.' At the Lichfield Conference, Bishop Maclagan announced that 'very few persons had taken advantage of the Bishops' resolution of 1884 ;' adding that 'in his judgment it would be

¹ In regard to the proposal involved in the clause, the objection, said Bishop Ellicott, was this : 'You are really reversing the law and principle of the Church ; you are simply superadding the spiritual to the secular.'

better to retain the diaconate as the preliminary step to the office of priesthood, and to avail themselves in a much greater degree than at present of the help of the laity in such work as they might legally and fittingly share with the clergy.' A motion approving of the bishops' resolution of 1884 was carried.¹ Early in the parliamentary session of 1887, Mr. Sydney Gedge brought in a bill to the effect that 41 Geo. III. c. 63, and parts of 1 and 2 Vict. c. 106,² 'should not apply to any person to be thereafter ordained a deacon of the Church of England, being not less than thirty years of age at the time of his ordination, so long as he should continue to be a deacon.' This last significant clause was of course intended to provide for his 'taking the benefit' of the 'Clerical Disabilities Act;' but an earnest layman might have been expected to show more respect, in his choice of phraseology, to the Church's principle as to the 'indelibility' or spiritual permanence of Holy Orders. However, to pass this by, the effect of the bill, if it were passed into a statute, would be (1), as the Archbishop of Canterbury said in Convocation, to 'restore,' in regard to deacons of the class specified, the former 'doubt as to their eligibility to sit in the House of Commons;' and (2) to allow them to carry on 'trade or dealing for profit.' On February 8 the Convocation of Canterbury and the House of Laymen assembled. In the Lower House the Rev. Henry Twells, Hon. Canon of Peterborough, gave notice of a motion identical in terms with the episcopal resolution of 1884, up to the clause which contemplated the contingency of 'admission to the priesthood.' On the next day Mr. Sydney Gedge thought fit, without waiting for any expression of the mind of Convocation, to move in the House of Laymen:

'That, in the opinion of this House, it is desirable that all the legislative enactments which now prevent a deacon from engaging in secular occupations should be repealed, or greatly modified.'

In spite of some expressions of dissent, the motion was carried by thirty-four votes to eighteen; Mr. Gedge, we ought to add, having intimated that a corresponding alteration in the canons would be necessary before his scheme could be carried into effect.³ The proceedings of a new consultative body, believed to represent the 'lay mind,' and therewith some qualities which should correct the deficiencies of the clerical, will command respectful and attentive interest; but they

¹ See *Guardian* for 1886, pp. 378, 1646-1650.

² See Cripps on *The Law relating to Church and Clergy*, p. 65.

³ *Guardian* for 1887, p. 274.

cannot, in any case, be exempt from criticism, and symptoms of one-sidedness or precipitancy will not win the confidence of the Church at large. In this case we find that the London Diocesan Conference in March disposed of the scheme by means of 'the previous question';¹ that the Norwich Conference in April rejected it on a division by sixty-four clerical votes against thirty-six, and fifty-two lay votes against thirty-four;² that the Rochester Conference, in spite of the personal appeals of Mr. Gedge, who was so injudicious as to sneer at the diocese of Norwich as 'Bœotian,' adopted an amendment in favour of 'leaving the present spiritual *status* of deacons unaltered';³ that at the Winchester Conference in June, with reference to the bill of Mr. Sydney Gedge, the Parliamentary committee reported 'that the *status* of the diaconate, as a holy order, would be materially lowered if those ordained were allowed to engage in secular pursuits,' and a resolution against the bill was carried by forty-four votes to thirty-six.⁴ At the Ely Conference Mr. Gedge, who was present and spoke, obtained a victory; we shall presently notice one or two points taken up by his chief clerical supporter. At the Oxford Conference, on the motion of a highly respected layman, the bill was disapproved without a voice being raised in its favour.

But we must now return to the proceedings of the Canterbury Convocation. On February 11, the Upper House had appointed a committee 'to report on the Bill agreed to by the House of Laymen for empowering deacons, ordained after the age of thirty, to continue in their secular occupations.' This committee reported on May 11, and, after stating some historical reasons, to which we shall afterwards advert, professed their inability to

'recommend any relaxation of the existing laws, unless it could be shown that the necessity for doing so had passed into that state of spiritual urgency which has ever been regarded by the Catholic Church as justifying departure from existing disciplinary practice. That the need is great, not only in our populous towns, but in scattered ham-

¹ *Guardian* for 1887, p. 343.

² Dr. Jessopp bluntly 'asked the Conference to throw away the folly of such proposals.' *Guardian* for 1887, p. 616.

³ This amendment favoured 'the extension of the present system of licensed preachers.' *Guardian*, p. 654.

⁴ This was in the presence of the Bishop of Winchester. He had said that 'if the Church rejected the proposal recently made, namely, that people should be deacons, and yet work at some useful occupation, yet in one way or another he trusted that a true diaconate would be provided for the Church of England.' *Guardian*, p. 914.

lets . . . for an increase of ordained ministers, cannot be denied ; but the measure proposed . . . was so great a departure from the long-continued practice of the Catholic Church, that we do not judge it to be desirable at the present time to take any step in regard to facilitating an entry into the diaconate, beyond that which has been taken in the passing of the . . . resolution'

of February 15, 1884, with which the report had previously contrasted the bill.

The Bishop of London, declining to express any decided opinion on the abstract question, said that—

'the purpose of the report was to maintain what was done in 1884, and to stand there : he thought it would be the best course they could adopt, as the experiment then proposed had not been tried sufficiently to judge whether it was wise to take another step in the same direction.'

The Bishop of Winchester, after going at some length into the question of precedents, expressed, somewhat hesitatingly, his acquiescence in the report, and only asked the House 'not to decide against the possibility and expediency one day of making a permanent diaconate, some of whose members might be engaged in secular callings.' The Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol spoke from a different standpoint to that of the Bishop of Winchester. The Bishop of Ely agreed with the Bishop of Winchester ; but he afterwards, with characteristic frankness, acknowledged before his own Conference that he had become 'better informed.'¹ The Bishop of Oxford uttered warnings against premature action : 'Those who advocated the bill before Parliament without reserve had looked on one side, and forgotten that there was another side, full of perplexity.' The Bishop of Bath and Wells hoped that the report 'would not be a permanent block in the way of increasing the diaconate by employing persons engaged in trade.' The Primate closed the discussion with an exceedingly weighty speech, from which we shall further on quote largely, and as to which we would echo the *Guardian's* words that it 'expressed with eminent and satisfactory clearness a view of the question which was both statesmanlike and learned.'² His Grace concluded thus :—

'I desire to see the diaconate extended under the restrictions laid down in the resolutions passed by your Lordships' House in the

¹ *Guardian* for 1887, p. 950. The Bishop then said that 'the proposal was a new departure, and in no sense the ancient custom.'

² *Guardian*, p. 754.

year 1884; but, until we have much larger experience of what can be done by means of readers, and with a diaconate within the power of the law, I think we should be rash indeed to abrogate the old constitutional law of the Church of England.'

The adoption of the report was carried unanimously; and so the matter stands in regards to the Upper House. In the Lower House, on the last afternoon of the July group of sessions, Mr. Twells 'found himself in the possession of the opportunity for which he had long waited,' that of bringing forward a motion for the extension of the diaconate. Those who have not read the report of that day's proceedings will, perhaps, suppose that Mr. Twells's resolution, as then moved, embodied a definite advance on the general language of 1884. On the contrary, it was a simple reproduction of the resolution of the Upper House passed in that year. He admits in his preface that it was 'indefinite,' but pleads that he 'was anxious to adopt the phraseology of the bishops, instead of formulating any motion of his own.' But much had happened since February 1884; Mr. Gedge's bill had been introduced into Parliament before Mr. Twells had given notice of his motion, and had been widely and elaborately discussed before he took his 'opportunity' in July. It was, therefore, an anachronism to fall back on language which, if adopted by the Lower House, would provoke the rejoinder, 'But what of the proposal now in hand?' If Mr. Twells desired to echo the language of the bishops, one would think that he might have referred to their own adoption of their committee's report in the previous May sessions. As it is, he asked his brethren to say simply what the bishops had said three years before, and *not* to add what the bishops had said two months before. He himself, in his speech, outran the terms of his own resolution. He argued for some measure¹ of that very relaxation of existing law which the bishops—implicitly in 1884, and explicitly in 1887—had declined, at least for the present, to advocate. The debate was adjourned, it being impossible, as the mover frankly admits, that it should be satisfactorily carried on while the House was expecting its notice of prorogation to a comparatively distant date. It will, in the ordinary course, be resumed when Convocation meets in February.

Let us now endeavour to realize the actual working of the

¹ We say, 'for some measure,' inasmuch as Mr. Twells would not include the lower trades among the 'secular callings' to be thus privileged. He would insist on such an examination as the Ordinal requires, and, therefore, on a knowledge of Latin (*Speech*, p. 21).

proposal. If Mr. Gedge's bill were carried, and a corresponding change in canon law effected, we should see a number of professional men—not to say tradesmen—applying to bishops for admission to the diaconate, on the understanding that they were to maintain themselves, as before, by their secular business, and also, of course, that during the week-days they should only be called upon to devote their 'leisure time,' in Mr. Twells's phrase, to work properly clerical or ministerial. We pass over the necessary qualifications of sufficient religious knowledge and what the Church calls 'godly conversation ;' they are assumed on both sides, and no one, we believe, would be more earnest than Mr. Sydney Gedge in desiring to secure their reality. The barrister, solicitor, physician, surgeon, auctioneer, bookseller (for we do not indicate such trades or lines of business as might hardly seem compatible with the amount or kind of knowledge, *in rebus sacris*, which every deacon ought to bring with him to ordination), would, on approval, be ordained, and, probably, be licensed to preach, perhaps with some limitations. He would wear clerical attire on Sunday ; would officiate in church as his vicar's assistant ; he would baptize in the vicar's absence ; he would bury the dead ; he would catechize in church, and preach, at any rate in a mission room ; he would take part, above all, in the administration of the Holy Eucharist. On Monday he would resume his lay dress ; he would be in all men's eyes what he was before his ordination ; he would see his patients, advise his clients, or, it may be, attend to his customers ; this ordinary routine of honourable secular work would necessarily be continued until the Saturday evening, with the exception of such occasional interludes of spiritual ministration as would be consistent with the demands of the profession or trade by which he would have to live and make his money. We add no comments at present ; we simply state the facts as they would be. And before we take account of arguments on the merits of the case, let us, by way of clearing the ground, consider how far the scheme would be a 'restoration.' Is it, in fact, a return to antiquity ? does it rely on authentic precedents ? We will take three points :

I. The fact that St. Paul, at least sometimes, amid his apostolic labours, worked at the trade which he had learned, like all Jewish boys, in youth. Himself the 'bondsmen' of that adorable Lord whose sacred hands, before the beginning of His ministry, had held the tools of a carpenter at Nazareth, the Apostle, with the care of all the Churches on his mind, found time and strength, as Döllinger expresses it, 'to make

carpets and tent-covers.'¹ As Dean Howson has said, when the young Saul's father, 'in compliance with this good and useful custom,' had to choose for his son a craft which might 'fortify him against idleness or against adversity, none would occur to him more naturally than the profitable occupation of the making of tents, the material of which was hair-cloth, supplied by the goats of his native province,' and known for ages by the name of *cilicium*. St. Paul's hand had not lost its cunning; and so at Thessalonica, during his second missionary journey, he 'did not eat bread for nought at any man's hand, but worked hard night and day' (2 Thess. iii. 8). Soon afterwards, while he was at Corinth, St. Luke tells us that the Apostle lodged and worked with Aquila and Priscilla, 'because he was of the same craft' (Acts xviii. 3); and he himself repeatedly reminds the Corinthians that he had thus supplied his own needs (1 Cor. ix. 12 ff.). He followed the same practice while at Ephesus, during his third missionary journey, as we learn from 1 Cor. iv. 12 and Acts xx. 34. Now, what is the relevance of these facts to the proposal before us? Arch-deacon Emery, in the Ely Conference, boldly declared that Mr. Gedge's bill followed the Pauline precedent.² Others have used equivalent language. But let us observe (1) that any argument from St. Paul's conduct is just as good for the case of bishops or priests as for the case of deacons. (2) No one at Thessalonica, Corinth, or Ephesus, could possibly fail to see that the Apostle's manual labour was altogether subordinate to his apostolic duties; he himself intimates that he snatched time from the hours of sleep in order to earn money by this occupation. (3) Both at Thessalonica and at Corinth he did accept contributions from other churches; so that there, at any rate, his was not the case of a Christian minister supporting himself altogether by secular work (Phil. iv. 16, 2 Cor. xi. 9, from which latter passage, indeed, we should not have learned that he did anything in this way for his maintenance). Further, (4) he had, as he himself tells us, two special motives for this self-denying exertion. At Thessalonica he wished, by a striking 'example,' to correct the tendency of the local Christians to idleness (2 Thess. iii. 9-12). At Corinth and at Ephesus he deemed it expedient to silence Judaizing misrepresentations, which imputed sordid motives to the man who, above all others, was sensitive on the point of integrity.³ The adversaries who dogged his footsteps, and left no stone un-

¹ Döllinger, *First Age of the Church*, E. Tr. p. 375.

² *Guardian* for 1887, p. 949.

³ See Howson's *Character of St. Paul*, p. 168.

turned to destroy an influence which they dreaded as revolutionary, had dared to insinuate that he was after all, in a worldly sense, a gainer by his Gentilizing propaganda. Hence his resolution to 'cut off' occasion from those who desired an occasion,' and 'to cause no hindrance to the Gospel,' such as might have ensued from any suspicion of self-interest; hence the pathetic protestation at Miletus, 'I coveted no man's silver, nor gold, nor apparel. Ye yourselves know that these hands ministered unto my necessities, and to them that were with me.' Lastly, (5) his words on this subject to the Thessalonians and Corinthians contain an express reservation of that ministerial right to a maintenance, which, for certain reasons, he chose 'not to urge to the full.' 'Not that we have not a right (*ἐξουσίαν*), but that we might make ourselves an example to you.' And yet more emphatically in the long context, 1 Cor. ix. 4-18, the Apostle urges this ministerial right on the threefold ground of natural reason, of a Mosaic precept spiritually interpreted, and, above all, of the express command of Christ. Referring, doubtless, to the precept, 'Provide neither gold nor silver nor brass in your purses . . . for the labourer is worthy of his hire,' he lays it down positively and dogmatically, that the Lord Himself had 'ordained that those who preached the Gospel should live of the Gospel.'

Now, the episcopal resolution reproduced by Mr. Twells had recognised 'the impossibility of providing sufficient endowments' for the 'required' increase in the number of the ministry; and Mr. Gedge, in the House of Laymen, insisted on this *crux*.¹ It was not merely a question of finding the men; it was, still more urgently, a question of finding the money. Therefore, Mr. Gedge argued, 'either there must be increased means of paying the men, or they must be men who would work for no pay, or for very little remuneration indeed.' Here is the point: *if* more men could be found, there would not be the 'means' of maintaining them as clergy; that is, the laity would not supply such means. Now, we ask, does the divine 'ordinance,' referred to by St. Paul, bind Christian people in our age and country, or does it not? Has it nothing to say to the richest laity of any Church on earth, who already, by virtue of long-standing endowments, enjoy a large amount of ministerial service without any contribution of their own? We can faintly imagine what St. Paul would have said, if he could have foreseen that his own high-minded self-abnegation would be

¹ *Guardian*, p. 274.

quoted in order to warrant such a laity in allowing a new class of ordained ministers to depend for support on this or that 'secular calling.' The difficulty of 'finding the right men' is another matter; but we have surely the fullest scriptural authority for contending that it ought to be *the* difficulty in the case.

II. And this naturally leads us to consider the position held by deacons, as such, in the early Christian Church, which had inherited the teaching of St. Paul. We may begin by hearing the testimony of St. Ignatius. How did the martyr bishop of Antioch, who had probably conversed with more than one of the Twelve, regard the office of deacons? As one might who had pondered the combination of deacons with ἐπίσκοποι, that is, presbyters, in the address of the Epistle to the Philippians, and in the first Epistle to Timothy. The deacons are marked off, with the bishops and presbyters, from the general body of the faithful (*Magn.* 13, *Trall.* 7, *Philad.* 4, &c.). They have been entrusted with διακονίαν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, which the Bishop of Durham takes to mean 'a service under Jesus Christ' (on *Magn.* 6); and the phrase also reminds us of terms in which St. Paul speaks of himself as a διάκονος of God or of Christ, and even of Christ as διάκονος of the circumcision. Again, the deacons are said to have been 'according to the mind of Jesus Christ' (*Philad.* 1). The Smyrnæans are bidden to 'pay respect to the deacons as to God's commandment.' In a very abrupt passage Ignatius enjoins the Trallians to 'respect the deacons as Jesus Christ, even as they respect in the bishop a type of "the Father;"' a 'startling comparison,' says Bishop Lightfoot,¹ 'which rests on the assumption that the relations of the deacon to the bishop are analogous to those of Christ to the Father.' Two passages are significant as to their function; one implies that the Philadelphian successors, so to speak, of Stephen and Philip had something to do with the public teaching. 'I cried out while I was with you . . . Give ye heed to the bishop, and the presbytery, and deacons.' Yet more emphatically in *Trall.* 2, the more spiritual side of their ministry is exhibited; they are 'deacons of the mysteries of Jesus Christ—not deacons of meats and drinks, but servants' (or 'under-officers') of God's Church.' On which Bishop Lightfoot comments—

'The diaconate was originally instituted διακονεῖν τραπεζαῖς (Acts vi. 2); and these less spiritual duties of the office, such as the

¹ *SS. Ignatius and Polycarp*, i. 157, on *Trall.* 3.

distribution of the alms, the arrangement of the Agape, and the like, *tended to engross the interests of the deacon*: he needed, therefore, to be reminded that the diaconate had a higher aspect also.¹

They could hardly then be 'engrossed' by their eleemosynary ministrations, if they were mainly occupied, in the sense required by Mr. Gedge's proposals, with the routine of secular work. Mr. Twells, indeed, astonishes us by contending that 'there could scarcely be a more secular or more unecclesiastical occupation than the doling out of rations, or what represented rations, to all the members of the infant community.' Not strictly to 'all,' but to the poor, who, as we know, formed the main body of the Church; but, whether they were more or fewer in any church, no one who reads Rom. xv. 25-27, or 2 Cor. viii. and ix., will compare the collecting or administering of charitable funds, in point of 'secularity,' with the ordinary tasks of a modern man of business. Those who 'served tables' at Jerusalem were thereby discharging an ecclesiastical trust, not carrying on a trade or profession for their own maintenance. And our contention is, that taking these Ignatian passages together, and assuming that they date from about ten years after the death of the last Apostle, we cannot reasonably suppose the officials then described to have been deacons after Mr. Gedge's pattern. They were evidently devoted to the exclusive service of Christ in His Church. They were, in a most practical sense, *addicti ecclesiæ et episcopo*. In that age, as Bingham says,¹ they 'performed all such offices as were' afterwards entrusted to the inferior orders, 'such as the offices of readers, subdeacons, exorcists or catechists, doorkeepers, and the like'—of which, apparently, the reader's office was the first instituted, since Tertullian speaks of it as of an office long established.² Bingham is here reiterating what is affirmed by St. Thomas Aquinas: 'In primitivâ ecclesiâ, propter paucitatem ministrorum, omnia inferiora ministeria diaconibus committebantur,' so that the powers required for them were 'implicite in unâ diaconi potestate.'³ But after these inferior orders were created, the deacons still had their hands full enough. Besides their functions in church,⁴ they had the general administration or stewardship of Church property, and of the funds belonging to the widows and orphans.⁵

¹ Bingham, b. ii. c. 20, s. 15 (vol. i. p. 301).

² *De Præscript. Hæc.* 41.

³ *Supplem.* q. 37, a. 2. 2.

⁴ For these compare the Greek rite, in Hammond's *Liturgies Eastern and Western*. Isidore of Seville even says that 'sine ipsis sacerdos nomen habet, officium non habet.' *De Eccl. Offic.* ii. 8.

⁵ See *Dict. of Christ. Antiq.* i. 528.

They were the Church's recognised almoners, as we know from the beautiful story of St. Laurence. In times of persecution, 'it was their duty to minister to the confessors in their prisons, and to bury the bodies of the martyrs.' They were permitted, when no presbyter was accessible, to 'receive confession, and bestow the parting blessing,' in the case of certain penitents at the approach of death. They were in close relation to the bishop, as St. Cyprian says that they were 'appointed to attend on the episcopal office of the Apostles, and on the Church' (*Ep.* 3). They were to be aides-de-camp and messengers of the bishops. Laurence thus asked Sixtus, 'When wert thou wont to offer the Sacrifice without thy minister?' that is, 'without my attendance;' and the readers of the life of St. Athanasius will remember how he employed an able and energetic deacon to hunt out Arsenius in his hiding-place.¹ The bishop had thus a standing right over their time and over their best energies; they were 'channels of communication' between him and his people, to inform him of 'scandals,' and to 'relieve him of the lighter cases brought' to him 'for adjudication.' Hence the familiar description of the deacon as 'the bishop's eye,' or 'ear,' or 'mouth.' Their numbers differed in various places. Thus, when Arius was originally condemned, the clergy who by their signatures expressed their assent to their archbishop's judgment were seventeen priests and twenty-four deacons of Alexandria, and nineteen priests and twenty deacons of the Mareotis. There was also a large number of deacons at Constantinople.² In some churches the original number of seven was strictly adhered to; we find this actually prescribed by the Council of Neocæsarea in 314; and the valuable clerical statistics preserved in Euseb. vi. 43 inform us that at Rome, in the middle of the third century, there were seven deacons and seven subdeacons, as against forty-six presbyters and forty-two acolyths. The same rule was retained at Rome in the fourth and in the fifth century.³ This proportion encouraged the Roman deacons to assume a loftiness of bearing which drew from Jerome a characteristic outburst of resentment.⁴ But we leave our readers to judge

¹ St. Athan. *Apol. c. Arian.* 65, 67.

² Bingham, ii. 20. 19. But there were six chief deacons, beside the archdeacon, at St. Sophia; Goar, *Eucholog.* p. 283.

³ Hilary the Deacon (or 'Ambrosiaster') on 1 Tim. iii. 13 ('Nunc autem septem esse diaconos oportet'): Soz. vii. 19.

⁴ *Epist.* 146. He calls the deacon here 'mensarum et viduarum minister.' Further on, 'Dices, Quomodo Romæ ad testimonium diaconi presbyter ordinatur? Quid mihi profers unius urbis consuetudinem? quid

whether such deacons as have been thus briefly described would recognize their own representatives in deacons who would but give to their Church the odds and ends of their weekday time.

Archdeacon Emery, at the Ely Conference last summer, told his hearers that 'when he was at Cambridge, he was constantly having impressed on him by those in authority that the great wisdom of the Church of England was to follow the precedents of the first three centuries. It was *beyond all question* that to adopt the principle of the Bill' (Mr. Sydney Gedge's) 'would be following the precedent of the first three centuries.' This affirmation was cheered, presumably by those who had not studied the extant evidence as to the light in which the deacons of those centuries were regarded, or the nature of the work which they had to perform. We will presently produce a little more positive evidence from these same centuries; at present we will observe that the sacredness of the diaconate was so fully recognised, that Optatus, in the fourth century, spoke of deacons as 'in tertio sacerdotio constitutos,'¹ using 'sacerdotium' for a 'holy order.' This, however, was exceptional language; and Præsidius, whom Jerome sent to Africa as a deacon, had become at least a 'presbyter' when Augustine wrote to him as 'consacerdoti.'² Usually the deacons were compared to the Levites; and at Carthage their office was called a 'ministerium' as distinct from 'sacerdotium.'³ But we may here not inconveniently notice a statement by Dr. Arnold,⁴ which has lately been reproduced, to the effect that 'according to the canon law, the deacon is half a layman, and could return at any time to a lay condition altogether.' Dr. Arnold was not likely to have made a study of such matters; and he was doubtless unaware of a passage in the Roman Pontifical, in which the candidates for the *subdiaconate*, which, as we all know, is unwarrantably included by Rome among the *sacred* orders, receive the following admonition:—

'Hactenus . . . liberi estis, licetque vobis pro arbitrio ad sæcularia vota transire: quod si hunc ordinem susceperitis, amplius non licebit a proposito resiliere, sed Deo, cui servire regnare est, perpetuo famulari . . . atque in ecclesiæ ministerio semper esse mancipatos. Proinde, dum tempus est, cogitate,' &c.

paucitatem, de quâ ortum est supercilium, in leges ecclesiæ vindicas?' He had been disgusted at seeing a deacon, at a private party, take precedence of a presbyter. He winds up by comparing them to the Levites. Compare Morinus, *De Sac. Ordin.* iii. 141.

¹ Optatus, l. i. p. 15, ed. 1679.

² See Jerome, *Ep.* 103; Aug. *Ep.* 74.

³ Mansi, *Concil.* iii. 951.

⁴ *Life of Arnold*, ii. 147.

We need not dwell on the language in which the ordaining bishop is directed by the Pontifical to address the 'diaconandi.' He bids them consider earnestly 'ad quantum gradum ecclesie ascenditis;' while at the same time the whole rite is so constructed as to set forth the far superior dignity of the priesthood. Of course the Pope is held to have a dispensing power which could cancel the obligations, without effacing the 'character,' of a deacon, or, for that matter, of a priest. Reginald Pole, while only a deacon, hoped to obtain release from his vows in order to espouse Queen Mary;¹ and other cardinals did actually receive such dispensation, as, for instance, Alexander VI. solemnly freed that remarkable deacon, Cæsar Borgia, from all the bonds of ecclesiastical life.² But the point is that the bonds would remain, for any deacon in the Roman Church, until relaxed by papal dispensation; he could not unloose them for himself at will.³

III. But now, to come close to the point, let us see whether certain ardent speakers have been justified in their deduction from certain facts and certain documents relating to secular work as done, or allowed to be done, by ecclesiastics in the fourth and fifth centuries. We will take first the oft-quoted canons, so called, of 'the Fourth Council of Carthage.' Much has been made of some canons in this long series.⁴ They have been claimed as proving that the African Church formally allowed the clergy to support themselves by manual labour or trade.⁵ But what do these canons say? They contain numerous directions as to the conduct of bishops, and one as to that of presbyters. Then come five canons, 37-41, relating to deacons. The last of them is:—

'Ut diaconus tempore oblationis tantum, vel lectionis, albâ utatur.'

Then comes canon 42:—

'Clericum, inter tentationes officio suo incubantem, gradibus sublimandum.'

Then, after an inserted provision, to the effect that a layman who has suffered for the Catholic cause shall be highly honoured by priests, and receive supplies of food through a deacon, comes a long string of canons relating to the 'clerici.' 'A cleric is not to wear long hair or a beard. A cleric is to indicate his profession by his dress and demeanour. A cleric is not to walk in the streets, except when absolutely obliged

¹ Hook, *Lives of Archbishops of Canterbury*, viii. 209.

² Creighton, *Hist. of the Papacy*, iii. 266.

³ We have high Roman Catholic authority for this statement.

⁴ Mansi, *Concil.* iii. 955.

⁵ *E.g.* by Mr. Sale, p. 5.

by his duty. A cleric is not to walk about the market-places, except for the purpose of buying something. A cleric who is absent from the vigils, except in case of bodily infirmity, is to be mulcted of his stipend. A cleric who, amid temptations, avoids his duty, or discharges it negligently, is to be removed from office.' Then come canons 51, 52, 53:—

'Clericus, quantumlibet verbo Dei eruditus, artificio victum quærat.'

'Clericus victum et vestimentum sibi artificiolo vel agriculturâ, absque officii sui detrimento, parat.'

'Omnes clerici qui ad operandum validiores sunt, et artificiola et litteras discant.'

The term 'clerici' would naturally be used for members of all the orders below the episcopate, from the presbyterate downwards; but as here the 'clerici' are named after and apart from deacons, Bingham takes them to be the 'inferior clergy' or members of the minor orders,¹ the subdeacons, acolyths, readers, &c., just as Hilary the Deacon speaks first of 'deacons,' then of 'clerici,'² and the Council of Laodicea requires 'the ministers and all the clerics' to pay respect to the deacons.³ But this seems too restrictive for the context. These canons, however, do not sanction the arrangement now proposed. For, in the words of the Archbishop of Canterbury—

'Labour, if poverty necessitates it—that is what is permitted by the Fourth Council of Carthage. If a clergyman was without food or raiment, then he was permitted to work for them. . . . Food and raiment . . . a meagre result of an "artificium" . . . or of "litteræ;" but it is all that is allowed. . . . That is what the canons . . . say.'

His Grace then alludes to a law of Gratian and Valentinian II. as enacting that 'clerici' might employ 'the miserable sum of ten or fifteen *solidi*' in a business.⁴ This law is one of a series on the 'lustral tax,' otherwise called 'chrysargyrum,' to which all tradesmen were liable. Mr. P. V. Smith, in a letter to the *Record* of February 18, 1887, said that 'when the Roman empire became Christian, the law encouraged the clergy to earn their own living by exempting them from the "chrysargyrum."' As to this, Bingham understands the 'clerici' thus exempted to be 'the inferior orders,' thus 'allowed

¹ Bingham, vi. 4. 13; comp. i. 5. 8. The Third Council of Carthage uses 'clerici' in both senses—generally in c. 11, &c.; restrictively in c. 15: 'Placuit ut episcopi et presbyteri et diaconi vel clerici non sint conductores.'

² Ambrosiaster, *In Eph.* iv. 11.

³ By 'ministers' (ὑπηρέτων) we must understand, as Hefele says, the subdeacons.

⁴ See *Cod. Theod.* xiii. 1. 11, A.D. 379; Bingham, v. 3. 6.

to traffic, to support themselves, without paying any tribute of this nature, when the Church's revenues were scanty, and not sufficient to give all the clergy a decent maintenance.' Certainly the first law as to this commerce-tax excepts 'only those "clerici" who are called "copiatæ,"' a very inferior class of ecclesiastical functionaries, appointed by Constantine to manage funerals.¹ A law of somewhat later date appears to distinguish the 'copiatæ' from the 'clerici,'² while exempting both from the (lustral) 'contribution' on condition of their aiming at nothing by trade more than 'tenuem victum vestitumque.' The law goes on to require this tax from the rest who were reckoned among 'negotiatores' at its last exaction, and afterwards 'clericorum se coetibus adgregarunt'—a phrase which implies that they had not risen beyond the lower grades of the clerical body. Profits beyond mere maintenance were to be given to the poor.³ But to return to the canons of Carthage; the Archbishop proceeds to point out that—

'in the canon itself it is distinctly provided that even this kind of trading by clerks must not be allowed to interfere with the discharge of their office—*absque officii sui . . . detrimento*. Now surely all this is the very contrary of what is now proposed. Such enactments cannot be produced to support the idea that deacons may occupy themselves in secular professions. . . . It is one thing to labour as a clergyman, and to earn sufficient by some occupation to get food and raiment, and another thing for a trader or professional man to take up diaconal work as a side pursuit. They are entirely different,' &c.

Similarly the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol, after alluding to that part of the Bishop of Winchester's speech in which stress has been laid on the African Church canons, remarked somewhat drily that his 'right reverend brother, with his consistent fairness, had, in the last part of his speech, completely answered himself in regard to the earlier. He had justly pointed out that the case of the "clerici," said to be permitted to engage, for their bare livelihood, in so-called secular occupations, was very different from that of deacons engaged in trades, under the circumstances in which trades are now carried on, and with the engrossing competitions with which we are now all perfectly familiar.'

¹ *Cod. Theod.* xiii. 1. 1, A.D. 357.

² *Cod. Theod.* xvi. 2. 15: 'Clerici vero, vel hi quos Copiatas recens usus instituit nuncupari.'

³ Compare *Cod. Theod.* xvi. 2. 8: 'Si qui de vobis *alimonie* causâ negotiationem exercere volunt.' *Ib.* xvi. 2. 10, 'Cum certum sit quaestus, quos ex tabernaculis [= tabernis] atque ergasteriis colligunt, pauperibus profuturos.' *Ib.* xvi. 2. 14, that such profits should be bestowed 'in usum pauperum.'

We might illustrate the African regulations by a passage in one of the letters of St. Basil, A.D. 375.¹ He speaks of his clergy (*ἱερατεῖον*, a term which would take in all the orders) as 'practising sedentary arts in order to obtain daily bread,' clearly because of the impoverished condition of the Church of Cappadocian Cæsarea.

And if we want to see how the Church of the early ages felt, and what restrictions she laid upon her ministers as safeguards against a secularizing tendency, let us look at the seventh 'Apostolic' canon, which is, at least in substance, very ancient :

'Let not a bishop, presbyter, or deacon take upon himself secular cares (*κοσμικὰς φροντίδας*).'²

Following the Archbishop, we 'do not press at all' the eighty-first and eighty-third canons of this series, because they are of later date. 'But then,' as he says,

'we have most marked testimony in Cyprian's first epistle, where, alluding to a much older Council . . . he gives one instance of the principle which he says is acknowledged : "Quæ nunc ratio et forma in clero tenetur, ut qui in ecclesia Domini ordinatione clerica promoventur, in nullo ab administratione divina avocentur, ne molestiis et negotiis sæcularibus adligentur."³ . . . Ad terrena et sæculares actus vacare non possunt.' They cannot attend to their religious work and to worldly cares too.'

We need not quote St. Cyprian's well-known censure of the secularity produced by the 'Long Peace,' as having even induced 'many bishops to disregard their office as stewards of God, and to become *procuratores rerum sæcularium*.'⁴ This evidence is well within that period of the first three centuries to which, as we have seen, Archdeacon Emery appealed, as warranting the exercise of secular professions by deacons, though not by priests. In the fourth century there was still further need to guard the clergy against the temptation of worldliness; and so the Council of Elvira forbade bishops, presbyters, or deacons to leave their posts in order to pursue a secular business, and only permitted them to employ agents in such a matter when it was a question of providing them-

¹ Basil, *Ep.* 198.

² On this canon see Bingham, vi. 4. 9; xvii. 5. 11.

³ Cypr. *Ep.* 1. He adds, 'but that by the respectful contributions of the brethren they only receive, as it were, tithes of the fruits of the earth,' &c. This language is such as to cover the case of deacons, although it was called forth by the nomination of a priest as executor. Nor does his principle depend on its relation to such a case.

⁴ Cypr. *De Lapsis*, p. 6.

selves with food ('sane ad victum sibi conquiendum.')

¹ And the Council of Hippo, in 393, provided, by its fifteenth canon, that bishops, presbyters, and deacons should not be 'conductores [agents] aut procuratores privatorum, neque ullo negotio tali victum quaerant, quo eos peregrinari, *vel ab ecclesiasticis officiis avocari necesse sit.*'² Can words make it plainer that deacons, as well as presbyters and bishops, are to give their main time to the Church's work? Observe, too, that this canon does not simply debar them from such secular work as was in itself discreditable or demoralizing; it rests its order on their primary obligation to sacred service—an obligation which, for the deacons of the new scheme, would become secondary. We will quote but one canon more, the third of Chalcedon; it enacts that 'no bishop, nor cleric' (here, of course, the term is used for all ecclesiastics below the episcopate), 'nor monk, shall engage in the management of temporal affairs, unless he be either absolutely required by the law to undertake the guardianship of minors, or be permitted by the bishop of the diocese to manage ecclesiastical business' (i.e. of a temporal kind), 'or the affairs of orphans not otherwise provided for, and of such persons as specially need the aid of the Church, because of the fear of the Lord.' This canon naturally introduces us to the exceptional instances which have been adduced as permitting clergymen to follow a secular calling.

Referring, clearly, to the ancient clergy in general, Bingham says that it was deemed 'lawful to spend their *leisure* hours upon any manual trade or calling, when it was to answer some good end of charity thereby; as that they might not be over-burdensome to the Church, or might have some superfluities to bestow upon the . . . needy, or even that they might set the laity a provoking example' (cf. Heb. x. 24, A.V.) 'of industry and diligence in their callings.'³ He adds that, after St. Paul's example, 'many eminent bishops of the ancient Church were not ashamed to employ their *spare* hours in some honest labour.' Thus when Spyridon, the canonized Cypriot bishop, retained his former occupation as a shepherd, he did so, says Socrates, 'out of deep humility';⁴ and Sozomen adds that 'of the fruits which accrued to him he gave

¹ Mansi, *Concil.* ii. 9.

² Mansi, iii. 921. Compare Jerome, *Ep.* 52, 5, to Nepotian: 'Negotiatorem clericum quasi quamdam pestem fuge.' See, too, the pseudo-Augustinian *In Quæst. Vet. et Novi Testamenti* (in appendix to Aug. *Op.* tom. iii.), c. 127, that a man is not allowed 'negotiarî' after he becomes an ecclesiastic.

³ Bingham, vi. 4. 13 (vol. ii. p. 199).

⁴ Soc. i. 12.

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away part to the poor, and lent the rest, without interest, to those who wished to borrow.'¹ While Zeno, bishop of Maiuma, kept up till his death, at a very advanced age, his old practice of weaving linen, he lived by part of the profits, and spent the rest in charity; and this handicraft never interfered with his daily attendance at 'the morning and evening hymns, or any other divine service.'² Epiphanius knew, it seems, of a great many similar cases; in all of them the object was partly to obtain funds for charitable purposes: in all of them the temporal industry was of a kind compatible with 'continuous attendance on ecclesiastical duties:' in all of them the labour thus undergone was purely voluntary; the 'priests' who thus 'imitated St. Paul' had an indefeasible right to be maintained (καὶ κατὰ δικαιοσύνην σιτουμένοιον).³ But how manifest is the true relation which such condescension, so to call it, bore to what Bingham calls the 'proper business' of the clergy! Nothing was for a moment to come between one who so acted and the perpetual obligations of his ministry. His life on the weekdays would be in no danger of seeming a laic life, *plus* some occasional calls to clerical duty. 'These men,' said the Bishop of Bangor in Convocation in 1884, 'were following their spiritual calling first and foremost. . . . No one of their contemporaries who witnessed their lives, or of those that read the record of them now, could mistake this. While one was tending sheep, and another weaving linen, they did not degrade the higher, but raised and sanctified the humbler office.'⁴ It was so, doubtless, with the 'excellent presbyter Fronto,' who, in a time of persecution and therefore of impoverishment, 'practised agriculture,' and arrived with a load of good wine upon his ass, near the spot where the corpse of the martyred innkeeper, Theodotus, was kept under strict guard.⁵ It may well have been so with many a clergyman who, for special reasons, acted as a local magistrate,⁶ or with St. Patrick's father, the deacon Calpurnius, who was a 'decurio,' perhaps from inability to find a substitute who could represent him⁷ in one of those 'curiæ,' which Mr. Hodgkin has called 'gaols' of the middle-class subjects of the decadent empire.⁸ It may have been the case,

¹ Soz. i. 11.² *Ibid.* vii. 28.³ Epiph. *Har.* 80. 6. Cp. *Apost. Const.* ii. 63.⁴ Compare an account, in *The Net* for November 1887, of Bishop McKenzie teaching Zulu boys to stuff saddles, to saw, and to print—as Wilfrid taught the South Saxons to fish, &c.⁵ Ruinart, *Act. Mart. Sinc.* p. 384.⁶ See Stokes's *Ireland and the Celtic Church*, p. 43.⁷ See Bingham, v. 3. 16. ⁸ Hodgkin, *Italy and her Invaders*, ii. 604.

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long afterwards, with many a mediæval chancellor-prelate or prince-bishop, who succeeded in resisting the temptation to let the secular character absorb the sacred, a temptation bitterly deplored by Colet,¹ and fully recognized by Laud, who guarded his defence of the employment of prelates in State offices by the proviso (borrowed from 2 Tim. ii. 4) that he must not be 'entangled' therein.² It may also have been the case with some clergymen dispossessed for conscience sake, or members of a poor unendowed communion, ashamed to live on charity, and fain to support themselves by some business, as was the case with Cartwright, one of the last Nonjuring bishops, who acted as a surgeon at Shrewsbury.³ We will mention one more instance. When the good peasant-folk of Seathwaite knew that Robert Walker was wont, while teaching in the day-school, to eke out his wretched stipend by spinning wool, 'in which trade he was a great proficient,' or was ready to aid them in the shearing of their flocks, did they ever forget for a moment that he was essentially their pastor, and that this character adhered to him through every hour of his truly 'wonderful' life?⁴

But enough—the reader will perhaps say, too much already—of these 'precedents.' They furnish, we think, another warning as to the seductive untrustworthiness of those hasty comparisons and false analogies which so often misled the late Dean Stanley, and which still crop up exuberantly in the pleadings of imaginative Broad Churchmen. We could not state the case more tersely than in the words of Archdeacon Bathurst, at the Ely Conference already referred to: 'In every precedent he had found *that the trade was supplementary to the orders, and not the orders supplementary to the trade.*' The same antithesis is put, with less of condensation, in the report of the Committee of Bishops. Referring to ancient precedents, it says:

'It is evident that a broad distinction must be drawn between allowing or encouraging clergymen to assist in maintaining themselves by

¹ In his Convocation sermon at St. Paul's, Feb. 6, 1512; see Lupton's *Life of Dean Colet*, p. 293 ff.

² Laud, *Works*, vi. 181. Robertson, the translator of Moehler's *Symbolism*, tells a story (Introd. p. lx), which was a favourite with the late Bishop Forbes, that an Archbishop-Elector of Mentz in the last century, passing through the streets, and seeing a poor man in a dying condition, considerably ordered his servants to 'fetch a priest.' The Council of Trent recognized cases of episcopal 'absence' from diocesan duty *propter aliquod munus et reipublicæ officium episcopatibus adjunctum* (Sess. 23. de Ref. 1).

³ Lathbury, *Hist. of Nonjurors*, p. 413.

⁴ See Wordsworth's notes to *Sonnets on the Duddon*.

secular labours, as St. Paul did, and admitting to the sacred ministry men *already devoted to secular occupations*, and purposing to continue in their callings.'

So the Bishop of Bangor in 1884:

'The persons now proposed to be admitted to the diaconate are to be, in the first place, doctors or lawyers, or it may be country gentlemen, and only in a subordinate degree deacons in the Church of God.'

And so the Primate himself, with all the authority of his great place and high attainments:

'What is really meant is a *mercantile or professional diaconate*. . . . The case set up entirely breaks down so far as the early Church is concerned. From the beginning, the earliest evidence we have shows that the bishops, priests, and deacons were to be maintained in other ways than by trading, the exception being in cases of extreme poverty, and in cases of self-devotion (asceticism), in which latter remunerative labour was permitted for the purpose of giving alms to the poor. That which is sought, then, to be established by this bill is an unknown order of clergy—unknown to our own Church, unknown to the primitive Church . . . an order which is both lay and clerical, is neither one nor the other.'

An expressive Greek term will help us in substituting a real contrast for an unreal similarity. The 'by-work' or *πάρεργον*, as distinct from the *ἐργον*, of a bishop like Zeno, or of a Carthaginian 'cleric,' was his secular industry. The *πάρεργον* of a deacon under the new scheme would be his clerical ministration. It is but his 'leisure' which can be consecrated to the Church's service; and we can all see how the urgent stress of modern professional or industrial life will, in many cases, reduce that 'leisure' to very narrow dimensions indeed. What a clashing of 'calls' would he experience!

Lest we should seem to overlook a point, we will add that the Roman Church-law permits incumbents of very poor benefices to practise agriculture or handicraft, yet so as not to interfere with sacred duties. The metrical summary of the 91st Distinction in the *Decretum* is, 'Arte parabis opes, nisi sint salis ecclesiæ res.'¹ And a received book of Roman moral theology allows the clergy to sell the proceeds of an industry, such as cloth, paintings, &c., and even, in cases of extreme emergency, to perform surgical operations, forbidding them, at the same time, to practise such 'arts' as are 'deemed inconsistent with the dignity of the clerical state.'² But here,

¹ See, too, the prose summary of this Distinction.

² Scavini, *Theologia Moralis*, i. 342 ff.

again, it is assumed throughout, that the clerical character is primary and dominant, and the secular work a *παράσπργον*.

'But,' it will be said, 'supposing the plea of a revival or restoration to be untenable, are there no innovations which are healthful, or even necessary? Must the living Church, in presence of her own huge tasks, be fettered by archaism, and forbidden to strike out new paths towards objects not set before a bygone generation? Is there any principle, permanent in its claim upon our reverence, which would be compromised by conferring the diaconate on men whose main work must lie in a secular calling?'

Yes, we reply, there is; it is the doctrine, so to speak, of Holy Orders.

It is a fact of some significance that the letter of Dr. Arnold to 'A. P. Stanley, Esq.,' in which he adumbrates the plan which Mr. Gedge has been urging upon the Church, contains the following words:—

'You would get an immense gain . . . by softening down that pestilent distinction between clergy and laity, which is so closely linked with the priestcraft system. . . . I have long thought that some plan of this sort might be the small end of the wedge, by which Antichrist might hereafter be burst asunder, like the dragon of Bel's temple.'

We suppose it is not necessary to explain what Dr. Arnold here meant by 'Antichrist.' It was that conception of the Christian ministry which regards it as an organ 'divinely appointed and commissioned for the exercise of spiritual power and the conveyance of spiritual gifts.'¹ Why he attacked this idea, will be best seen by mentally contrasting it with his favourite theory of a 'Church-State.'² But many reject it who do not hold that theory; and without surmising beyond public evidence, we may at least say that if we, for our own part, disowned this claim on behalf of the ministry, and regarded the 'distinction between clergy and laity' as fundamentally technical and conventional, as a human arrangement for the Church's religious convenience, we should do all in our power to forward the new scheme of 'a commercial and professional diaconate.' Among its supporters, we well know, there are those who think much more highly of ordination; and Canon Twells is especially emphatic in urging that the new recruits for the Church's army should be duly ordained men. Some, probably, would say that the plan before

¹ Gore, *The Church and the Ministry*, p. 27.

² Mozley, *Essays*, ii. 33.

us accentuates the sacerdotal dignity of the presbyter, as distinct from the 'inferior office' of the deacon. We do not underestimate the difference between the Order which does, and the Order which does not, involve the power to celebrate, bless, absolve, and take charge of a flock. We do not forget that the exhortation to lay aside 'all worldly cares and studies' occurs in the ordination of priests. But we must still contend that the step between the lay life and the life of an ordained deacon is wider and more critical than the step from the diaconate to the priesthood. We appeal, on this point, to the recollection of all our readers who have taken first the one step, and then the other. It is when a man enters on the ministry that he makes the great advance to which there is no true parallel. It is the day of his first ordination which stands out as the great day of his life, the day in which he professed his belief that he was 'inwardly moved by the Holy Ghost to take upon him that office and ministration,' and that he was 'truly called' according to the will of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the due order of this realm, to the ministry of the Church—words which, in the depth of their solemn pathos, impress on true hearts the claim of that 'call' on their whole energy.

And we believe that a change which would go far towards verifying the apprehensions of the London Conference, and 'reducing the diaconate in the public mind to the level of a lay ministry' (inasmuch as the agency to be created would be, in Mr. Gedge's own words, 'practically lay-clerical'), would, in effect, degrade the presbyterate also, by weakening the already enfeebled idea of the whole clerical office in the minds of Church people, and ultimately of the clergy themselves. When we realize the exceeding haziness and laxity of belief in regard to Ordination which still prevails among many respectable church-goers, we shall see a special reason for deprecating what would be sure to bring strange confusion into their thoughts as to a principle so imperfectly appreciated. They might vaguely take up with that conception which prevails in some sects, where preacher and tradesman are one, and the frequenters of the chapel, like the Puritan laymen in Laud's time, think their minister's gifts the greater because he can thus unite both.¹ Mr. Eugene Stock—no High Churchman—spoke plainly in the House of Laymen: 'Mr. Gedge,' he said, 'had laughed at a clerical title. He ventured to say that the title and dress were visible signs of reality.

¹ Laud, *Works*, vi. 181.

No one would suppose that a man could be the Rev. Sydney Gedge on Sunday, and Mr. Sydney Gedge on Monday.' Two months later, at the Central Council, the Rev. T. A. Stowell, after arguing in the first part of his speech for the importance of a large increase of clerical force in crowded parishes, proceeded to mention two cases in the diocese of Manchester in which men had been ordained as permanent deacons, one of them being Mr. George Harwood, 'who was preaching to large congregations of men of business,' and who '*wore the dress of a layman, and did not take the title of a clergyman.*'¹ Exactly. Mr. Stowell could not have seen how he was reinforcing an objection to the scheme which he admired. Might not some of Mr. Harwood's hearers ask, 'Is he a clergyman or a layman?' Would not persons who had received the sacred chalice from a new assistant-minister on a Sunday sustain a sort of shock when on Monday he was found ready to cash their cheque over his bank counter, or take their fee for his opinion on their 'case'? We gladly reproduce the words of the *Guardian* (May 4, 1887):—

'So far as we can judge, Mr. Gedge and his supporters do not sufficiently consider the immense importance of maintaining in people's minds the conception of a distinct clerical character. . . . This distinct clerical character is a great safeguard to the Church; it has kept up, even in very lax days, a visibly higher standard of life and morality among the clergy than among the laity. We believe that the creation of what may be called an order of secular deacons would tend greatly to impair the distinctness of the clerical character.'

Or, to quote the Bishop of Bangor again:—

'Constituted as men's minds are, I much fear that there would be a lowering of the ministry, or diminution of its influence for good, if the same men who as ordained ministers addressed them from the pulpit were found, in the ordinary commerce of life, to be as much engrossed by worldly pursuits as themselves.'

Again, the change would be likely to produce an undesirable effect on the minds of ordinary candidates for orders, or young clergymen in their year of diaconate. They would, to say the least, be rather hindered than assisted in withstanding the influences which attract them into secularity. We are far from desiring to see their tone and habits conformed to what would be called on the Continent the Seminarist standard. We would not have them drilled into an unnatural rigidity, and, *pro tanto*, alienated from the best types of 'the lay mind.' But the peril now lies, we think, in an opposite

¹ *Guardian* for 1887, p. 695.

quarter. As if in recoil from 'starchedness,' or in weak dread of being thought 'conventional,' young clergymen too often fall into an ungraceful and almost ostentatious imitation of lay fashions as such. A passion for outdoor amusements, such as is represented by Herbert Bowater in Miss Yonge's *Three Brides*, is among the milder forms of this tendency; its graver forms are fostered by various causes—the desire to 'keep in touch with the people,' the cant which is current about 'sacerdotalism,' the influence (as far as it extends) of democratic or secularized conceptions of the Church, the example sometimes of priests 'whose daily life seems quite easily explicable without the introduction of anything supernatural.'¹ If a young man biassed in any of these directions comes across a brother-deacon of mature age, permitted both by 'Church and realm' to spend the main part of his time in worldly business, will he not be tempted to put aside, as unpractical and out of date, the counsels of true clerical experience as to the need of maintaining a spiritual tone? Once more, what would be the effect on the 'secular deacons' themselves? Thirty-six years ago Lord Hatherley, himself a typical lay churchman, expressed his doubt 'whether deacons with secular employment would answer.' He thought that temptations to serve God and mammon would be too great; in times when the constant liability to martyrdom afforded a test, there was not the same risk of scandals.² In a like spirit the *Spectator* of May 14, 1887, observed that 'a diaconate immersed in secular business,' and taking ministerial duty as a 'secondary occupation,' would cause more scandal than *lay* help. The Bishop of Oxford in the Upper House observed that there were

'some persons who would make the diaconate the means of giving themselves some little status and authority in the world;' and that 'if the bishops had secular deacons who were unworthy, it would be very difficult to deal with them in the way of discipline, more difficult even than to deal with those who were wholly devoted to their sacred calling.'

And even if we suppose (it is a considerable supposition) that none would enter the diaconate on these new terms from questionable motives, it is still true that those who did so enter it would be placed in a position of some spiritual disadvantage. Mr. Twells asks why we should deny to the new workers whom we want to enlist 'the grace of holy orders, the responsibility

¹ *Guardian*, September 7, 1887.

² *Memoir of Lord Hatherley*, vol. ii. p. 120.

of holy orders, the binding power of holy orders.' But what if that grace is conveyed, that power committed, that responsibility imposed, under conditions not spiritually favourable to the due employment of such gifts and the due discharge of such obligations? By hypothesis, the persons in question will have had (as the Bishop of Bangor observes) no special theological training, and their 'natural gifts,' for lack of such discipline of mind and spirit and will as the thorough preparation of young ordinands can furnish, may receive but a one-sided development, or possibly be perverted to evil. To speak plainly, will it be very easy for the physician or lawyer in full practice, the head partner in a firm or in a bank (to take no other instances), so to transport himself into the atmosphere of his new office as, in that character,

'reverently to obey his Ordinary, and other chief ministers, to whom will be committed the charge and government over him; to follow with a glad mind and will their godly admonitions; to have a ready will to observe all spiritual discipline; to be modest and humble . . . in his ministrations?'

We omit one word here, for by the very terms of his compact '*constancy* in ministration' will not be expected of him. However pure may be his intentions, he will come before the ordaining bishop with lay habits long formed, and with so much the less of aptitude for imbibing the clerical spirit and for learning clerical duty. Even in his plans for good he will too probably be prone to self-confidence, wilfulness, 'impatience of restraint,' and will need too often to be reminded of the warning—

'There are two ways to aid the Ark—
As *patrons*, and as sons.'¹

Mr. Twells, indeed, argues like Mr. Gedge and others, from the fact that even priests often do a great deal of work which does not pertain to their function; they keep schools, take pupils, write for the press, or 'are constrained, whether they will or not,' to farm land. We answer: A priest who engages in education is specially bound to make it a religious work, and the like may be said of all his literary labour. He was solemnly admonished, at his priestly ordination, to 'draw all his cares and studies this way.' If an incumbent is in the case last specified, he is so far like those clerics of old who, as we have seen, practised 'agriculture' for a maintenance; and that position is morally quite different from that of persons who are making money in a secular calling, and propose to

¹ *Lyra Apostolica*, p. 176.

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superadd to it, *horis subsecivis*, a certain amount of sacred ministration. To be sure, Mr. Twells asks whether, granting this difference, the advantage is altogether on the side of the former :

'We will suppose that doctors are in future allowed to become deacons, and deacons, conversely, to become doctors. . . . Two men in the same parish are found to unite the ministerial and medical professions. The one, being originally a deacon, has determined to supplement his income by practising as a doctor ; the other, being originally a doctor, has placed his leisure time, without money and without price, at the service of the diaconate. Why should the first be a better man than the second ? . . . *Cæteris paribus*, should we not be disposed to prefer the one with whom monetary considerations have had no weight, but who has simply sought to make himself useful ?'

The question, we conceive, is not which is 'the better man' of the two, but which is acting most in accordance with the character of a deacon ? By hypothesis, the deacon who takes to medicine is primarily a minister to souls, and secondarily a minister to bodies. The other man reverses this order. We do not enter into the question how far either of them ought to have 'leisure' for uniting with his ministry, or uniting his ministry with, a profession so persistent in its demands on strength and time.

In the above remarks the words 'sacred' and 'secular' have, of necessity, often recurred. And if it be said that such an iteration represents a false antithesis, which is fraught with injury to the true conception of life as, in all its aspects, 'sacred,' we answer that all honest work is indeed, in one sense, holy ; not only the Christian banker, or solicitor, or surgeon, not only the Christian tradesman or apprentice, but the Christian field-labourer, or (as the Bishop of Lincoln might say) the Christian carter-lad, can do his daily task as to the Lord and in the Lord, and find in it the sphere of his sanctification. But, in the words of an earnest Presbyterian writer¹—

'The difference between the secular and the sacred is, in our time, very apt to be overlooked . . . as if the whole truth were stated when it was declared that the most earthly and common labour can be made truly religious. Agreeing with all that can be said on that matter, it is well to keep in mind the great truth that the spiritual has a sphere of its own. . . . There is a life within the life, a shrine within the temple. . . . There must be religion everywhere, but the soul needs a fountain from which to draw it,' &c.

¹ Dr. Watson, in *Good Words* for 1877, p. 205.

In short, there are diversities of spiritual operation, involving degrees of spiritual intensity. Weekday work, though a man should do it 'in the Name of the Lord Jesus,' and offer it up consciously to be blessed and prospered, is not as sacred as the act of saying one's prayers, of reading God's Word, or still more, of receiving His Sacraments; and in that sense, and on that ground, the work of a lay profession may be called 'secular,' as distinct from the service of 'the kingdom which is not of this world,' without the slightest disparagement of its proper dignity, or of its entire consistency with the highest forms of Christian excellence. The calendar of Saints (*Deo gratias*) includes lay people of every class; it has room for king and soldier, physician, gardener, innkeeper; but some kinds of occupation are more closely related than others to the Divine economy of the Incarnation, and the attempt to treat all things as equally sacred may result in treating all things as equally secular.

We must draw these remarks, already too far extended, to an end. It is hardly worth while—it may seem almost like a bathos—to dwell on the question which has been raised as to the inconvenience which might be caused to an incoming rector or vicar by the presence in the parish of an uncongenial 'professional deacon,' who, as carrying on his temporal business in the parish, would be a permanent resident in the immediate neighbourhood of the new parson. On this it has been argued that a lay reader might indeed have his licence revoked, but, not being a clergyman, would be under no clerical discipline, and might therefore give more trouble than a deacon as such. We should like to know how discipline would in practice be applicable to a deacon of the 'Arnoldian' type, a popular man of middle age and local influence, who, after his services as an 'assistant minister' had been discontinued, would retain his clerical *prestige*, and might thus become the centre of a malcontent party, and the representative of a rival clerical interest.¹

For our own part, we believe that much of the work for which this 'new foundation' of deacons has been planned would be within the competency of laymen properly so-called, who, under some well-chosen title, would not be confounded with the ministers of the Church,² and at the same time, while

¹ See the *Guardian* of Feb. 16 and May 4, 1887.

² A writer in the *Christian Remembrancer* for April 1854 deprecated the forming of 'a multitude of half-parsons. Let laymen . . . be encouraged to read, talk, exhort, or even preach in rooms, but let them do this as laymen. Maintaining the severe distinction between clerics and non-clerics

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holding a commission from bishop and parish priest, would be really employed in the Church's work, and serving under her banner, so that she would reap the benefit of their devotion and their energy. They might act as catechists, might hold mission services in schools or other unconsecrated buildings, might take a great deal of parochial work off the hands of the overworked pastor. They could not, of course, officiate in the parish church, except in the reading of the lessons; they could not say the prayers, nor baptize (except so far as any layman might baptize in case of extreme necessity), nor assist in the administration of Holy Communion, an office for which, in the North, it appears that there is special need of more clergy. It will be said, therefore, that they could not do all that is wanted. It is true, they could not, in any sense, be 'assistant curates;' but their agency, as far as it went, would be consistent with the spirit of Holy Scripture and Church tradition, which is more than could be said for that of 'professional deacons,' who, after all, could not fill any of the posts for which priests are wanted. It might be desirable also to have small companies of 'lay evangelists'—although we do not much like that use of the great title—employed under episcopal sanction, as in the diocese of Lichfield, to address the working-men of thickly peopled districts; but, of course, very careful preparation and supervision would be necessary in order to guard against crude or onesided statements. It might be a help, also, to a bishop to keep near him, after the example of the Bishop of Salisbury, a few priests who could be sent to supply some pressing want in this or that part of his diocese. It would be well to raise funds in the several dioceses for supporting at some theological college, such as that at Lincoln, youths who have given token of a vocation to the ministry, and who are only kept back by want of means. It would be still better to reinforce the 'Ordination Candidates' Fund,' and, best of all, let Churchmen put more heart into the solemn prayer of each recurring Embertide, and into habitual supplication for an increase of labourers in the fields that are white unto harvest. Let them pray for light to discern not only the spiritual needs of the Church, but also such methods of supplying them as are most in accordance with her mind, and with the indications of that Will which works by order and not by confusion, *disponens omnia suaviter*. In ecclesiastical and social reform, the temper of our time is

is the only way in which to secure the most useful kind of lay assistance.' So the *Spectator* of May 14, 1887: 'Lay help is necessary to the Church, more urgently necessary than ever. But it should be lay help.'

apt to set itself ardently on this or that object (regarded, and rightly regarded, as good and necessary), and to be over-hasty in the choice of means, or even to despise caution in that respect as mere punctiliousness, or as a symptom of indifference to a great interest. But the *quocunque modo* has again and again been the source of perilous mistakes ; and when we are dealing with the affairs of the City of God, we are specially bound to look to means as well as ends, to remember that immediate success would be bought too dear by the compromise of a sacred principle, and rather to endure some present dimness than to ' walk in the light of a fire ' too simply our own.

ART. III.—THE FIRST CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHERS.

The Christian Platonists of Alexandria. Eight Lectures preached before the University of Oxford in the year 1886 : on the Foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton, M.A., Canon of Salisbury. By CHARLES BIGG, D.D., Assistant-Chaplain of Corpus Christi College, formerly Senior Student of Christ Church, Oxford. (Oxford, 1886.)

THE period and the authors described in the book above named belong to one of the most interesting and anxious times in the history of the Church of Christ. Christianity was learning by actual experience what it meant to have a mission to the whole world. The conversion of the world implied more than the simple extension of the belief in Christ over the whole area of the world, through all the nations of it. Following in the train of this belief came a wave of change, which left no element in the then constitution of things untouched. Christianity was to draw under its influence politics, art, and intellectual culture, as well as provide the one religion. From the upper chamber at Jerusalem there had sprung a force which was to reconstruct the whole order of the civilized world. Though grafted on to the religion of a despised race, it was to crush out of existence the religions which had all the world's power and prejudice on their side. It was to absorb, and to transmute while it absorbed, the art and philo-

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sophy for which Greece had already won age-long fame. It was to draw into itself and sanctify that love of law and organization by which Rome had won its lordship over the world. This was its task; and it is the spectacle of the Christian Church gradually becoming conscious of its task which forms the peculiar interest of the early centuries of the Christian era. It is always interesting to watch the gradual assertion of a new principle through an old order—to note the angry surprise, the growing concern, the savage hatred with which the new thoughts or practices are received. And our interest reaches its highest point, perhaps, at the moment when the adherents of the old principles first become conscious that the new ideas cannot be simply laughed down, but are serious rivals—rivals which will not be satisfied without undivided rule.

At the same time a contest like this does not end in the entire ejection of one set of ideas, and the substitution of another. The triumphant side learns many lessons from those whom it defeats; the force expended in the struggle does not run to waste. However complete the victory, the defeated party leaves its mark upon its conquerors; it vanishes as a separate party, but its influence lives in the altered conditions of things which are the result of the struggle. The war between the Church and the world is no exception to this rule. If the Church vanquished Heathendom, it was none the less influenced by it. If it forced the world to think after its own fashion, still many of the forms and categories of heathen philosophy survived in the language of its creeds. The study of the *Christian Platonists of Alexandria* brings us just to this point in the controversy between the world and the Church. The philosophic schools have learnt that they must take account of Christianity, for it has an answer of its own to give to the questions which perplex them; and, on the other hand, the Church has learnt—now that it is freed from the mere struggle for existence—that there is something to be gained by careful study of this world's lore, for God has not been without a witness even in Pagan schools of thought. This we believe to be the most vital interest of the history of Christian Platonism. It has all happened long enough ago for us to be able to measure the result—to see to some extent the principle upon which the Church, under the Holy Spirit's guidance, dealt with the problems before it—and hence, perhaps, to derive some hint for our own action in the future. Indeed, without this interest, it is difficult to see what motive could possibly be found for studying the problems of an obsolete

metaphysic in phraseology which we can only galvanize into life by careful and diligent study.

In order to form an opinion upon a matter of this kind the first requisite is a clear conception of the facts of the period, the opinions and history of its great authors. Such a conception is presented to us in Dr. Bigg's *Bampton Lectures*. Within the Bampton Lecturer's usual limits Dr. Bigg has given a careful and scholarly account of the two great Christian philosophers, Clement of Alexandria and Origen. The first lecture is introductory, and is occupied with a brief description of the work of Philo and of some of the other modes of thought which had been prevalent previous to the time of Clement. The seventh lecture describes the Reformed Paganism, with which the Church had to contend most vigorously, and in the last a sketch is given of the later estimate of the character and work of Clement and Origen, together with a summary of the results attained. Throughout these lectures Dr. Bigg displays the accuracy and precision of a real scholar. His estimate of his authors is always scholarly and fair. Though evidently attracted and interested by them, he is keenly alive to their defects. His study of them has been close enough to have given him a conception of their personality, which makes the exposition of their writings vivid and definite. He has traced the close connexion of their respective modes of life upon the tone of their thought, and has endeavoured to estimate the value of the materials which were at their command. He is acquainted with the modern literature which bears upon his subject, and uses plentiful illustrations from authors contemporary with Clement and Origen. Furthermore, the text of the lectures is lucid and easy in style, so that the reader is led to take an interest in abstruse questions of metaphysic and theology for which he would scarcely have given himself credit. Much of this is due, no doubt, to the familiarity which Dr. Bigg has acquired with the language and method of his authors, but it is also aided by the vivid pictures we occasionally meet with of the life at Alexandria. Such would be the account of the Catechetical School (pp. 41 *seqq.*), of the services of the Alexandrine Church and the habits of the congregation (pp. 128-9). To the text of the lectures Dr. Bigg has added footnotes, copious and elaborate, in which the student will find careful references to the writings of Clement and Origen, and to various other works ancient and modern, in which he may pursue for himself the lines of thought indicated in the lectures. We cannot claim to have tested all the references, but so far as we have

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tested them they are accurate, which, seeing the number and fulness of them, is no light praise. From this point of view there is only one fault to be noticed, but it is a serious one. The book has no index. In a work so valuable for reference as this is an index would be of the greatest service. The syllabus at the beginning, which, of course, only professes to mark in outline the succession of the subjects treated, is in a certain degree a help to the use of the book, but it is not enough. This fault will, no doubt, be rectified in a later edition.

Before we take leave of this side of the subject it will be necessary to take account of Dr. Bigg's view of the Alexandrine Presbyterate. On p. 39 he says as follows: 'The most interesting feature in the Alexandrine Church was its College of twelve Presbyters, who enjoyed the singular privilege of electing from among themselves, and of consecrating, their own Patriarch.' After a sketch of the 'struggle' by which the Patriarchs succeeded in destroying the prerogative of the Chapter, he winds up (p. 40): 'Thus was finally abolished this most interesting relic of a time when there was no essential difference between Bishop and Priest, and of a later but still early time when the Bishop was chairman or life-president of a council of Priests, by whom the affairs of a great city church were administered in common.' This well-rounded theory rests on an assertion in the *Annales*¹ of Eutychius, Patriarch of Alexandria, 933 A.D.; on a passage in St. Jerome where he says that the Presbyters 'unum ex se electum in excelsiori gradu collocatum Episcopum nominabant'; on statements in Lightfoot's *Philippians*, p. 231; and inferences in Ritschl's *Entstehung der altk. Kirche*, p. 432. This seems to be all the evidence there is for it. 'The authority of a writer so inaccurate as Eutychius,' says Bishop Lightfoot, 'if it had been unsupported, would have had no weight.' The support consists of St. Jerome's assertion above quoted and a passage of uncertain interpretation by the commentator Hilary. In view of the language it seems somewhat arbitrary to say that St. Jerome's expression includes the right of consecration. On the other hand, it should be noticed that Eusebius, who took a special interest in the affairs of the Alexandrine Church, makes no allusion to this practice. The phrase he uses to describe the appointment of a successor to the Alexandrine Patriarchate is the same as that used of any other see—*διαδέχεται τὴν λειτουργίαν*. Further, in a council at Alexandria

¹ Published with a Latin translation by Selden, under the title *Contentio Gemmarum*.

held in 324, Ischyra was deprived of his orders on the ground that he had been ordained by Colluthus, who was a presbyter; by this time, therefore, non-episcopal ordination was not recognized in the Alexandrine Church. Lastly, there is a full account of the election of St. Athanasius, who succeeded Alexander, the patriarch, according to Eutychius, who effected the change. There is no talk of the College of Presbyters. And it is a little surprising that, whereas the Arians did assail the validity of the election of St. Athanasius, they made nothing of the unusual method employed. Surely if St. Athanasius had not been elected in the manner to which the Alexandrine Church was accustomed, such a convenient ground of attack would not have been neglected by enemies so ingenious and so unscrupulous. We are sorry that Dr. Bigg should have given his countenance to this theory, which, in spite of the modern authorities in its favour, seems to us to rest on the most shadowy evidence. The history of the Alexandrine Presbyterate is obscure and exceptional, and we think a less dogmatic tone would have been more suitable in describing it.¹

We have praised Dr. Bigg's book as the work of a careful and erudite scholar. The materials of a judgment upon the period are to be found in it, set down in a convenient order and intelligible form. But we cannot think that he has approached the constructive side of the book with nearly the same degree of success. It is, as we have said, the first requisite to the understanding of the past that the facts should be clearly set forth; but this is not all. The really valid interpretation of the facts requires far more than this. It requires a real sympathy with the motive which underlies them—a union in spirit which overcomes the barriers of time. To a certain extent Dr. Bigg possesses this sympathy. The existence of it was probably the motive of his book. But at the same time we cannot but feel that in both the philosophical and theological regions his want of complete sympathy has prevented him from giving an adequate estimate of the authors he describes. The philosophy which he brings with him to the task is a somewhat rough-and-ready philosophy. This comes out in his treatment of the whole question of Free-will and Grace: 'No wise man will attempt to find a precise solution for the eternal antinomy of Freedom and Necessity' (p. 80). 'Already the door is opened for all the barren disputes that troubled the Church and the Schools from

¹ Cf. Simcox, *Lectures on Church History*, p. 359.

the days of Augustine to those of Pascal' (*ibid.*). The same tone reappears in the comparison between Origen and St. Augustine on this same point (pp. 284 *seqq.*). To this we shall have to return.

A similar indifference to philosophical or theological accuracy is shown in the following notes. In one case, speaking of Origen's belief in the eternity of creation, Dr. Bigg says: 'The same argument in Origen's mind proved the eternal generation of the Son and the eternity of creation. Later theologians regarded it as admirable in the first case, and abominable in the second.' We agree with the later theologians, notably with St. Athanasius (cf. *Or. c. Ar.* i. 29), and St. Thomas Aquinas (cf. *Summa*, I. xlv.). It is shown by St. Athanasius that there is a difference between a *γέννημα* and a *ποίημα*. The former is proper to the essence of the Father, the other is not. The former does not depend upon an act of will, but is eternal like the Father. The *ποίημα* is brought into being *ἐπὶ συντελείᾳ τῶν αἰώνων*. If it be urged that this doctrine implies a change of will in God, St. Thomas in the passage referred to shows that there is a difference between a change of will and willing a change. Again, on p. 270-271 there is a long note dealing with the various heresies ascribed to Clement and Origen. Clement is accused of Docetism. Origen also was charged with 'preaching "two Christs,"' as afterwards was Nestorius. In all three cases the accusation has no other root than an unreasoning bitterness, of which the most ardent controversialist would now feel ashamed.' Whatever may be the truth as regards Origen, surely the accusation had the merit of being true in the case of Nestorius. We cannot conceive that Dr. Bigg supposes that the difference between Nestorius and the Church was a mere question of terms—a controversy for controversy's sake. We do not press phrases which may have crept through oversight into the notes, but they sound ill-omened.

It is not, however, only in details in footnotes that we feel a sense of want in Dr. Bigg's treatment of Christian Platonism. From time to time he seems conscious that the methods of Platonism are not fully adequate to deal with the Christian creed. So he says, in reference to Clement's account of the Incarnation (p. 71), 'His (*i.e.* Christ's) Flesh was not wholly like ours, inasmuch as it was exempt from all carnal desires and emotions, even the most necessary and innocent. And as his Platonic dislike of the body has led Clement here, though no Docetist, perilously near the confines of

Docetism, so another Platonic theory, that all suffering is corrective, has induced him to speak of the passion of Jesus as undesigned by God.' So again he points out the inadequacy to perform what was required of it of Origen's modified Platonic doctrine of pre-existence¹: 'All he could accomplish by his departure from Plato was to push the insoluble problem a step further back, and to stereotype Clement's vicious theory of the indifferentism of the will.' But although he is alive to some of the failures of the Platonists in dealing with Christian truth, he never attempts to give any such complete account of the differences between Christian and Platonic assumptions as will enable him to mark with certainty and confidence the points where the two systems are necessarily irreconcilable. This is not due altogether to a want of appreciation that there are irreconcilable differences as to a confusion of thought in respect of the regions in which these differences are to be sought. The points indicated as failures due to Platonic preconceptions are isolated; they are not shown to rest on a basal difference in principle. Yet this we believe to be the case. Once only, so far as we remember, and that in a footnote, does Dr. Bigg display any conception of this. On p. 159, commenting on Origen's view of the nature of God, he says: 'His point of view is *moral*, not, like that of Clement, pseudo-metaphysical. Hence all the so-called negative attributes sink into the second place. The more the reader reflects upon this, the more important, I feel persuaded, he will see it to be.' Nothing could be more direct than this. It expresses, as we believe, exactly the point of difference between the right and the wrong ways of looking at the nature of God. Yet a more free use of this test would have given clearness and stability to the treatment of Alexandrine thought, which at present we lack. The point at issue is of the most vital importance, as we hope to show later on; it will therefore be worth while to mark the chief points all along the line where we differ from Dr. Bigg in his estimate of his authors.

The first signs of the confusion in thought of which we have spoken occur in the lecture on Philo. We are there told (p. 9, *note*) that 'Philo never for a moment ceases to think of God in Platonic fashion, as pure spirit opposed to matter.' And this a little further back (p. 8) is said to have been the point of view of some of the Rabbis: 'Others, fol-

¹ Is it not too strong an expression to say, as Dr. Bigg does (p. 283), that 'this belief might claim support from the well-known passage in St. John's account of the healing of the man born blind'?

lowing the lead of the prophets and developing the conception of the ineffable name, refused to think or speak of Jehovah except as a pure spirit.' Further on we learn, somewhat to our surprise (p. 156, *note*), that 'πνεῦμα of itself does not connote immateriality.' Surely there is here a great confusion. In the first place, we believe, on the authority of Dr. Westcott (*Ep. of St. John*, p. 167), that the assertion πνεῦμα ὁ Θεὸς is absolutely unique. The phrase, 'the Spirit of the Lord,' had occurred before, but the spiritual nature of God had never before been asserted. Next, we believe we are right in saying that the word πνεῦμα is never used in Plato except in a more or less material sense. The word for the nature of God is νοῦς. No wonder therefore that those who used Platonic ideas in order to elaborate the philosophical aspects of the nature of God found the word πνεῦμα not 'necessarily connoting immateriality.' This may seem a small point to make, a mere anachronism in the use of a term. But we must remember that language with all its history and associations has a powerful influence on thought, and that by the substitution of what is apparently a synonym we may distort all the real facts of the case. Even to the modern mind there would seem to be some degree of arbitrariness in using Spirit as a synonym for Intellect, and this arbitrariness is multiplied tenfold when the substitution is tacitly made in the Alexandrine period. Spirit is a much fuller, more concrete, more living word than Intellect. In its widest application Intellect can only be one mode in which a Spirit expresses itself, and Intellect is just for this reason without those possibilities which are necessary to the idea of a spiritual being. To Philo it was most natural to think of God under intellectual forms. Although he was so devoted a Jew, yet his associations were Hellenic. He does not understand, apparently, that the word Lord in his own Scriptures is merely a substitute for the ineffable name. He interprets it in accordance with his own prepossessions as a power of the Eternal—His justice as opposed to His goodness (p. 13). This, and many other facts which might be adduced, must lead us to suppose that νοῦς for him would have meant the same as it would for Plato, and that God in his mind is the abstract Platonic God: a being wholly short of the Living God of the Jews. He struggles hard to keep his two lines of thought in harmony one with another, but whenever one has to go to the wall it is the Hebrew, and not the Greek. This point is of great importance to the Philonic doctrine of the Logos. In relation to this Dr. Bigg

criticizes Dr. Westcott's contention that the Logos in St. John is derived, not from Philo, but from the Palestinian schools. Dr. Westcott's chief argument is that in Philo Logos is reason, and not will. 'But to a Platonist like Philo there is no difference between reason and will' (p. 18, *note*). It would be truer, perhaps, to say that to a Platonist like Philo will is an inconvenient subject of which the less said the better. It was just the point which Platonists always found so intensely difficult to deal with at all on their principles. It involved, as it seemed, change, and therefore imperfection. The complex system of powers was a rather clumsy effort to cover the gap between the changeless passionless Being who was in some way responsible for things as they are, and the fleeting phenomena of the material world. Now the word 'logos' in St. John may have come from Philo, if Dr. Bigg pleases; but he must surely admit that the idea and its associations in Philo are wholly different from that in St. John. To the Platonic point of view 'the Incarnation is an impossibility' (p. 25). To St. John it is the natural climax of the previous self-manifestations of the Word of God. St. John, of course, is not controversial in his statement. There is no suggestion in the opening words of his gospel that he was conscious of any difference of usage or meaning in relation to the word *logos*. He only chooses it as a word which his readers will understand, and his assumptions about it and associations with it are to be gathered from his use of it. Whatever may be said of the source from which he derived it, it is clear that the meaning he gives to it falls in exactly with the three great statements of the nature of God which occur in his work—God is Spirit, God is Light, and God is Love. All these imply life and action; they require no cumbrous system of powers or æons to account for self-manifestation. They involve a conception of God which is moral and spiritual, not pseudo-metaphysical, and in this they differ *toto caelo* from Philo's 'Eternal Negation.' Great things frequently arise from small causes, and we do not think that Dr. Bigg would have made these assertions about the divine Logos unless he had confused spirit with intellect, or at least allowed that Plato or any Platonist could have meant spirit in the Hebrew sense of the word when he said *voûs*. It is not perhaps much of an argument for our Logos-doctrine to appeal to the authority of names, yet we think that Dr. Westcott and Dr. Harnack, whom we follow in this matter, are not accustomed to be wrong when they make statements of this nature.

In approaching the question of the doctrine of the Trinity, we are of course involved in the greatest difficulties owing to the vagueness of the statements of those who were under the influence of Alexandrine thought. But here, too, we think that the conception of God as living and active will form a test of the closeness to Christian theology of the various Trinitarian, or partially Trinitarian, formulæ.

It is frequently asserted that the doctrine of the Trinity is traceable to Plato. The whole history of the question is excessively confused, as Dr. Bigg remarks (p. 248), and, in spite of some expressions in Plato himself which seem to countenance the assertion, we should probably be safer in accepting Dr. Bigg's statement (p. 249, *note*): 'With the exceedingly dubious exception of the Second Platonic Epistle, it may be confidently affirmed that no Trinity is to be found in any Pagan philosopher who was not well acquainted with Christianity.' Yet, in spite of this vagueness and uncertainty as to the reality of the Platonic Trinity, it is perfectly clear that a great many conceptions which are traceable to Plato found their way into the writings of the Alexandrines, and were used by them to describe the nature of God. So Philo gives the following account of God (p. 8): 'He is above Space, being Himself Space and Place, inasmuch as He embraces all things and is embraced of none; above time, for time is but the register of the fluctuations of the world, and God, when He made the world, made time also. . . . He is unchanging. . . . He has no name. . . . The phrases that Philo himself prefers to employ are "The One," "He that is," "Himself." From all this it follows that God is incomprehensible.' He expresses himself in the Word and other powers. To the Word 'belong many of the Divine titles by right. He, too, 'is the Sun, the Darkness, the Monad, God, the Second God' (p. 17). He is also the Creator of the world, the *ἰδέα ἰδεῶν*, 'the Helmsman and Pilot of the Universe.' Very closely parallel to this is the account of God given by Clement: 'We know not what He is, only what He is not. He has absolutely no predicates, no genus, no differentia, no species. He is neither unit nor number. He has neither accident nor substance. Names denote either qualities or relations. God has neither' (p. 63). After this it seems to be an unnecessary piece of self-denial for Clement to avoid 'using the Platonic phrase *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*.' This definition of God naturally precludes all possibility of revelation—at any rate of direct revelation of the Father. 'God, then, being indemonstrable, is not the object of knowledge, but the Son is Wisdom and

Knowledge and Truth, and whatsoever else is akin to these, and so is capable of demonstration and definition' (*ἀποδείξιν ἔχει καὶ διέξοδον*). 'He is the ideal Many, the Mind, of which the Father is the principle of identity. He is, in fact, the consciousness of God' (p. 64). As regards the Holy Spirit, there is some uncertainty in Clement. It is not clear under what forms he conceived of the relation of the Three Persons of the Godhead. He regarded the Holy Spirit as a distinct hypostasis (see p. 70). To Origen God is the absolutely Perfect Being, Triune. 'The Father is "the God," "the only true God;" the Son is "God," without addition, because His Deity is derived' (p. 180). He possesses all the attributes of the Father, unchangeably and fully. Though subordinate and derived, He is fully God. Origen bases this doctrine on Scripture—on our Lord's own words: 'My Father is greater than I;' 'None is good, save One.' It is not, in other words, an *a priori* speculation rising out of some philosophical doctrine: it is his interpretation of the actual words of Scripture. So also he asserts the Divinity of the Holy Spirit; indeed, this is the distinctive belief which marks off Christianity from Paganism. The effect of Platonic ideas is less apparent here than in Origen's treatment of Creation already noticed. 'Creator and Creation are correlative notions; the one cannot be thought of without the other. God must, indeed, precede logically, as the cause is in conception prior to the effect, but his inner perfection implies external realization' (p. 160).

In all these three writers we have strongly metaphysical conceptions of God, and in all three cases we cannot carry them far without meeting with some startling, if not actually pagan, development. Of Philo we cannot, of course, expect Christian Truth. But Clement and Origen come before us offering to connect the utterances of the world's wisdom with the revealed truths of Christianity. To us they seem to have fallen far short of the Christian standards; and we cannot but attribute their failure to their excessive submission to the current philosophical categories. We are quite willing to credit them with the best intentions, the most sincere zeal, and philosophical precision in drawing their inferences; but here our commendation stops. They tried to evolve the idea of a living God out of conceptions which were not big or full enough to hold it, and hence they failed. How much more true to the Scriptural idea of God is the conception of St. Irenæus of God as the self-limited: 'Mensura Patris Filius.' Or, again, how much more complete and satisfactory is the doctrine of the Trinity to be found in St. Augustine's great

work *De Trinitate*. St. Augustine confines himself to an attempt to formulate as clearly and fully as he can the idea of triplicity in unity. And in order to this he searches through the whole field of nature and human thought for analogies. He never attempts, as these writers attempted, an *a priori* deduction of the Trinitarian idea. The result of this is that they are involved in all the final difficulties which are associated with the categories in which they chose to represent theology. The Trinitarian idea is said to be found in Plato, but no one can say definitely in what sense. So in Clement the doctrine of the Trinity, wherever described in philosophical terms, is really only intelligible on Platonic assumption. It does not cohere with the doctrine of God at all. The revelation of the Trinity, as given by Christ, is a revelation of the Being of God; the Trinitarian idea as found in or inferred from Plato is the final result of reflection on nature. No doubt men discern the invisible things of God by reflection on the things which are made, but the function of revelation is gone if the mere exercise of his normal powers places a man in exactly the same position as the voice of the Son of God Himself. Plato's loftiest ideas bear with them always the marks of their origin in the attempt to grasp the meaning and truth of the natural world. And hence it is that they are not fit to be the final expressions for our fullest knowledge of God. To the mind speculating on nature God appears as its cause. And it is to be observed that cause and effect are strictly relative terms. Or He is thought of as Pure Intellect as opposed to matter, Real as opposed to phenomenal. This is developed from the opposition erected between the form and the content of a thought; between the fleeting, changeful phenomena which belong to the world of matter and the eternal changeless ideas which belong to the world of form. Or He is the absolutely Universal. This arises out of the opposition between the universal and particular. This is closely connected with the other two. The particular represents the union of the ideal and the phenomenal; it is less true, therefore, than the unqualified universal. Carried out to their logical conclusion, these notions land us in impossibility. The Universal, instead of being the term which could be predicated of a particular, becomes that of which nothing can be predicated—a mere negation. So, too, the ideal loses all phenomenal content; it becomes pure form, negative and void, opposed to mere material, limitless, formless, without any principle of rationality in it at all. And not only do these oppositions land us in negation, they also

produce a situation of deadlock. The pure form, the negative universal, have no principle of action in them; the formal is defiled by the material, and yet all along it has been assumed that in some sense the universal or formal is the cause of the particular or material. How is this hopeless difficulty to be overcome? There are various expedients. We may assume intermediary beings and fill up the gap with them. This is one of the metaphysical reasons for the Gnostic conception of æons and for the divine powers of Philo. Thus, when Moses asks to see God's glory (Ex. xxxiii. 18), the answer given him is thus explained by Philo. God Himself is *ἀορατὸς καὶ νοητὸς*; yet He has powers (*δυνάμεις*) which, though *νοηταί*, can make themselves known to souls which have the power and will to see them, as a seal can stamp itself wherever it finds matter that is suitable. These stand between God and the world in a great series, of which the lower are produced by the higher, and through them He acts. At the end of the series appear the attributes of God manifested through matter. The whole idea is an expedient for bridging over the unmanageable gap which has arisen between the material and intelligible. Clement is prevented by his Christian presuppositions from producing quite so elaborate a scheme, yet the passage quoted above to illustrate his doctrine of God will show how largely he was influenced by this notion. The *ἐπίνοιαί* of the Son occupy in Origen's system a very similar position. But his tendency is not quite the same as Clement's. Dr. Bigg remarks (p. 70) that Clement is 'jealous of the slightest approach to Pantheism.' We do not wish to add to the accusations which have been heaped on the head of Origen, but it must be observed that his doctrines of the Eternity¹ of Creation—of the Pre-existence of Souls—lie very close to Pantheism. There is no absolute beginning: God and the world are equally eternal; the two aspects of the same relation.

Surely all these difficulties arise from the attempt to formulate the Christian faith in a living, loving, self-manifesting God in terms of the metaphysic of nature, of the philosophy of nature, as the object of knowledge. If we could bring ourselves to think of the Doctrine of the Trinity first, and then see how far intellectual forms helped or hindered us, we should run far less risk of being involved in untheological conclusions.

¹ Dr. Bigg says, p. 161, that, according to Origen, 'God created matter and made it what it is by His own reason and His own beneficence.' We do not see how this is reconciled with the other point of view.

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We should think of God's Triune Nature as closely connected with His revelation of Himself as Love. We should know that Love as eternal and complete. We should be involved in no difficulty about the existence of the world, for we should have no presuppositions entangling us with the world. God exists, and that is all. We have begun with the contemplation of His existence—His self-sufficing, self-limited existence. Then He creates. Still out of His Infinite Love 'He had allowed a work to take form and substance away and apart from Himself: He had suffered His almighty power to go forth out of its holy and hidden abode in Himself, and to become active, and strong, and substantial, in the establishment of a life, which, however, proceeding out of God, was yet other than God's own, distinct from God, a thing to be looked at apart from God.'¹ There is here no stretching of some reluctant formula to make it express an idea which is wholly beyond it. We have begun with God, and the Love of God, and this carries us through. Questions will arise as we come into these regions as to the relations of this idea of a loving God to our intellectual forms—such as Time, for instance. But these, though important, are secondary. It is of primary importance, at least, for the theologian to secure that his idea of God should not be clipped and docked in order to make it fit some human category; this treatment it must necessarily undergo, if the process which we are criticizing is allowed.

There would have been much more to be said in favour of this use of Platonic forms, if it had been reasonably successful. But it was not. Not only in the regions which we have just traversed was it a failure, but in many others also. As we have seen, there was a strong Platonic prejudice against matter. It was the Unlimited, Formless, and in some thinkers was actually the cause and centre of evil. This made a full doctrine of the Creation and of the Incarnation almost impossible. Clement approaches perilously near Docetism. Thus (*Strom.* VI. ix. 71), he says Christ was ἀπαξαρλῶς ἀπαθής, and ate and drank only to forestall Docetism. He was exempt from all carnal desires and emotions, even the most innocent (p. 71). Origen was far more governed by actual Scripture phrases than Clement, and therefore was less under the absolute rule of Platonism than his predecessor. Yet it is one of his characteristic thoughts 'that the Incarnation was a weakening of the Divine Glory, not the highest and profoundest revela-

¹ Holland, *Logic and Life*, p. 102.

tion of the Divine Love' (p. 262). In the 'beautiful fancy' that the followers of Judas were unable to recognize our Lord, because 'the darkness of their own souls was projected upon the features of Him they sought,' 'we may, perhaps, recognize the last faint trace of Docetism.'¹

There remain but two points requiring comment, the Alexandrine Doctrine of Freedom and the Alexandrine Doctrine of Sacraments. We will endeavour to treat them as shortly as possible. The question of Freedom does not stand alone: it is closely bound up with the questions of the Origin of Evil and of Grace, and these again with the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The problem arose in connexion with the origin of evil. They had to account for the fall of the first man. How was it that Adam fell, if he were created good? The answer was found in Indifferentism. The will is, according to Clement, 'an independent faculty, knowing both good and evil, and choosing between them, selecting and in fact creating its own motive' (p. 79). 'Evil, then, is not a power but an act. It is not the Platonic "lie in the soul," nor the Pauline "law of sin;" not a vicious motive, nor a false belief, because these have no constraining force. Vice consists in acting the lie, and we need not act it unless we choose. Clement could not then believe in any inherited depravity of human nature' (p. 80). The Doctrine of Grace falls in with this. 'There is no entailed necessity between Adam's sin and ours. . . . We are created capable of wisdom, goodness, felicity, which yet we can only attain by grasping the Divine Hand outstretched to lift us up. Not without special grace does the soul put forth its wings' (p. 82). The view of Origen as to the will is much the same as that of Clement: 'Evil comes from the will of man' (p. 196). But he goes beyond Clement in placing this fall in a previous state. The account of this, given by Dr. Bigg, is worth quoting in full.

'Except the Holy Trinity nothing is incorporeal. Each of the created spirits had from the first an envelope, a principle of differentiation, a body, adapted to the nature of its environment, at first then of fine ethereal texture, fitted in all respects for its celestial habitation. The spirits were equal and like, but they were free. Some sinned and fell, some remained steadfast in their first estate, or rose to higher levels of power and goodness. The latter are the stars, the angels in the various degrees of their hierarchy. Of those who rebelled, some became devils, fiends, or archfiends, according to the manifold proportions of their transgression. But those whose error was less, whose love of God is cold, yet not extinct (it is one

¹ Bigg, p. 191.

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of Origen's fanciful etymologies), turned into souls, better or worse, according as the faculties of sense and desire gained the upper hand over the intelligence. For these, at any rate, there is hope of restitution, yet only through chastisement. The appointed scene of their discipline is this world, a later and grosser model of the first. It is infinitely various, to afford scope for the treatment proper to every phase of character, "like a great house, in which are vessels of gold and silver, of wood and clay, some to honour and some to dishonour." [In this passage the fanciful etymology is the derivation of $\psi\chi\eta$ from $\psi\chi\omega$.]

Origen's view of grace is the same as that of Clement: 'God perpetually incites, surrounds sustains, rewards, but does not constrain the will. To use the language of a later time, Grace is prevenient, concomitant, peculiar, but not efficacious' (pp. 201-2). So he explains away the texts which assert predestination.

'He could admit neither election nor reprobation. If, he argues, God predestines only those whom he foreknows, it follows that He does not know those whom He does not predestine. This is absurd. We are compelled, therefore, to drop the preposition. Foreknow is the same as know, know in countless passages of Scripture is equivalent to love. God knows only the good, whom he loves; of evil He has no knowledge. Again, "whom He did predestinate, them He also called according to purpose." According, that is, to their own purpose; or if according to the purpose of God, then because He knew that they desired salvation.'

In the last lecture this doctrine is compared with Augustinianism, considerably to the disadvantage of the latter (pp. 283-290). The Alexandrine aspect of the question is regarded as essentially Pauline (p. 283), and described as aiming at this end—to show that 'the Christian must be holy yet free, obedient yet intelligent, able to judge and act for himself, a true son of God, needing no earthly director because guided by his Father's eye' (*ibid.*). Certain misconceptions did arise in connexion with the Alexandrine point of view, and though the Pelagian controversy did much to lessen them, yet 'the real lesson of the debate was obscured by the misplacement of the point. It was made to hinge on the insoluble problem of the Freedom of the Will. But this is in truth a side issue. The really fruitful question is the nature of the motive, not the mode of its operation' (p. 284). The one point, 'the initial desire of amendment, is all that Origen, and even Clement, postulates' (p. 285), for the solution of the problem, and this, 'small as it may seem, involves an insuperable speculative difficulty' (*ibid.*). St. Augustine may be

said to have 'no theory,' or, rather, that which he seems to have regarded as his theory is 'inconsistent with itself, is not in harmony with the facts of experience, and involves a moral paradox' (p. 285). 'It would have been far better if he had made the same confession of ignorance as regards free will that he makes frankly as regards the origin of the soul. But then the Pelagians could not have been condemned' (p. 287, *note*).

Surely it was not simply the desire of condemning the Pelagians which led St. Augustine to the point of view which he adopts. To him, and we confess to us also, it would seem morally paradoxical that the initiative, even in the acceptance of the terms of salvation, should rest in the will of man. There is no doubt much speculative mystery surrounding the whole of the inner side of man's salvation. Even more, the whole idea of *action* at all seems to involve speculative mystery. But certain moral facts seem to come out clearly. There has been a Fall, which infected with a taint of sin the whole nature of man. And between this condition and that of Regeneration we cannot conceive that there is an unbroken continuity. 'That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the spirit is spirit.' 'Ye, my brethren, were made dead (*ἐθανατώθητε*) to the law by the Body of Christ, that ye should be married to another, even to him that is raised from the dead.' In other words, there is needed an infusion of new life from the side of God, and the self-surrender of faith on the side of man. Now, when we look at this self-surrender, we shall find that it is by no means irrelevant to ask whether it comes of a free undetermined will or not. We shall find ourselves landed in the assertion that man attains his salvation by his own unaided act—a thing which is morally paradoxical and tends to depreciate Christ's saving activity—unless we can put up with the speculative paradox of an action which is free and is our own, but yet is the result of Grace preventient and efficacious. The view of freedom advocated by the Alexandrians seems not to be that of St. Paul. St. Paul does not contemplate the possibility of absolutely isolated action. Man is the servant of sin, or the servant of God; this he states as a matter of every-day experience. But whatever he is, under whichever of these powers he is, he is by an act or acts for which he is responsible. Surely the passage quoted from St. Augustine by Dr. Bigg (*De Grat. et Lib. Arb.* 15), is nearer St. Paul than anything he has told us of Origen: 'Semper est autem in nobis libera voluntas, sed non semper est bona. Aut enim a iustitia libera est, quando servit peccato, et tunc est mala: aut a peccato libera est, quando servit iustitiæ, et tunc

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est bona.' Cf. Rom. vi. 20-21 : 'For when ye were the servants of sin, ye were free from righteousness. . . . But now being made free from sin and become servants of God, ye have your fruit unto holiness, and the end everlasting life.' From another point of view man is free when his powers are realized, when he is unimpeded by the hampering and distorting influence of sin. The Alexandrine view of the human soul is too much that of a monad. It is speculative and metaphysical ; emphasizes unduly the separateness of each soul ; passes by the influences, natural or divine, which go to make it what it is. Even though Origen believed in the 'solidarity of all that thinks and feels' (p. 68), yet he has failed to apply his 'master-thought' in the place where it would most have helped him. It supplied him with the idea of analogy afterwards adopted and worked out by Butler ; but it does not help him, as it should have helped him, to a better solution of the problems which lie round Free Will and Determinism. Here, as before, he falls from the excessively metaphysical view which he adopts.

One word on the Sacramental Theory of the Alexandrines. The opinions of Clement on the subject of the much-contested words, 'Priest, Altar, Sacrifice, the Body and Blood of Christ, the Power of the Keys . . . were at variance with the spirit of the age' (p. 58). He was, therefore, driven to employ the 'immoral doctrine of Reserve.' There were two types of doctrine—the one the special prerogative of the true Gnostic, the other suitable for a person living the lower life of Faith. For the latter the letter of Scripture was enough. The true priest, the antitype of the priest of the Old Covenant, was the true Gnostic. 'The one office assigned to the presbyter is that of "making men better," and this is also the special function of the Gnostic' (p. 102). The Eucharist is an allegory. 'The Body is Faith, the Blood is Hope, which is, as it were, the life-blood of faith' (p. 106). 'Christ is present in the Eucharist in the heart, not in the hand' (p. 107). This is the account given by Dr. Bigg. It has, of course, been contested, but it seems on the whole to fall in with many of his ideas and prepossessions. 'The Church is one, true, ancient, Catholic, because the doctrine and tradition of the Apostles is one ; the heretic who has forsaken her fold has "an assembly devised by man," "a school," "a sect," but not a Church' (p. 100). Origen 'ranked far higher than Clement the authority and privileges of the clergy' (p. 214). 'The ordinary Christian is a priest only in a spiritual sense ; the ordained priest is the vicar of God' (p. 215). He declares, but does not bestow,

Absolution, yet he alone has received judgment of souls. The rule of faith which is authoritatively given by the Church is binding on all Christians. It is elaborately stated at the opening of the *De Principiis*. The language of Origen on the subject of the Holy Eucharist is much more definite than Clement's, much less suggestive of attenuation in the interests of the 'spirit as opposed to the letter.' 'There is a Presence of Christ, but it is a spiritual, and, therefore, in Origen's view, the only real Presence, real precisely because in nowise material' (p. 221). "It was not that visible bread, which He was holding in His hand, that God the Word called His Body: it was the word as a symbol whereof that bread was to be broken" (*In Matt. Comm.* Series 85, quoted, Bigg, p. 221).

May we not see in these doctrines a survival of the Platonic distrust of matter? Dr. Bigg describes Origen's view of Allegorism as 'one manifestation of the sacramental mystery of nature. There are two heavens, two earths—the visible is but a blurred copy of the invisible' (p. 134). This seems to us to be a fair account of Origen's view, but to contain a most inadequate view of a sacrament. We do not deny that the whole sacramental order may be in a sense economical; but surely, while it lasts, the material side is just as real, as important, as true, as the spiritual. The material becomes the vehicle of the spiritual, but conveys its spiritual grace just by the fact that it remains material, and so reaches our senses. As the Body of Christ Incarnate was fully and entirely human, and yet is so united to the Divine Word as wholly to reveal Him to men, so it is with the Holy Eucharist. We cannot insist on the spiritual side of it without also maintaining the reality of its material media. They are not 'blurred copies' of the invisible; they convey it as material vehicles.

We have now gone through some few of the points of interest and importance in this work. There are many which space compels us to pass by. We have chosen those which seem to lie nearest to questions of our own time. For the Alexandrine period is in many respects like our own. We also have forced upon us the claims of philosophy based on the interpretation of nature or of thought. We, too, have the task before us of doing what we can to smooth away differences where they arise merely from misunderstanding; of showing how the faith once delivered to the saints has still in it stores of fresh vigour, is still the truest satisfaction of all the highest aspirations of the human mind and will. We do not come forward, as Clement and Origen came forward, to champion a

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new way, against the angry contempt of older systems. We have to show that our most holy Faith has not become effete, as those old religions did ; that it is not, like them, incapable of answering any further demands, or of looking new facts in the face. What, then, can these Alexandrine thinkers teach us as to the best way of fighting our battle? The Church has always looked askance upon the work of Origen, especially in the East. He has been condemned ; he has given rise to the fiercest controversy. Clement, on the other hand, has been canonized, though his name was removed from the Roman Martyrologies by Clement VIII. (Bigg, p. 272). Must we say, then, that this is just another of those cases where the Church has been on the side of ignorance, and moralize on the inveterate hatred of superstition for real enlightenment and progress? We think there is a preferable alternative. There is in this careful withholding of unbounded confidence a real and necessary faithfulness to the Rule of Faith ; there is in the attitude of Clement and Origen a real unfaithfulness, however little intended, to the Church's Creed. It is true that the Church had to win its victory in the intellectual field as well as in the moral ; but it was to be a real victory and not an unconditional surrender. Platonism provided forms, which to some extent the Church could adopt. It developed points of view which were a real gain and help to Theology. But when all is said and done, it was the result of the free investigation of Nature and Thought, and it must in its highest manifestations retain the limitations which belong to its origin. It has no words to express the Faith which is the key to this world and the next. It was this sense of the inadequacy of the solution offered which led the Church to reject it. We cannot but feel that this rejection was right, if we conceive for one moment what would have been the result of the other plan ; the history of the doctrine of Transubstantiation is enough to show the ruinous misfortune of binding the Church to one form, to one stage in philosophy. At the present time we are invited, in view of the present conditions of philosophic speculation, to modify our dogma, to adopt the terms and assumptions of one or another system, and throw overboard all that they will not hold. The Incarnation, the Atonement, the Resurrection, even the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, can be held in the old way no more. Philosophy will show us a more excellent way. We have no need to cut ourselves adrift from these speculations, although they may seem menacing ; they are the real outcome of the period in which we live, and express much that is true. We shall find, perhaps, that many

of our beliefs have an analogy in the philosophic realm, or that our own theology is fragmentary, so that we have brought upon our heads the scorn of philosophers, when a full statement of our point of view would show it to be undeserved. This fault, it is to be feared, is not unknown in the Church of England. Let us not shrink from acknowledging it, so far as it is imputable to us, and let us make amends, not by feebly accepting anything and everything which is offered us, but by a fuller and bolder statement of the Eternal Faith of the Church of Christ. The true theology contains the true philosophy, natural and moral; for in the knowledge of God is all Truth and Eternal Life.

ART. IV.—PAPAL INFALLIBILITY AND GALILEO.

1. *The Case of Galileo.* (*Nineteenth Century*, May.) By the REV. JEREMIAH MURPHY. (London, 1886.)
2. *The Pontifical Decrees against the Doctrine of the Earth's Movement, and the Ultramontane Defence of them.* By the REV. W. W. ROBERTS. (Oxford, 1885.)
3. *Essays on the Church's Doctrinal Authority.* By WILLIAM GEORGE WARD, Ph. D. (London, 1880.)
4. *When does the Church Speak Infallibly? or, the Nature and Scope of the Church's Teaching Office.* By the REV. FR. KNOX. (London, 1870.)
5. *The Catholic Church and Biblical Criticism.* (*Nineteenth Century*, July.) By ST. GEORGE MIVART. (London, 1887.)
6. *Mr. Mivart's Modern Catholicism.* (*Nineteenth Century*, October.) By Mr. Justice STEPHEN. (London, 1887.)
7. *Dr. Mivart on Faith and Science.* (*Dublin Review*, October.) By the Bishop of NEWPORT AND MENEVIA. (London, 1887.)

In the May number of the *Nineteenth Century*, 1886, appeared a rejoinder from the Rev. Jeremiah Murphy to the article by Mr. St. George Mivart, to which we called attention in our issue of January 1886. In commenting on Mr. Mivart's article, we expressed an opinion that, while such an attack upon the Roman ecclesiastical authorities was most improperly

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made by one professing to be at the same time 'a loyal and consistent Roman Catholic,' it was nevertheless delivered with such effect that those authorities would find it difficult or impossible to sustain or reply to it. The Rev. Jeremiah Murphy, against whose criticisms in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* Mr. Mivart's article was specially directed, is not of our opinion: he rather thinks and, as he deems, clearly demonstrates that 'Mr. Mivart's parallel then breaks down at all points, and his headlong and unaccountable assault on ecclesiastical authority is a complete, a lamentable breakdown' (p. 735). Even with the new light that Mr. Murphy brings, we are unable to detect a single point at which Mr. Mivart's 'parallel breaks down;' on the contrary, it is even clearer to us than before that his parallel is well and truly drawn. Partly, then, to uphold the judgment passed in our former article, and partly taking occasion of this discussion to remark upon certain matters connected with the lately decreed Papal Infallibility, we propose again to review the question with the assistance of Mr. Murphy's article.

We are chiefly impressed in reading that article by the writer's want of candour, in evading rather than fairly and straightforwardly meeting the argument of his opponent. We venture to say that there is not a single criticism that he makes on Mr. Mivart's presentment of the Galileo case (which he calls a false and distorted version of it) that has not been abundantly and triumphantly anticipated either by Mr. Mivart, or by the Rev. W. W. Roberts in his admirable little work, *The Pontifical Decrees against the Doctrine of the Earth's Movement*. To what purpose would controversy be carried on if, when an argument had been fully and fairly met and refuted, it might again be calmly advanced as if it held the field without dispute? Mr. Murphy is like those combatants in our sham-fights, who obstinately refuse to be 'dead,' no matter how untenable the position they have taken up, or how withering the fire to which they have exposed themselves. He reproduces, *e. g.*, the old objection that heliocentricism is not a matter of faith or morals and therefore does not fall within the scope of Papal Infallibility. 'What the Pope's opinions may be on matters not revealed or not in any way connected with Revelation . . . need be of no concern to Catholics' (p. 728), as if the Roman authorities would have dealt with the matter at all if it had been 'in no way connected with Revelation;' as if Mr. Roberts and Mr. Mivart had not over and over again pointed out that the matter at issue was, not the truth of Copernicanism, but the true interpretation of Scripture; as if Dr. Ward, that

great champion of Papal Infallibility, had not admitted, 'Supposing, therefore, that Paul V. had really pronounced the judgment *ex cathedrâ*, his definition would have been nothing less than a definition of faith.'

'Galileo,' says Mr. Mivart, 'was suspected of holding the Copernican theory and therefore of heresy. "I am," he was made to say, "suspected of heresy: that is, that I hold that the earth moves and the sun does not;" and to make the matter quite clear in the "Monition," it was expressly stated that Copernicus was suspended because his principles were *contrary to Scripture and to its true and Catholic interpretation.*'¹

Mr. Murphy cannot be ignorant of these arguments: why, then, does he ignore them?

Even more earnestly do we protest against Mr. Murphy's statement of the Roman Catholic doctrine concerning the scope of Papal Infallibility. On p. 728, quoting the Vatican decree, he lays down three conditions, the fulfilment of which is necessary to entitle any papal pronouncement 'to rank as *ex cathedrâ* teaching in the sense defined by the Vatican Council.' We assert, and we challenge Mr. Murphy to meet our assertion, that these conditions are perfectly illusory and can be adapted to the real teaching of Roman theologians, say of Father Knox, whom he quotes as an authority on the next page, only by explaining them away. Here and there, Mr. Murphy, unconsciously of course, misrepresents his opponent. Mr. Mivart does not, *e. g.*, 'introduce Galileo as an argument for the undoubted orthodoxy of Evolution.' Mr. Mivart does not write nonsense: his contention is that science need not concern itself with orthodoxy at all. Mr. Murphy seems to cast a doubt on Mr. Mivart's statement that 'he knows two London priests who are anti-Copernicans and are so because they believe the Church is committed to that doctrine,' for he himself with his wider knowledge of Catholic priests is unacquainted with any such 'fossils.' The *Dublin Review* represents, we believe, the educated Roman Catholics of England and Ireland; and, if Mr. Murphy will turn to the January number, 1886 (p. 276), he will find there 'A Wrangler' commended for having raised doubts of Copernicanism. "'A Wrangler" will have done good service,' it says, 'if he has succeeded in inspiring doubt of that which, however probable, still admits of doubt.' Why is it good service to inspire doubt of Copernicanism rather than of the Theory of Fluxions, say, or the rotundity of the earth, unless because 'the Church'

¹ *Nineteenth Century*, July 1885, p. 38.

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is at least seriously compromised by her condemnation of it in the seventeenth century? Mr. Murphy plainly does not know or heed much that appears in the *Dublin Review*—we will quote a few passages for his behoof later on—but surely he will not say that it represents only the ‘fossils’ among his brethren.

Lastly, we think it necessary to remind Mr. Murphy that the truth or falsehood of a doctrine does not depend on the character or the knowledge of the person who teaches it. He would lead us off on a wrong scent when he urges that ‘for his treatment Galileo had himself largely to blame; they say that he was overbearing; that, not content with science, which was his province, he was perpetually meddling with theology, which was not’—a charge that might easily be retorted upon the ecclesiastical authorities. And again, ‘No unprejudiced reader can deny that his own conduct tended very largely to bring on the trial before the Inquisition’ (p. 732). Dr. Ward, somewhat in the same fashion, argued that Copernicanism, *although true now*, was rightly condemned at that time, because it was only ‘a random scientific conjecture.’ It ought not to be, but in the face of such argument it is, worth while to say that, if the sun is really the centre of our system, then heliocentricism has been true from the beginning of the world, and would be true when uttered by the most abandoned criminal the world has ever seen, or by an idiot talking in his sleep. It was never a mere ‘random scientific conjecture;’ it was a *fact*.

We have criticized somewhat sharply the attitude which Mr. Mivart has taken up towards the authorities of his Church, but we cannot allow that Mr. Murphy is in a position to rebuke him as ‘claiming not freedom but wanton licence, the offspring of intellectual pride,’ as having ‘shocked and pained Catholics by his extraordinary assertions;’ for, as we will presently show, there is very little to choose between Mr. Mivart and Mr. Murphy in respect of reverence to ecclesiastical authority, and ‘people that live in glass houses should not throw stones.’

We will now pass on to consider the alleged ‘breakdown’ in Mr. Mivart’s parallel. What is the parallel that he has sought to draw? He tells us that ‘with the assistance of well-known and universally-esteemed experts in theology’ he put forward the theory ‘that the body of the first man was evolved by the same ordinary secondary laws as . . . evolved the bodies of his fellow animals,’ and claimed that this doctrine might be accepted by the strictest Ultramontanes. Mr. Murphy

'turned to the Catholic theologians themselves' (not to Mr. Mivart's 'experts in theology,' we presume), and, as he tells us, 'very soon the conviction forced itself upon me that the whole weight of Catholic theological teaching was opposed to the application of the evolution theory to man.' He owns that he 'cannot point to a solemn definition; but he has authority just as strong in 'the *ordinary magisterium* of the Church,' which we are as strictly bound to believe as if it had been defined by a General Council or by a Pope speaking *ex cathedra*.' One would have thought that an infallible judge was required to decide in any case what the ordinary magisterium of the Church might be; and the *Dublin Review* seems to be much of the same mind in a passage which we will quote for Mr. Murphy's consideration. 'After all,' it says (July 1880, p. 119), '*ordinary magisterium* as commonly used is a phrase which covers a large body of practical teaching, many details of which are *not authoritative at all*, but shade off into mere pious opinions, or even at times touch upon abuse and superstition.' And again (p. 126):—

'The only fault we should be inclined to find with Dr. Ward' (says the Rev. Jeremiah Murphy) 'is . . . that he hardly recognizes with sufficient clearness *the difficulty there is and must be in deciding in any case what is, or is not, included in the scope of that magisterium.* The Church teaches by the mouths of men. Bishops publish pastorals, priests preach and instruct, theologians write, professors teach, *Catholic journalists write their articles*, the faithful . . . use their prayer-books and follow their devotions. *But any one of these organs of teaching, or of witness to teaching, may, in individual cases, fall into corruption or error.*'

The words we have italicized might have given pause even to a bold man, but Mr. Murphy felt himself equal to the responsibility of deciding upon the ordinary magisterium of the Church in this case, and opposed it to Mr. Mivart's theory, citing a number of theologians to still further and superfluously strengthen his position. Mr. Mivart then drew his parallel. Just such another theory as mine, he said, was opposed in precisely the same way, two hundred years ago. In the former case the long array of theologians, the ordinary magisterium of the Church, were on the wrong side. Once wrong, they cannot be infallible; therefore, not as against me and my application of the theory of evolution to man. Nor in any question between religion and science can they claim to pronounce an infallible judgment. Nay, in the former case, there was a solemn *ex cathedra* definition, which Mr. Murphy owns he cannot quote against me; so that, to use an Hibernicism

which Mr. Murphy will assuredly pardon, my case is *more parallel* and an argument not *à pari* but *à fortiori*.

Mr. Murphy answers that Galileo's theory is in no way parallel to Mr. Mivart's; nor is the condemnation it received at the hands of the ecclesiastical authorities at all to be compared with that which he himself has pronounced upon the doctrine of evolution as applied to man.

'The solar system,' he says, 'is not so important for students of revelation as the creation of the first man. The doctrine I have set in opposition to Mr. Mivart is an explanation of an article of faith founded on texts of Scripture as clear apparently as any that exist. Mr. Mivart adduces a doctrine in no sense necessarily connected with an article of faith, and the Scriptural expressions are indirect and incidental' (p. 725).

Then as to the ordinary magisterium of the Church:—

'Even Bellarmine does not by any means hold the consensus to be decisive against Copernicanism; for in his letter to Father Foscarini he says that "although he does not believe that any proof of the earth's motion will be adduced, yet, should that occur, he is quite prepared to change his view as to the meaning of the Scripture,"' &c. (*ibid.*).

Ergo, Copernicanism was an open question of no particular importance 'and in no way connected with revelation.' But now let us hear the Sacred Congregation of the Index against Mr. Murphy, which calls the doctrine in question 'tam pernicioso, falsa et omnino contraria sacræ et divinæ scripturæ'; and again, 'Proposizione assurda e falsa in filosofia e formalmente eretica per essere espressamente contraria alla sacra Scrittura.

As to Bellarmine's opinion, let us read a little more of his letter to Father Foscarini. After observing that the Copernican interpretation of Scripture is already under the ban of the Council of Trent, he proceeds:—

'You are aware that the Council forbids us to interpret Scripture in a sense opposed to the consent of the holy Fathers; and if your paternity will read, I do not say only the holy Fathers, but also modern commentators on Genesis, the Psalms, Ecclesiastes, Josue, you will find that they all adhere to the literal exposition that the sun is in the heaven and revolves round the earth with very great velocity, and that the earth is very far from the heaven and remains immovable in the centre of the universe. Consider with yourself as a man of prudence, whether the Church can permit Scripture to be interpreted in a sense opposed to the mind of the holy Fathers and of all modern commentators. Nor can you reply that the matter is not one of faith:

for though it is not a matter of faith *ex parte objecti*, it is a matter of faith *ex parte dicentis*.¹

Let Mr. Murphy note this also :—

'A few weeks before the date of this letter the cardinal's opinion was reported to Galileo . . . in the following unmistakable terms: "With regard to the opinion of Copernicus, Bellarmine told me himself that he holds it to be heretical, and that the doctrine of the earth's motion is beyond all doubt (*senza alcuno dubbio*) contrary to Scripture."²

The contention that Bellarmine and the Sacred Congregation considered Copernicanism an open question and professed their willingness to accept it, should a demonstration of it ever be offered, is sufficiently met by the fact that Father Foscarini was condemned for '*endeavouring to show that that doctrine was consistent with the truth*;' and Galileo, for '*adducing arguments of great efficacy in favour of it*' after he had been '*forbidden to hold, defend, or teach in any manner the aforesaid false doctrine*.' How can it be said that they thought it possible to adduce or were ready to welcome a demonstration of the doctrine when they forbade it to be treated of in any way whatever, and when it was an offence in Galileo to have added '*arguments of great efficacy in favour of it*'?

Father Murphy, then, with his principal Fathers and theologians is, if not '*paralleled*,' at least well matched with Bellarmine and the '*holy Fathers and all modern commentators*.' It is manifest also that the matter in question was not a scientific theory, but the interpretation of Holy Scripture, which Mr. Murphy will admit is not '*a doctrine in no sense necessarily connected with any article of faith*.' We should like to learn, therefore, whence Mr. Murphy derives the authority to pronounce upon the ordinary magisterium of the Church. Bellarmine opposes it to Copernicanism, and Mr. Murphy says Bellarmine was mistaken. Mr. Murphy quotes it against Mr. Mivart, and it is equivalent to and must be accepted as '*a solemn ex cathedrâ definition*.' Is Mr. Murphy the better theologian? or has he some *charisma* that the great cardinal had not? May not Mr. Mivart echo the memorable words of another great cardinal—'*I acknowledge one Pope, jure divino*'—thereby *not* meaning Mr. Murphy? And we should be especially glad to learn the meaning of this sentence (p. 725)—'*And if there was ever anything like an ecclesiastical tradition against Copernicanism, it was broken down long before Galileo's time*.' Does it mean that long before Galileo's time

¹ Roberts, p. 25. The italics are ours.

² *Ibid.* p. 27.

there was an *unbroken tradition* against Copernicanism—which infallibly condemned it as false? Or, in other words, does it mean that the chain of witnesses unbroken in one century may be broken in another, and so the ordinary magisterium may in different ages infallibly decide for and against a given doctrine. And if Mr. Murphy does not mean this, what *can* he mean?

Mr. Murphy proceeds to deal with the condemnation of Galileo by the Sacred Congregation of the Index. This, he says, was 'the judgment of a number of men . . . who *happened*' (happened! in formal session and judicial sentence) 'to express an erroneous opinion on a subject on which they are confessedly fallible. It proves what requires no proof, that a number of theologians may err.' Who are these 'fallible men' and 'erring theologians'? They were 'a Congregation acting under the provision of a Bull which distinctly gave the Church to understand that decisions of the kind would invariably be examined and ratified by the Holy See before publication, and would go forth to the world armed with the papal authority.' This Congregation, then, issued a decree in 1616 which Mr. Murphy quotes on p. 727. This decree, he says, is in no way the act of the Pope:—

'He does not speak in it as Universal Teacher; *he does not speak in it at all*. There is no doctrine of faith or morals promulgated in it; the thing decreed in it is the prohibition of certain books, and the suspension of certain others. That is, it is a merely disciplinary decree, which may be altered according to circumstances, and such a decree is not rendered dogmatic by the approbation of the Pope.'

And we should have been inclined to agree with Mr. Murphy, for the references to 'that false Pythagorean doctrine, altogether opposed to Holy Scripture,' seem to be merely *obiter dicta*. But, unfortunately, Galileo thought, or pretended to think, so too, and the Sacred Congregation, 'in emphatic and unmistakable terms, repudiated the notion that its decree might be considered as anything short of an absolute settlement of the whole question.'

'Understanding,' the Congregation said, 'that through the publication of a work at Florence, entitled *Dialogo di Galileo Galilei delle due massime Sistemi del Mondo Ptolemaico e Copernicano*, the false opinion was gaining ground of the motion of the earth and the stability of the sun, it had examined the book, and had found it to be a manifest infringement of the injunction laid upon you, since you have in the same book defended an opinion already condemned and declared to your face to be so, in that you have tried in the said book by various devices to persuade yourself that you leave the

matter undetermined and the opinion expressed as probable; the which, however, is a most grave error, since an opinion can in no manner be probable which has been *declared and defined* to be contrary to the Divine Scripture. And when a convenient time had been assigned you for your defence, you produced a certificate in the handwriting of the most eminent lord Cardinal Bellarmine . . . in which certificate it is affirmed . . . that the *declaration made by our lord the Pope*, and promulgated by the Sacred Congregation of the Index had been announced to you . . . this very certificate . . . asserts that the above-mentioned opinion is contrary to Holy Scripture; yet you dared to treat of it, to defend it, and advance it as probable.' (Roberts, pp. 71, 72.)

Mr. Murphy still holds out and affirms that the Congregation was fallible in the second decree as in the first; for, he argues, the Pope's infallibility cannot be delegated, and it is exercised only when he speaks *ex cathedrâ*. He goes on to quote the Vatican Council as to the conditions of an *ex cathedrâ* pronouncement, and cites various theologians to bear him out in the distinction he draws between dogmatic definitions and *obiter dicta*—a distinction which is rendered quite nugatory by the fact that (we quote from the *Dublin Review*, July 1880, p. 127) 'there is often considerable practical difficulty in knowing whether such "dicta" are "obiter dicta" only or formal pronouncements; or, indeed, in recognizing what pronouncements are *ex cathedrâ*, and what are not.' With regard to his conditions of an infallible decree, we will quote one of those 'Ultramontanes of the most pronounced type' whom he claims to have on his side. Dr. Ward says to Father Ryder (or to Mr. Murphy), 'You often reason as though the supreme Pontiff were tied by God's law to certain particular forms and methods of exercising his office of universal teacher.' And again: 'If there is abundantly sufficient evidence of an instruction having been inculcated on the Church by the Pope, you have no right to reject it on some *à priori* theory as to what dress such an instruction should wear.' And whereas Mr. Murphy holds that the decree was purely disciplinary, and could not have been rendered dogmatic (infallible?) even by the Pope's approbation, Dr. Ward is of opinion that if Paul V. had really pronounced this judgment *ex cathedrâ*, it would have been nothing less than a definition of faith. It is the common teaching of Ultramontane theologians that congregational decrees, issued in the name of the Pope, are beyond doubt infallible. Thus Bouix (*Tractatus de Curia Romana*, part. iii. cap. 7, p. 471) affirms that decrees which (1) the Pope puts forth in his own name after consulting a Congregation, (2) those which a Congregation puts forth

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in its own name with the Pope's confirmation or express order to publish, are certainly *ex cathedrâ*. The decree against Copernicanism was decided upon in the Pope's presence; it was officially made known to Galileo as the *declaration of our Lord the Pope* himself; it dealt with a matter of doctrine. The Congregation emphatically asserted that it should have come to Galileo as a definition fully armed with the Pope's authority and finally decisive of the question. Mr. Murphy's objection that the Congregation had no power to *define* anything, tells against himself; for something certainly was *defined*, and as it could not have been the act of the Congregation, it must have been the act of the Pope himself. Moreover, nothing was done 'nisi jubente et mandante Sanctissimo.' At the very least the Pope was silent when supreme authority was claimed for a congregational decree. Can we suppose that he would have silently endured to see his authority usurped? And if so, would not his silence have been a failure of his infallibility, seeing that, according to the Bull *Speculatores* of Alexander VII., the Church has the right *and the duty* not only of refusing to tolerate but also of proscribing and condemning all errors.

This Bull of Alexander VII. *Speculatores domus Israel*, on which Mr. Mivart so much relies, is treated by Mr. Murphy as altogether beside the mark. It is merely a *list* of decrees, 'an authentic copy of the Index containing all the decrees published by the Congregation up to that time. *It is a reissue by public authority* of all these decrees; but it leaves each decree just as it was. No new obligation is imposed, no change in the character of any of these decrees is made by this Bull' (pp. 723-4). How will this be made to agree with the teaching of all Ultramontane theologians that a confessedly fallible decree of a Congregation becomes undoubtedly infallible when issued in the name of the Pope himself? How could a reissue by public (*i.e.* by Papal) authority leave a decree just as it was, if before it had not the Papal authority? How does the language of the Bull itself support such a view? 'This same general Index,' it runs, 'which we will should be considered as inserted in these presents, *together with all and singular the things contained therein*, we, having taken the advice of our cardinals, confirm and approve with Apostolic authority by the tenor of these presents, and command all persons everywhere to yield this Index a constant and complete obedience.' What, we ask, would be the meaning of confirming and approving with Apostolic authority—a catalogue? And how were all per-

sons everywhere to yield a constant and complete obedience to—a list? Is it not evident that the Pope's intention is to embody in his Bull and make himself responsible for, and give the sanction of his supreme Apostolic authority to, and bind all his subjects to the observance of, not a catalogue of decrees—which would have no meaning—but to *all and singular the things contained therein*, to the subject-matter of the decrees?

But perhaps the best way of dealing with Mr. Murphy is to ask him what would be thought by Roman Catholics of any member of their Church who should treat the ecclesiastical authorities of the present day as he treats those of the seventeenth century, who should persist in preaching a doctrine that had been repeatedly condemned by the Sacred Congregation of the Index, the Pope at least giving his tacit assent and approval to their acts, on the ground that a Congregation is only 'a number of fallible men,' and their decree 'only proves what needs no proof, that a number of theologians may err.' Would he not be considered almost a heretic, and at least be excommunicated? And remembering that the Copernican decrees are still in force, *i.e.* have never been withdrawn, how would Mr. Murphy show that he is not liable to such a penalty? This is why we say that, in respect of obedience to ecclesiastical authority, Mr. Murphy has nothing to boast of over Mr. Mivart. For his article seems to address Mr. Mivart somewhat in this fashion: 'Mr. Mivart, I, with many loyal Catholics, am pained and shocked by your extraordinary assertions. The licence you claim for scientific men the Church will not and cannot grant: it is the offspring of intellectual pride. For you have maintained that in your scientific speculations you are "completely independent, even of supreme ecclesiastical authority," and you "will in no wise allow your efforts after truth to be checked by the declarations of the ecclesiastical authorities." This is flat heresy, and the Catholic Church, if your ideas were to prevail, would be "a Church without a fixed and definite creed;" which fixed and definite creed, notwithstanding certain additions to it, say, in 1851 or 1870, is her chief glory, and that which distinguishes her from all other religious bodies. And this licence is wanton; for the Church leaves you free enough. For look! not only I, the Rev. Jeremiah Murphy, but a Cardinal of the Sacred Congregation of the Index may oppose to your doctrine of evolution as applied to man the ordinary magisterium of the Church; and you may disregard him and still be perfectly orthodox. The Sacred Congregation, assembled in

formal session in the presence of the Holy Father himself, may condemn your doctrine as heretical and most dangerous to the Catholic faith, and contrary to the true sense of Holy Scripture, and their decision may be communicated to you as the "declaration of our lord the Pope" himself; yet you may reassure yourself by reflecting that their act is only the judgment of a "number of fallible men," who have "happened" to take an erroneous view of the matter. But even this is not the whole length of your tether. The Pope may force you in your infirm old age to make a long and toilsome journey to Rome, and present yourself before this Congregation of erring theologians. They shall imprison you and severely rebuke you for having disregarded their fallible decree. They shall threaten you with torture, and force you publicly to abjure your scientific theory as heresy; but all the time its orthodoxy will be unimpeachable. But your independence is more complete than this—more even than you desire; for you shall be actually put to the torture (since this, however painful to you, makes no difference to the argument); you shall, by order of the said Congregation, with at least the tacit assent of the Pope, suffer a horrible death at the stake—but still you will be perfectly orthodox. For, "like the judges in our law courts" (very like!), 'the infallible Pope may order or permit you to be burned alive on a mistaken charge of heresy—in his private capacity!! And even so, your liberty is not exhausted; for, years after, some other Pope may issue a bull, in which he will have inserted the decree that condemned you to death, and confirm it by his Apostolic authority, and order it to be observed always by all. And yet, in that liberty of which your terrible death will be the pledge, all Roman Catholics accepting your theory of evolution will be as orthodox—as I am; and as free to hold it—as you were. Why all this coil, then? Why this outburst of temper in the *Nineteenth Century*? Let me counsel you to act, not perhaps less *fortiter in re*, but somewhat more *suaviter in modo*. Above all, brother, let us be orthodox—you know what I mean.'

This whole discussion raises many questions which it is impossible adequately to treat of at the end of an article; but, we consider, it powerfully illustrates and confirms some conclusions concerning Papal Infallibility which we have long since arrived at, and which we submit for the consideration of Mr. Murphy and of Roman Catholic controversialists generally.

We hold (1) that if the Pope were the infallible guide he

claims to be, the supreme pastor of souls, his voice would give forth no uncertain sound, but when it spoke infallibly would make that fact indubitably clear. We cannot believe that our Lord left His divine truth bound about with the *red tape* of the *Curia Romana*—that it should need experts to discover where it is and what it is, and extricate it from the mass of preambles, arguments, *dicta*, *obiter dicta*, &c. The light of truth can hardly be the *luminous haze* of the Vatican. We hold (2) that his infallibility would be of such a kind as to attach to every official act, not a kind of pontifical robe to put on or off as he chose; not only though he omitted to express his intention of speaking infallibly, but even if he expressly disclaimed such intention, he would speak infallibly. And since some papal acts, even official ones, might be considered too trivial, we should contend that, in spirituals, the excommunication of any member of the Church (which is a direct exercise of the power of the keys), or, in temporals, the sentencing any one to death, is an act of sufficient magnitude to call into exercise and serve as a test of his infallibility. So that if the Pope, acting as head of the Church, has ever sentenced anyone to death unjustly, that act is enough to demonstrate him fallible. The absurdity of the contrary view is shown by Mr. Murphy's suggestion that the Pope, like any other 'fallible theologian,' may err in *his private capacity*, just as 'the judges in our law courts' may, 'who may be in error as to law in a given case, and are not infallible expounders of law in any case.' Is this Mr. Murphy's way of drawing parallels? Do our judges decide cases in their private capacity? And is the Pope not an infallible expounder of law in any case? (3) An infallible voice would not only speak infallibly but would *infallibly speak*; it would not remain silent on a matter of critical importance, especially when a fallible voice, usurping its authority and imitating its accents, was teaching error. For, according to the Bull *Speculatores*, it is not only the *right*, but the *duty*, of the Pope to condemn error. According to Mr. Murphy's own admission, the Pope stood by in silence while a Congregation of cardinals, of which he was the president, which referred all important matters to him for the mature decision of his Apostolic authority, persecuted an innocent man and forced him in prison to abjure as a heresy what, according to Mr. Murphy, is now admitted by the Roman Church to be 'not in any way necessarily connected with revelation.' 'The Pope does not speak in it [the decree of the S. Cong. of the Index] as universal teacher; *he does not speak in it at all*.' There is the breakdown, then, in his

infallibility. To stand by while his authority was used on the side of error and injustice, and then to plead that he took no part in the transaction—that is not like Christ; it is like Pilate washing his hands in token of his innocence of the blood of this just man. For, note, if Galileo had been burnt as a heretic, Mr. Murphy could, and would be bound to, argue in precisely the same way—the Pope did not speak, and if he assented, it was in *his private capacity*. The Pope's voice is infallible? But how if this infallible voice be *dumb*? (4) We do not know that attention has ever been sufficiently drawn to the silence of the Pope's infallible voice on matters belonging to what is in some respects the more important department of his jurisdiction. 'The Pope cannot err in faith or morals, for he is our infallible guide in both,' says the Roman Catholic. But while doctrine is defined with the utmost precision and assent exacted with the utmost rigour, *morals* are severely left alone—practically, as we may observe in Ireland at the present time; theoretically, as may be seen in any volume of Moral Theology, say that of St. Alphonsus Liguori, or the Compendium by P. Gury. Here are to be found literally hundreds of questions concerning practical right and wrong to which the Roman Catholic can get no certain answer. Opening Gury at random, we come upon such a question as 'How long an omission to pray constitutes a grave sin?'—*a grave* or *mortal* sin meaning one that, in the elegant language of the *Dublin Review*, 'merits hell' (*passim*). Surely a question of conduct that may involve everlasting punishment is one of the first importance, and seems to demand a plain answer; surely it is just such a question as calls for the *dictum* of an infallible voice. The oracle, however, is silent, and the question is left to the theologians: who say, some that a month's, others that as little as a week's, others again that not less than a year's, neglect to pray makes a grave sin; and the confessor is advised to leave the question alone. Hundreds of questions are 'answered' in the same way. The infallible guide in faith and morals—prudently, no doubt—says nothing.

This, we conceive, should be a matter of most careful consideration to those who feel drawn to the Roman Church by the hope she holds out that in her communion all doubts are solved, all questions answered; 'who,' in the language of Fr. Knox, 'weary of their searchings after a truth that is perpetually slipping from their grasp, yearn for nothing so much as an infallible teacher, whose eye will ever be on them and whose voice will never fail them.' Never! though in a

question involving eternal punishment it will allow three uncertain answers!

Lastly and chiefly, we would point out that the Roman Church has two standards of infallibility, one for foreign and the other for domestic use, one for the heretic outside and the other for the faithful within the fold; so as to obtain the maximum of power with the minimum of responsibility. Arraign any act of a Pope's, and Mr. Murphy or some other counsel for the defence will plead that the infallibility of the Pope was not exercised in it at all, inasmuch as the Pope claims to speak infallibly only when he speaks as (1) Universal Teacher, (2) on some matter of faith or morals, (3) intending to bind all the members of the Church to accept his teaching; and it is only his express teaching that is infallible, not the title or preamble or arguments or *obiter dicta*. And so the assailant is beaten off. But let him, feeling that, after all, the infallibility claimed by the Pope is very limited, be persuaded to become a Romanist, and he is taught: (1) Many truths . . . not theological but philosophical, political, historical, physical . . . the Church can declare infallibly (Ward's *Essays*, p. 445); (2) God has not obliged the Pope to any determinate form of speaking *ex cathedrâ* (p. 463); (3) A pronouncement may be *ex cathedrâ* which, as regards its form, is not addressed to the whole Church (p. 465). It appears from the history of the Louvain decrees that a decree may be infallible which the *Holy See requires to be kept secret*; the *Dublin Review* even declares that a Roman Catholic 'may be obliged, at times, loyally to accept what may afterwards turn out to be erroneous' (July 1880, p. 117). And the same Review, whilst instructing us that the *dicta* of a papal instruction alone claim infallibility, adds (July 1880, p. 127): 'There is often considerable difficulty in knowing whether such *dicta* are *obiter dicta* or formal pronouncements; indeed, in recognizing what pronouncements are *ex cathedrâ* and what are not' (see *ante*, p. 345). And so in spite of Mr. Murphy's 'three conditions,' F. Knox (p. 103) lays down:

'We can neither set limits to her teaching nor free ourselves from the obligation of obeying her [the Church, *i.e.* the Pope]. Since He [our Lord] has put no restriction on the obedience she can claim from us, it follows that whatever she bids us do we are bound to do, and whatever she bids us believe we are bound to believe. *She can bind us to what she pleases and in what way she pleases.* Our obedience must be unbounded, absolute, unreasoning.'

Attack Papal infallibility, and the Pope will ask only the limited domain of the Vatican decree. Become a subject of

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the Pope, and see how his theory develops in practice until it is found that he exacts absolute and unreasoning obedience in every department of action and thought; thus reversing another maxim of old Rome in making his policy

'Parcere Superbis, debellare Subjectos.'

Since the above was in type this controversy has advanced another stage. Not having received 'even the slightest hint of disapprobation from any ecclesiastical authority,' although he had 'purposely so stated his case as practically to challenge censure,' but having, on the contrary received many messages of praise and thanks, amongst them one from the superior of a Mediæval Religious Order, Mr. Mivart considers that 'all danger of conflict between "the Church" and Biology is for ever at an end,' and 'biological science is, in respect of Catholic controversy, an affair of the past' (p. 32). But there are other departments of science, he fears, with which 'the Church' is likely to come into early and desperate conflict, and chief among them is Biblical criticism.

To this important department of science Mr. Mivart has had his attention directed and has devoted some study since writing his former article. He has found it possible 'without having any recourse to the Hebrew tongue,' to form satisfactory judgments about many Biblical matters, and more particularly to decide that certain conclusions of critics like Reuss, Colenso, Wellhausen, and Kuenen concerning the dates, authorship, and historical value of the several books of the Old Testament, are indefinitely nearer to the truth than the old beliefs on those points 'which are still most widely accepted by the Christian world, and were universally accepted till the middle of last century' (p. 42). These new views have great weight, and must on the whole be accepted as correct, because they solve satisfactorily a number of problems which otherwise appear insoluble, and, 'moreover, a refutation of them has not even been seriously attempted by Catholics.' The novelty and startling character of these views may move 'the Church' to exercise her infallible authority and pronounce upon them. If she is guilty of such temerity, Mr. Mivart can foresee only one result—a defeat as decisive and crushing as that she suffered over the question of Copernicanism, and as that which she would have suffered from Biology if she had not saved herself by a timely surrender. Indeed, 'there are men of mark' who 'are convinced that the great Catholic Church—the ship of Peter—after successfully riding the swelling billows of physical science, will at last be

engulfed in the whirlpool of Biblical criticism' (p. 31). To save her from this disaster, he counsels and implores her to lighten the ship by casting overboard her charts and compass. So certain is he that she will be worsted in any conflict, that he solemnly warns her to keep out of the fray and not again venture to measure her strength with an enemy who has invariably proved the stronger. And this counsel is the more salutary, he urges, that 'this is an age of synthesis, and *naturally augmenting Catholicism*;' an age 'in which we ought to do all we can to promote the spirit of conciliation, sympathy, and brotherhood, and to cultivate above all a large-hearted charity, while remaining scrupulously zealous for every atom of scientific truth' (p. 36)—a sentence which would have a more logical conclusion if instead of *scientific* he had written *religious* truth.

Mr. Mivart's views are not at present our concern, or we might remark that, if before his next article he has time to study the modern criticism of the *New Testament* in the works of such writers as Strauss and Renan, he will arrive at as strange views concerning our Lord Himself as he has already reached concerning Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, *e.g.*, of whom it is thought to be 'in the highest degree unlikely that they ever existed,' and 'no passage of the history of any one of them is of the slightest historical value' (p. 41). Mr. Justice Stephen points out that Christianity is based on certain facts related in the Old and New Testaments, and with these facts must stand or fall. Either issue, indeed, he can contemplate with equanimity, but he clearly foresees that for the Church to allow some at least of these facts to be called in question, to be described as doubtful, unhistorical, or untrue, would be to surrender all that she exists to preserve, and allow the ground to be cut away from under her feet. 'Surely you do not call *that* history,' says the pious lady in the *New Republic*, referring to the Old Testament. 'I should think *not*,' answered the sceptic with a sneer: and the sceptic was right, though in a sense not his own—or Mr. Mivart's. The Bible is not history—that is, is not mere history. It is much more than history. It is a revelation of God to man, given through the Church, and error in the Bible is tantamount to a flaw in her own title-deeds. In whatever sense and to whatever extent it be inspired, it stands apart from all other books, even from those which in the modern cant are most *inspired*; and the Church cannot suffer it to be dealt with as other

¹ The italics are ours.

works. Mr. Mivart, indeed, can hardly mean all that his words imply. If modern Biblical criticism should conclude that our Lord was not born of a Virgin, that He did not say and do the things recorded of Him in the Gospels, or that He did not rise from the dead, he would not, we hope, consider it necessary or safe for the Church to accept or tolerate such conclusions, or charge her with being an 'obstructive' if she branded them as false, heretical, and subversive of the Catholic faith. Mr. Mivart is in the first enthusiasm of his Biblical studies. We doubt not that after he has made some further progress he will return to his more sober judgment. Leaving him, then, to continue his Biblical studies, we turn to the purpose which we have chiefly set before ourselves in watching this controversy, viz. to observe the action of the Roman ecclesiastical authorities, and try to estimate the value both of the Unity which Roman Catholics make their special boast and proudly contrast with the unhappy divisions of other branches of the Church, and also, of the newest weapon that has been forged to preserve that unity, the personal infallibility of the Pope.

That 'infallible teacher, whose eye will ever be upon them, and whose voice will never fail them'¹ has, it is almost needless to say, been *silent*. 'There were not wanting persons,' says Mr. Mivart, 'who anticipated that I should incur severe blame, and I have reason to know that others earnestly solicited my condemnation;' but 'up to the present time I have not received even a private hint of disapprobation from any ecclesiastical authority' (p. 31). Perhaps the Pope is waiting for the opinion of those 'erring theologians' 'who may be in error as to law in a given case and are not infallible expounders of law in any case,' to quote Mr. Murphy. No wonder that his silence has encouraged or provoked Mr. Mivart to 'Call him louder!'

It is equally edifying to observe the *unity* of Mr. Mivart's fellow Roman Catholics. 'Their unanimity is wonderful.' Many of them, 'members of the clergy, most varied as to rank and position, and a much smaller number of the laity, have sent him most gratifying messages of warm thanks for his first article.' A most esteemed superior of one of the Mediæval Religious Orders writes:

'Since your *Nineteenth Century* article, I have frequently had to explain your views both in England and elsewhere. *There is not a shadow of a shade of unorthodoxy about them.* That also is the

¹ Vide ante, p. 351.

opinion of Cardinal —, with whom I had a conversation there-
 ament. Your article was telling in the right direction, even for theo-
 logical science. What a pity it is to find such narrowness amongst
 those whose duty it is to teach the noblest science of all! Deep and
 far-seeing theological thinkers are rare; but there are some to be
 found, though they write comparatively little. They have, I am
 happy to say, more influence at headquarters than some people
 think' (p. 32).

On the other side, Mr. Jeremiah Murphy testifies, as we
 have seen, that 'Catholics who have read Mr. Mivart's article
 are pained and shocked by the extraordinary assertions it
 contains.' Since Mr. Mivart's second article appeared, Dr.
 Hedley also, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Newport and
 Menevia, has entered the lists against him, and goes so far as
 to say that he 'has said some rather strong things which are
 wrong in point of theology—erroneous principles—views
 which in some cases implicitly contradict the defined Catholic
 faith' (p. 402).

Bishop Hedley deals very tenderly, almost timidly, with
 Mr. Mivart:

'Just hints a fault, and hesitates dislike;'

and gives him, we think—and Mr. Murphy agrees with us—
 undue credit for certain dubious expressions of loyalty to his
 Church. 'A loyal Catholic must of course say that when
 any matter is clearly of faith, his conclusions must be wrong
 if they are opposed to it.'¹ 'And I admit,' says Bishop
 Hedley, 'that he never knowingly contradicts or nullifies this
 latter avowal'—whereas we have ourselves pointed out that
 he nullifies this avowal in the very next sentence, which runs:
 'But after all, and in every case, he has but his own judgment
 to rely on as to the fact or nature of the supposed conflict.
 It is only through his reason informed by his senses that he
 can possibly know that any decision has been made. . . and
 therefore he has always the choice whether to distrust the
 fact of the decision or the fact of physical science.' This, Mr.
 Murphy says, 'completely neutralizes' the avowal that gives
 so much satisfaction to Bishop Hedley, and is equivalent to
 saying that 'loyal Catholics are free to believe just what they
 please.'

Indeed, we cannot but regard it as unfortunate that these
 two champions of unity and orthodoxy did not come to some
 agreement together as to the line they should take in this
 controversy. For example, Bishop Hedley, speaking in
 defence of Mr. Murphy, says:

¹ Mr. Mivart, July 1885, p. 45.

'The Rev. Jeremiah Murphy . . . denied that Catholics were free to hold the doctrine, &c., &c.; but he took care to add, "On this ordinary meaning of Scripture we can insist unless the evolutionists show that there is sufficient reason for departing from it. This they have not done, and consequently the *prima-facie* Scriptural view need not be abandoned." Could anything show more clearly that Fr. Murphy is not an obstructive? Had he acted in the spirit of Mr. Mivart's articles, he would have said, "Theology belongs to the Church; man's creation is a theological matter, and therefore no scientific investigation can possibly affect the Church's view about the formation of the body."

Now this is, we take it, precisely what Mr. Murphy did say and mean and means to say. Whether the *primâ-facie* Scriptural view need be abandoned or not is irrelevant; the question is, *May it not* be abandoned? Is it unorthodox to abandon it? So Mr. Mivart understood Mr. Murphy's article, and so must every candid reader. Is it possible that Bishop Hedley's views are not quite orthodox? Or again, is it possible that Mr. Murphy, even in condemning Mr. Mivart, took care to *hedge*? Does Bishop Hedley mean that 'a doctrine asserted by the ordinary magisterium of the Church,' which 'we are as strictly bound to believe as if it had been defined by a General Council or by a Pope speaking *ex cathedra*,' can be abandoned if 'evolutionists show that there is sufficient reason for departing from it.' Does he deem it consistent with his faith to consider *any* reason that might be adduced as, in this sense, *sufficient*?

Bishop Hedley promises another article, in which he will consider Mr. Mivart's views on the inspiration of Holy Scripture. Meantime he goes to the root of this controversy, and handles Mr. Mivart's test question, the Condemnation of Galileo. He gives us one more version of the affair, has recourse to just one more ingenious, but far from ingenuous, shift to escape from the facts of the case. His contentions are: (1) Admitting, merely for the sake of argument, that Galileo was infallibly condemned, nevertheless the heresy of which he was condemned was *technical* and *constructive* only. (2) That this is so is shown by the fact that, even while his theories were being condemned as heretical, they were considered by Bellarmine and other 'instructed persons' who could fairly interpret the mind of the Church, as possibly true, and not impossible to be one day so clearly demonstrated as to prevail over the then orthodox belief.

With regard to the first point, he proceeds thus: Copernicanism was condemned as a heresy; but this condemna-

tion was founded on a *reason*, viz. that it contradicted Holy Scripture: and this contradiction is the very essence of the heresy. We must therefore chiefly regard, not the condemnation, but the reason—the alleged contradiction of Holy Scripture. But further, the term, Contradiction of Holy Scripture, is used in two ways: (a) Strictly, signifying 'the formal contradiction of God's Word—the contradiction of the undoubted, admitted and unassailable interpretation of God's Word;' (b) 'in a much looser sense, to imply a contradiction of the common, but not necessarily Catholic, view of what Scripture says.' In this latter sense Galileo's theory was condemned; and so far from its being heresy in the stricter sense, 'there would be no harm in discussing it privately, so as not to scandalize the general Catholic flock' (pp. 408-9).

Mr. Murphy tells us that in any infallible pronouncement, 'it is the thing decreed and not the preamble *or the reasons for it* that is affected' (p. 729). But let that pass. All that we have to do is to oppose to Bishop Hedley's elaborate ingenuity the words of the condemnation itself. Whereas, in his view, Copernicanism was condemned as contradicting the common but *not necessarily Catholic* view of the Holy Scripture, the *Monitum* of 1620 condemned it as contradicting *the true and Catholic interpretation* of Scripture: 'Sacra Scripturae ejusque verae et Catholicae interpretationi repugnantia' (Roberts, p. 122). That there would be no harm in discussing it privately is in the teeth of the emphatic words, 'Et ut *prorsus tolleretur* tam perniciosa doctrina;' of the prohibition to teach, defend, or treat of the theory in any manner; and most of all, of the sentence upon Galileo which says, 'You have rendered yourself vehemently suspect of heresy to this Holy Office in having *believed and held* the false doctrine,' &c. (*ib.* p. 130). Galileo was examined under threat of torture as to whether he *believed in* heliocentricism; he was required to abandon with 'a *sincere heart* and faith unfeigned,' what Bishop Hedley says he or anyone else was perfectly free to discuss privately.

But Bishop Hedley further holds that, however clear and emphatic the terms in which Copernicanism was condemned, they must be interpreted according to what we know of the sense put upon them by 'instructed persons who were on the spot and mixed up in the controversy. For words mean what they are intended to mean' (p. 410). Anyone but a Roman Catholic controversialist in a difficulty would prefer to maintain that *words mean what they say*; inasmuch as

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honest men use those words which will express what they mean, or, if Bishop Hedley will have it so, what they intend to mean. But, surely, the right way to get at the mind of the Church tribunals is to examine their own official documents rather than to interpret them by unofficial statements or by mere gossip. An Act of Parliament is interpreted by the terms in which it is expressed, and not, *e.g.*, by the remarks on it in the daily press before and after it is passed. The decision of a court of judges is not to be read in the light of some expressions that one of them has let fall at a dinner-party the night before. And so, any private opinion that Cardinal Bellarmine may have expressed concerning the subject-matter of the decree of the S. Cong. of the Index is nothing to the purpose in examining the official act, in which, after due discussion, as we may suppose, he joined with his brother-cardinals to issue a solemn, authoritative and final decision. Then again, it is not as if there were any dearth of words by which the precise *note* of condemnation could be affixed to the doctrine. The ecclesiastical vocabulary is, in this kind, as ample as precise. We are informed by Roman theologians that we cannot be too precise in the interpretation of these *notes*, seeing that the utmost precision is observed in applying them. If the Pope did not mean to condemn Copernicanism as *heresy*, he might have branded it as *heresi proxima*, or *heresin sapiens*, or *falsa*, or *temeraria*, or *piis auribus offensiva*, or in any other way that would have exactly expressed his meaning. But he condemned it as *heresy*—simply and plainly *heresy*; we will take leave, therefore, in spite of Bishop Hedley's private judgment to the contrary, to assume that he meant what he said.

But the most interesting point that Bishop Hedley raises is, whether at the time that Copernicanism was condemned as *heresy*, it was considered by Bellarmine and other instructed persons as a 'theory that might some day be demonstrated to be correct, and therefore plainly not a matter concerning which an infallible definition was possible.' With an air of triumph masking a very desperate move, Dr. Hedley rebukes Mr. Mivart for stopping short just at the most interesting passage of Bellarmine's letter to Padre Foscarini. We will quote as much of the letter as is necessary to get the full force of Bishop Hedley's comment, which we consider one of the most remarkable utterances in all controversy. Bellarmine writes (p. 408):—

'All the Fathers and modern commentators have interpreted literally those passages which speak of the sun in the heavens and

its revolution round the earth and of the earth's immobility in the centre of the universe. Think calmly and prudently whether the Church can allow a meaning to be given to Holy Scripture which is contrary to that of the Fathers and all interpreters, Greek or Latin. Do not say that this is no matter of faith: if it is not a matter of faith *ex parte objecti*, it is a matter of faith *ex parte dicentis*. Thus it would be heretical to deny that Abraham had two sons or Jacob twelve, as it would be to deny that Christ was born of a Virgin, because both assertions are made by the Holy Spirit through the mouth of the Prophets and Apostles. *If there were any true demonstration that the sun was in the centre of the universe and that it does not revolve round the earth but the earth round the sun, then it would be necessary to proceed very solicitously and carefully in the explanation of those passages of Scripture which appear to be contrary, and rather to say that we do not understand than to say that what is demonstrated is false. . . . In case of doubt we ought not to abandon the interpretation of the Fathers.*"¹

Here the Cardinal says, as plainly as words can speak, that geocentricism is the interpretation of the Fathers and all interpreters; that we must not say it—the literal interpretation—is no matter of faith; for although the relation of the sun to the earth is a physical and not a religious truth (*ex parte objecti*), the truth of the Scripture which affirms it is a religious truth (*ex parte dicentis*). Just as Abraham's having had two sons may not be denied, not because that is a religious truth, but because the truth of the Holy Spirit is as much involved in it as in the Gospel statement that Christ was born of a Virgin.

Now, how does Bishop Hedley torture this plain statement? He says:

'The Cardinal sees all the time that the Scripture statements as to the earth and the sun are *not* [!] really so plain and categorical as the statement about the sons of the patriarch. He sees, therefore, that the literalness of these statements *could* be denied [!] without necessarily proclaiming Scripture false. He sees, in other words, that the literal meaning cannot be of faith either *ex parte materie* or *ex parte dicentis*!!!'

Before such comment as this we can only rub our eyes and ask if *black* really can be *white*, and *yes* and *no* mean the same thing. 'Do not say,' writes Bellarmine, 'that this is no matter of faith: if it is not of faith *ex parte objecti*, it is of faith *ex parte dicentis*.' 'He sees,' coolly explains Bishop Hedley, 'that the literal meaning *cannot* be of faith either *ex parte objecti* or *ex parte dicentis*.' But then we only know what Bell-

¹ Italicised by Bishop Hedley.

armine said: Bishop Hedley doubtless knows not only what he said but what he 'intended to mean.'

But how then, Bishop Hedley will ask, shall we deal with the passage he has italicized, which surely speaks of a doubt, and entertains the possibility of a future demonstration of the Copernican theory. Could he consider a view to be possibly reformable which had been declared to be a matter of faith? We do not think it difficult to answer this question. It is common in argument to put a case *per impossibile*. When a certain bookseller complimented a certain poet by saying, 'Sir, your epic will be read when Homer and Milton are forgotten—but not till then,' the poet was probably not very much flattered. The common saying, 'If the sky falls, then we shall catch larks,' does not imply any doubt of the stability of the firmament. In the same way, we submit, Bellarmine, *per impossibile*, supposes a future demonstration of the Copernican theory, and speculates as to what course would then have to be adopted in interpreting the Holy Scripture, without at all admitting that such a demonstration would ever really be furnished. This was certainly the case with Caramuel, whom Bishop Hedley quotes on the next page as, 'notwithstanding the judgment of the Inquisition, considering that the heliocentric view might prevail.' Fortunately, Caramuel has explained the nature of his doubt. In treating this question, he says:

'Assero igitur, esse impossibile quod olim moveri terram demonstrative suadeatur. Quid si suaderetur demonstrative? Respondeo: Uno impossibili admissio, non esse absurdum si impossibilia et absurda sequantur.'¹

These are the words of Bishop Hedley's own witness, and we put it to him, Do they express the doubt of one who did or did not believe that the condemnation of heliocentrism was irreformable, and the supposition of its truth a manifest absurdity?

But, after all, Bellarmine is for ever silent, and although we know what he said, we do not profess to know, although Bishop Hedley is ready to inform us, what he intended to mean. That is not the case, however, with the Rev. Jeremiah Murphy, who has expressed a doubt concerning the possibility of demonstrating the evolution of man in almost exactly the same terms as Bellarmine's doubt as to the possibility of demonstrating Copernicanism.

¹ *Theologia Fundamentalis*, lib. i. n. 28, p. 210; quoted by Roberts, p. 34.

'On this ordinary meaning [of the text of Scripture] we can insist, *unless the evolutionists show that there is sufficient reason for departing from it. This they have not done, and consequently the prima-facie Scriptural view need not be abandoned.*'¹

'*If there were any true demonstration that the sun was in the centre of the universe &c., then it would be necessary to proceed very solicitously and carefully in the explanation of those passages of Scripture which appear to the contrary. . . . In case of doubt, we ought not to abandon the interpretation of the Fathers.*'²

Here are doubts expressed in perfectly equivalent—practically identical—terms. Bellarmine, as we have said, is beyond our questioning, but Mr. Murphy is not. To Mr. Murphy, therefore, we put the question: Does he consider 'the immediate formation of our first parents' to be doubtful, although, in his own words, 'it is asserted by the ordinary magisterium of the Church which we are as strictly bound to believe as if it had been defined by a General Council or by a Pope speaking *ex cathedrâ*'? Has he condemned Mr. Mivart's theory 'with the implicit understanding that it may possibly one day be proved to be correct'? If not, then we make answer to Bishop Hedley: 'Cardinal Bellarmine's doubt means just as much and just as little as Mr. Murphy's or Caramuel's.' If, on the other hand, Mr. Murphy only means that Roman Catholics must hold the immediate formation theory to be infallibly true *until science has proved it to be untrue*, then we conjure him to say so, and put an end to a ridiculous discussion that begins and ends in an *infallible doubt*.

ART. V.—THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE AND THE ROMAN CATHOLIC REACTION.

1. *Renaissance in Italy. The Catholic Reaction.* By JOHN ADDINGTON SYMONDS. In two volumes. (London, 1886.)
2. *Chapters in European History.* By W. S. LILLY. In two volumes. (London, 1886.)
3. *Short Studies in Ecclesiastical History.* A Biography. By the Rev. H. N. OXENHAM. In one volume. (London, 1885.)

It was recently suggested in the leading literary journal of the day, that an inquiry into the reason for the interest which

¹ Mr. Murphy quoted and italicized by Bishop Hedley, p. 405.

² Cardinal Bellarmine quoted and italicized by Bishop Hedley, p. 408.

the study of Italian literature has always aroused in this country would form a good subject for a prize essay. Such an essay might well rest for its basis upon the works of Mr. Symonds; for, among the many enthusiasts whom Italy enrolls under her banner, it would be difficult to find one who has studied more profoundly the fascinating subject under all its aspects.

In the great highway of Italian literature, beginning with the *Introduction to the Study of Dante*, published some years back, through the more recent *Italian Byways*; from the broad political problems, spiritual and secular, first propounded in the *Divina Commedia*, and ever since the text to which the great writers of all nations and ages have referred, down to the narrow issues of every petty principality which now appear so insignificant, but which have yet in their time contributed their little piece of mosaic to make up the wonderful *pietra dura* of Italian life, and literature and history, Mr. Symonds has studied and observed, and noted and compared, till it becomes a subject of speculation whether the hitherto apparently inexhaustible mine will not some day yield up its last treasures to his indefatigable pen.

The *Catholic Reaction* represents one of his largest studies upon Italy. It forms, as he himself says, 'a logically necessitated supplement' to the five former volumes upon the *Renaissance*, and it is treated on a method analogous to that adopted for the former study. In the volumes now before us for consideration, their subject may be said to divide itself under three distinct heads. The Spanish influence and position in Italy; the conduct of the Council of Trent; and the organization of the Jesuits. With these three clues in his hand the reader may thread with comparative ease the labyrinth of political intrigue, the gloomy horrors of the Inquisition, and the tangled social skein presented by the close study of Italian history during the first seventy years of the sixteenth century in Italy. The retrospect of the period immediately preceding this epoch (1494-1530) is given in a few masterly strokes describing the character and condition of the five great powers which represented Italy. The kingdom of Naples, largest in extent, but stupefied by conquest, and ground under the iron heel of Spain, the most backward in civilization. The Papal States, which each successor in turn to the chair of St. Peter, whether Riario, Della Rovere, Borgia, or Medici, tried in vain to form into one homogeneous kingdom. Equally futile for its purpose and fatal in its consequence, their policy, which must have appeared so crooked and complicated to

their contemporaries, was in reality simple. It consisted in placing the wealth and authority of the Holy See at the disposal of their relatives, military delegates, of whom Caesar Borgia will ever remain as a typical representative. For their own part, despite the absorbing fascination exercised to this day by the temporal interests of the Papacy upon each successor to the Holy See, their attention was at that time forcibly diverted by the pressing claims of General Councils and the hardy attacks of the Reformers, which threatened to shake to its very foundation the spiritual authority of the papacy.

The Duchy of Milan is included in the five great powers, not on account of its size, but, because of its position, its agricultural and commercial resources, it was ever the apple of discord cast down at the opening of each fresh campaign between France and Germany, tossed to and fro till, after the disaster of Pavia, it eventually fell into the lap of Charles V.

Venice had only begun to play a part worthy of her position and power upon the scene of Italian politics. Hitherto her attention had been concentrated upon her Levantine dominions and commercial interests, but when across the golden East, with its sparkling gems and exhaustless treasures, there fell the dark shadow of the advancing infidel invasion, Venice bethought herself in time of strengthening her position by the acquisition of territory upon the mainland. When her seaboard extended till it reached from Aquileia to the mouths of the Po, and her possessions in Lombardy as far as Bergamo, she could stand in the first rank among the powers who made up the scheme of Italian politics, a position from which she was afterwards dethroned, having incurred the displeasure of Rome by the league of Cambrai.

To Florence, the sister republic, this period, one of transition while the republican constitution made its last stand for existence, had resulted in the final triumph of the Medici, and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany now represented in one compact principality the struggle of the last three centuries within and without the ancient walls of the city.

Such was the federation which formed what can only be called the independence of Italy by contrast with the surrender of the country to the Empire, when, after the duel in which the ambition of France received a mortal wound, Charles V. came out with triumphant laurels to receive at the hands of Clement VII. at Bologna the Imperial insignia of the iron and golden crowns.

Mr. Symonds needs no excuse for enlarging on so solemn an epoch in Italian history, and the only lines which could

be spared out of the brilliant pages which describe the muster of the princes, men of letters and artists, to witness the coronation of Charles, is the illustration (vol. i. pp. 36, 37) where the effort to discredit the grace of the Sacraments is of no service in adding point or force to the passage. This and similar passages which occur from time to time throughout the book are unworthy of the pen which can produce so masterly a description as that which sums up the tragic effects upon Italy of the Spanish rule, a description which may be said to form the keynote to those dark masterpieces by Morone in which he has preserved for posterity, alike in the sombre dress introduced by the Emperor into Italy and the determined melancholy of the expression, a record of the eclipse cast by Spain over what is so ably described as 'the constellation of commonwealths from which all intellectual culture, arts of life, methods of commerce, and theories of political influence had been diffused' (p. 54). The following chapter is devoted to what is described by the writer as the counter-Reformation, a term which, he carefully explains in a note, is intended

'to denote the reform of the Catholic Church which was stimulated by the German Reformation, and which, when the Council of Trent had fixed the dogmas and discipline of Latin Christianity, enabled the Papacy to assume a militant policy in Europe, whereby it regained a large portion of the provinces that had previously lapsed to Lutheran and Calvinistic dissent.'

The full significance of the term becomes evident when the writer, passing in review the Councils which preceded the Council of Trent, points out the two methods which were the result of the deliberations of the Council of Constance 1414.

1. The way suggested by John Hus, 'that the Church should be reconstituted after a searching analysis of the real bases of Christian conduct, an appeal to Scripture as the final authority, and a loyal endeavour to satisfy the spiritual requirements of individual souls and consciences.'

2. An inquiry into the existing 'order of the Church, and detailed amendment of its flagrant faults, with preservation of the main system' (vol. i. p. 100).

The first of these two methods, commending itself to the Teutonic race, produced in the next century the rapid and palpable result of the Reformation, while the counter-Reformation was a tardy result of the adoption of the second method by the Latin races in the reforms suggested for the purgation of the Church by the Council of Trent.

If the organization of the counter-Reformation was slow and deliberate by comparison with the rapid propagation of the Reformation doctrines, yet when at last it began to take shape and effect there was neither hesitation nor delay in its action, and the Council of Trent convened by the Emperor Charles V. and the Pope Paul III.—two of the most astute politicians who have ever worn the imperial diadem or the papal tiara—was able to cast up in defence of the Church of Rome a bulwark which was of strength and durability sufficient to stem the wave of reformation, then at the high tide of enthusiasm, and against which it has ever beaten in vain.

'Rome,' it is commonly said, 'was not built in a day,' and it took nearly a quarter of a century to erect the bulwark which so effectually propped the tottering foundation of her spiritual power.

Officially opened at Trent in 1542 by Cardinals Pole and Morone, legates of Pope Paul III., it was transferred to Bologna lest the powerful influence of the Emperor Charles V. should carry the reforms urged by the Spanish bishops, which were to secure the independence of their episcopate, and then back again to Trent in 1551, where it continued its deliberation under the successive pontificates of Julius III. and Marcellus II.

In 1555, in the domineering influence of Cardinal Caraffa, who under the title of Paul IV. succeeded to the Holy See, the Papal ascendancy became again manifest in proportion as the Imperial influence subsided; the reins which had fallen from the powerful hands of Charles V. being feebly lifted by Ferdinand, while on behalf of Spain Philip II. made a vain attempt to contend with the fierce will which was divided between two objects—the emancipation of Italy from the Spaniards, and the establishment of the most rigid orthodoxy in the Church. Yielding the former point, even when Alva stood triumphant before the gates of Rome, he became afterwards, in the Pope's iron grasp, a fitting tool with which to manipulate the process of the counter-Reformation, the other supreme ambition of this determined successor to the chair of St. Peter; and for ever associated with their two names will be the first outline of the dark shadow cast by the Inquisition upon the history of the time.

The genuine reformation of ecclesiastical abuses which had been the declared object of the reign of Paul IV., while it worked a miracle at Rome, stimulated the efforts of the Tridentine Council, and brought it to a conclusion under the succeeding pontificate of Pius V., with the result of 'leaving

an undisputed sovereignty in theological and ecclesiastical affairs, with the Papacy.'

It only remained for Pius V. to support the spiritual supremacy with temporal authority, and by organizing an alliance between the sovereigns of Europe and the Holy See so maintain his position against the aggressive advance of the Protestants.

Such an alliance was the crowning success for Rome of the Tridentine Council. The steps by which this result was attained, the clever diplomatic stroke by which the ecclesiastical authorities on the Council were transformed, at the conclusion of their labours for ecclesiastical reform, into so many ambassadors from the different Courts of Europe; and the solemn Conclave into a political conference, are described with vigorous touches as the subject reaches its climax—touches which would have lost none of their interest, and gained instead of alienating the full confidence of the reader, if the profane satire with reference to the Holy Ghost (p. 121) had not been quoted as an illustration, or at least not repeated three times, and twice in one page (p. 131).

The Council terminated, its decrees were ratified (December 26, 1563) by a Bull reserving to the Pope the sole right of interpreting them in doubtful or disputed cases.

Throughout the pages of this brilliant chapter upon the Tridentine Council it seems as if each successor to the Holy See became instinct with life as he approaches in turn to occupy the chair of St. Peter, and by his individual characteristics, whether it is the caution of Paul III., the fiery nature of the Neapolitan Paul IV., the far-sighted powers of calculation and diplomacy of Pius IV., or the ascetic severity of Pius V., each and all contribute their quota to produce for the Papacy that position of absolute sovereignty, that acknowledged headship of Christendom which, remaining as a fact for more than three centuries in Europe, has hardly lost its influence, even when divested of actual temporal dominion.

With the Council of Trent the first epoch of Ultramontanism is closed. It had commenced with the Council of Constance, when, as we have seen, the two methods or principles of reformation were balanced in the scales of Christendom.

Had the opposite method been adopted, the religious schism would not have been completed, and the Church would have remained catholic without the narrowing epithet of Roman—a direct result of the Ultramontane policy, but which formed no part of the wide scheme of Hildebrand, the greatest Pope (Gregory VII.) who ever occupied the chair of

St. Peter. His election to it has been considered one of the four landmarks of history, the turning point of the Middle Ages, which began with the coronation of Charlemagne and closed with the fall of Constantinople. And as in modern history the Council of Trent may be looked upon as the pivot upon which the affairs of the Papacy and the Roman Church may be said to turn, it will not be out of place to consider two events of such vital importance together.

We are indebted to Mr. Lilly for reminding us in his *Chapters on European History* of a striking metaphor which, by seizing upon the imagination, fixes the first two epochs in our minds. 'Charlemagne,' remarks M. Villemain in his rhetorical way, 'in decorating the Pope with so many titles, had merely wished to raise a gilt statue which should place the Imperial crown upon his own head. After Charlemagne, when his empire was ruled with a feeble hand, and divided by factions, the pontifical statue came to life and wanted to reign.'¹

But, although in the person of Hildebrand 'the statue wanted to reign,' it was not from motives of personal ambition; and the investigations of the last half-century, especially those of MM. Villemain and Guizot, have gone far to remove the popular conception of him as a man of insatiable ambition and spiritual pride, and to represent him as an earnest reformer upon the basis of morality, justice, and order. His idea was a reform at once voluntary and thorough, purely for the spiritual welfare of the Church, not, as in the case of the Tridentine Council, a concession wrung from the Pope at the last moment because his temporal position would be endangered by a refusal to permit it.

The honest policy of Hildebrand has its full value when contrasted with the manoeuvres and subterfuges by which each succeeding Pontiff throughout the eighteen years' session of the Council of Trent endeavoured to mask his determination to uphold the temporal supremacy of the Holy See at whatever cost—a determination which would even lead them to invite the assistance of Soliman and his Turkish forces, or side with the Protestants when they could be made a thorn in the side of the Emperor, although, as Sarpi observes, 'ben voleva la depressione dei Protestanti ma non con aumento delle cose di Cesare.'²

¹ Lilly's *Chapters in European History*, vol. i. p. 119; see also Rosmini's *Five Wounds of the Holy Church*, chap. iv. pp. 194-5.

² 'He earnestly desired the damage of the Protestant cause, but not if it was to result in the advantage of Cæsar [the Emperor].—*Ist. del Conc. Trid.* vol. ii. p. 49.

For the same reason also, as we have seen, Paul III. moved the Council from Trent to Bologna, that he might more effectually crush the claims of the Spanish episcopate. It was not for such treatment as this that Hildebrand rescued episcopal investiture from lay hands. It was no wish of his that the Bishops should become so many police officers whose duty it was to sacrifice all claim of national independence or individuality at the slightest sign from the Vatican. His conception of the position of the Church was such as to put to shame any notion so petty and so vulgar, and it has been well described by Mr. Lilly in one of his most eloquent passages:—

‘His aim was the liberty of the Church. To free her from the fetters whether of vice or earthly tyranny, and vindicate her claims to absolute independence in carrying out her mission—as a society perfect and complete in herself, divine in her constitution, divine in her superiority to the limit of time and space, in the world, but not of it, a supernatural order amid the varying forms of secular polity.’¹

Before so grand a conception as this even the proud *urbi et orbi* appears infinitely small, for such an ideal would seem to be reserved the fulfilment of the Divine promise that ‘all things are possible,’ because it implies the full persuasion of the belief which is the first condition of the promise. In all his battles for the Church Hildebrand never lost sight of her spiritual character; when he fought for her liberties, it was not for the aggrandizement of the Papal dominions by this or that petty State; it was not for the indulgence of evil passions which were sufficient to bring the Holy See into perpetual disrepute: it was for the voice of conscience, the principle of responsibility to One whom it is better to obey rather than man; it was for the liberty with which Christ has made us free to serve Him and accomplish His work—that liberty which Hildebrand, by his famous *non possumus*, refused to surrender when, seized in the dead of night, while celebrating mass on Christmas Eve 1075, he hardly escaped the fate of Beckett at the hands of a baron as ruthless as Tracy or Morville, the servant of a master as unscrupulous as our English Henry.

Out of that struggle, characteristic of a fierce nation and a barbarous period, he came forth victorious. The result of the Council of Trent was also to leave the victory with the Papacy; but if it is a vain speculation as to what might have been the position of the Church had there been then a Hilde-

¹ Vol. i. p. 137.

brand to guide her counsels, we may at least enumerate some of the advantages from the negative side.

The religious wars in France would not have culminated in the horrors of the St. Barthélemy, the Thirty Years' War would not have desolated Germany, the Civil War in England would have lost its primary incentive, Charles I. need not have died a martyr to his religion, and the shuddering tale of the French Revolution would have remained untold.

These were the struggles for a liberty which no Divine Master ever authorized, struggles which need never have taken place, but which were the result more or less direct of the tyranny exercised by the Roman Church when from her strengthened position she sent forth to accomplish her arbitrary decrees those two 'bad angels,' as Mr. Symonds advisedly terms them, 'on whose assistance she relied in her crusade against liberties of thought, and speech, and action. These were the Inquisition and the Company of Jesus.'

Two very powerful chapters are devoted to the consideration of these twin subjects. The insolence of the Holy Office, that supreme misnomer for the Inquisition, which, as it increased in pride and power, fearlessly insulted thrones and episcopates, nay, even the Papacy itself, is well designated, and the subsequent horrors perpetrated by Torquemada and his 'black guards,' but upon these last there is no occasion to dilate; they are familiar to every student of history, though perhaps they never appeared more hideous than when summed up in these pages.

Less known than these barbarous horrors, but more interesting, is the account of the growth of the Index, described by an Italian writer as a dagger drawn from the scabbard to assassinate letters, and by another 'as the finest secret which has ever been discovered for driving men out of their senses.'¹

The wholesale and more vulgar method of destruction by fire which prevailed in the Middle Ages with regard to heretical writings, and which, stretching into modern times, produced the holocaust of six thousand volumes at Salamanca, destroyed in 1490 by Torquemada on the charge of sorcery, gave place to the elaborate regulations of the Index. The date of the institution of the Index is easily fixed, because it followed close upon the heels of the discovery of printing, and was indeed the chief weapon in the armoury of the Vatican for carrying on the literary warfare against the diffusion of the

¹ 'In somma non fu mai trovato più bell' arcano per adoperar la religione a far gli uomini insensati' (Sarpì, *Ist. del Conc. Tridentino*, vol. ii. p. 91).

Protestant opinions throughout the world by means of the new and wonderful discovery.

The foundation of the Index was laid by Sixtus IV. ; it began by prohibiting the publication of books not previously licensed by ecclesiastical authority. This was confirmed by Alexander VI., who placed all books under the censorship of the episcopacy and the Inquisition, and finally solemnly ratified by a Lateran Council in the time of Leo X.

A list of prohibited books was then drawn up by the Inquisition ; the Universities of the Sorbonne in Paris and Louvain for the Empire, under their respective monarchs, Francis I. and Charles V., were instructed to prepare their lists ; the catalogues were published, and whoever read or owned the works of Luther throughout the Empire was threatened with the penalty of death, while in France a royal edict was issued (1535) prohibiting publication through the press altogether.

The catalogues of the Sorbonne and Louvain formed the nucleus of the Index, which, after the Council of Trent and by means of the Inquisition, grew to the proportions which might be expected from such hands and under such a guidance. 'It was a penal offence to print, sell, own, convey or import any literature, of which the Inquisition had not first been informed, and for the diffusion or possession of which it had not given its permission' (i. p. 211).

Venice, Florence, and Milan contributed their list of prohibited books, and Philip II. and Paul IV. issued their edicts. The Tridentine Council and the Congregation of the Index worked hand in hand, and by 1595, under the pontificate of Clement VIII., the machinery of statutes and decrees had been brought into working order, and that engine of destruction of the human intellect was as completely equipped for its purpose as the torture chambers of the Inquisition with their horrible paraphernalia for the mutilation of the human body. The doctrines of Luther, Zuinglius, and Calvin were utterly condemned ; the translation of the Holy Scriptures into any vernacular idiom wholly excluded from public use and circulation ; all polemical and controversial works, any compilations by heretics, such as dictionaries or concordances, were also prohibited until revised by censors of the press. The prohibition extended next to treatises dealing with occult arts, magic, sorcery, predictions of future events, reservation being made, only to be flagrantly violated in the memorable instance of Galileo, in favour of scientific observation 'touching navigation, agriculture, and the healing art.'

The next point was the censorship or correction of books

which had passed the ordeal, and might be allowed to enter the press; and it is a curious instance of the vigilance inculcated upon the censors that they were not only to investigate the 'notes, summaries, marginal remarks, indexes, prefaces, and dedicatory epistles,' in search of pestilent opinions, but they must even eliminate 'epithets in honour of heretics and anything that may redound to the praise of such persons.'

And if after such severe censure and expurgation any work composed by a condemned author was licensed for the press, although the book might be accepted, the author would remain under condemnation; the title of the book would be printed, as, for example: *The Library*, by Conrad G, 'a writer condemned for his opinions, which work was formerly published and proscribed, but is now expurgated and licensed by superior authority.'

To complete the injustice of the system, the office of censorship was often made over to ignorant persons, who condemned books they did not understand, and many were the expostulations addressed to the Vatican by sons of the Church whose faith had stood even the test of the Inquisition, calling attention to the ignorance and incapacity of the officials they employed.

Commentaries on the Greek Fathers or the Hebrew Psalter would be corrected by persons who, guiltless of the knowledge of either language, concentrated their attention upon discovering passages which did not exactly tally with the Vulgate, for the purpose of annoying the author; or they were instigated by a yet baser motive, that of extorting money by menaces of denouncing the unhappy writer to the Inquisition. In such circumstances the literature of the day had a hard struggle for existence.

Many a passage could be quoted from Sarpi's letter complaining of the impossibility even in Venice of getting books; and Latino Latini, one of the most learned students of the day, writing from Rome, asks his correspondent:

'What are you dreaming of when now that almost every book is interdicted, you still think of making new ones? Here, as I imagine, there is no one who for many years to come will dare to write except on business or to distant friends.

'An Index has been issued of the works which none may possess under pain of excommunication, and the number of them is so great that very few indeed are left to us, especially of those which have been published in Germany. This shipwreck, this holocaust of books, will stop the production of them in your country also, if I do not err, and

¹ *Renaissance in Italy—the Catholic Reaction*, vol. i. p. 219.

will teach editors to be upon their guard. As you love me and yourself, sit and look at your bookcases without opening their doors, and beware lest the very cracks let emanations come to you from those forbidden fruits of learning.¹

Not content with stifling the literature of the period, the censors carried their odious task of mutilation into the old libraries, and laying their ruthless hands upon the precious volumes, erased with printer's ink or pasted over with opaque paper those passages which did not accord with the new theories and practices of the Vatican.

And yet while this secret machinery was in full force the attitude openly assumed by the Holy See towards the new discovery of printing was intended to convey a totally different impression. It formed one of the main features of the counter-Reformation. If the heretical doctrines were to be suppressed at all costs, the Popes had a cherished object, to restore, in their own way, ecclesiastical and theological learning; and when Paolo Manuzio and Aldo il Giovane were fetched in turn from Venice to conduct the Vatican press, it was for the purpose of printing the Fathers and diffusing Catholic literature to counteract the active efforts of the Protestant printing-presses in Germany. But the men of erudition collected for the purpose, with the fear of the Inquisition before them, cramped and intimidated, dared not let the light of knowledge have fair play. If the Vulgate was pronounced inviolable by a Tridentine decree, what was the use of Hebrew scholarship to collate it with the original manuscripts? The Vatican Library was sealed to all such inquiries, and the scholars who were chosen to prepare the manuscripts for the press were no match for students like Erasmus, Casaubon, or Sarpi.

In the present century it is sufficient to cite the name of Rosmini to recall the treatment that is meted out to the scholar who, while perfectly loyal to his Church and his creed, endeavours to bring the light of reason to bear upon those fatal errors of her government which in his treatise are described under the mystical though significant title of the 'Five Wounds of the Holy Church.'²

The hasty condemnation of this book was, it is true, after a lapse of time rescinded, and all the works of Rosmini pronounced free of censure; but their author only survived his acquittal one year. Nor did their error of judgment, of which

¹ *Renaissance in Italy*, vol. i. p. 223-4.

² *Of the Five Wounds of the Holy Church*, Rosmini. Rivingtons, 1883.

they remained, so to speak, self-convicted, have any effect in deterring the Congregation of the Index from dealing out the same cruel measure to the next eminent writer, Padre Curci, who ventured while remaining within her pale to proclaim with persistent courage the ever-unwelcome truth that the spiritual life of the Church was choked by her zeal for temporal interest.¹

The iron determination of Rome to maintain at all costs (1) the Catholic dogma as put forth by herself, (2) the supremacy of the Church, remains unaltered now, as it was then at the period of the counter-Reformation. There was yet another weapon in her armoury more subtle and more deadly in its operations than even the violence of the Inquisition or the unjust tyranny of the Index. These two last dealt with accomplished work, but prevention was better than cure, and the task of the organized Company of Jesus was to penetrate into the secret chamber of the heart and intellect, to drop the poison of deceit and hypocrisy at the source, before ever the thoughts could form themselves into words.

That such was the office of the worse of the two 'bad angels' of Rome, Mr. Symonds endeavours to show in the following chapter. With extraordinary ability—but with an almost ferocious bitterness which begets some doubts as to the writer's accuracy—the whole system is laid bare, beginning with the founder, whose strange and powerful character, a compound of enthusiasm, of chivalry and religious zeal, would leave the moralist at fault in his speculations as to how much to admire and how much to deprecate, were it not for the eternal voice of conscience, which reminds us of the awful condemnation awaiting those who say, 'Let us do evil that good may come,' and bids us repel with horror the primary article of the Jesuits' Creed: 'If the Church teaches that what seems to us white be black, we must declare it to be black on the spot.' The result of this teaching was, it is true, obedience. But never was there a more forcible example of the truth that an exaggerated virtue becomes a vice. Unquestioning obedience became under the cruel system of the Jesuits blind, servile, and—if we were able to place full confidence in Mr. Symonds's translations of the Institutes—unscrupulous. It is, however, certain—as will be seen from the subjoined note—that the passage cited on p. 283, vol. i.—'A sin, whether venial or mortal, must be committed, if it is commanded by the Superior in the Name of our Lord Jesus Christ, or in virtue of

¹ *Il Vaticano Regio.*

obedience'—instead of being a version, is a gross perversion of the original.¹ We confess, this example of Mr. Symonds's

¹ The following is the passage in the Constitutions of the Company which Mr. Symonds, we presume, had in his mind when he gave the summary in the text, the correctness of which we have impugned. The chapter is headed, 'Quod Constitutiones peccati obligationem non inducant,' and then proceeds: 'Cum exoptet Societas universas suas Constitutiones, Declarationes, ac vivendi ordinem omnino juxta nostrum Institutum, nihil ullâ in re declinando, observari, optet etiam nihilominus suos omnes securos esse vel certè adjuvari, ne in laqueum ullius peccati, quod ex vi Constitutionum hujusmodi aut ordinationum proveniat, incidant: Visum est nobis in Domino, præter expressum votum, quo Societas Summo Pontifici pro tempore existenti tenetur, ac tria alia essentialia, Paupertatis, Castitatis et Obedientiae, nullas Constitutiones, Declarationes, vel Ordinem ullum vivendi posse obligationem ad peccatum mortale vel veniale inducere, nisi Superior ea in nomine Domini Nostri Jesu Christi, vel in virtute Obedientiae juberet; quod in rebus vel personis illis, in quibus judicabitur, quod ad particulare uniuscujusque vel ad universale bonum multum conveniet, fieri poterit, et loco timoris offensæ succedat amor et desiderium omnis perfectionis, ut major gloria ac laus Christi Creatoris ac Domini Nostri consequatur' (*Constitutiones Societatis Jesu anno 1558*, pars vi. cap. 5). The first remark we have to make on this passage is (1) that the gist of it and the language of it did not originate with the Jesuits, as will be seen from the Constitutions of the Tertiaries of St. Francis of Assisi (A.D. 1221) and of the Dominicans (see Holstenius, iii. 42, iv. 13). (2) That such expressions as '*obligationem ad peccatum mortale inducere*,' and the like, do not mean, as Mr. Symonds would fain have us believe, 'to impose an obligation on anyone to commit mortal sin,' but 'to impose an obligation the non-fulfilment of which would be a mortal sin.' (3) That the word *ea* after the word *Superior* in the above extract does not refer to *peccatum* (as Mr. Symonds takes it: in which case it would have been *id*), but to the 'Constitutiones, Declarationes,' &c. &c. The phrase to which we have referred, viz. '*obligare ad peccatum*,' is part of the recognized terminology, as Mr. Symonds might surely have known, of the Moral Theology of the Schoolmen. Take, for example, the following passage of St. Thomas Aquinas (II. II. qu. 186, art. ix.): 'Sed si quælibet transgressio eorum quæ in Regula continentur, religiosum obligaret ad peccatum mortale, status religionis esset periculosissimus propter multitudinem observantiarum. Non ergo quælibet transgressio eorum, quæ in Regula continentur, est peccatum mortale.' It will be seen that '*obligare ad peccatum*' and '*est peccatum*' are here used as equivalents. The framers of the Jesuit Constitution would seem to have had this passage of Aquinas in their minds, the whole drift and object of the above extract being that none of the Statutes (with the exception of the four great vows specified) were to bring those who transgressed them into mortal or venial sin, except in those cases where the Superior, for some specific object, should enforce the fulfilment of them in the Name of Our Lord and in virtue of Holy Obedience. We believe it was Ranke, in the first edition of his *History of the Popes*, who first discovered the mare's nest about the Superior commanding the commission of a mortal sin. In his second edition (vol. i. p. 151 n., Austen's translation) he made a retraction by which every subsequent writer has profited, with the exception, it seems, of Mr. Symonds, whose blind fury led him into the pitfall. The whole subject has been thoroughly thrashed out by G. E. Steitz in the *Jahrbücher der Deutschen Theologie* (1864). See also Gieseler, *Kirchengesch.* iii. 2. 536,

treatment of his authorities makes us look with great suspicion on the other maxims which he professes to quote from Jesuit documents, but for which, unfortunately, he gives us no *specific* references.

The study of the sketch of the *Exercitia Spiritualia* reveals the terrific mental tortures by which at the outset of his training the Jesuit's mind was cramped and stunted for all future exercise of the intellectual faculties; the conscience manipulated so as to have lost for ever all power of discerning between good and evil; and the result of this teaching and influence is summed up in a passage of remarkable force:—

‘It remains, however, to inquire in what the originality, the effective operation, and the modifying influence of the Jesuit Society consisted during the period with which we are concerned. It was their object to gain control over Europe by preaching, education, the direction of souls, and the management of public affairs. In each of these departments their immediate success was startling, for they laboured with zeal, and they adapted their method to the requirements of the age; yet, in the long run, art, science, literature, religion, morality, and politics all suffered from their interference. By preferring artifice to reality, affectation to sincerity, shams and subterfuges to plain principles and candour, they confused the conscience and enfeebled the intellect of Catholic Europe. When we speak of the Jesuit style in architecture, rhetoric, and poetry, of Jesuit learning and scholarship, of Jesuit casuistry and of Jesuit diplomacy, it is either with languid contempt for bad taste and insipidity, or with the burning indignation which systematic falsehood and corruption inspire in honourable minds.’¹

Upon this general statement follows an individual instance, selected out of many, when, in 1584, thirty young noblemen of Siena were lured away from their families to fill the Jesuit ranks, in one case two brothers, sons of Pandolfo Petrucci, being actually induced to commit a theft to get them into the power of the Society. Blackest of all is the list of their political intrigues and crimes with which the chapter concludes, and which, beginning with the attempted murder of the Prince of Orange in 1580, and his actual murder in 1584, include the assassination of two French monarchs and the instigation of

Anm. 30 (German edit.); Herzog's *Encyclop. der Theologie* (first edit.), vol. vi. p. 533, xix. p. 671; comp. Besombes, *Moralis Christiana*, Tract. IV. art. II. tom. i. p. 58 b. (ed. Ven. 1757). We think that after reading this note every unprejudiced person will admit that when Mr. Symonds states, ‘The obedience of the Jesuits was to be absolute, extending even to the duty of committing sins at a Superior's orders’ (vol. i. p. 264), he states what is not true.

¹ Vol. i. p. 103.

the Gunpowder Plot in England, and reach a climax of audacity in the unaccountably sudden death of three Popes in succession who were supposed not to favour their order.

Aghast and breathless, the reader may well pause to moralise upon the fatal fundamental error of a system which could make a society, originally founded for the purpose of benefiting mankind, a company marching under the standard of the Name than which none other is given under heaven for our salvation, individual lives of self-sacrifice crowned in many instances by a martyr's death, yet all finally result in what can only be described as an organized system of crime, bringing with it its own fearful retribution in the violent suppression of the Order after an existence of two hundred and thirty years.

The story of the suppression, barbarous, violent, and unjust, avenging upon innocent individuals the guilt of a system for which they were not responsible, has been often told, but it is very ably condensed by Mr. Lilly in his chapter on the eighteenth century.¹ For the sake of impartiality it is also well to consider, side by side with the formidable indictment against the Jesuits just cited, his eloquent pleadings on their behalf, although it will be observed that some of the most tremendous accusations are passed by in silence.

If the public welfare of States suffered grievously from the interference of the Jesuits and the Inquisition, the chief agents of the counter-Reformation, their influence upon the social and domestic morals of Italy was not less disastrous; but the chapter devoted to this subject appears very weak by contrast with the preceding one, and is, in point of fact, nothing but a catalogue of the most revolting crimes, so revolting in unnecessary detail as to disqualify the book from the general reading to which on many grounds it is so eminently entitled. It is, moreover, unworthy of a writer of such eminent literary skill to string together one after the other a series of bald narratives badly translated from the original sources; and we miss the reference to Manzoni's famous *Colonna Infame* in the description of the plague at Milan, with the attendant horrors of the 'Untori,' which gave the name of 'La Peste degli Untori' to that awful visitation of 1629-30.

The first volume of Mr. Symonds's book is entirely occupied with the discussion of the Catholic reaction, which forms the sub-title of the work; but, as treated by the author, it makes a natural prelude to his main subject—'The Renaissance.' The word alone opens a vista of thought at once so vast and so

¹ *Chapters in European History*, vol. ii. pp. 99-107.

complicated that the student alike of history, literature, and art is glad to be able to gather into his hands the clues with which others have threaded the difficult labyrinth before deciding the question for himself. The works now before us for review may be said to adequately represent the condensed conclusions of the two great schools of thought upon the subject. The object of Mr. Symonds's five previous exhaustive studies of the Renaissance were, as he himself says, 'devoted to showing how Italy in the Renaissance elaborated a new way of regarding man and the world, a new system of education, new social manners, and a new type of culture for herself and Europe.'¹ It was, he proceeds to say, a 'period of transition from the middle ages,' and while 'she was engaged in this work she lost sight of Catholic Christianity,' till, forcibly reminded of its necessity by the violent progress of the Reformation, she was obliged in self-defence to organize the Catholic reaction in the methods which have been described at length in the first volume of his latest work, the one now under discussion.

The second volume endeavours to prove that this effort to crush Protestantism involved the simultaneous destruction of all Liberalism, such as the renaissance of literature and art and the political liberties of the people.

Three types of representative Italians of this period are selected as victims of such a system—Tasso in the madhouse of St. Anna, Giordano Bruno at the stake, and Fra Paolo Sarpi, who barely escaped the stilettos of the Papal hirelings. Of these three very able monographs, the most powerful sketch is that of Fra Paolo Sarpi, which deserves the attention of all who desire a more intimate knowledge of the life, habits, and modes of thought of that great ecclesiastical historian, the Savonarola of his age, who nearly shared Savonarola's fate.² His life suggests also many points of resemblance with that of his living follower, Padre Curci, in its simplicity, his love of study, and zeal for the Church, which made him long for the reform of those corruptions which in this century were, as we have already seen, again exposed by Padre Curci in his *Vaticano Regio*. The following passage might have been written for both:—'What he really had at heart was the restoration of the Church of God to unity, to purer discipline, and to sincere spirituality.'³ He believed that this reconstruction would have been accomplished by the Council of Trent; but, although 'the

¹ Vol. ii. p. 413.

² See the article on Sarpi in *C. Q. R.* for October 1886.

³ Vol. ii. p. 243.

dearest hope of his heart was frustrated, he did not vent his own disappointment in laments, which might have seemed rebellions against the Divine Will.' Both Fra Paolo Sarpi and Padre Curci *protested* against the worldliness of Rome, the ecclesiastical abuses, and the temporal power of the Pope; but they were not on that account *Protestants*, because they continued to believe firmly in the dogma, sacraments, and Divine institution of the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church; and Padre Curci, when he made his submission to the Pope, was but echoing the words of Fra Paolo Sarpi—'It is better to suffer certain rules and customs that are not in all points commendable than to acquire a taste for revolution, and to yield to the temptation of confounding all things in chaos.'¹

The next chapter presents a sharp contrast to its grave predecessor, and, in a masterly quartet of Guarini, Marino, Chiabrera, and Tassoni, gives the picture of the decline of Renaissance literature; nor could any but so practised a literary hand have sifted the chaff of mannerism from the beauties of the *Pastor Fido*, have exposed the prolixity and false rhetoric of the *Adone* of Marino, while indicating its merits, have condemned Chiabrera as a failure, and have dissected with consummate skill the pungent satire of the heroico-comic poem, the *Secchia Rapita* of Alessandro Tassoni.

No picture of the Renaissance could aspire to the name without touching upon music and painting, and the two final chapters of the work are devoted to showing the effect of the counter-Reformation upon these.

However inadequate for their purpose the Tridentine decrees may have been in the larger matters of reform, we are indirectly indebted to the 'Decree on Church Music' for Palestrina's masterpiece, the 'Mass of Pope Marcellus.' The state of confusion to which ecclesiastical music had been reduced, the open profanity of the words, while every law of music was set at defiance in the execution, had made the Fathers of the Tridentine Council resolve that the scandal must be reformed, even at the cost of excluding all music but plain song from the service of the Church. So the committee of cardinals summoned to deliberate upon reform determined: 1. That masses and motetts in which different verbal themes were jumbled together should be prohibited. 2. That musical motives taken from profane songs should be abandoned. 3. That no countenance should be given to compositions or words invented by contemporary poets. Further, that there

¹ Vol. ii. p. 247, quoting *Lettere di Fra Paolo Sarpi*, vol. i. p. 227.

should be a plain and intelligible enunciation of the sacred words. But the college of pontifical singers, accustomed to the more figured style of music, declared that it was impossible to put in practice such theories, and in this position of extreme difficulty the aid of Palestrina was invoked. He was to write—

‘a mass in sober ecclesiastical style, free from all impure and light suggestions in the themes, the melodies, and the rhythms, which should allow the sacred words in their full sense to be distinctly heard, without sacrificing vocal harmony and the customary interlacing of fugued passages. If he succeeded, the cardinals promised to make no further innovation; but if he failed, Carlo Borromeo warned him that the Congregation of Reform would disband the choral establishments of the Pontifical Chapel and the Roman churches, and prohibit the figured style in vogue in pursuance of the clear decision of the Tridentine Council.’¹

That he succeeded in his most arduous task was the universal verdict at the time, and it has since been confirmed by all who have heard the ‘Mass of Pope Marcellus,’ so called out of compliment to the good Pope Marcellus, whose brief pontificate of twenty-two days, so full of promise for the welfare of the Church, had been abruptly closed by an untimely death. This Mass and the ‘Arie Divote,’ written by Palestrina for the oratory of San Filippo Neri, to words composed by San Filippo himself, redeemed for ever ecclesiastical music from profanity and placed it in a position it had never occupied before; and, as Mr. Lilly beautifully expresses it—

‘From Palestrina to Carissimi, from Pergolese to Bach, from Gluck to Mozart, from Handel to Haydn, the heavenly secret was whispered down. No generation lacked gifted souls who caught and recorded, for the perpetual joy and solace of mankind, the outpourings of eternal harmonies which fell upon their trembling ears.’²

By a strange coincidence, simultaneously with the grave music of the oratorio, and composed in many cases by the same eminent masters, the brilliant and marvellous production of the opera were being elaborated in the Palazzo Vernio at Florence, and the appeal—

‘Sphere-born harmonious sisters, Voice and Verse,
Wed your divine sounds and mixed power employ
Dead things with inbreathed sense able to pierce’³—

represents the last effort of the creative genius of Italy. For painting was already in a rapid decline, and to the influence

¹ Vol. ii. p. 354-5.

² Lilly, *Chapters in European History*, vol. i. p. 291.

of the counter-Reformation Mr. Symonds attributes all the faults of the mannerist school.

An unsparing criticism of the coarseness and vulgarity of the Caracci precedes a careful analysis of Guido, Albani, and Domenichino, ascribing the defects of the 'Martyrdom of St. Agnes,' Domenichino's masterpiece, to the *Exercitia Spiritualia*, and tracing to the same pernicious influence the horrible pictures of tortures, martyrdoms, and acts of violence by which Italy was inundated, and which, as Mr. Symonds truly observes, 'inspire neither terror nor pity, only the sickness of the shambles.' This feeling became still further intensified when the naturalist school of painting, led by Caravaggio and Lo Spagnoletto, succeeded to the mannerist, and painted the same subjects with a crude realism which rendered them still more revolting; but Lo Spada and Guercino are rescued from this category, and the masterpieces of Guercino receive a due meed of praise.

The general observations and criticisms on painting close with a reference to Sir Joshua Reynolds, and with, we think, an unnecessary apology from Mr. Symonds for 'noticing' his 'obsolete doctrine.' If the doctrine is 'obsolete,' it is singular that on the main points of art it should corroborate Mr. Symonds's own criticisms. We find in Mr. Symonds's work the admonition of Goethe quoted—

'To live in the whole,
The good, and the beautiful.'

Sir Joshua gives, it is true, the admonition a more practical direction with regard to art; but the sentiment is the same, when he devotes an entire discourse¹ to prove that genius consists principally in the comprehension of a whole: 'Excellence in every part and in every province of our art, from the highest style of history down to the resemblance of still life, will depend on this power of extending the attention to the whole, without which the greatest diligence is vain.' Then, as to the substitution of a false ideal for the faithful representation of nature, Mr. Symonds observes with truth:—

'The substitution of generic type for portraiture, the avoidance of individuality, the contempt for what is simple and natural in details, deprived their work of attractiveness and suggestion. It is noticeable that they never painted flowers. While studying Titian's landscapes, they omitted the iris, and the caper-blossom, and the columbine which star the grass beneath Ariadne's feet. The lessons of the rocks and chestnut-trees of his "St. Jerome's Solitude" were lost on

¹ *Discourse xi.*

them. They began the false system of depicting ideal foliage and ideal precipices—that is to say, trees which are not trees, and cliffs which cannot be distinguished from cork or stucco. In like manner, the clothes wherewith they clad their personages were not of brocade, or satin, or broadcloth, but of that empty lie called drapery. The purpled silks of Titian's "Lilac Lady" in the Pitti, the embroidered hems of Boccacini da Cremona, the crimson velvet of Raphael's "Joanna of Aragon," Veronese's cloth of silver and shot taffety, are replaced by one monotonous, nondescript stuff, differently dyed in dull or glaring colours, but always shoddy. Characteristic costumes have disappeared. We shall not find in any of their *Massacres* of the Innocents a soldier like Bonifazio's "Dall' Armi." In lieu of gems with flashing facets, or of quaint jewels from the *Oreficeria*, they adorn their kings and princesses with nothing less elevated than polished gold and ropes of pearls. After the same fashion, furniture, utensils, houses, animals, birds, weapons are idealized—stripped, that is to say, of what in these things is specific and vital.¹

All this is but the unconscious echo of Sir Joshua's eloquent passage:—

'Never lose sight of nature ; the instant you do you are all abroad, at the mercy of every gust of fashion, without knowing or seeing the point to which you ought to steer. . . . The art of seeing nature, or in other words, the art of using models, is in reality the great point to which our studies are directed. . . . He who recurs to nature, at every recurrence renews his strength : the rules of art he is never likely to forget, they are few and simple ; but nature is refined, subtle, and infinitely various, beyond the power of retention of memory ; it is necessary, therefore, to have continual recourse to her. In this intercourse there is no end of improvement ; the longer he lives the nearer he approaches to the true and perfect idea of art.'²

Mr. Symonds writes with condescending pity of the 'delusion' Sir Joshua fell into in his admiration of the 'so-called grand style,' as portrayed by the Caracci ; but, in reality, when the parallel passages are compared, the criticisms will be found to be the same, only expressed in different language:—

'Though the Caracci [writes Mr. Symonds] invented fresh attributes, and showed complete mastery of the human form, their types remained commonplace.'³

'The Caracci [observes Sir Joshua] it is acknowledged adopted the mechanical part with sufficient success. But the Divine part, which addresses itself to the imagination, as possessed by Michael-Angelo or Tibaldi, was beyond their grasp.'⁴

But the most conclusive testimony of all is to be found in the final paragraph of the *Discourses* ; for it proves that the one

¹ Vol. ii. pp. 405-6.

² *Disc.* xii.

³ Vol. ii. p. 377.

⁴ *Disc.* xv.

purpose of their now 'obsolete doctrine' was to give the highest place in art to Michael-Angelo, to 'bear testimony of my admiration of that truly divine man; and I should desire that the last words which I should pronounce in this Academy, and from this place, might be the name of *Michael-Angelo*.'¹

Mr. Symonds arrives at precisely the same conclusion when he selects Michael-Angelo as the highest type of artist; but when he also gives him the title of 'Prophet, or Seer of the Renaissance,' two questions again force themselves before our mind—What is the meaning of the word Renaissance? When did the Renaissance take place? In the first place, is the common acceptance of the word, 'the new birth of freedom,' true? Is liberty the characteristic note of the Renaissance? Many writers of great reputation have answered in the affirmative. They are summed up, one under the other, by Mr. Lilly when he gives quotations from Michelet, Pater, Freeman, and the highest place in that school of thought to Mr. Symonds's five previous volumes upon the subject.²

But this definition is capable of a fuller construction when employed by the opposite school of thought. With them liberty is not only 'the absence of restraints upon the true development and right exercise of the human faculties,' it has a positive side also—

It 'is the undimmed possession of inward light, the enjoyment of the vision and faculty divine, unobscured by arbitrary rules, unrestricted by false conventionalisms; *but* there are rules which are not arbitrary, and conventionalisms which are not false, whereby the thinker is enabled to discern, after his measure, the objective quality of things—to look through phenomena upon the venerable face of Nature, to apprehend truth in his own mind, and creatively to fashion it there. For truth is the object of the human intellect in whatever department of thought engaged; and where its bright beams are shut out there is no freedom, but—worse imprisonment—the darkened mind becomes the dungeon of itself. Philosophy, morals, art, do but contemplate different sides of truth, for nothing but truth is good or beautiful, and nothing is good or beautiful that is not true; all truth, goodness, and beauty of which we have knowledge being but faint emanations, the dim shadows of Him who alone, in the highest sense, *Is*.'³

Such a construction as this, far from bearing out the common acceptance of the word and the period at which it is generally fixed, will on the contrary disprove the claim of the Renaissance on all grounds, political, social, scien-

¹ *Disc.* xv.

² Lilly, *Chapters in European History*, vol. i. p. 255.

³ *Ibid.* p. 258.

tific, literary, and artistic, to the title—of a new birth unto liberty.

In order to arrive at the date vaguely assigned to the Renaissance, we must go over again the accepted division of European history into three epochs—1. The first eight centuries of the Christian era. 2. The next seven centuries of the Middle Ages; and the three succeeding ones down to the closing decade of the last century—to fix the Renaissance epoch.

This general division established, we may follow, for the purpose we have in view, Mr. Symonds in assigning the years 1453-1527 as convenient for fixing 'in the mind the narrow space of time during which the Renaissance culminated and the highest point of the culmination during the eight years of the pontificate of Leo X.'¹

The picture of political Europe at that time, viewed in a general aspect, and of Italy in particular, when described by Mr. Symonds as 'The Age of the Despots,' will show no 'new birth unto liberty;' it was, on the contrary, nothing but the beginning of the 'March of Absolutism,' which, by the end of the sixteenth century, wielded its sway throughout Europe.

If the Renaissance was not a new birth unto political liberty, can the title be claimed for it in poetry? Again the answer is an emphatic negative. It is like comparing the respective merits of creation and imitation to attempt to set side by side with the unfettered freedom of Dante's noble intellect the poets who share with him the laurels of the Italian Parnassus.

Like the eagle of his own divine poem, he fixed his eye on the eternal sun, and drawing his inspiration thence, soared with spiritual insight beyond the reach of time and space, so that his thoughts will endure throughout all ages as a *κτῆμα ἐς αἰῶνα*, 'a possession and a joy for ever.' This was liberty indeed, beside which the poetical inspirations of Petrarch, Ariosto, and Tasso, however beautiful, attractive, and alluring by their polished refinement, yet seem, when compared with the flight of the eagle, but the gyrations of a trained falcon. She also can soar with infinite grace, and sometimes to so lofty a height as if she were about to be lost in space, but she is a captive notwithstanding, and at the beck of her master she must return to the earth whence she took her flight.

The subject of the *Gerusalemme Liberata* was indeed

¹ *Age of the Despots*, preface, p. 1.

sufficient to carry the trouble-tossed mind of the writer heavenward beyond the reach of his tormentors ; but in the artificial age to which he belonged his free thought was for ever checked and clogged by the fetters of classical pedantry, just as, to the shame of the age be it stated, his hands were loaded with manacles in the foul dungeon of St. Anna. The Renaissance or 'new birth unto liberty' in poetry was not by any means with him.

Art is next put forward as the especial field of the Renaissance influence ; but when the 'arts of design' are taken one by one, neither in architecture, sculpture, nor painting can the period commonly assigned to the Renaissance be said to bear the stamp of liberty.

'Renaissance architecture [writes Mr. Ruskin] is the school which has conducted men's inventive faculties from the Grand Canal to Gower Street ; from the marble shaft and the lancet arch, the wreathed leafage and the glowing and melting harmony of gold and azure, to the square cavity in the brick wall.'¹

No touches certainly are required to complete that picture.

In sculpture the observation is so obvious as almost to appear trite, that it reached its zenith with Michael-Angelo—in which case Mr. Symonds's appellation of prophet or seer of the Renaissance is not well chosen—and that after that it declined to a servile copying of the classical or living model or an equally servile imitation of the *chefs-d'œuvre* of antiquity. The Renaissance cannot therefore be said to be a 'new birth unto liberty' in sculpture. Nor yet in painting, for the same universal consent which bids all sculpture lead up to a climax in Michael-Angelo would make Raphael represent the culmination of the art of painting, and thence the decline of art is gradual but steady till it reaches those depths of which Mr. Symonds's latest volumes afford such convincing proof.

Lastly, science. Was it 'a new birth unto liberty' which narrowed down to the study of the mere physical sciences of this material world the knowledge which in the thirteenth century was centred upon Him who created it all, by whose breath it was made, and by whose word 'The heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also and the works that are therein shall be burned up'?'² How infinitely grander, freer,

¹ *Chapters in European History*, vol. i. p. 284, quoting *Lectures on Architecture*, p. 134.

² 1 St. Peter iii. 10.

and more noble was the conception of the Schoolmen which placed theology on the throne of science, round which the other sciences revolved, borrowing their light from thence !

‘With the old Schoolmen that God was the basis of all truth, the foundation of all sciences, was not a piece of pious rhetoric, but a scientific axiom. Necessary truth is unchangeable, they said, simply on account of His immutability ; His All-Holy Nature is the source of morality, His Eternal Word the sanction of certainty. In this spirit they pursued their labours in every department of human thought, freely using in their search after truth every instrument proper for its discovery : observation, induction, deduction, abstraction, speculation.’¹

When, therefore, the ‘Revival of Letters’ had for its result the study of the humanities of literature to the exclusion of, or with the purpose of discrediting, the study of theology, in other words, the knowledge of God, man, by the exchange of the infinite for the finite, restricted instead of enlarging the confines of his reason, and the Renaissance must forego her claim to having wrought ‘a new birth unto liberty’ for science.

What, then, was the Renaissance? If it is to be taken in the sense of a ‘new birth unto liberty,’ we have seen that it will not fit the period generally assigned to it in history by one great school of writers upon the subject. The evidence of facts would rather indicate that it ceased to exist at the time when, by a common but vague and misleading acceptance, it is supposed to have begun—that is, at that period of European history when from one cause or another the spirit of religion ceased to guide those highest intellectual faculties which, as they are derived from God, can only receive from Him their fullest and most perfect development.

We must retrace our steps further down the stream of time, but we need not leave the beautiful country with which the word is pre-eminently connected, when we can find in Dante, Donatello, and Michael-Angelo living examples of the Renaissance in the highest, truest sense of the word ; nor is the word ‘living’ misapplied, for from Him who can alone give immortality they derived the inspirations which have rendered their works immortal.

Mr. Symonds’s indictment against the Church of Rome is tremendous, and it is just, but he does not realize that the flagrant errors of the Catholic reaction were due to her having lost sight of her spiritual character and her divine commission, not because she insisted upon them too much.

¹ *Chapters in European History*, vol. i. p. 294.

What he terms in one place 'a venerable delusion' and in another 'the false deities of an antiquated religion,' is in truth 'the faith once delivered to the saints,' which was placed in sore jeopardy when those who should have been its guardians were the victims of worldly ambition and vice. But the remedy is not to be found in rationalism, which it is much to be regretted *has* 'penetrated and permeated the Christian races,' nor yet in Protestantism, nor any rash handling of the faith of Christ.

'Vie più che indarno da riva si parte,
Perchè non torna tal qual ei si muove,
Chi pesca per lo vero, e non ha l' arte :
E di ciò sono al mondo aperte prove
Parmenide, Melisso, e Brisso e molti
I quali andavan, nè sapean dove.
Sì fe Sabellio ed Arrio e quegli stolti
Che furon come spade alle scritture
In render tòrti li diritti volti.'¹

Par. xiii. 121-9.

Nor can the heart created to love, serve, and worship, rest content with the mere cold negation of error.

Nearly half a century ago one of those earnest minds and zealous natures who, from the very ranks of the Church of Rome, have from time to time pleaded with fearless self-sacrifice the cause of truth and justice, suggested, while leaving the events of history to slumber in the 'domaine paisible du passé,' a noble future for

'l'institution Catholique languissante et persécutée, principalement par les pouvoirs qui affectent de s'en déclarer protecteurs. Il pensoit qu'elle devoit étendre ses racines presque desséchées dans le sein de l'humanité même, pour y puiser de nouveau la sève qui lui manquoit et qu'en unissant sa cause à celle des peuples, elle pourroit recouvrer sa vigueur éteinte, régulariser le mouvement social et le hâter en lui imprimant ce caractère religieux qui naturellement lié à tous les instincts de l'homme est aussi une force et la plus grande. Quelque chose de semblable à ce qui se passa lors de la première prédication de l'Evangile paraissoit nécessaire pour ramener au Catholicisme

¹ 'Since he returns not such as forth he went,
He goes far more than vainly from the shore
To fish for truth, who lacks art competent.
Parmenides, Melissus, and (with more)
Brissus, this plainly to the world disclose ;
Who went, and knew not whither their way bore.
So did Sabellius, Arius, and those
Whose folly made them mar, as swords, the pure
And perfect features that the Scripture shows.

Haselfoot's Trans.

defaillant les populations qui s'en éloignoient. La fraternité universelle proclamée par Jésus, cette doctrine si belle, si constante, si divine, recueillie dans les profondeurs désolées de l'âme humaine y ranima soudain les germes flétris du vrai et du bien, que Dieu y avait déposés originairement. Ce qu'une société égoïste et corrompue avait abaissé le Christ le releva, Rénovateur des lois immuables, de l'oubli desquels étaient sortis tant de maux, tant de crimes, tant d'oppressions, il effaça devant le commun Père, qui ne fait point d'exception entre ses enfants, toutes les distinctions créées par l'orgueil et la cupidité. Il plaça le pauvre en face du riche, le foible en présence du fort, et il demanda quel est le plus grand? Et le plus grand, ce ne fut ni le fort à cause de sa force, ni le foible à cause de sa foiblesse, ni le riche à cause de son opulence, ni le pauvre à cause de sa dénuement, mais celui qui accompliroit plus parfaitement le souverain précepte d'aimer Dieu et les hommes. Les droits les plus sacrés, parce qu'ils n'avoient d'autre défense qu'eux-mêmes, furent les droits de ceux à qui jusque là on n'avait reconnu aucuns droits : les devoirs les plus étendus furent les devoirs de ceux qui s'étoient cru au-dessus de tout devoir. Le titre de serviteur devint la définition même du pouvoir. On dut se faire le dernier pour être le premier.¹

Since these eloquent words were penned, the future of Italy has advanced far upon its way, and Mr. Symonds does not paint his picture in too bright colours when he says that

'in this year of grace we have before us the spectacle of a resuscitated Italy. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the work of her heroes, Vittorio Emmanuele, Mazzini, Garibaldi, and Cavour, stands firmly founded. The creation of united Italy, that latest birth of the Italian genius, that most impossible of dreamed-of triumphs through long ages of her glory and greatness, compensates for all that she has borne in these three hundred years.'²

But when, in order to traverse 'the space of time in front, incalculably longer than that which is left behind,' he proceeds to invoke the assistance of faith, hope, and charity, we feel that we need hardly recall to so practised a student of Dante that these are theological virtues placed on that account in the highest spheres of the Paradiso, and that they would point to a greater future yet, which, still beginning with Italy, may extend to the uttermost parts of the earth—a future which will only be fulfilled when united Christendom shall once more join in the worship of Him 'in knowledge of Whom standeth our eternal life, whose *service* is *perfect freedom*.'

¹ *Affaires de Rome*, par F. Lamennais, vol. i. pp. 5, 6.

² Vol. ii. p. 435.

ART. VI.—THE CULTURE OF THE HORRIBLE:
MR. HAGGARD'S STORIES.

1. *The Witch's Head*. A Novel. By H. RIDER HAGGARD. (London.)
2. *King Solomon's Mines*. By H. RIDER HAGGARD. Forty-eighth thousand. (London, 1887.)
3. *She. A History of Adventure*. By H. RIDER HAGGARD. Sixth edition. Thirty-first to Thirty-fifth thousand. (London, 1887.)
4. *Allan Quatermain*. Being an Account of his further Adventures and Discoveries in company with Sir Henry Curtis, Bart., Commander John Good, R.N., and one Umslopogaas. By H. RIDER HAGGARD. (London, 1887.)
5. *Jess*. Third edition. By H. RIDER HAGGARD. (London, 1887.)

IT requires no little consideration rightly to estimate the relation which novels bear to life in the present day. Whilst great advance has been made in every branch of human knowledge, and the accumulation of facts renders a mastery of any subject harder for ourselves than it was for our forefathers, the hurry and pressure of modern life tends to make those books most popular which awaken interest without demanding the exercise of thought. To meet this condition of the public mind every conceivable lesson, sacred and profane, scientific and artistic, historical and social, orthodox and sceptical, is disguised under the garb of fiction, until mere stories probably exercise a larger influence at this moment than at any other period in the world's history. If we may judge from some recent indications, we shall soon be reaping the natural result of this indulgence of modern craving for naked intellectual indolence. We have still amongst us many authors who worthily maintain the high dignity acquired for fiction by Miss Austen and Sir Walter Scott, by Thackeray and George Eliot; but is there not some reason to fear that novel-writing is rapidly descending to the level of mere narrative of startling incident? Is description of adventure not taking the place of delineation of character? Is the hasty dash of the scene-painter to supersede the thoughtful finish of the genuine artist? Is a taste springing up—to which some popular authors are not ashamed to pander—which craves

after pernicious stimulus, and has no enjoyment of chaste and thoughtful composition? So long as writers, whose books are disfigured by extravagance of assertion, unrestrained indulgence in semi-sensual and repulsive detail, and a pernicious familiarity with topics which good taste and Christian feeling prompt us to handle reverently—so long as such writers are left on the same shelf with M. Zola—we might be content to pass them by in silence; but when their works are praised by the acknowledged guides of English literary taste, circulated in periodicals held deservedly in high esteem, and pushed by all the arts of modern *réclame* to a sale of many thousands of copies, they become so serious a nuisance as to call for loud and immediate protest.

These remarks have been suggested by the popularity of Mr. Haggard's stories, whose titles stand at the head of our article. Let us admit frankly at the outset that they are not wanting in some of the qualities which deserve success. The author's genuine admiration of manly pluck and fighting skill are specially attractive in a day when athletic exercises are even apt to be overrated. His narrative flows on with uninterrupted rapidity. His style is easy, and some of his characters—such as his savage heroes and persons in the humbler walk of life—are simple, and the latter are endowed with a genial humour that occasionally degenerates into coarseness. One incident follows another so quickly as to keep the story from flagging, and the writer's acquaintance with African scenery and manners, and with the details of hunting larger game, gives reality and vigour to his pages. If, moreover, there are readers—and we presume from the commercial success of Mr. Haggard's writings that they form a numerous class—who can experience any other sensation than weariness from the perusal of page after page describing caverns and tombs and deserted cities—mere *châteaux d'Espagne*—the creation of architectural fancy run mad; if the disagreeable mannerism of pretended editorship, which allows the writer to make comments on his own narrative, and to correct affected mistakes by means of footnotes; if the constant re-introduction in successive stories of the same characters under the flimsiest of disguises, and most of these besides such mere *nominis umbræ* that it is hard to feel the faintest interest in them or in their fortunes; if the wiredrawn conceit of spreading an inscription over many pages by its repetition in different languages and in varied type; if the absence of most of the higher qualities of style which ensure a permanent place in literature—if all these defects ought to be condoned

on the plea of counterbalancing excellence, we should be content to pass them by without further criticism. For adventure pure and simple, written only to amuse, is a legitimate, if not a very lofty aim, and the hands of a competent artist would mould it into stories that should be delightful to the imagination as well as interesting to the understanding. Dexterity in construction, intricacy of plot, vivid powers of describing things fairly describable, and genuine enthusiasm might combine to present such stirring perils by flood and field as should kindle a keen, healthy interest, and foster manliness of thought and character. But such books could no more be produced without the conscious or unconscious observance of the canons by which the literature of the imagination is regulated, than a valid argument can be constructed in defiance of the rules of logic. Whether Mr. Haggard sins, and in what degree, against the laws of his art, we hope to make sufficiently plain to our readers.

Mr. Haggard's stock in trade is singularly limited. A few very shadowy characters, with a scanty sprinkling of more substantial actors—a description of a sunrise, a sunset, and a storm—scenes from life and sport in Southern and Central Africa—a battle involving terrific carnage and a desperate single combat described with the minuteness and refinement that would grace the account of a prize fight in a sporting newspaper—these, with the architectural details already adverted to—interspersed with agnostic reflections, morbid moralizing, and a queer vein of genuine but broad humour, form the warp and woof of these stories. If the dramatis personæ are mostly either fiends or fools, we have the satisfaction of seeing them gradually disappear as the story is developed, and the curtain falls upon a stage that has been cleared of many of the leading actors. With the exception of Jess and (as it has been well termed) 'that utterly impossible She,' there is very little delineation of character, and the author relies for his effects upon the skill, such as it is, with which he can interweave horrors into his narrative. We have them in every conceivable form. Indiscriminate and individual slaughter, whole corpses and dismembered limbs, skulls and bones, duels and suicide, torture and treachery, witchcraft and madness—all are available material for Mr. Haggard's purpose. He presents us with all the minutæ of the shambles and all the imagery of the charnel-house, and when the frightful scenes of suffering and slaughter have been duly exhausted in action, we have a distorted repetition of them in the actor's dreams. That the narrative at times trembles on the verge of sen-

suality, that the writer's humour does not disclaim the broadest farce, that his well-bred Englishmen can hardly be acquitted of vulgarity, and that sceptical theories should be gratuitously scattered broadcast in his pages, are subsidiary but serious blemishes in what may be designated as the culture of the horrible. We shall give our readers ample opportunity to determine how far these strictures are deserved, and shall also notice, as occasion offers, some other peculiarities of the author's style.

Now the first requisite in all works of pure imagination is self-restraint. It needs neither art nor genius to kindle superficial emotion if the writer has no reserve. It is easy to season a story with coarse attractions, to invest it with powerful though evanescent interest, and to gain a passing reputation for strength by vehement efforts to say extraordinary things; but very different qualities are essential to fiction of a high order. Simplicity and sincerity, delicacy and sympathy, are necessary to its construction, and these elements are conspicuous by their absence in Mr. Haggard's stories. His elaborate detail is too often only tawdry ornament. His raptures are so insincere and unreal as to suggest the uncomfortable suspicion that he is laughing at his readers. He knows not, or he utterly disregards, the sanctities with which mankind deems it fitting to shroud the secrets of the tomb and the solemn presence chamber of death. Nor are these defects a venial violation of merely conventional propriety. They are transgressions of innate and universal law,

‘Not easily forgiven
Are those who, setting wide the doors that bar
The secret bridal chambers of the heart,
Let in the day.’

But it is time to pass from general principles to their application. It is Mr. Haggard's wont to supply himself with certain invariable stage properties before he introduces his melodramas to his audience. These include, first, an insipid Adonis, of whom all the women are enamoured, and a champion pugilist, whose exploits fill a large space in the play; second, two or more women, whose affections are at cross purposes, to the eventual triumph in most cases of the least worthy; third, several scoundrels, civilized and savage, whose repulsive appearance and atrocious deeds form the leading attractions; and lastly, a crabbed, sententious sage, the guide, philosopher, and friend of the piece. The story of *Jess* apart, there are characters in each of the four other books before us

which might be bodily transferred and exchanged from one story to another without any sense of incongruity jarring upon the mind of the reader.

The Witch's Head opens with a pitched battle between Ernest Kershaw and Jeremy Jones, who become subsequently the Adonis and the champion of the story. The two boys are living, as is Jeremy's sister Dorothy, under the roof of Reginald Cardus. All three are orphans. Ernest is a nephew of Reginald's, and the other two are the children of Mary Atterleigh, to whom Cardus had been engaged, and by whom he had been jilted. Two sisters, Eva and Florence Ceswick—the former surpassingly beautiful and a fool, the other less fair and a fiend; Mr. de Talor, a vulgar, unprincipled, and wealthy *parvenu*; Rev. James Plowden, a diabolical and impossible clergyman; a maniac grandfather of Jeremy and Dorothy; and Mr. Alston, a sententious colonist—form the company. The story itself is sufficiently commonplace, its seeming purpose, if it have any, being to illustrate the mischief which may be wrought by the weakness of a beautiful woman, who, having won a man's true love, has not the firmness to be faithful. The tragedy is brought about by the infernal intrigues of Florence Ceswick, who is herself in love with Ernest, and is determined that Eva shall not marry him.

We feel that we must apologize to our readers for introducing them to *The Witch's Head*; but as its name appears on the titlepage of all Mr. Haggard's later works, he evidently exults in its authorship, and would take advantage of the popularity of *She* and *King Solomon's Mines* to promote its sale. We know not how to escape the imputation of harshness in handling it. The story is clumsy in construction, and so essentially coarse, alike in expression and in thought, that its pages bristle with sentences that outrage sound judgment, cultivated taste, and refined discrimination. The seashore adjoining Kesterwick is said to present a coast line out 'of which the waves had taken huge mouthfuls, *till it was as full of gaps as an old crone's jaw*.' Lady Kershaw (the one bright, lovable person of the story) knows that her blind husband *will be down on his luck* for at least a day after he has described the circumstances under which he lost his sight. Florence Ceswick soundly rates her future brother-in-law—

"Listen; it suits my purpose that you should marry Eva, and you shall marry her; but I will not stoop to play the hypocrite with a man like you. You talk of yourself as a gentleman—a gentleman, forsooth! A satyr, a devil in disguise!" . . . Mr. Plowden left the

house white with fury, and cursing in a manner remarkable in a clergyman' (pp. 204, 205).

It would be hard indeed to surpass the coarseness of these brief extracts, but even vulgarity may be aggravated by its intrusion at a specially incongruous season, and this literary feat Mr. Haggard has successfully accomplished. Ernest persuades Eva to sail with him one summer evening, and the one tender love scene of the story follows. With poetry and mutual vows of unwavering fidelity, with rapture and blandishment, they repeat the old, old story. When they return to the shore the boatman is awaiting them.

'Ernest paid the man, and they turned to go. Eva had not got many yards when she felt a heavy hand laid upon her shoulder. Turning in astonishment she perceived the mariner. "I say, miss," he said in a hoarse whisper. "Well, what?" "*Never you eat the rind of a Dutch cheese!*" [The italics are Mr. Haggard's.] "I says it as knows." Eva did not forget his advice' (p. 77).

We shall be so largely indebted to Mr. Haggard for quotations that we borrow another brief one as our sole comment on this extract. 'Ernest's was a fine-strung mind,' he tells us, 'and he shuddered when it was set to play such coarse music.' We shudder too.

We should hardly have troubled our readers with any further notice of *The Witch's Head*, but for the illustration it affords of Mr. Haggard's extraordinary predilection for the horrible. The title of his story is derived from a mere passing incident, introduced quite unnecessarily, without any influence upon the course of the story or the fortunes of the characters, but apparently suggested by the author's conviction that a tale, unless it be highly seasoned with horrors, is a very insipid affair indeed. The sea has encroached upon the churchyard of the village where Eva Ceswick and Mr. Cardus reside, and the young lady finds upon the shore a leaden box, which is brought to the house of Mr. Cardus and opened in the presence of the whole family.

'And this was what they saw there upon the box :—Let the reader imagine the face and head of a lovely woman of some thirty years of age, the latter covered with rippling brown locks of great length, above which was set a roughly fashioned coronet studded with uncut gems. Let him imagine this face, all but the lips, which were coloured red, pale with the bloodless pallor of death, and the flesh so firm and fresh-looking that it might have been that of a corpse not a day old ; so firm, indeed, that the head and all its pendent weight of beautiful hair could stand on the un-

shrunk base of the neck which, in some far-past age, cold steel had made so smooth. Then let him imagine the crowning horror of this weird sight. The eyes of a corpse are shut, but the eyes in this head were wide open, and the long black lashes, as perfect now as on the day of death, hung over what appeared, when the light struck them, to be two balls of trembling fire, that glittered and rolled and fixed themselves upon the face of the observer like human eyes. It was these awful eyes that carried such terror to the hearts of the on-lookers when they cast their first glance around, and made them, not unnaturally, cry out that it was alive. . . . But perhaps the most dreadful thing about this relic of forgotten ages was the mocking smile that the artist who "set it up" had managed to preserve upon the face—a smile that just drew the lips up enough to show the white teeth beneath, and gave the idea that its wearer had died in the full enjoyment of some malicious jest or triumph. It was a terrible thing to look on, that long-dead, beautiful face, with its abundant hair, its crowning coronet, its moving crystal eyes, and its smile; and yet there was something awfully fascinating about it: those who had seen it once would always long to see it again.¹

This cheerful ornament, which irresistibly recalls a certain railway advertisement of Nubian blacking, possessed, like the witch, of moving crystal eyes, and, with the further attraction of swarthy features, is duly set upon a bracket and forgotten until the close of the story. The revenge of Reginald Cardus—another episode in this strange tale—is accomplished. 'Jones, *who was rich*, went fraudulently bankrupt, and ended by committing suicide.' De Talor is utterly ruined through the secret intrigues of Cardus, who, although apparently a country solicitor at Kesterwick, is really the head of three other firms practising respectively at Ipswich, Norwich, and London, as well as sole proprietor of a railway grease factory at Manchester, and partner in a leading house on the London Stock Exchange. Mr. Haggard does not do things by halves. De Talor is hopelessly penniless. Cardus is a millionaire. A month after this consummation is reached, the case containing the Witch's Head is burst open by the falling of some armour suspended above it, and everyone is 'unhinged' at the sight of the baleful eyes which seem to *nod, nod, nod*. That same night, mad Atterleigh stabs Mr. Cardus in his bed, and, mounting Ernest Kershaw's black horse, the Devil, plunges into the sea marshes, and is lost. The description is too long to be quoted in full, and no abbreviation could do justice to the absurdity of its style and language. Our old friend the sailor, who has been lost sight of for three hundred pages, appropriately reappears at the

¹ *The Witch's Head*, pp. 60-61.

closing scene. 'Bust me!' said the ancient one aloud, and shaking with a mortal dread; 'bust me, I have stood still and seed many a queer thing, but I never seed a thing like that!' Comment is superfluous.

She, King Solomon's Mines, and *Allan Quatermain* may be classed together. They are all stories of imaginary adventure, a type of romance, as it appears to us, utterly unworthy of the literary ability which has recently been devoted to it, but which, through the writings of Jules Verne, Mr. R. L. Stevenson, and others, has attained very great popularity. In some respects Mr. Haggard must be placed in the very front rank of writers of this class of fiction. He possesses very remarkable imaginative power. He can write descriptions of natural scenery, of sporting incident, and of perilous adventure with a vivid brilliancy that has rarely been surpassed. The ability to portray all the higher qualities of African savage life, and the writer's sympathy, as well as his acquaintance, with Zulu character, give a reality to his savage heroes which is wanting to the European characters in these three stories. The portraiture of the latter is confined to what any farce-writer would select in placing his piece upon the stage—oddity of feature, dress, and manner—trick of gesture or of phrase. Nor does Mr. Haggard lack special ingenuity in keeping the preternatural element so largely in subordination to what is possible as to make the two blend easily together. We may have to advert presently to the method which he employs to work out a realistic picture by introducing matters of daily experience into the substance of his wildest conceptions. Yet, without calling in question these important qualifications, we question whether three more repulsive books have for a long season been sent forth by publishers of good repute than *She, King Solomon's Mines*, and *Allan Quatermain*.

Most of the blemishes in Mr. Haggard's writings may be traced to his disregard of the sound rule *Nec nimis valde, nec nimis sæpe*. He knows nothing of the force of moderation. From more than a purely literary point of view the blots arising from this neglect of self-restraint are neither few nor unimportant. We are anxious not to be misunderstood. We do not wish to check the flight of Mr. Haggard's imagination. We do not object to the conception of life and beauty preserved unimpaired for two thousand years, nor to the weird journey in search of King Solomon's Mines, nor to the voyage by the underground river that passed through the subterranean volcanic lake and emerged in the lost country of the Zu Vendi. If we do not place a high value upon even well-

elaborated conceits of this nature it is because the ground has already been so fully occupied that we are satiated with such literary dainties, and still more because the marvels revealed by science are of such supreme interest as to make us impatient that any man's talents should be absorbed in working out unsubstantial wonders. But, accepting Mr. Haggard's work from an entirely neutral standpoint, it cannot bear the test of sound literary criticism; not because of the subjects selected, but because of his mode of handling them. The faults we have to expose would equally mar the attempt to deal through the medium of fiction with any section of the broad field of human life.

We have already alluded to Mr. Haggard's tendency to exaggeration. He continually overdoes his part. He has little sense of proportion. All his adjectives are superlatives. Once embarked on the stream of the supernatural the reader is prepared quietly to enjoy some of the wonders described under a temporary delusion of their reality; but this repose is forbidden us. We are perpetually stirred up by the energy of the writer's affirmations or the extravagance of his epithets. Sometimes these are so startling as to awaken not only our antagonism, but our strong repugnance. When we read in the description of She's incantations, 'down came the clenched hands to her side, then up again above her head, and, *as I am a living and honourable man*, the white flame of the fire leapt up after them,' we are provoked to brand the statement as the briefest and most odious of English monosyllables. A kindred feeling of irritation is awakened by the repetition *usque ad nauseam* of the assertion that the writer's powers are too feeble to convey an adequate idea of the marvels he is setting before us. It is the business of his art to give expression to beauty, emotion, and thought, and although it may be perfectly legitimate at times to assert that any of these were present in a form or degree which was indescribable, yet the continual reiteration of such a statement evinces poverty of skill and still more of pains. No more indolent device can be adopted to evade the trouble of accurate and exact description than to declare that anything is indescribable. How often Mr. Haggard betakes himself to this refuge for the destitute may be gathered from the following extracts, and our list is by no means exhaustive.

He 'cannot describe' two minutes of heart-breaking excitement amongst the breakers (*She*, p. 54), nor the look of wise and sardonic humour with which Bellali's whole countenance was instinct (p. 77), nor the grim grandeur of the tower-

ing volcanic mass above the plain of Kôr (p. 128), nor the melancholy chant of his hearers and the effect produced by their voices (p. 130), nor the attraction by which Holly was drawn through the dark passage to witness She's incantations (p. 161), nor the agony, the blind passion, and the awful vindictiveness displayed upon She's quivering features, and in the tortured look of her upturned eyes (p. 163), nor the sculptures in the cave of torture, which are so awful that he will not harrow the reader by attempting their description (p. 175, note), nor the awful and hideous grandeur of the arena lighted by torches of dead bodies (p. 218), nor the infernal and fiendish can-can danced at this fascinating spectacle (p. 219), nor the grandeur of the sight presented by the Temple of Truth (p. 259), nor the poet's dream of beauty frozen into stone (p. 265). No doubt some of these things present considerable difficulty even to a well-practised pen, but as Mr. Haggard has grappled with tasks no less arduous, and, in the opinion of his admirers, with no mean success, we feel that we are not intended to take him *au pied de la lettre*, and that it is only a stale trick by which he desires to goad our jaded sense of astonishment to quickened sensibility.

The painful sense of this inarticulate dumbness in presence of the mighty thoughts 'too big for words' that constantly oppresses Mr. Haggard's soul, finds occasionally very ludicrous vent. We are favoured at length with the terms in which She curses her rival, who had been dead now for a brief matter of 2,000 years, and the denunciation, which extends over more than a page, is made irresistibly comic by the words '*and so on*' at its close. The writer proceeds:—

'The flame rose and fell, reflecting itself in her agonised eyes; the hissing sound of her terrible maledictions—and no words of mine, *especially on paper*, can convey how terrible they were—ran round the walls, and died away in little echoes,' &c. (p. 164).

Are we to understand that, if vellum or papyrus had been available, the reader would have enjoyed a more vivid impression of the scene? Possibly we may congratulate ourselves that the conducting power of the medium was not more perfect when we learn the extraordinary effect produced by a glance at a piece of statuary in the Temple of Truth:—

'For in the exact centre of the court, placed upon a thick square slab of rock, was a huge round ball of stone, some forty feet in diameter, and standing on the ball was a colossal winged figure, of a beauty so entrancing and divine that when I first gazed upon it, illuminated and shadowed as it was by the soft light of the moon,

my breath stood still, and for a moment my heart ceased beating' (p. 264).

Mr. Haggard's lack of simplicity frequently neutralises some of the most marked excellences of his book. When he can resist the temptation to indulge in fine writing he presents us with sketches of scenery that, for beauty and truthfulness, cannot easily be surpassed. Take the following description of sunrise: except for some redundancy at the close, it is exquisite:—

'The moon went slowly down in chastened loveliness: she departed like some sweet bride into her chamber, and long, veil-like shadows crept up the sky, through which the stars peeped slyly out. Soon, however, they too began to pale before a splendour in the east, and then the quivering footsteps of the dawn came rushing across the new-born blue, and shook the planets from their places. Quieter and yet more quiet grew the sea: quiet as the soft mist that brooded on her bosom and covered up her troubling, as the illusive wreaths of sleep brood upon a pain-racked mind, causing it to forget its sorrow. From the east to the west sped the angels of the dawn, from sea to sea, from mountain-top to mountain-top, scattering light with both their hands. On they sped out of the darkness: perfect, glorious, like spirits of the just breaking from the tomb; on, over the quiet sea, over the low coast and the swamps beyond, and the mountains beyond them; over those who slept in peace and those who woke in sorrow, over the evil and the good, over the living and dead, over the wide world and all that breathes or has breathed thereon' (*She*, pp. 56-7).

Is it not strange that an author who has so clear an eye for poetic beauty, even though it may clothe his expression of it in too luxuriant language, should have allowed himself to compose such an extract as follows, which occurs in his account of country life amongst the Zu Vendi:—

'On other days we would pay visits to the country seats at some of the great lords' beautiful fortified places, and the villages clustering beneath their walls. Here we saw vineyards and cornfields, and well-kept, park-like grounds, with such timber in them as filled me with delight, for I do love a good tree. There it stands, so strong and sturdy and yet so beautiful, a very type of the best sort of man. How proudly it lifts its bare head to the winter storms, and with what a full heart it rejoices when the spring has come again! How grand its voice is, too, when it talks with the wind—a thousand æolian harps cannot equal the beauty of the sighing of a great tree in leaf. All day it points to the sunshine, and all night to the stars, and thus passionless, and yet full of life, it endures through the centuries, come storm, come shine, drawing its sustenance from the cool bosom of its mother earth, and as the slow years roll by learning the great

mysteries of growth and of decay. And so on and on through generations, outliving individuals, customs, dynasties—all save the landscape it adorns and human nature—till the appointed day when the wind wins the long battle and rejoices over a reclaimed space, or decay puts the last stroke to his fungus-fingered work. Oh! one should always think twice before one cuts down a tree.¹

It would require a wider acquaintance with modern English prose than we can claim to parallel, within the limit of a single paragraph, the incongruities and absurdities of this piece of *bombastic fustian*. They are so numerous and involved as almost to defy analysis. To say nothing of the park-like grounds, so suggestive of an auctioneer's advertisement of a tenth-rate suburban villa, we are sorely puzzled alike by the type here suggested and by the terms of the laudation so copiously bestowed. Is the similarity between a tree and the best sort of man confined to the first sentence, so that pre-eminent human excellence consists in strength and sturdiness, provided only that they are set off by beauty? or does the best sort of man also bare his head to the winter storms, talk to the wind with a grand voice, and through centuries draw his sustenance from the cool bosom of his mother? Is it the paradoxical endowment of a good tree to be passionless, and at the same time proud and rejoicing with a full heart? Is it at all more congruous to assert that a thousand æolian harps cannot equal in beauty the sighing of a giant tree in full leaf, than to affirm that ten thousand grand pianos cannot equal in pathos the whisper of a grand lady in full dress? In what intelligible understanding of the terms can a tree be said, any more than a tortoise or any other living thing, to learn the mysteries of growth and of decay? Or by what rational sequence of thought can it be portrayed as outliving the landscape of which itself forms a part, *and human nature*? Possibly it is not decay, but the pen of a modern novelist, to which, after reading such a paragraph, we should apply the new-coined epithet of 'fungus-fingered.'

But we have more weighty objections to these stories than that they are disfigured by many literary blemishes. We regard them as a serious offence against the reverence and delicacy with which horrible things ought to be treated in books whose object is pure amusement. We look upon the repeated introduction of scenes of slaughter, and of every detail of the charnel-house, interspersed as these scenes are with purposely ludicrous effects and comic allusions, as a vio-

¹ Allan Quatermain, p. 174.

lation of the decency we have a right to demand from all who handle such solemn themes. We consider this offence to be further aggravated by the tone rather than the direct expression of sensuality which penetrates the whole story of *She* and much of *Allan Quatermain*. We object yet more strongly to the gratuitous intermingling of sacred names and sacred things in the narrative, to the heedless scattering of sceptical opinions, to the contemptuous allusions to religious subjects, to the jocular satisfaction in profanity. We hold that good taste and right feeling should restrain an author from masquerading in theological costume in tales of adventure, and from interjecting his suggestions of doubt when the reader's mind is off its guard and unfitted to weigh the deep questions so unseasonably thrust before it. We cannot recognize, indeed, any competency in Mr. Haggard to deal with matters of such unspeakable importance; but we hold that it would be better that he should state outright, even in the strongest terms which he can command, any difficulties with which the acceptance of Christianity troubles him, rather than that he should insert elaborate agnostic disquisitions, and then, after a faint protest that these are not his own convictions, should presently repeat them without supplying a full refutation. But we must once more pass from general principles to particulars.

A few illustrations shall first be given to show that our criticism is not unfounded before we proceed to consider each separate work. Perhaps nothing could bring out more strongly the degree in which these books are saturated with horrors than to quote some of the similes which occur in them. The silver moon is not generally regarded as pre-eminently suggestive of the horrible, but to Mr. Haggard's fancy it repeatedly inspires the most funereal thoughts. At one time the mountains on its face stand out weird and sharp like the bones on the face of a corpse; at another, its beams cast pencils and patches of light upon the blackness of a marble floor, like white flowers on a coffin. Even lichens clinging motionless to a rock recall the thought of a white beard hanging from a dead man's chin. Each story in turn is ghostly and ghastly. The sight of Frank Muller, seen with a background of fiery sunset, prompts the remark, 'He looks like a devil in hell: the fire seems to be running all up and down him.' The truly diabolical character of Muller, and the murderous work with which he is engrossed at the moment, serve to palliate Jess's strong language; but it is the mere wantonness of ill-timed levity to describe conciliating Billali, the Amahagger chieftain,

as making a friend of 'this Mammon of Unrighteousness,' or to drag in a sarcastic reference to the punishment of Nebuchadnezzar. No doubt there are some persons to whose taste a keen edge of wit is forged by profanity, but we are dull enough to see nothing but a pointless vulgarity and a shocking ribaldry in the account of the manner in which the three comrades in *King Solomon's Mines* pretend to cause an eclipse of the moon.

'I lifted up my hand solemnly towards the sky, an example which Sir Henry and Good followed, and quoted a line or two of *The Ingoldsby Legends* at it in the most impressive tones I could command. Sir Henry followed with a verse out of the Old Testament, whilst Good addressed the Queen of Night in a volume of the most classical bad language that he could think of. . . . "Keep it up, Good. I can't remember any more poetry. Curse away, there's a good fellow." Good responded nobly to the tax upon his inventive faculties. Never before had I the faintest conception of the breadth and depth and height of a naval officer's oburgatory powers. For ten minutes he went on without stopping, and he scarcely ever repeated himself' (pp. 185, 186).

The story of *She* is, in our judgment, one of the most repulsive that ever was conceived. *She* herself, half woman, half demon, with the form of a siren and the heart of a cynic; whose cold, calculating, chaste coquetry is almost more immoral than warm-blooded sensuality, and who is represented as delighting to kindle passion that she may gloat over its impotence as she alternately quickens and quenches it, will supply a new figure to the Walhalla of Monsters which modern fiction is gradually forming. The conception of her life of two thousand years with beauty unimpaired, and with all the gathered wisdom and experience of twenty centuries, spent in the cavern tombs of a deserted city and in the society of an embalmed corpse, surrounded by deaf and dumb attendants, and ruling over ferocious savages who crawl like reptiles into her presence, and whom she terrifies at intervals by unutterable tortures, is so loathsome that we are astounded at the commendation it has secured. Her persistent recollection of a terrible crime, her asserted acquaintance with the philosophy of varied schools, her irresistible power, as competent surely for weal as for woe, even her immutable fidelity to her long, long-lost Kallikrates—all fail to exercise one softening influence or to suggest one kindly sentiment.

Yet the central figure is not more hateful than the setting by which it is surrounded. The book is steeped in horrors. Leo the Adonis, Holly the mentor, and Job their faithful

attendant—this latter being the one only genuine specimen of true warm flesh and blood—have not got far on their voyage from Zanzibar before the chronicle of horrors commences. A squall wrecks the dhow in which they have sailed, and all the crew, save Mohammed the Arab captain, and the three Englishmen, are drowned. They pass through a lagoon into a swampy *cul-de-sac* with every prospect of perishing from hunger or malaria, and as Holly sinks into a doze he has a vision of the appearance which the boat and its crew will shortly present.

‘There she would lie, with gaping seams and half filled with fetid water, which, when the mist-laden wind stirred her, would wash backwards and forwards through our mouldering bones, and that would be the end of her, and of those in her who would follow after myths and seek the secrets of nature. Already I seemed to hear the water rippling against the desiccated bones and rattling them together, rolling my skull against Mohammed’s, and his against mine, till at last Mohammed’s stood straight up upon its vertebræ and glared at me through its empty eyeholes, and cursed me with its grinning jaws, because I, a dog of a Christian, disturbed the last sleep of a true believer’ (pp. 73, 74).

He is roused from this cheerful dream to find himself and his companions prisoners in the hands of the cannibal Amahagger, who put red-hot iron pots on the heads of strangers and eat their flesh. These amiable savages are the subjects of She.

We are now fairly launched upon the stream of horrors, and their intensity, as the story develops, increases until we wonder what new terror can be devised. We are bound to acknowledge that Mr. Haggard is equal to the difficulty. His repertorium of the frightful is inexhaustible. The struggle to hot-pot Mohammed, the terrific scene of the dance lighted by huge torches of dead bodies, the vast bone-pit with the dream it inspires, and the dangers of the passage to the cavern of the Spirit of Life, duly reach their climax in the final scene. That some of the most revolting of Mr. Haggard’s tableaux have their counterpart in the orgies of African savages, and that authority might be quoted from ancient books of travel or from the records of modern discovery for many of his strongest delineations may be true : but to what purpose are they introduced into stories of imaginary adventure? Why should the imagination be educated to revel in the bestial? No such plea could be urged in extenuation of the following detailed account of She’s death :—

“Why, what is it—what is it?” she said confusedly. “I feel

dazed. Surely the quality of the fire hath not altered. Can the principle of Life alter? Tell me, Kallikrates, is there aught wrong with my eyes? I see not clear," and she put her hand to her head and touched her hair—and oh, *horror of horrors!*—it all fell upon the floor.

"Oh, look!—look!—look!" shrieked Job, in a shrill falsetto of terror, his eyes nearly dropping out of his head, and foam upon his lips. "Look!—look!—look! she's shrivelling up! she's turning into a monkey!" and down he fell upon the ground, foaming and gnashing in a fit.

'True enough—I faint even as I write it in the living presence of that terrible recollection—she *was* shrivelling up; the golden snake that had encircled her gracious form slipped over her hips and to the ground; smaller and smaller she grew; her skin changed colour, and in place of the perfect whiteness of its lustre it turned dirty brown and yellow, like an old piece of withered parchment. She felt at her head: the delicate hand was nothing but a claw now, a human talon like that of a badly-preserved Egyptian mummy, and then she seemed to realize what kind of change was passing over her, and she shrieked, ah, she shrieked!—she rolled upon the floor and shrieked!

'Smaller she grew, and smaller yet, till she was no larger than a baboon. Now the skin was puckered into a million wrinkles, and on the shapeless face was the stamp of unutterable age. I never saw anything like it; nobody ever saw anything like the frightful age that was graven on that fearful countenance, no bigger now than that of a two months' child, though the skull remained the same size, or nearly so; and let all men pray to God they never may, if they wish to keep their reason.

'At last she lay still, or only feebly moving. She, who but two minutes before had gazed upon us, the loveliest, noblest, most splendid woman the world has ever seen, she lay still before us near the masses of her own dark hair, no larger than a big monkey, and hideous—ah, too hideous for words. And yet, think of this—at that very moment I thought of it—it was the *same* woman!

'She was dying: we saw it, and thanked God—for while she lived she could feel, and what must she have felt? She raised herself upon her bony hands, and blindly gazed around her, swaying her head slowly from side to side as a tortoise does. She could not see, for her whitish eyes were covered with a horny film. Oh, the horrible pathos of the sight! But she could still speak.

"Kallikrates," she said in husky, trembling notes; "forget me not, Kallikrates. Have pity on my shame. I shall come again, and shall once more be beautiful; I swear it—it is true! *Oh—h—h!*" and she fell upon her face, and was still.

'On the very spot where more than twenty centuries before she had slain Kallikrates the priest, she herself fell down and died.

'Overcome with the extremity of horror, we too fell on the sandy floor of that dread place, and swooned away.

'I know not how long we remained thus. Many hours, I suppose. When at last I opened my eyes, the other two were still outstretched upon the floor. The rosy light yet beamed like a celestial dawn, and the thunder-wheels of the Spirit of Life yet rolled upon their accustomed track, for as I awoke the great pillar was passing away. There, too, lay the hideous little monkey frame, covered with crinkled yellow parchment, that once had been the glorious She. Alas! it was no hideous dream—it was an awful and unparalleled fact!'—*She*, pp. 293-5.

Mr. Haggard touches in *She* the zenith of his glory as Pontifex Maximus of the horrible, but he displays no mean ability in the same cult both in *King Solomon's Mines*, which preceded, and in *Allen Quatermain* which followed it. Each story is distinguished by a highly spiced individuality in this respect which shows the strange fascination which it exercises over Mr. Haggard's mind. Is it worthy of the writer's unquestionable talents that he should squander them in detailing the enormities committed by a ferocious savage? The dark places of the earth are full of the habitations of cruelty; let us leave them in the deep shadow that hides them from our sight, not drag them into the glare of the noonday sun. Had Mr. Haggard led the host of Israel against Amalek we presume that he would have carefully spread out, under the very eyes of Samuel, 'all that was vile and refuse,' which, even in the haste of their disobedience, the rebellious people had the decency utterly to destroy. What imaginable purpose save that of making our minds familiar with all that is repulsive can be served by the sickening description of the witch-hunt with its infernal cold-blooded murders, or by the elaborate conceit of the Hall of Death, in which a colossal skeleton figure presided at the board, around which are gathered the grinning and petrified corpses of the royal house of Kukuana? The sight of a filthy hag, pouring out a stream of foul abuse, is not one over which we would willingly let our children linger. Is the portrait of Gagool a more elevating spectacle?

'I observed a wizened, monkey-like figure creeping up from the shadow of the hut. It crept on all fours, but when it reached the place where the king sat, it rose upon its feet and throwing the furry covering off its face, revealed a most extraordinary and weird countenance. It was (apparently) that of a woman of great age, so shrunken that in size it was no larger than that of a year-old child, and was made up of a collection of deep yellow wrinkles. Set in the wrinkles was a sunken slit that represented the mouth, beneath which the chin curved outwards to a point. There was no nose to speak of; indeed, the whole countenance might have been taken for that of a sun-dried corpse, had it not been for a pair of large black

eyes, still full of fire and intelligence, which gleamed and played under the snow-white eyebrows and the projecting, parchment-coloured skull, like jewels in a charnel-house. As for the skull itself, it was perfectly bare and yellow in hue, while its wrinkled scalp moved and contracted like the hood of a cobra. The figure to whom this fearful countenance—which caused a shiver of fear to pass through us as we gazed on it—belonged, stood still for a moment and then suddenly projected a skinny claw armed with nails nearly an inch long, and began, in a thin piping voice, "Blood! blood! rivers of blood! blood everywhere. I see it, I smell it, I taste it—it is salt. It runs red upon the ground, it rains down from the skies."

After another page and a half of similar rant Gagool falls foaming in an epileptic fit, and is carried into a hut. No more disgusting fare could well be provided in the 'penny dreadfuls' of the London slums than this choice morsel prepared for the boudoirs and schoolrooms of modern English life.

There is not much substantial reality in any of the three European adventurers who start forth in the quest of King Solomon's mines, but Mr. Haggard calls them out again to do duty in *Allan Quatermain*, where a grand old Zulu warrior, Umslopogaas, fills the vacancy occasioned by the restoration of Umopa to the throne of Kukuanaland. In *Allan Quatermain*, Mr. Haggard enjoyed, as he is careful to acknowledge, the advantage of Mr. Thomson's admirable book *Through Masailand*, but his third story of adventure is very inferior to those which preceded it. Not that it lacks the abundance of incident or the vigorous movement which are characteristic of its author, but it bears palpable marks of haste, both in execution and conception. Its literary merits are on a level with those of *The Witch's Head*, and in imaginative power we should rank it far below *She*. To this estimate one large exception must in justice be made. Umslopogaas is a splendid example of all the highest qualities of which uncivilized man is capable, and his fidelity, truthfulness, and unblenching courage, that rises higher and higher in the crisis of danger, are portrayed with a sympathy and force that make him completely to eclipse his European associates. It is a pity that so fine a portrait should be marred by its setting. It was hard, indeed, even for so ardent a worshipper of the horrible as Mr. Haggard to surpass in nastiness some of the scenes in *She* and *King Solomon's Mines*; but in the invasion of the black devil crabs which haunt the valley of the subterranean river we have the further choice elements of

screech and stench, united with coarse burlesque, to produce the following choice specimen of refined humour:—

‘Still, we got on pretty well, although the meat was tainted by the heat through which it had passed, till I happened to look behind me, my attention being attracted by a noise of something crawling over the stones, and perceived, sitting upon a rock in my immediate rear, a huge species of black freshwater crab, only it was five times the size of any crab I ever saw. This hideous and loathsome-looking animal had projecting eyes that seemed to glare at one, very long and flexible antennæ, or feelers, and gigantic claws. Nor was I especially favoured with its company. From every quarter dozens of these horrid brutes were creeping up, drawn, I suppose, by the smell of the food, from between the round stones, and out of holes in the precipice. Some were already quite close to us. I stared quite fascinated by the unusual sight, and, as I did so, I saw one of the beasts stretch out its huge claw, and give the unsuspecting Good such a nip behind that he jumped up with a howl, and set the “wild echoes flying” in sober earnest. Just then, too, another, a very large one, got hold of Alphonse’s leg, and declined to part with it, and, as may be imagined, a considerable scene ensued. Umslopogaas took his axe and cracked the shell of one with the flat of it, whereon it set up a horrid screaming which the echoes multiplied a thousandfold, and began to foam at the mouth, a proceeding that drew hundreds more of its friends out of unsuspected holes and corners. Those on the spot, perceiving that the animal was hurt, fell upon it like creditors on a bankrupt, and literally rent it limb from limb with their huge pincers, and devoured it, using their claws to convey the fragments to their mouths. Seizing whatever weapons were handy, such as stones or paddles, we commenced a war upon the monsters, whose numbers were increasing by leaps and bounds, and whose stench was overpowering. So fast as we cracked their armour others seized the injured ones and devoured them, foaming at the mouth, and screaming as they did so. Nor did the brutes stop at that. When they could they nipped hold of us—and awful nips they were—or tried to steal the meat. One enormous fellow got hold of the swan we had skinned, and began to drag it off. Instantly a score of others flung themselves upon the prey, and then began a ghastly and disgusting scene. How the monsters foamed and screamed, and rent the flesh, and each other! It was a sickening and unnatural sight, and one that will haunt all who saw it till their dying day—enacted as it was in the deep, oppressive gloom, and set to the unceasing music of the many-toned nerve-shaking echoes. Strange as it may seem to say so, there was something so shockingly human about these fiendish creatures—it was as though all the most evil passions and desires of man had got into the shell of a magnified crab, and gone mad. They were so dreadfully courageous and intelligent, and they looked as if they *understood*. The whole scene might have furnished material for another canto of Dante’s *Inferno*.¹

¹ Allan Quatermain, pp. 114, 116.

One more condensed illustration of Mr. Haggard's taste must close this series of quotations. The three Europeans are treated with the utmost kindness at the court of the Zu Vendean queens, hospitably entertained and lodged in the royal palace, and are occupied, among other things, in learning the language of the country. Unknown to his companions, Good has arranged that their tuition shall be carried on by young ladies. Quatermain appeals to Curtis for advice, and this high-bred English baronet, who, we have been assured, is a man of genuine piety and sterling worth, and is secretly enamoured of Nyleptha, one of the sister queens, replies:—

"Well," he said, "you see the ladies are here, ain't they? If we sent them away, don't you think it might hurt their feelings, eh? One doesn't like to be rough, you see; and they look regular *blues*, don't they, eh?" . . . Sir Henry and his governess appeared, so far as I could judge, to be going through a lesson framed on the principles laid down by Wackford Squeers, Esq. . . . The lady softly repeated the Zu Vendi word for "hand," and he took hers; "eyes," and he gazed deep into her brown orbs; "lips," and—but just at that moment . . . the door opened, and, attended by two guards only, in walked *Nyleptha*. [The infuriated queen orders the girl to be slain.] "It is well," answered Curtis; "then I will die with her. I am thy servant, oh Queen; do with me even as thou wilt." And he bowed towards her, and fixed his clear eyes *contemptuously* on her face' (pp. 177, 178).

The inaptitude of the adverb is sublime. The only possible contempt in Sir Henry's 'orbs' must have been reflected from the glance of the high-spirited generous woman who was ready to peril her crown, and life itself, for the sake of so unworthy a lover. The rest of the scene in which this incident occurs harmonizes entirely in tone and taste with the passage we have quoted.

In *Jess* Mr. Haggard gives evidence of higher qualities than in any other of the books before us. The scene is laid in his favourite region, and the writer's familiarity with South African life enables him to describe it with a minute fidelity of detail that invests his story with charming reality. The characters are more carefully thought out and more powerfully drawn than in any other of his works with which we are acquainted, and had Mr. Haggard thoroughly grasped and worked out the contrast which his story suggests between the uncontrollable self-indulgent passion of Frank Muller and the far deeper and yet self-sacrificing love of Jess, he might have produced a work of a very high order. As it is, although the story falls short of the splendid lesson it might have conveyed, and although it is disfigured by some of Mr. Haggard's

characteristic faults, it is a novel of considerable interest and power.

It commences, of course, with a pitched battle. This time the combatants are a sturdy ostrich and Captain John Neil. John, who is going to make experiment of ostrich-farming, with Silas Croft, in the Transvaal, arrives just in time to rescue Bessie Croft from the attack of the bird, whose fury is then turned against himself. Bessie and her elder sister, Jess, are the nieces of Silas; the former a beautiful, sweet, domestic girl; the latter a thoughtful, romantic, visionary woman, who has been wont from childhood to tenderly watch over her fair young sister, and to promote her happiness, if necessary, at the expense of her own. Frank Muller, a Boer with English blood in him derived from his mother—rich, handsome, and endowed with great personal strength and great abilities, but utterly unprincipled and unscrupulous—completes the circle of the principal persons in the story. We have neither space nor desire to condense Mr. Haggard's story into the scant limit of a review. It must suffice to say that Frank Muller is madly in love with and is entirely odious to Bessie, and that in his ruthless determination to carry her off by force, if necessary, he stirs up the Boers to the rebellion against the English government, which culminated in the crowning disaster of Majuba Hill.

We are constrained by lack of space to pass the picturesque sketches of Boer character with its astounding ignorance, brutality, and self-esteem; the strong and masterly portrait of Frank Muller, a type of monster only possible under certain conditions, and uniting in his own person the vices of both savage and civilized life; and the sweet, but faint, pastel of Bessie Croft. The interest of the story is concentrated upon Jess. Her suffering borne so bravely and silently, the terrific struggle in the swollen stream of the Vaal, the sudden passionate avowal of her love when death seems inevitable, and her stern repression of it when she and John unexpectedly reach the shore, and finally the determination of the weary-hearted, worn-out woman to slay Frank Muller and deliver her sister, are all told with much pathos and power. Yet we altogether refuse to accept Mr. Haggard's portraiture as the true ideal of self-sacrificing love. We are told, indeed, that such love is the one secret of earthly happiness; but although Jess does not shrink from the pain of it, she is not allowed even fully to enjoy the bitter-sweet joy which self-sacrifice brings. She secretly nurses deep down in her heart the love which she was bound, on her own self-imposed conditions, to extirpate. She bids John escape and leave her to die. 'I

know you love me, and I can die happy. I will wait for you. Oh, John! wherever I am, if I have any life and any remembrance, I will wait for you. Never forget that, all your life. However far I may seem away, if I live at all, I shall be waiting for you' (p. 227). This to the man who, as she knows and wishes, is going to marry her own sister Bessie. Why should not Bessie in that farther stage of being, and with far higher claims, be waiting for him too? This half-surrender enervates the story; nor is the fault redeemed by the circumstances of her death and the author's reflections upon it. 'Her head sank gently on her lover's breast as on a pillow, and there she died and passed upward towards the wider and larger liberty, or, as some would have us believe, downwards into the depths of an eternal sleep' (p. 332).

The alternative here so gratuitously obtruded affords an illustration of Mr. Haggard's method of dealing with the most serious questions, a method against which we desire in conclusion to utter our most emphatic protest. Throughout these stories the truth of Christianity is treated as an entirely open, almost as an indifferent, question. A chapter in *The Witch's Head*, entitled 'Mr. Alston's Views,' represents this thoughtful friend and adviser of Ernest Kershaw as sneering at the younger man's hopes of immortality. 'Ah! you believe that, do you? Think you are immortal and that sort of thing!' Several pages are devoted to the exposition of Mr. Alston's opinions, which rarely surpass the low level of agnosticism. Perhaps, he says—and he seldom gets beyond a perhaps—we, as compared with the insect tribe, 'are at the top of the tree of development, and for them may be the future, for us the annihilation. Who knows? There, fly away, and make the most of the present, for nothing else is certain.' Then, after the usual travesty of the Christian faith, he concludes:—

'When Fate finds me I shall meet him fearing nothing, for I know he has wreaked his worst upon me, and can only at the utmost bring me eternal sleep; and hoping nothing, because my experience has not been such as to justify the hope of any happiness for man, and my vanity is not sufficiently strong to allow me to believe in the intervention of a superior power to save so miserable a creature from the common lot of life.' 'On the following day his fate found him' (p. 248).

We are of course not about to enter upon any refutation of Mr. Alston's views, nor even upon the exposure of the exquisite pride, in the garb of humility, which could regard the deepest of problems as sufficiently solved by his own individual experience. It accords with such convictions that the con-

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stancy of Jess should be undermined in the hour of trial by the persuasion that free-will is denied us. The miserably degrading tendency of modern so-called intellectual scepticism is nowhere perhaps more clearly marked than in its reduction of mankind to blind automata driven helplessly forward by irresistible destiny.

'Jess felt her impotence in the hands of Fate. All in an instant it seemed to be borne in upon her mind that she could not help herself, but was only the instrument of a superior power, whose will she was fulfilling through the workings of her passion, *and to whom her individual fate was a matter of little moment.* It was inconclusive reasoning and perilous doctrine, but it must be allowed that the circumstances gave it the colour of truth. And, after all, the border line between fatalism and free will has never been quite authoritatively settled, even by St. Paul, *so perhaps she was right*' (p. 148).

Has anyone, with a just sense of moral responsibility, the right to fling about at random such inconclusive reasoning and perilous doctrine, unless he has definitely renounced the blessed assurance of a loving care for us, so minute that the very hairs of our head are all numbered? Nor are such blemishes as these relieved by the tone in which Mr. Haggard refers to the most awful subjects in his lighter works. We are indignant at the use of sacred things as mere colours to add effect to an imaginative picture, or to give point to a description of the grotesque. It is, in our judgment, sheer profanity to heighten the foul account of She's death by adding, 'Let all men pray to God that they may never see such a sight if they wish to preserve their reason.'

It is time for us to bring these strictures to a close. We have written in no carping or captious spirit, but under a strong sense of the mischief which is wrought by the unrestrained acceptance of such works as those before us. 'Literary falsehood,' it has been well said, 'is pernicious, not in proportion to its magnitude or malice, but to its unsuspected character, and to its appeal to the vain imaginations and idle prejudices of the reader.' The false taste which introduces the reek of the shambles into fiction is outdone by the false sentiment which intermingles truth and error on their pages, to the gradual confusion of all moral truth. Was it not Goethe who said, 'Tell me your firm convictions; keep your doubts to yourself; I have plenty of my own'? Christianity must be, and is, prepared to hold its own in the arena of the fullest and most open discussion; but the handling of deep problems after Mr. Haggard's fashion is little less than grave impertinence and ostentatious folly.

ART. VII.—TWO MORE TRANSLATIONS OF THE
DIVINA COMMEDIA.

1. *The Divina Commedia of Dante Alighieri, translated line for line in the Terza Rima of the Original, with Notes.* By FREDERICK K. H. HASELFOOT, M.A. (London, 1887.)
2. *The Commedia and Canzoniere of Dante Alighieri.* A New Translation with Notes and Essays, and a Biographical Introduction. By E. H. PLUMPTRE, D.D., Dean of Wells. In Two Volumes. (London, 1886 and 1887.)

THE imperfection of all things natural, and of those new creations which art 'adds to nature,' is a theme tolerably familiar to all.

Se fosse appunto la cera dedutta,
E fosse il cielo in sua virtù suprema,
La luce del suggel parrebbe tutta ;
Ma la natura la dà sempre scema,
Similmente operando all' artista,
Ch' ha l' abito dell' arte e man che trema.¹

Nor is it the artist's hand alone that is at fault.

Forma non s'accorda
Molte fiate all' intenzion dell' arte,
Perchè a risponder la materia è sorda.²

And yet, however we may explain it—whether by the natural craving of conscious imperfection for some strength beyond its own, or through dreamlike memories of something perfect, known to us before the 'sleep and the forgetting' of our birth we find much in nature and in art (ever more, perhaps, the wiser we become) to which we willingly and unreservedly ascribe perfection.

¹ 'Were the wax
Moulded with nice exactness, and the heaven
In its disposing influence supreme,
The brightness of the seal should be complete ;
But nature renders it imperfect ever,
Resembling thus the artist in her work,
Whose faltering hand is faithless to his skill.'

Cary (*Par.* xiii. 73).

² 'Ofttimes but ill accords the form
To the design of art, through sluggishness
Of unreplying matter.'—Cary (*Par.* i. 127).

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All cannot indeed hope, many would not even wish, to experience that ecstasy of 'divine madness,' those tremblings of the spirit 'that hath its dwelling in the heart's most secret chambers,' of which we read in the *Phædrus* and the *Vita Nuova*; but all of us surely know what it is to surrender ourselves in restful content to that which we accept as perfection made manifest in the imperfect—a perfection which is often wholly veiled from us, but which sometimes, 'in seasons of fair weather,' stands out, as it were, with wonderful distinctness on the far horizon.

This self-surrender, this recognition of the presence of perfection, is indeed an indispensable means for the attainment of true life. By it we are brought into a living organic relation with external things, and are supplied with what Plato quaintly calls the 'fodder of the soul,' by which alone it can be nourished for its winged chariot-flight towards the apex of heaven; by which—to express it less metaphorically—the soul is strengthened for its aspiration towards that perfection which is the end of all spiritual energy, perhaps of all energy whatsoever.

By this, or by some other, theory we may endeavour to explain to ourselves the fact—for a fact it surely is—that while there are some things in nature and in art which we gratefully and without conscious self-delusion accept as perfect, and from which we draw life-giving nourishment, there are many others essentially different from these—dark points and surfaces in our 'dome of glass' unilluminated by the 'white radiance of eternity'—objects that may indeed supply much active exercise to brain and senses, but with which our soul seems never to enter into any organic relationship; which remain for us ever mere phenomena.

It may be due to some unfortunate idiosyncrasies or prejudices, but to not a few men translations of poetic masterpieces seem ever to remain in the category of phenomena. The feeling that such men experience in regard to the most successful translations of the *Antigone*, of *Hamlet*, or of the *Divina Commedia*, is something intrinsically different from the feeling with which they regard the originals. Nay more, they can conceive no possible translation towards which they could be otherwise affected.

That this does not hold true for all minds is evident. Notable instances to the contrary will readily occur to all. No purer inspiration was ever drawn from any source than that which Keats drew from Chapman's version of Homer. No more fervent enthusiasm for the

'signor dell' altissimo canto,
Che sovra gli altri come aquila vola,'¹

ever found utterance than that which Keats has expressed in his famous sonnet. Another oft-quoted exception is that of the Bible, which, whatever else it be, is a poetic masterpiece. In extent and multifariousness of influence the translations of the Bible are to their original as the spreading branches and multitudinous foliage of some mighty tree are to its gnarled and leafless trunk, and all in various degrees—from Luther's Bible to the last rude version by some Central African missionary—preserve a living relation to the parent stem.

But by ordinary humanity, and in the case of ordinary works of human genius, the most that is generally accorded to any translation is that it is a 'success'—an extraordinary success perhaps—successful, may be, over all rivals, and beyond all expectation—but nothing more; nothing of that which we might accord to a simple wild flower, to a simple melody by Beethoven, or to a single line by Dante. We applaud, we are amazed at the dexterity, the ingenuity, the assiduity of the translator; we may find it difficult to determine, as Macaulay found it difficult when reviewing Cary's *Dante*, 'whether to praise more the writer's intimacy with the language of the original, or the extraordinary mastery over his own;' we may note with sympathy the reverence with which he has approached his subject, the 'lungo studio' which he has expended, the 'grande amore' which has led him not only to explore but also to reproduce in another tongue some such 'sacred song' as the *Divine Comedy*. But admiration and sympathy are the only feelings aroused; there is no self-surrender; there is no recognition of even a possibility of perfection.

Let us consider, not only whether we have justifiable grounds for being thus affected, but whether we are actually thus affected towards everything that we style a translation. It is evident that so-called translations differ in regard to their natures, and also to their ends—and therefore necessarily also in regard to the methods of their composition. For instance, the end which the English translator of the *Divina Commedia* has, or should have, in view is distinctly *not* that at which he aims who translates Milton into Virgilian hexameters, or Tennyson into Alcaics. In the latter case the result desired is a production such as Virgil or Alcæus might

¹ *Inferno*, v. 95.

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have composed in his own language, age, and country. The more successfully another effect is substituted for the effect produced on us by the original, the more do such academical exercises merit the approval of the critic, or the marks of the examiner. But in the former case the effect produced by the translation should be as far as possible that of the original, and the effect of a perfect translation would be both essentially and apparently the same as that of the original.

Now, is such a perfect translation a possibility? Or, even though no possibility, is it an ideal towards which we may hope to approach by dexterous reproduction of what we loosely call 'form'? Is it possible that, recasting a poem such as the *Divina Commedia* in another language, we can by the most skilful translativ process preserve its essential character as a work of art, so that this 'translation' of ours may not merely bear an apparent resemblance to the original, but may belong to the same class of things, and may together with it take its place, as a creation, under that Order which is 'concreato e costruito alle sustanzie'? (*Parad.* xxix. 31.) Again, even though by no mere translativ process we can effect this, can it not be effected at all? And if it can, why should we be unable to conceive no translation which we could possibly regard with the same feeling as we regard a true work of art? The answers to these questions, and to all such questions, must come direct from the heart. We believe it to be thus or otherwise, because we feel that it is thus or otherwise; we cannot theorize ourselves or others into or out of beliefs of this nature.

But we may fairly attempt to find some form of doctrine by which we may illustrate, if we cannot justify, such beliefs. Those who hold that by mere translativ skill no perfect translation can ever be produced would probably be ready to accept (as far as any such thing can be accepted) some theory not essentially different from that which Dante, using the terminology of the Schoolmen, propounds in several well-known passages of his great poem.

The act of creation, he says, was threefold. Simultaneously issued forth from the creating Power, 'as three arrows from a three-stringed bow,' form, matter, and the combination of form and matter. Form (that is *pure*, or substantial, form, *μορφή*) is the spiritual informing energy; it is this 'pure form'¹ which conjoined with 'pure matter' constitutes the natural

¹ Dante speaks of the Angels and of the human soul as 'form.' The same use of the word is found in some English writers, e.g. Spenser and Henry More. Cf. Philip. ii. 6.

world. Pure, or formless, matter is imperceptible—a mere 'potenza' (potentiality).

If there be in the faculty divine of the poet something of a creative power, something at all events analogous to the power by which the natural world was created, we may surely hold that a true poetic work is the result of the combination of pure form and pure matter; that its existence consists in this combination; and that this combination is due to an act of creative power.

Further, to analyse the simplest natural object into its component form and matter is beyond our alchemy: were it possible, such disintegration would involve annihilation; and we cannot annihilate.

'Strinse potenzia con atto
Tal vime, che giammai non si disvima.'¹

Equally beyond our power is metamorphosis—if the *μορφή* be pure substantial form.

Now, without entering further into the intricacies of this question, or attempting to theorize on the mystery of death, the temporary or eternal dissolution of the body from that soul which 'nature gave it as form,'² we have already enough known quantities for the following formula: 'The attempt to substitute anything in the place of the substantial form of a work of poetic genius is an attempt at metamorphosis.' The result of such an attempt we may describe as a *simulacrum*, or, at the best, an *Homunculus*. With simulacra and Homunculi our soul can enter into no living relation; they find no place in the order which is 'concreated and assigned to substances.' Still, even an *Homunculus* may have its uses: flickering through the air in its glass retort, it may guide us to Peneius, to Helen, to perfection revealed in the imperfect; and such, we hold, is the function of a mere 'translation.'

But, it may be asked, is there no such thing as *recreation*? Is it not possible that a translator who himself possesses the poetic faculty may, while also imitating external form, create something at least analogous to, if not essentially the same as, the original?

If we apply Dante's theory rigidly to the act of poetic creation, our answer must necessarily be that such a thing is only then possible when what is produced is a new combination of pure matter and pure form, an independent existence.

¹ Literally: 'Such withe has bound potency with act [*i.e.* matter with form], that it is never unwithed [loosed]' (*Par.* xxix. 35).

² *Par.* iv. 54.

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That such recreations can and do exist, possessing more or less external resemblance to an original, we do not for a moment deny; but such we can scarcely regard as mere 'translations.' To state the case rather paradoxically, the one indispensable condition of a true translation of a poem is that it should itself be a poem, and in so far as it is a poem it is an independent existence, and therefore no translation. Mere translations make no pretence to independent existence.

Still, as we have said, mere translations have their uses. 'Read a chorus of Sophocles or an ode of Pindar in a "*crib*,"' exclaims Dean Plumptre, 'and see what you think of it!'

We confess to having used a '*crib*' ere now—though probably not exactly for the purpose of seeing 'what we thought of it'—and we are convinced that, were we to renew the study of 'Bohn's Library' with this purpose in view, we should draw far more profit and enjoyment from its pages than from the perusal of any possible translation of the *Divina Commedia* in which the most skilfully fabricated imitation of external form were substituted for the '*pura forma*' of the original.

But, it may be objected, no such substitution is attempted. The mere substitution of one language for another does not affect the essential nature of a poem, and, this being the case, the one aim of the translator should be to reproduce as nearly as possible an external resemblance.

We think that very much might be said to render it most probable, if not to prove conclusively, that in the case of a poetic creation a change of language is a change not merely of external but of substantial form, and that unless a translator of Dante possess creative power he had much better give us an honest faithful prose version—as vigorous and rhythmic, if he can, as Carlyle's version of the *Inferno*.

Mr. Haselfoot, in his Introduction, argues temperately and, if we grant his premisses, forcibly in favour of *terza rima*. 'The form of the poem,' he says, 'seems to me to be part of its very essence. I have therefore adhered to it.' But surely he would not deny that that form of the poem which is part of its essence may possibly consist in something besides its 'interwoven *terzine*,' its 'rhythmic effects,' and its 'sweet cadences of polysyllabic rhymes.'

In the mere act of translation, of attempting to express in English what Dante has expressed in Italian, he has abandoned a form most necessary to the 'essence' of the poem, without which it can never be essentially the same, nor

produce even an analogous effect, unless its loss be supplied by an act of creative power.

This surely differs *toto cælo* from that criticism of which Mr. Haselfoot justly complains. We express no 'trenchant condemnation' of any 'attempt to perform the impossible,' if by that is meant the impossibility of reproducing satisfactorily in English the rhythmic effects and the sweet cadences of the original. Mr. Haselfoot has himself proved what unsuspected 'potenza' the English language has for such imitative work.

Nor do we hold that it is in the least 'culpable to interpret Dante in the metre which he has chosen.' On the contrary, presupposing that the poetic value of Mr. Haselfoot's version is equal to that of Cary, we consider it a most fortunate circumstance that he has chosen the original metre.

What we do hold to be an attempt to perform the impossible is the attempt to reproduce a work of poetic genius in another language, so that it may remain essentially the same, by any such means as an imitation of external characteristics, or indeed by any means whatever but an act of poetic creation.

It is a brilliant but deceptive remark of Boileau's—a specimen of his own 'tinsel'—that a translator 'should endeavour to write as the ancient author would have written had he writ in the same language.'

Had he writ in the same language! One might almost as well require a man to write as Dante would have written had he not thought and felt as Dante. Language, thought, and feeling are inextricably interwoven. He who would write or speak efficiently in English or Italian must think and feel as an Englishman or an Italian. The poet—if such should ever exist—who could produce veritable poems in two languages would be able to approach his subjects in two very different attitudes; and were he to reproduce in the second language one of his own works, he could only then reproduce its essential character as a poem if he recreated its substantial form. If, in addition to this, he were to preserve close external resemblance between the two poems, he would have produced a perfect translation—a result which no mere translatable gifts could ever attain.

Turning now from the theoretic aspect of the matter we shall, with all due deference to the opinions of others, state what we think about the two metrical translations of the *Divina Commedia* which have lately appeared, and of which the titles stand at the head of this article, only premising that we have studied them, not so much with the object

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of detecting external defects, as for the purpose of recording the 'essential effect' that they produce on our mind.

Mr. Haselfoot's translation of the *Divina Commedia* has one very decided advantage over that of his latest rival, Dean Plumptre. It is all comprised in one volume, and the attention of the reader is not distracted by notes at the bottom of the page. The text of the translation flows on without interruption, and if any difficulty arises the reader has only to turn to the Notes at the end of each Canto. These Notes are worthy of the highest praise. They are thoroughly scholarly, and the object of the writer is evidently to say as little as he possibly can with that conciseness of which Dante has taught him the art. In Dean Plumptre's translation the *Divina Commedia* runs over into a second bulky volume, and some of the pages are half, and more than half, filled with wordy Notes, many of which might well have been spared,¹ and most of which might with advantage have been curtailed. In spite of the flourish of trumpets in three dedicatory sonnets, and of the *Exegi monumentum ære perennius* tone of the Preface, it may be doubted whether Dean Plumptre's translation will, as the writer almost seems to anticipate (p. xii), 'hold the field.' For the achievement of such a result there is need not only of *terza rima*, but of a terser rhymers. A translator of Dante is nothing if not concise; but the besetting sin of this version is a feeble diffusiveness. No reader of it can fail to be struck with the perpetual recurrence of the use of 'doth,' 'dost,' and 'did' with the verb. This of course *must* occasionally be resorted to by every translator. But here it is rather the rule than the exception. In *Inf.* ii. 133-6 we get three 'dids' and a 'dost' in four lines! In *Purg.* ii. 73-84 five 'dids' occur. Such instances are endless.² Mr. Ruskin has remarked how Dante maps out his journey for us with the accuracy of a land surveyor. But all this is blurred and obscured in the Dean's translation, and not only so, the master's landmarks are obliterated. Let anyone read, in the original, Canto xi. of the *Inferno*—that ground-plan of the whole *Cantica*—and then see how the translator fritters its lines of demarcation away. For example, in l. 82 are enumerated the three main

¹ Take, for example, the ludicrous note on *Par.* xxviii. 93, where Dante alludes to the famous story of the chessboard and the grains of wheat. The Dean actually lugs in the 'algebraic formula of geometrical progression' in a silly speculation as to whether Dante worked the sum, and, if so, by what process!

² See *Inf.* xvii. 124; *Purg.* xii. 106-117, ix. 65, 66, xi. 115, 116, &c.

divisions of the sins punished in Hell—'Incontinenza, Malizia, e la matta Bestialitate:' but in the translation these all disappear in the meaningless rendering—

'Unbridled will, fixed evil, last we meet
Brutal excess.'

The introduction of epithets is fatal to the precision required, nor is any hint given that we are here dealing with the whole sum and substance of the *Inferno*. This froward departure from Dante's vivid touches betrays itself in numberless minor instances. Who would recognize the famous 'gran rifiuto' (*Inf.* iii. 60) in the feeble paraphrastic disguise, 'who basely from his calling high withdrew'? The whole point of the pathetic appeal of Rome left widowed and *alone* by the Emperor Albert (*Purg.* vi. 114), 'Cesare mio, perchè non m'accompagni?' is lost in the translation, 'My Cæsar, why dost thou to help me fail?' Nor is this all. The translation is not free from glaring mistakes. The following are taken at random. *Inf.* vii. 90, 'Si spesso vien' chi vicenda consegue,' is rendered, 'So oft comes one to whom strange chances fall,' instead of, 'one who obtains his turn,' which, *pace* Fraticelli, is unquestionably the true meaning. In *Inf.* xxiii. 42, 'Tanto che solo una camicia vesta,' is rendered, 'One scant shift her only robe supplies,' whereas the meaning is that the mother does not stop even to put on a shift.¹ (Cary and Longfellow have likewise fallen into this mistake.) In *Purg.* ii. verses 11, 12 are rendered, 'As those who on their way move pensively, Who go in heart and yet with loitering mien;' whereas the comparison is to those who think of, look forward to, their further way, and go in heart, though in body they do not move. Mr. Haselfoot *ad loc.* aptly compares the 'animus sine corpore velox' of Horace. This attribution, by the Dean, of motion to those whom Dante describes as stationary occurs again in *Inf.* iv. 134, 135: 'There Socrates and Plato see I pass, Who near him stand, while others further go.' All that Dante says is, 'Socrate e Platone Che innanzi agli altri più presso gli stanno.' How can people 'pass' and 'stand' at the same time? So in *Purg.* ii. 124, 'Le colombe adunate alla pastura' becomes 'The doves who through the meadows stray;' and in *Inf.* xxxii. 31, 'E come a gracidar si sta la rana' is converted into 'And the frogs to croak are wont to flock'! In *Purg.* ii. 4 'La Notte che

¹ It is not necessary to suppose that Dante imagined the woman running out of the house stark naked. Raphael's artistic instinct shows us what Dante may have had in his mind. In his famous fresco, the *Incendio del Borgo*, the mother (naked down to the waist) is leaning over the wall and handing her child down from the burning house.

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opposita a lui cerchia' is rendered 'Night whose path wheels where his went before'! In *Purg.* vi. 118, 'If the name be lawful—our great Jove,' the Dean is self-convicted of error, for in a note he says that in Dante's time it was *not* thought irreverent to apply the name of Jove to the Deity. But the 'Se licito m'è' of the original refers, not to the boldness of calling Christ 'Jove,' but to the imputation that Dante is about to make in lines 120–123 that His eyes are turned elsewhere, &c. In *Purg.* xvii. 39 Lavinia is made by Dante to say she has her mother's fate to bewail before that of another (Turnus). But the Dean renders the line 'Grief for thy fate above all else is keen.' One of the worst blunders is that in *Purg.* xviii. 84, 'Del mio carcar diposto avea la soma,' which the Dean translates, 'Had made my doubts cease to be burdensome,' which would seem to imply that it was Dante himself who bore the 'burden;' whereas the meaning of 'mio carcar' unquestionably is 'the burden which I had laid on him' (*i.e.* Virgil). Again, in *Inf.* xxxi. 144, 145, we read in the Dean's version :—

'Nor paused he, thus bowed down, to reascend,
But rose, as mast in gallant ship doth tower.'

Surely the meaning of 'he did not pause to reascend' is not 'he did not delay his reascending' but 'he did not stop for the purpose of reascending.' 'To reascend' is interpolated to the detriment of the meaning. And in the next line the striking comparison of Antæus to the raising up of a mast in a ship is altogether lost by the reference to the mast as already in position and 'towering.' Of course the epithet 'gallant' is only shoved in to eke out the proper number of syllables. In *Par.* i. 93, 'who back to thine dost flee,' 'thine' should be 'it.' In *Par.* viii. 60, 'Me for a while as sovereign lord did own,' is exactly the opposite of the original—'per suo Signore a tempo m'aspettava'—which is, that the country 'expected to own me in time as its Lord,' an expectation never realized, as the speaker, Charles Martel, died before his father. In *Par.* ix. 74, 75 the better interpretation surely is, 'So that no will can make itself escape thee.'

The passage *Inf.* xv. 25–30 seems to be an instance where some blunder has been allowed to pass through the press. It runs thus :—

'And I when he his arm towards me shook,
From bringing him to recognition clear
I was not hindered by his scorched look.
But thought my mind a knowledge gained full clear,
And bending down my hand towards his face
I asked "What, Ser Brunetto, art thou here?"'

Now line 26 of the original—'Ficcai gli occhi per lo cotto aspetto' does not seem to be here translated at all, lines 26 and 27 of the translation being a rendering of lines 27 and 28 of the Italian. Line 28 of the translation is an interpolation. The Bishop of Ripon has, we believe, pointed out the error committed in making Brunetto Latini shake his fist at Dante! We did not know before that 'distese' meant 'shook.'

We have taken up so much space—and we could easily fill ever so much more—in pointing out what we venture to think must be called serious blunders, that we have left ourselves no room to call attention to scores upon scores of examples we had noted of substitutions and interpolations¹ of the feeblest of expletives and most meaningless of epithets, not a trace of which is to be found in the Italian. We might also have added a page or two on the omissions which occur again and again, and which mutilate and deface Dante's thoughts. Something might also have been said on the Dean's extraordinary perversions of proper names, e.g. 'As now a Cincinnate or Cornelié'! In not a few cases there are lines so ludicrous that we marvel how they got into print, and so obscure that they ought not to have been printed without a 'crib.' In the two following passages the ludicrous and the obscure are combined in equal proportions (*Inf.* xxxiv. 62–63):

'Iscariot,
Whose legs without with head inside combine.'

How is this strange combination effected? And again a few lines further on we read (76–80):—

'When we had reached the point *where legs of men*
Turn round upon the thickness of the thighs,
My guide with toil and eager breathing strain
Where his legs had been made his head uprise.'

This is an anatomical puzzle which the mere English reader will find it hard to solve. In Mr. Haselfoot's translation all is clear. Then for obscurity pure and simple take the following (*Purg.* xxxii. 4–6):—

'Beyond, like walls that bounded either eye
Reigned simple nescience, so that sweet smile lent
To the old net resistless mastery.'

¹ One of the worst of these interpolations occurs in *Purg.* v. 16–17, where the Dean thinks it necessary to translate Dante's simple word 'pensier' by 'thoughts *weak and light*.' The meaning simply is that a man cannot entertain two thoughts at once. Of the *quality* of the thoughts there is no sort of question. The Dean, however, suffers from an eruption of adjectives.

One is tempted to ask how 'non calere' or 'heedlessness' can mean 'nescience'? how nescience can be like walls? how walls can reign? and how a smile can make a loan to a net, old or new? Compare Mr. Haselfoot's translation:—

'And walls on this side and on that coerced
Those eyes to heed not; the smile's sanctity
So drew them to it with its net, as erst.'

In *Parad.* xiii. 79-80, we read:—

'If then the burning Love that worketh still
Clear view of that first virtue should assign.'

A note of explanation was much needed here, but is not forthcoming, to show how from this rendering the Dean can extract the meaning which in his note to line 59 he, in accordance with Mr. Haselfoot and most other commentators, assigns to it, viz. 'If the creative action of the Divine Love is immediate.' No passage in the whole of the *Divina Commedia* can match this for obscurity, and we believe that Mr. Haselfoot, in his masterly note, has been the first to find the key.

In the same Canto, verses 26-27, we find:—

'Persons three who in one nature shine,
And in one person that in manhood show.'

In the first of these lines 'one' should be 'divine.' The second seems utterly misunderstood and hopelessly unintelligible.

In Dean Plumptre's *Paradiso*, which was published seven months after Mr. Haselfoot's translation of the entire *Commedia*, we have noticed some resemblances so startling that it is hard to believe that they are—as of course they may be—mere coincidences. Take, for example, the following:—

CANTO III. 19-21.

'As soon as to perceive them I began
Thinking them semblances in mirrors ta'en,
I turned my eyes where they might be to scan.'—H.

'And I, when to perceive them I began,
Esteeming them as mirrored semblance vain,
Turned mine eyes round me, where they were to scan.'—P.

IV. 10-12.

'Silent I was, but my desire became
Limned in my face, and my demand as well
More ardent far than speech distinct could claim.'—H.

'Silent I stood, but my desire became
In my looks painted, and thus my request
More fervent was than clearest speech could claim.'—P.

IV. 113-114.

'She means it of will absolute, and I
Of the other ; thus we both speak truly here.'—H.

'She spoke of that will absolute, and I
Of the other ; thus we both speak truly here.'—P.

V. 58.

'And to account each change as foolish learn.'—H.

'And every change to account as foolish learn.'—P.

V. 127-129.

'But know not who thou art or wherefore lies
Thy lot, O worthy soul, in that sphere's grade
From mortals veiled by rays which elsewhere rise.'—H.

'But thee I know not, nor why for thee lies,
O worthiest soul, thy home within the sphere
Veiled from men's eyes by rays that elsewhere rise.'—P.

XX. 130-133.

'Predestination ! what far depths conceal
Thy root from those looks which may not attain
Insight of all the First Cause can reveal !'—H.

'O Grace predestined ! how thou dost conceal
Thy secret root from every mortal eye
That sees not what the First Cause can reveal.'—P.

XXIV. 51.

'For such profession and such questioner.'—H.

'For such profession such a questioner.'—P.

It is due to Mr. Haselfoot to say that we do not remember to have met with any such striking coincidences in the *Inferno* and *Purgatorio*.

Mr. Haselfoot expresses the hope that his version of Dante's poem may be accepted as a 'true photograph of the original.'

Such a simile should not be pressed too far. It will be enough if we allow that in many of those qualities in which the chief excellence of a photograph consists—in fidelity to outline, in chiaroscuro, in detail, and in tone—Mr. Haselfoot's version fully justifies his modest expectation. But in one most important point we find a radical dissimilarity. No photograph that we have ever seen has produced on us an effect similar in kind to that produced by this translation. Whatever satisfaction the most perfect of photographs may give to the eye of the professional or amateur, however much we may admire or envy the technical excellences of the thing, it has no independent existence : it is, as Plato says of imita-

tive art, twice removed from reality—it is a simulacrum, the only use of which is to remind one of an original.

Now, much as we have admired, and perhaps envied, the very extraordinary technical excellences of Mr. Haselfoot's work, such as its literal accuracy, and its effects of rhythm and rhyme, yet we hold that we confer a praise of a far higher order than that which he seems to expect, when we state that, as we read canto after canto, we became ever more and more oblivious of the existence of an 'original,' but that we almost always experienced, in a greater or a less degree, a feeling similar to that which we experience while reading Dante. We felt ourselves borne along, so to say, by wind and stream on some 'proud keel that singing cuts its way.' We do not of course mean to intimate that, even had Mr. Haselfoot's version been an original work, it would have been a work as great, or nearly as great, as Dante's poem, but we believe it to be comparable with that poem, as belonging to the same class of things.

This opinion is founded upon a general impression, and can neither be justified nor refuted by the quotation of a few passages. We frankly allow that passages might be quoted, and some of considerable length, where Mr. Haselfoot's 'faltering hand is faithless to his skill,' and where 'forma non s' accorda all' intenzion dell' arte.' The following version of the well-known inscription over Hell's Portal is an instance of what we mean:—

'Through me is reached the dolorous abode ;
Through me is reached eternity of woe ;
Through me to reach the lost folk lies the road.
Justice inclined my lofty Maker so ;
From Power divine, from highest Wisdom's spring,
And from Love's first source did my fabric grow.
Before me there was no created thing
Save those eternal, and eterne last I ;
Away all hope, O ye that enter, fling.'—*Inf.* iii. 1.

But unsuccessful as is this rendering, there is a certain latent power in it. One feels that some bright inspiration might touch it into vigorous vitality. It is not struck with fatal constitutional disease, as is the case with Dean Plumptre's version of this passage, and alas! of most passages. Indeed Mr. Haselfoot fails here where all, even Cary, have failed. The wondrous force and simple grandeur of Dante's words have never yet, as far as we are aware, been reproduced in any language with any measure of success. It may interest some of our readers to compare with the above version, and

with others, that given by a popular German translator of the *Divina Commedia*, if we may thus style a writer whose *tersa rima* translation is published in a popular edition at the price of one shilling.¹

‘Durch mich geht’s ein zur Stadt der ew’gen Qualen,
Durch mich geht’s ein zum wehevollen Schlund,
Durch mich geht’s ein zu der Verdamniß Thalen.
Gerechtigkeit war der Bewegungsgrund
Dess, der mich schuf; mich gründend, that er offen
Allmacht, Allweisheit, erste Liebe kund.
Nicht ward vor mir Geschaffnes angetroffen,
Als Ewiges; und ewig daur’ auch ich.
Ihr, die ihr eingeht, lasst hier jedes Hoffen.’

The adoption of the *tersa rima*, even though the *verso tronco* be substituted for the *verso piano* with its soft dissyllabic ending, taxes the powers of a language which even Coleridge found so ‘poor in rhymes’ that he abandoned his intended metrical version of Schiller’s ‘Lager.’ The choice of such a metre is one of those self-imposed restraints by which art gives outline and consistence to its creations—a ‘freno dell’ arte,’ as Dante calls it.

‘Das ist die Eigenschaft der Dinge;
Natürlichem genügt das Weltall kaum,
Was künstlich ist, verlangt geschlossnen Raum.’

Now, the manner in which such a necessity of external form is met is a test not only of translative ingenuity but also of poetic power. The following is an example of the manner in which Mr. Haselfoot and Dean Plumptre respectively meet the difficulties of the same case. In the translation of the line (*Inf.* i. 93):—

‘Se vuoi campar d’ esto luogo selvaggio,’

Mr. Haselfoot finds himself encountered by two importunate rhymes which passionately demand another—a third dimension, so to speak—by which their existence may be assured. What does the writer do? He at once abandons his ‘high standard of literal accuracy,’ he boldly ‘sacrifices the sense to the rhyme’ (we are quoting his own words), and he writes:—

‘If thou wouldst go free from this savage cage.’

We can almost imagine the alabaster features of the great master—whose bust was doubtless enshrined somewhere near

¹ *Dante Alighieri’s ‘Göttliche Komödie’: übersetzt von Karl Streckfuss (Universal-Bibliothek).*

—relaxing in an approving smile as Mr. Haselfoot wrote down the last word of his line.

Dean Plumptre finds himself in a like predicament. How does he extricate himself? By his usual method. He writes :—

‘If thou wilt scape this region waste and drear.’

Again (l. 135), Dante’s words are—

‘E color che tu fai cotanto mesti.’

Dean Plumptre has his ‘tag’ ready :—

‘And those thou tell’st of in their torments dire.’

Mr. Haselfoot follows Boileau’s audacious advice to ‘emulate rather than imitate,’ and gives us something truly Dantesque :—

‘And those thou makest to such sorrow prone.’

Very numerous examples might be given to the same effect. Opening the volume at haphazard we find ourselves in the heaven of the fixed stars, and from the one page select two further specimens of such ‘emulation.’

‘Questo conforto dal fuoco secondo
Mi venne.’ (*Par.* xxv. 37.)

‘I heard the second fire articulate
This comfort.’

‘E quella pia, che guidò le penne
Delle mie ali.’ (*Par.* xxv. 49.)

‘And she who guided tenderly the aim
Of my plumed wings.’

The fact is that Mr. Haselfoot, strictly adhering to his rule of ‘excluding every rhyme that is not thoroughly legitimate,’¹ and never tagging on extraneous matter to the end of

¹ Surely, however (we speak under correction), ‘gone’ . . . ‘scorn’ (*Par.* xxvii. 31), is scarcely legitimate. A very large number of spurious rhymes may be culled from Dean Plumptre’s work. We offer a few specimens: ‘be . . . cry;’ ‘harsh . . . o’erarch;’ ‘crashed . . . detached;’ ‘learn . . . mourn;’ ‘birth . . . wrath;’ ‘isle . . . toil;’ ‘spoil . . . ere-while;’ ‘stir . . . ear,’ and ‘bear’ (‘bear,’ indeed, is used *passim* as though it were pronounced ‘beer’); ‘me . . . due;’ ‘note . . . thought;’ ‘sound . . . shore;’ ‘join . . . design;’ ‘bind . . . joined;’ ‘advance . . . descants.’ It may be easy, as the Dean remarks in his Preface, to point out faulty rhymes, and, after all, one easily allows such discordances in a great poem. But discordance when used by a master is a sign of strength; Dean Plumptre’s discordances are signs of weakness, and are consequently irritating. Another irritating sign of weakness is the omission of the article in consequence of the exigencies of rhythm. Such expressions as

a line, finds himself sometimes obliged to 'sacrifice sense'—and the manner in which he repairs that loss is one proof, among others, that he possesses the highest qualification of a translator.

In Dean Plumptre's version the matter is—otherwise.

Let us take a few specimens of his line-endings from the first fifty lines of the first canto:—

Selva oscura: 'gloomy forest dell.' *La paura*: 'that terror fell.' *Di paura*: 'with terror's torturing power.' *Ogni calle*: 'path most true.' *Che nel lago del cuor m'era durata*: 'that my heart's fountain vexed, nor did relent' (!) *Con lena affanata*: 'panting, worn, and spent.' *Rabbiosa fame*: 'hunger fierce and wild.'

In the same light tripping style in which Dean Plumptre speaks of Dante's 'Bohemian habits,' and of the '*cause célèbre* of the Divorce Court' towards which such relationships as that of Dante with Beatrice would seem to tend, he asserts that the result of 'falling back upon' a prose translation 'is, at the best, like drinking stale champagne.' (Preface, p. x.)

We should have held it a juster simile if he had compared prose with water—stale or otherwise—and poetry with wine; and we should have fancied that the result of reading a *tersa rima* translation of Dante from which all the original strength and flavour had effervesced might have borne a very striking resemblance to the result of drinking stale champagne.

We have already allowed that there are passages, and some of considerable length, in Mr. Haselfoot's volume where he seems to us to have signally failed—where we are fain to cry

'Ikarus, Ikarus !
Jammer genug !'

On the other hand, we readily allow that there are passages, and some of these of considerable length, where Dean Plumptre seems to us to rise to a somewhat higher level; as, for instance, in his rendering of the wondrous description of Buonconte's tragic end.¹

But we have no hesitation in asserting that Mr. Haselfoot's faults are the faults of strength, and that Dean Plumptre's successes are the successes of weakness; that the work of the former is informed by living poetic energy, which is not 'ill dream true,' 'the ribs of ship,' 'in gloomy forest dell,' 'like lion' . . . &c., remind one too forcibly of our old friend 'lion vile' in a certain 'most lamentable comedy.'

¹ *Purg.* v. We must, however, beg to disagree entirely with the Dean's translation of line 112, though he is supported by Cary's authority.

present, or only present to an almost inappreciable degree, in the work of the latter; that by virtue of certain inner characteristics, which are the root of all true external resemblance, Mr. Haselfoot's work produces, whereas Dean Plumptre's does not produce, the 'essential effect' of the original.

One of the most recognizable of such characteristics is that of *power*, which is perhaps more apparent in Dante's poem than in any other work of human imagination—a power that, like the lightning, rives and rends its way through all resisting substances, seeking its directest path. Something of this power Mr. Haselfoot seems to us to possess. The effect produced on us by his work has been not unlike that produced by the strong onward sweep of a great river, while Dean Plumptre's version, which we have studied quite as conscientiously and impartially, has left on us an impression such as might be gained by following the course of some trickling streamlet rippling and wriggling round every obstacle.

The following excerpts may, or may not, seem to justify our opinion, and we should be very unwilling that anyone should pass a verdict on such fragmentary evidence. Still, as far as it goes, the evidence is unimpeachable, and it shall be prejudiced as little as possible by unnecessary comment.

First let us take the renderings by both translators of some well-known lines and passages.

Who has not felt the arrowy directness of the following line?

Tanto è amaro che poco è piu morte.¹

With its simple piercing words, it is a veritable *μελαινέων ἔρμ' ὀδυνάων*. Translated, it should produce a like effect.

Mr. Haselfoot's translation is

So bitter is it, death is little more.

Dean Plumptre renders it—

So bitter 'tis, death's self were little more.

The two lines are verbally almost identical, but the difference is the difference between something alive and something not alive. To economize space, we shall refrain from further criticism, and merely subjoin specimens, together with the originals:—

‘Noi leggiavamo un giorno per diletto
Di Lancelotto, come amor lo strinse:
Soli eravamo e senza alcun sospetto.

¹ *Inferno*, i. 7.

Per più fiate gli occhi ci sospinse
 Quella lettura, e scolorocci il viso :
 Ma solo un punto fu quel che ci vinse.
 Quando leggemmo il disiato riso
 Esser baciato da cotanto amante,
 Questi, che mai da me non fia diviso,
 La bocca mi baciò tutto tremante :
 Galeotto fu il libro e chi lo scrisse :
 Quel giorno più non vi leggemmo avante.'—*Inf.* v. 127.

'We for delight were reading on a day
 Of Lancelot, how Love of him made prize.
 Alone we were, suspicions far away.
 For many times that reading tranced our eyes
 And made the colour from our faces flee :
 But one sole instant took us by surprise.
 When we read how the smile he yearned to see
 Was by the kiss of such a lover sought,
 This one, who never shall be torn from me,
 His own kiss to my lips all-trembling brought.
 A Galeot was the book, its writer too !
 That day we read not further in it aught.' (H.)

'It chanced one day we read for our delight
 How love held fast the soul of Lancelot ;
 Alone were we, nor deemed but all was right [!] ;
 Full many a time our eyes their glances shot,
 As we read on ; our cheeks now paled, now blushed ;
 But one short moment doomed us to our lot.
 When as we read how smile long sought for flushed
 Fair face at kiss of lover so renowned.
 He kissed me on my lips as impulse rushed,
 All trembling ; now with me for aye is bound.
 Writer and book were Gallehault to our will :
 No time for reading more that day we found.'¹ (P.)

Se quella, con ch' io parlo, non secca. (*Inf.* xxxii. 139.)

If that wherewith I parley drieth not. (H.)

Unless my tongue lie stiff my lips within. (P.)

Cominciò Pluto con la voce chioccia. (*Inf.* vii. 2.)

Plutus began with clucking voice to cry. (H.)

So Plutus spake with accents rough and hoarse. (P.)

Io vidi entrar le braccia per l' ascelle. (*Inf.* xxv. 112.)

I saw the arms go at the armpits in. (H.)

I saw the arms drawn up at the armpits' frame. (P.)

¹ How utterly has the wondrous *delicacy* of Dante's line vanished in this most unfortunate remark !

Siena mi fe ; disfecemi Maremma. (*Purg.* v. 134.)

My life Sienna gave, Maremma took. (H.)

Sienna gave me life, Maremma slew. (P.)

La faccia sua era faccia d' uom giusto. (*Inf.* xvii. 10.)

Its face was as a man's face who is just. (H.)

Its face was of a man of righteous thought. (P.)

E come a gracidar si sta la rana

Col muso fuor dell' acqua, quando sogna

Di spigolar sovente la villana. (*Inf.* xxxii. 31.)

And as the frog pursues his croaking strain

With muzzle out of water, when in dreams

The village girl oft thinks she gleans again. (H.)

And as the frogs to croak are wont to flock [!]

With snout thrust forth from water, when in dreams

The peasant maiden gleans from every shock [!]. (P.)

A guisa di leon, quando si posa. (*Purg.* vi. 66.)

In semblance of a lion in repose. (H.)

Like lion ¹ when he couching doth abide. (P.)

Il tremolar della marina. (*Purg.* i. 117.)

The twinkling of the sea. (H.)

The trembling of the main.² (P.)

E quindi uscimmo a riveder le stelle. (*Inf.* xxxiv. 139.)

And issuing thence we saw again the stars. (H.)

Thence passed once more to rebehold each star.³ (P.)

S' io avessi le rime ed aspre e chioce

Come si converrebbe al tristo buco

Sovra 'l qual pontan tutte l' altre rocce,

Io premerei di mio concetto il suco

Più pienamente ; ma perch' io non l' abbo

Non senza tema a dicer mi conduco. (*Inf.* xxxii. 1-6.)

Had I of rough and strident rhymes a stock,

Such as would for the dismal hole be meet,

Down upon which thrusts every other rock,

I would press out the juice of my conceit

More fully ; but because of none possessed,

I come not without fear the theme to treat. (H.)

¹ Surely no other but our old friend above mentioned !

² Dean Plumptre translates Æschylus' famous expression by the 'innumerable smile' of ocean !

³ Similarly the last line of the *Purgatory*.

If I had rhymes as out of tune and harsh
 As would be fitting for that drear abyss,
 Which, as their centre, th' other rocks o'erarch,
 To press thoughts' grape-juice I were not remiss
 More fully. Since by me they're not possessed,
 Not without fear I come to speak of this. (P.)

Ahi, dura terra, perchè non t' apristi? (*Inf.* xxxiii. 66.)

Ah, cruel earth, why didst not open yawn? (H.)

Hard earth, why opened not thy depths that day? (P.)

Guardami ben : ben son, ben son Beatrice.

Come degnasti d' accedere al monte?

Non sapei tu che qui l' uomo è felice?

Gli occhi mi cadder giù nel chiaro fonte ;

Ma veggendomi in esso, io trassi all' erba :

Tanta vergogna mi gravò la fronte.

Così la madre al figlio par superba,

Come ella parve a me ; perchè d' amaro

Sente 'l sapor della pietade acerba. (*Purg.* xxx. 73.)

Look at me well ; I am, am Beatrice.

How didst thou deign to come unto the Mount?

Didst thou not know that man is here in bliss?

My downcast eyes were dropped on the clear fount,

Seeing me in which I made them grassward turn ;

So weighed down was my brow on shame's account.

Even as a mother to her son seems stern,

Seemed she to me ; for bitter is the taste

Of harshness mixed with pitying concern. (H.)

Behold ! In me thy Beatrice see :

How didst thou deem thee fit to climb the hill !

Didst thou not know that here the blessed be?

Mine eyes then fell upon the waters still,

But there myself beholding, to the grass

I turned, such shame upon my brow weighed ill,

As mother to her son for proud doth pass,

So she to me, for with a bitter twang

Tastes pity which in sternness doth o'erpass. (P.)

But of odious comparisons enough ! In the *Paradise* Mr. Haselfoot is at his best, just as the Dean is at his worst. Whether he undertakes to reproduce in English some lovely description of animal life, or of earthly or celestial scenery, or some quaint simile, or some wondrously-worded confession of faith, he displays a poetic power and a mastery in expression which place his version of the *Divina Commedia*—as a poem—on a level *at least* with that of Cary, while the most unusual skill that he shows in reproducing, as far as it can be repro-

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duced, the external form of the original, secures him very high, if not the highest, place among successful imitators. We have chosen the following passages, not for any rare and special excellence,¹ but as fairly representative specimens.

'O insensata cura de' mortali,
Quanto son difettivi sillogismi
Quei che ti fanno in basso batter l' ali !
Chi dietro a jura, e chi ad aforismi
Sen giva, e chi seguendo sacerdozio,
E chi regnar per forza o per sofismi ;
E chi 'n rubare, e chi 'n civil negozio,
Chi, nel diletto della carne involto,
S' affaticava, e chi si dava all' ozio.'—*Par.* xi. 1.

'O care insensate, swaying mortal kind,
How full those syllogisms are of flaws
That keep thy wings to downward flight confined !
One after aphorisms, after laws
Another went, one for the priesthood sought,
And one to reign by force or specious cause ;
One robbery, one civil business wrought
One in the pleasure of the flesh ensnared
Wearied himself, one turned to doing nought.'

'Sì come quando 'l colombo si pone
Presso al compagno, l' uno all' altro pande,
Girando e mormorando, l' affezione.—*Par.* xxv. 19.

'As, when a dove alights beside its mate,
One circles round the other to evince
Its love by murmurings affectionate.'

'Come rimane splendido e sereno
L' emisferio dell' aere, quando soffia
Borea da quella guancia ond' è più leno,
Per che si purga e risolve la roffia,
Che pria turbava, sì che 'l ciel ne ride
Con le bellezze d' ogni sua paroffia.'—*Par.* xxviii. 79.

'Even as remains serene, with splendour bright,
The hemisphere of air, when Boreas blows
From that cheek whence he tempers most his might ;
Because the film is purged and, melting, goes,
Which first disturbed it ; whence the smiling sky
With all its retinue of beauties glows.'

As a final example let us take the passage in which Dante describes the manifestation of the Trinity under the visible form of three equal but differently coloured circles :—

¹ Of this the best example will be found in the exquisite rendering of the second canto of the *Purgatorio*.

'Nella profonda e chiara sussistenza
 Dell' alto lume parvemi tre giri
 Di tre colori e d' una contenenza ;
 E l' un dall' altro, come Iri da Iri,
 Parea riflesso, e 'l terzo parea fuoco
 Che quinci e quindi igualmente si spiri.
 Oh quanto è corto il dire e come fioco
 Al mio concetto ! e questo, a quel ch' io vidi,
 È tanto, che non basta a dicer poco.'

—*Par.* xxxiii. 115.

' In the profound and bright fused elements
 Of the high light three circles on me beamed,
 Triple in hues, and single in contents ;
 And one reflected by another seemed,
 As rainbow is by rainbow, and the third
 Seemed fire which equally from either streamed.
 How short is speech ! how feebly therein heard
 Is my conception ! which, to what was shown,
 Is such that 'little' is too weak a word.

Mr. Haselfoot has wisely expended none of his energies in adding yet another to the almost innumerable 'Lives' of his author, and what notes he gives us are, we repeat, of the most refreshing terseness and vigour. It is a novel and a pleasant sensation to find oneself credited by a Dante commentator with a certain amount of common sense and insight.

We do not purpose to enter into any detailed criticism of the very voluminous *emballage* of Notes, Preface, Life, Sonnets, &c., in which Dean Plumptre has swathed his translation. Indeed, we openly confess that we have not studied these portions of his volume with the attention necessary for such criticism. Dean Plumptre's work in life has been, as he says, 'largely that of a commentator,' and his experience has, he thinks, 'taught him what the average English reader wants.' The 'average English reader' will, therefore, we feel assured, find all he wants, and possibly more, in Dean Plumptre's comments and compilations.¹

The only remark that we allow ourselves to make is that, as our eyes strayed, perhaps too carelessly, over the pages of his Introduction, and lightly skimmed the expanses of his footnotes, they seemed to alight with considerable frequency

¹ The Dean (not Dante) would seem to consider that his brethren of the clergy are even below the 'average,' for in *Par.* viii. 147 he permits himself to translate the line, 'E fate re di tal ch' è da sermone,' 'And take as king some sermonising fool' !! What Dante says is, 'one who is a man of sermons,' i.e. a preacher. But the Dean is too often indifferent to 'what Dante says.'

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on such expressions as 'the conjecture which I venture to interpolate,' 'this provisional working hypothesis,' 'I conjecture, though I cannot prove,' 'imagination may picture,' and the like. The exercise of the imagination is one of the highest privileges of humanity, and we would not for a moment desire to deny this privilege to a commentator or a biographer. But we leave it to the 'average English reader' and to others to decide whether such surmises as the following are likely to add to our knowledge of the great poet, or to our appreciation of his poem.

'I find in Dante, by this hypothesis' [namely, the 'provisional working hypothesis,' that the poet exile and Cardinal da Prato were in close correspondence as chief conspirators in the scheme for securing the election of Henry of Luxemburg], 'the master mind that was working behind the scenes, and pulling the wires that moved the puppets in the great drama which was now unfolding' (*Life*, p. xcviij).

Or take the following:—

'I may seem to be unduly influenced by local prepossessions, but to me it does not seem an incredible hypothesis that when Dante was in England he may have been attracted by the fame of Peter Lightfoot, the maker of the clock, to visit Glastonbury. . . and may have worshipped within the walls of my own cathedral' (*ib.* p. lviij).

Strange indeed is oftentimes the phenomenon of a human mind under the influence of 'working hypotheses'!

ART. VIII.—THE CODEX AMIATINUS, WHEN AND WHERE WRITTEN.

1. *The Guardian*, February 16, March 2. (London, 1887.)
2. *The Academy*, February 26, March 5. (London, 1887.)
3. *Venerabilis Bedæ Opera Historica ad fidem Codicum Manuscriptorum recensuit* JOSEPHUS STEVENSON. (English Historical Society.)

Vita beatorum Abbatum, Benedicti, Ceolfredi, &c.
Historia Abbatum Gyrvensium, Auctore anonymo (Appendix). (London, 1841.)

THERE is in the Laurentian or Mediceo-Laurentian Library at Florence a manuscript of the whole Bible in Latin, which has

long been recognized by critical scholars as the oldest¹ and best copy of the Latin version of St. Jerome, commonly called the Vulgate. It is in fact one of the chief ornaments of that collection. It has recently been established beyond any doubt that this book was written at Wearmouth or Jarrow under the superintendence of the Abbat Ceolfred, the instructor of the Venerable Bede, and that it was intended by the abbat as a gift to the see of St. Peter at Rome. We propose in the following pages to give a brief narrative of the various steps by which this discovery has been made, passing by for the present all critical details. Our readers will find it to be truly a marvellous history. It may not be amiss, however, first to give some account of St. Ceolfred himself, whose history is most interesting, and in some passages affecting. There are two authorities for his life besides what we are told concerning him in Bede's *Ecclesiastical History*.² The first is Bede's own most beautiful work, *The Lives of the Abbats of Wearmouth and Jarrow*.³ The second is an anonymous tract, evidently written by a monk of Wearmouth or Jarrow. It also is inscribed in printed copies *The Lives of the Abbats*, but it is really a *Life of St. Ceolfred*, the others being noticed only so far as their history was connected with his.⁴ It supplies some particulars not to be found in Bede.

¹ *I.e.* of the whole Bible; as to the New Testament, the Codex Fuldensis is older.

² *Hist. Eccl.* iv. 18; v. 21, 24.

³ Bede's *Lives of the Abbats* is printed in Dr. Smith's edition of Bede's *Historical Works*, 1722; in the edition of the *Hist. Works* published by the English Historical Society, edited by Jos. Stevenson, 1841; in the *Works of the Venerable Bede*, edited by Dr. Giles, 1843; and in Dr. Hussey's edition of the *Hist. Eccl.*, 1846.

⁴ The anonymous *Life of St. Ceolfred* was first printed in the appendix to the English Historical Society's edition of the *Hist. Works* from Harleian MS. No. 3020, and is reprinted by Dr. Giles in his appendix. Mr. Stevenson asserts that it was the source from which the Venerable Bede derived much of his information for his *Lives of the Abbats*. It is difficult to understand how anyone acquainted with both *Lives* could say so. Mr. S. seems to have been thinking of what is commonly said of Bede's *Life of St. Cuthbert* and the anonymous *Life* by a monk of Lindisfarne. But the two cases are widely different. St. Cuthbert lived at a considerable distance from Jarrow, and died when Bede was very young. Bede spent all his life after the age of seven in the monastery of Jarrow; he must have been an eye and ear witness of most of what he sets down, and it is not easy to see what need he had for help from anyone in recording events of which he could most emphatically say, were he so inclined, 'quorum pars magna fui.' All that he could not be acquainted with from personal knowledge is the early history of St. Benedict Biscop, of which the anonymous writer says nothing. On the other hand, the latter gives a brief account of the early life of St. Ceolfred, of which Bede says nothing. The anonymous *Life* has all the appearance of a sermon

St. Ceolfrid, whose name, Alban Butler says,¹ is the same as Galfrid, Gaufrid, or Geoffrey, was born of noble and religious parents about the year 642, seven years after the arrival of St. Aidan, about thirty before the birth of his illustrious pupil the Venerable Bede.² His father was a 'comes,' or ealdorman, high in the service of the King, and was even more distinguished by his piety and his kindness to the poor than by his social position. On one occasion,³ in expectation of a visit from the King, he had prepared a magnificent banquet; but the exigencies of war having called the King away in another direction, all his costly preparations seemed to be rendered useless. To most men this would have been a dire disappointment; but, far from murmuring, the good man gave thanks to Him who ordereth all things rightly, then called together the poor and the afflicted from far and near, and offered the banquet, which he had prepared for his earthly sovereign, to the King of Heaven in the persons of His poor members. He waited on the men himself, while his wife served the women, thus affording a notable instance of the change the Gospel had wrought, even so soon, in our fierce and haughty forefathers. From his early days Ceolfrid had striven to lead a godly life, and at the age of eighteen⁴ he resolved to give himself up entirely to the service of God. It is hardly necessary to say that in those rough days, when war was almost the only employment for a layman, especially for a nobleman, a monastery was the only resource for a devout youth. At Gilling, near Richmond, in Yorkshire, there was a monastery founded by King Oswy, at the instance of his gentle queen, Eanfleda, as an act of penitence for the foul murder of King Oswin. Till recently this house had been under the charge of Cynifrid, Ceolfrid's elder brother; but zeal in the pursuit of Divine learning had drawn Cynifrid away to Ireland. His successor was his kinsman Tunberct, afterwards first Bishop of Hexham. Hither it was that Ceolfrid directed his steps. Perhaps we may infer from this that he was a native of Yorkshire. Being kindly received by his kinsman, Ceolfrid gave himself up with all his energy to reading, working, and to learning his monastic duties. After a time Tunberct and

for the *Natalitia* of the saint. The writer begins with a text, and a most appropriate one, Heb. xiii. 7, and his subject is St. Ceolfrid alone, others being mentioned only incidentally.

References are here made to the English Historical Society's edition. *B. H. E.* = Bede's *Ecclesiastical History*; *B. V. A.* = Bede's *Lives of the Abbats*; *V. A.* = Anonymous *Life of St. Ceolfrid*.

¹ *Lives of the Saints*, September 25.

² *Ibid.* 331.

³ *V. A.* 318.

⁴ *Ibid.* 318.

Ceolfrid, with some others of the brethren, were invited¹ by the famous Wilfrid, then Bishop of York, to his monastery at Ripon, and there in his twenty-seventh year Ceolfrid was ordained priest by Wilfrid. He now paid a visit to Kent, to perfect himself in the monastic rule and the duties of the priesthood. He also visited with a like purpose the Abbat Botulf² at Ikanhoe, in Lincolnshire, from whom the town of Boston (Botulf's Town) derives its name—a man, we are told, who was everywhere famous for his singularly good life as well as for his learning, 'a man full of the Holy Spirit.' Having profited as much as he could by a short visit, Ceolfrid returned home; and thinking more of the duty of humility than of his worldly rank, of his learning, or of his station as a priest, he hesitated not to employ himself in the menial services of the monastery. He became the baker of the community, and was employed in winnowing corn, in kindling and cleansing the oven, and baking the bread. So were the English of that day, who thought all such work degrading, taught the dignity of labour, when they saw a man of noble birth, of great learning, and a priest, so employing himself. While thus engaged, he was at the same time most assiduous in learning and practising all the duties of the priesthood; and in time, on account of his learning, the fervour of his godly zeal in instructing the ignorant, and dealing wisely with the obstinate, he was appointed to a high charge in the monastery.

It was about this time that Benedict Biscop was planning the foundation of the famous Abbey of Wearmouth. This remarkable man had three times³ made a journey to Rome, and had, in his visits to no less than seventeen⁴ most ancient and famous monasteries, acquainted himself with the rules and the details of the monastic life. In these journeys Benedict had not only seen much that was interesting and instructive, but he had also collected great numbers of books and relics and ecclesiastical ornaments. When he came home he gave an account of all to King Ecgrifd,⁵ who was so much pleased with what Benedict had to tell him, and to show him, that he made him a large grant of land at the mouth of the river Wear, on which to build a monastery. Upon this

¹ *V. A.* 319.² *Ibid.*

³ Benedict had really been four times at Rome. In his second journey he returned as far as Lerins, where he stayed some time and received the tonsure, and then went back to Rome. Bede reckons the journeys as 'from Britain,' 'de Britannia Romam.' He made in all five journeys, or six according as the second from Britain, during which he was twice at Rome, is counted as one or as two.

⁴ *B. V. A.* 150; *V. A.* 320.⁵ *Ibid.* 143.

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Benedict, having heard much of Ceolfrid's learning and devotion, and skill in government, sought and obtained him from Wilfrid as a fellow worker in his new enterprise.¹ Ceolfrid therefore removed to Wearmouth. After the monastery was erected, Benedict crossed the sea to Gaul to find masons to build a church to be named in honour of St. Peter. During his absence Ceolfrid began to tire of his work. Some young noblemen in the monastery gave him a great deal of trouble by their intractability and reluctance to submit to regular discipline. So he gave up his charge and withdrew to Ripon, whence he had come. Benedict, however, on his return followed him, and prevailed on him to come back. Benedict brought not only masons from Gaul,² but also workers in glass, who, besides glazing the windows of the church, taught the English the art of working in glass, of which they had previously been entirely ignorant.³

When St. Peter's Church was finished, Benedict, taking Ceolfrid with him, set out on a fourth journey to Rome.⁴ Here Ceolfrid had the opportunity of vastly increasing his stores of knowledge. They returned laden with books, pictures, and ecclesiastical furniture, bringing with them also John, the 'archicantor,' or precentor, of St. Peter's at Rome, that he might introduce the knowledge of church music into the north of England.

And now Ecgfrid made a further⁵ donation of land at the mouth of the Tyne, for the foundation of a new monastery. This was Jarrow, and thither Ceolfrid was sent with a number of monks to begin the new establishment, which, we are constantly reminded, was not a separate community, but formed part of the one society in two places. When the monastery had been built at Jarrow, and a church, which was named in honour of St. Paul, as the church of Wearmouth had been in honour of St. Peter, Benedict, designing a fifth journey to Rome, appointed Ceolfrid to the charge of Jarrow, and a young nobleman named Eosterwini, his own cousin, to that of Wearmouth. He then set out for Rome, and in due time came back, as usual, with a rich cargo of books, and pictures, and church furniture for the adornment of his two monasteries. Heavy tidings awaited him on

¹ *V. A.* 320.

² *B. V. A.* 143.

³ Since it was thus introduced by Benedict Biscop the manufacture of glass has been a leading industry on the spot. It is now fast retiring to Belgium. Was Belgium the part of Gaul from which Benedict fetched it?

⁴ *V. A.* 321.

⁵ *B. V. A.* 145; *V. A.* 322.

his return. His friend King Ecgfrid had been slain in battle. A pestilence had visited Wearmouth and Jarrow and carried off many of the brethren. At Wearmouth Eosterwini had died, and the deacon Sigfrid had, to Benedict's entire satisfaction, been chosen in his room. The account of Jarrow is most interesting, though peculiarly sad.¹ All who could read or preach or chant the antiphons and responsories had been cut off, save the abbat and one little boy 'who had been brought up and educated by him, and even to this time,' adds the writer, 'holds in the same monastery the rank of presbyter, esteemed by all who know him both for his discourses and his writings.' These two, with many tears, sang the Canonical Hours, only, save at Matins and Vespers, omitting the antiphons. This went on for a week, and then they could bear it no longer. They resumed their old practice, which they continued under all difficulties till others could be trained to take part with them. There can be no doubt that the boy was the Venerable Bede, who, by his own account, had been entrusted to Benedict at the age of seven, and by him put under the charge of Ceolfrið.² He would now be about fourteen years of age. We are indebted to the anonymous monk for this story. It is thoroughly in accordance with Bede's character that he makes no mention of it.

Not long after this, Benedict was attacked by paralysis.³ He lingered on for three years, entirely disabled in the lower parts of his body. Sigfrid also was afflicted by an acute and incurable disease of the lungs,⁴ and was drawing near his end. In these circumstances, it seemed good to Benedict and Sigfrid, with the advice and consent of the community, to appoint Ceolfrið sole abbat of the united monasteries. Bede gives a most affecting account of the death-bed scenes⁵ of Sigfrid and of Benedict, who died about four months after his friend and colleague.

After this Ceolfrið ruled the community for twenty-eight years.⁶ Bede tells us that he 'carried on with undiminished zeal all the good works which his predecessor had begun with such earnestness and energy. He built new oratories; he increased the number of the vessels of the altar and the church, and of vestments of every kind. The library which

¹ *V. A.* 323.

² *Bed. Hist. Eccl.* v. 24.

³ *B. V. A.* 150; *V. A.* 323.

⁴ This is probably the first historical mention of consumption, as Montalembert remarks, 'le premier des Anglais, je pense, chez lequel l'histoire ait signalé cette maladie si habituelle et si fatale à leur race' (*Moines d'Occident*, iv. 485).

⁵ *B. V. A.* 150-154.

⁶ *Ibid.* 155; *V. A.* 325.

Benedict had taken such pains to found, with no less zeal he doubled in extent; and to one Pandect¹ of the old translation which he had brought from Rome he added three Pandects of the new translation. One of these when, as an old man, he was going back to Rome he took with him, among other things, as a gift; two of them he left to the two monasteries, one to each.' Ceolfrid set out on his journey to Rome in the year 716, when he was seventy-four years of age. The account of his leave-taking is most picturesque, but must be passed over here. He never reached Rome, but died at Langres, in France. He was accompanied by a very large retinue of no less than eighty persons. Of these some returned home to tell what had happened; some remained in the place where their beloved father had been laid to rest; while others proceeded on the journey to Rome, bearing with them the gifts that Ceolfrid had brought, and among the rest the Pandect of the new translation.

We come now, at last, to the famous manuscript at Florence, known as the Codex Amiatinus, having once belonged to the Convent of Monte Amiata. It has long been known and highly admired and esteemed by critical scholars. The Bishop of Salisbury thus speaks of it:—²

'The great Bible of Monte Amiata, now one of the most prominent ornaments of the Mediceo-Laurentian Library at Florence, is at once a most important specimen of palæography and one of the principal foundations of the text of any critical edition of the version of St. Jerome, both in the Old and New Testaments. . . . It is a book measuring about 50 × 34 centim. (19·7 × 13·4 in.) in length and breadth, and nearly 20 centim. (7·9 in.) in thickness without the binding; containing 1,029 leaves of beautiful vellum, written in two columns to a page, with forty-three or forty-four lines to a column, in short lines, technically called *cola* and *commata*, or sometimes, perhaps less correctly, *stichi*, which represent an ancient system of punctuation perfectly intelligible to the trained eye.'

It is no wonder that curiosity should be very much alive as to the origin and history of such a volume. The only guides afforded by itself are: 1. A somewhat barbarous Greek inscription at the end of the prologue to the Book of

¹ Πανδέκτης, *all-receiving, all-containing*, hence οἱ Πανδέκται, name for a universal dictionary or encyclopedia; but later, *the Pandects or General Code of Law*, drawn up by order of Justinian (Liddell and Scott). They have overlooked its application to the Scriptures. But Maitland (*Dark Ages*, p. 194) was not aware of this use of the word so early. 'I do not know that this name [for the Scriptures] was ever general, or that it was used by any writer before Alcuin.'

² The *Guardian*, Feb. 16; *Academy*, Feb. 12.

Leviticus (**Ο ΚΥΡΙC CΕΡΒΑΝΔΟC ΑΙΠΟΙΗCΕΝ**), from which it might be inferred that it was the handiwork of one Servandus. 2. An inscription on the back of the first leaf,¹ four words of which are manifestly written on erasures (here distinguished by italics)—

*'Cenobium ad eximii merito venerabile Saluatoris
Quem caput ecclesiæ dedicat alta fides
Petrus Langobardorum extremis de finib. abbas
Deuoti affectus pignora mitto mei,
Meque meosq. optans tanti inter gaudia patris
In cælis memorem semper habere locum.'*

As the lines in which there are no erasures are regular hexameters and pentameters, it was clear that the erasures had marred both the metre and the sense. In two lines the metre was entirely destroyed. The Saviour is said to be 'dedicated by lofty faith as the Head of the Church.' True, certainly; but unlikely to be enunciated in such a way. He is also called Father 'tanti inter gaudia patris,' which is still less to be expected. But the purport is quite clear. Peter, an abbat in Lombardy, sends the volume to the venerable monastery of the Saviour, and he alters the original inscription to suit his own purpose. The object, then, with inquirers was, if possible, to restore the original inscription, in doing which, of course, the metre was a most valuable guide. First, then, Bandini proposed to read the first line—

'Culmen ad eximii merito venerabile Petri.'

This brought the metre right, and 'Petri' agreed well with 'caput ecclesiæ.' Still the third line stood sorely in need of mending, and Bandini, availing himself of the hint conveyed in the inscription at the end of the prologue to Leviticus, suggested 'Servandus Latii' in place of 'Petrus Langobardorum;' and the volume was supposed to have been a gift to the Holy See from Servandus of Latium, whoever he might have been. Still neither 'Langobardorum' nor 'Latii' suited the phrase 'extremis de finibus,' neither Lombardy nor Latium being far from Rome. It occurred to another distinguished Italian scholar, 'the famous epigraphist and historian of the cata-

¹ A facsimile of this inscription will be found in the *Palæographical Society's Publications*, 2nd series, part iv. pl. 65, 66. We take this opportunity of strongly commending this remarkable and 'epoch-making' publication to the attention of our readers. Under the able auspices of Mr. Maunde Thompson, the distinguished Keeper of the Manuscripts in the British Museum, it has acquired a European reputation, and has given rise to similar undertakings in France and, we believe, in Germany.

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combs, G. B. de Rossi,' that 'extremis de finibus' pointed to England. He had become acquainted with the Venerable Bede's story of Ceolfrid intending one of his three Pandects of the new translation as a gift to the Pope. He therefore proposed for the third line—

'Ceolfridus Britonum extremis de finibus abbas.'

This seemed to satisfy the metre, supposing the penultimate of Ceolfridus to be long, and 'Britonum' agreed with 'extremis de finibus.'

Conjecture had arrived at this stage when, in the *Guardian* of February 16 last, there appeared a paper from the Bishop of Salisbury calling attention to the subject. 'The interest of De Rossi's discovery,' his lordship most truly said, 'for all members of the English Church is startling.' Still the origin of the Codex remained a mystery. Where was it written? How did Ceolfrid become possessed of it? Benedict had made five journeys to Rome, in the fourth of which he was accompanied by Ceolfrid, and the Pandect of the old translation had come from Rome. Did Ceolfrid's three Pandects of the new translation come from Rome too? It was certainly a curious process to carry back to Rome, as a gift to the Pope, a manuscript which a few years before had been brought from Rome; but no better supposition seemed to occur to anyone. Meantime another correction of the inscription was suggested by a Cambridge scholar, the Rev. G. F. Browne,¹ who pointed out that Ceolfrid was not in the least likely to describe himself as a 'Briton;' he noticed also that the penultimate of Ceolfridus was most probably short from the analogy of 'Wilfridus' (Bede, *H. E.* v. 19). He therefore for 'Britonum' in the third line proposed to read 'Anglorum.'

'Ceolfridus Anglorum extremis de finibus abbas.'

All this while a full and clear solution of the problem was lying ready and close at hand in the anonymous *Life of Ceolfrid*, with which, unfortunately, no one who had yet taken part in the discussion seems to have been acquainted. They knew only the Venerable Bede's *Lives of the Abbats of Wearmouth and Jarrow*. Speaking of the close of Ceolfrid's career, the anonymous writer says—

'He made noble additions to the library which either he or Benedict had brought from Rome; inasmuch as, among other things, he caused to be written three Pandects, two of which he placed in the churches of his two monasteries, that if anyone wished to read any

¹ The *Guardian*, March 2.

chapter of either Testament he might readily find what he desired ; the third he proposed to offer as a gift to St. Peter, the prince of the Apostles, when he should take his journey to Rome.¹

Surely there could not be a more appropriate or acceptable gift than such a fair codex, written in a remote English monastery.

Here, then, the origin of the great Codex is fully disclosed. It was written in the united monastery at the very time that the Venerable Bede was living and studying and teaching at Jarrow. This most important passage was pointed out, immediately after the Bishop of Salisbury's appeal, by Dr. Hort,² Hulsean Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, in a letter to the *Academy*. But this is not all. St. Ceolfrid's biographer, after narrating the circumstances of his departure from Wearmouth, his journey through France, and his death at Langres, goes on to say³ that some of his company went on to Rome, bearing with them Ceolfrid's gifts, 'among which was the Pandect we spoke of, translated by St. Jerome from the Hebrew and Greek originals, having at the beginning verses to this effect :—

“Corpus ad eximii merito venerabile Petri
Dedicat ecclesiae quem caput alta fides,
Ceolfridus, Anglorum extimis de finibus abbas,
Devoti affectus pignora mitto mei,
Meque meosque optans tanti inter gaudia patris
In caelis memorem semper habere locum.”

With the exception of a transposition in the second line, and the form 'extimis' for 'extremis' in the third, these lines are identical with all that part of the inscription now to be seen in the Codex which has not suffered erasion. The inevitable inference is that they supply the true reading of the erased words. The slight discrepancies just mentioned might easily be caused by a lapse of memory in the writer ; in fact he only professes to give them 'to this effect,' 'versus hujusmodi.' It is most remarkable that the whole inscription except the first word, which now becomes 'corpus' instead of 'culmen,' had been correctly restored by the learned ingenuity of modern Italian and English scholars before attention was drawn to the anonymous *Life of Ceolfrid*. The inscription supplies *ex abundantia* the last link—a link perhaps scarcely required—in the chain of evidence. It is worth remarking, too, that, with one exception, the metre of the inscription in the Codex has now become faultless. The ex-

¹ *V. A.* 325.

² *The Academy*, Feb. 26.

³ *V. A.* 332.

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ception is that the second syllable of 'ecclesiæ' is shortened. The same anomaly occurs repeatedly in Bede's metrical *Life of St. Cuthbert*, and in others of his poems. Greek scholarship was not then very extensive or accurate.¹ They used Greek words much as we now use the Hebrew when we speak of Lébanon, Chérubim, Sérâphim, whereas those who are skilled in the Hebrew tongue tell us that we ought to say Lebānon, Cherūbim, Serāphim. It is very far from unlikely that this inscription was written by the Venerable Bede. Does it even seem an extravagant stretch of fancy to suppose that it may be an autograph?

There cannot now be the least shadow of doubt that this famous manuscript is the identical Pandect which was intended by Abbot Ceolfrid as a gift to St. Peter; and of course Servandus was relegated to the region of shades. It is supposed that he might have been the writer of the manuscript from which the Pandect was copied, and that the scribe, who, though clearly a master in calligraphy, may not after all have been a very intelligent man, had simply copied what he found, without regard to the fact that it was really no part of the work.

There is still another point to which Dr. Hort has directed attention. As far back as 1883 it was pointed out by Dr. Peter Corsen, of Jever,² that there was some close relationship between the *Codex Amiatinus* and the three Latin Bibles described by Cassiodorus,³ as presented by him to his monastery at Vivarium. This eminent and excellent man had held various high offices under Theodoric, the Ostrogothic

¹ In a verse of Alcuin's, quoted by the Bishop of Salisbury (*Guardian*, Feb. 16), we have a similar instance—

'Quod nunc a multis constat *Bibliotheca dicta*.'

² See the Bishop of Salisbury's paper in the *Guardian*, Feb. 16, and Dr. Hort's paper in the *Academy*, Feb. 26.

³ Always so named until of late the spelling 'Cassiodorius' has come into favour. The history of this remarkable man has recently been illustrated most fully by Mr. Hodgkin in vol. iv. of *Italy and her Invaders*, a work in which evidence of the most laborious research is joined to a most attractive style, qualities which are not always found combined. Mr. Hodgkin has also published the Letters of Cassiodorus in a separate work, to which is prefixed a biography, in p. 5 of which the question of the spelling of the name is discussed. Mr. Hodgkin, for the present at least, prefers 'Cassiodorus,' and quotes an hexameter verse of Alcuin as evidence of the spelling in the eighth century. He might have added the Venerable Bede, only in this case prose is not such sure evidence as verse. Gibbon and Dr. Westcott in 1866 (*The Bible in the Church*) agree with Mr. Hodgkin. In such company we may be excused if we write 'Cassiodorus.'

King of Italy, and at the age of sixty retired from public life to 'spend the remainder of his days in monastic seclusion.'¹ He survived thirty-five years, and 'consecrated his old age to religious meditation and to a work even more important than any of his political labours, the preservation by the pens of monastic copyists of the Christian Scriptures and of the great works of classical antiquity.' Among other things he wrote a book for his monks called *Institutio Divinarum et Humanarum Literarum*, in which he gives various lists of the sacred books, and speaks of a representation of the Temple of Solomon, and of Ezra writing at a table, of which he gives a description. Now, the *Codex Amiatinus* contains similar lists of the sacred books, and also a representation of the Temple of Solomon and of Ezra writing at his table, so that little doubt is left that the preliminary matter of the Codex is derived directly or indirectly from Cassiodorus.

Amongst others of his codices Cassiodorus notices particularly one of the old translation, which he describes as 'codex grandior littera clariore conscriptus.' In this he had caused the lists of the sacred books and the representation of the Temple of Solomon to be inserted. Now it has been pointed out by Dr. Hort² that the Venerable Bede, in two of his expository works, mentions a representation of the Temple of Solomon in a Pandect of Cassiodorus, of which he speaks as one who had actually seen it.

'In his tract on the Tabernacle, ii. 12 (vii. 107 of Giles), Bæda speaks as follows: "Quomodo in pictura Cassiodori Senatoris cujus ipse in expositione Psalmorum³ meminit expressum vidimus;" and again in his tract on Solomon's Temple, c. 16 (viii. 314 f. of Giles), "Has vero porticus Cassiodorus Senator in Pandectis, ut ipse Psalmorum expositione commemorat, triplici ordine distinxit," adding below, "Hæc ut in pictura Cassiodori reperimus distincta."'

But we have no reason to believe that Bede was ever in Italy, or, in fact, ever travelled farther south than York. He must, therefore, have seen the Pandect of Cassiodorus at home, so that it is as nearly certain as can be that this was the Pandect of the old translation which Benedict or Ceolfrid brought from Rome. In course of time it had found its way from

¹ Hodgkin, *Letters of Cassiodorus*, p. 54. See also the article on 'Cassiodorus' in *C. Q. R.* for July 1880, pp. 289-318.

² *The Academy*, February 26.

³ It may be worth noting in connexion with these passages that there is in the cathedral library at Durham a manuscript of Cassiodorus's Exposition of the Psalms, which tradition, perhaps not on very secure grounds, asserts to be the handiwork of the Venerable Bede himself.

Vivarium to Rome, where, after the new translation by St. Jerome came into favour, it might not be so highly prized, and had been acquired by Benedict in one of his numerous journeys. It would naturally be regarded with great reverence in Northumbria, and though Ceolfrid's Pandects were certainly not copied from it, seeing they were of a different translation, yet it is plain that the preliminary matter would be equally suitable to either version.

Thus this grand Codex, of which Dr. Hort says, 'Even on a modern spectator this prodigy of a manuscript leaves an impression not far removed from awe,' has been fairly traced to its birthplace in the united monastery of Wearmouth and Jarrow. First, it was manifest that the inscription at the beginning was not in its original state; part had been erased and new words written over the erasures. Then came the guess founded on the hint conveyed in the inscription at the end of the prologue to Leviticus, referring to Servandus. Next comes the persuasion that 'extremis de finibus' fits neither Lombardy nor Latium in reference to Rome, and the most happy conjecture of G. B. de Rossi about St. Ceolfrid, founded on the Venerable Bede's *Lives of the Abbats*, which ultimately led to the restoration—still by conjecture—of every word but one of the original inscription. Then Dr. Hort directs attention to the passages in the anonymous *Life of St. Ceolfrid*, in which it is stated that Ceolfrid *caused* three Pandects of the new translation *to be written*, one of which he intended for the Pope; and along with this, to the original inscription itself, agreeing in every word but one with the conjectural restoration of the inscription now to be seen in the Codex, so that the origin and early history of 'this prodigy of a manuscript' were removed from the region of doubt and conjecture into that of absolute certainty. Lastly, we have Dr. Hort's identification of the Pandect of the old translation at Wearmouth with Casiodorus's 'codex grandior littera clariore conscriptus.' It is surely a most interesting and a most marvellous history.

There, then, were these three great manuscripts, the 'codex grandior' of the old translation in the library, and the two Pandects of the new, one in the Church of St. Peter, the other in the Church of St. Paul, in the ancient united monastery. Dr. Hort thinks it would be 'a wonder if these two huge manuscripts in the two famous abbey churches did not exercise a wide influence for centuries.' Alas! it must be feared that their time was very brief. In little more than seventy years after the death of St. Ceolfrid came the first Danish invasion of Northumbria. Lindisfarne, Wearmouth, and Jarrow

were sacked with circumstances of peculiar atrocity, and there can be little doubt that the 'codex grandior' of Cassiodorus, and the two Pandects of St. Ceolfrid, were then destroyed. After that, a long period of intellectual torpor and darkness succeeded in the north; indeed, in England generally. Let us rejoice that the third Pandect of St. Ceolfrid was far away in Italy, safe from the heathen ravager, and that it has remained to this day the admiration of all who behold it, to be a monument of the pious zeal and learning of the monks of Wearmouth and Jarrow, and their learned and holy abbat, ST. CEOLFRID.

ART. IX.—OWEN'S DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

A Treatise on Dogmatic Theology. By the Rev. ROBERT OWEN, B.D., late Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford. Second Edition. (London, 1887.)

AMONG the earliest efforts of teachers to impart knowledge to the minds of even very young children there will be found, in a prominent position, the constant endeavour to make the pupil understand the difference between the essential and the accidental. Not, indeed, that these alarming words will be actually pronounced; but that, nevertheless, the idea represented by them will be constantly in play. The child is shown a bright new shilling, with some explanation of the nature of money, and immediately a tin counter is supposed to be a coin of the realm; a horned quadruped in a park is at once dubbed a cow; and so forth. Even children of a larger growth, unless self-education be constantly at work, are liable to similar mistakes. Dr. Arnold, of Rugby, was fond of insisting on this tendency to error. He has somewhere commented on the supposition, fostered by certain would-be historical critics, that the invention of gunpowder must needs render any inquiry into ancient strategy an unprofitable task for the soldier. Arnold justly points out that the essentials of strategy remain the same, whatever be the accidental differences respecting the means of destruction employed; and, in homely phrase, he clinches his argument by calling attention to the advice of Napoleon (assuredly no mean judge, even though a prejudiced one) bidding the youthful student

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of the art of war content himself with a thorough study of the campaigns of seven great captains : namely, Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Julius Cæsar, Turenne, Montecuculi, Eugene of Savoy, and Frederick of Prussia ; a list in which three are 'ancient masters.'¹

Accordingly, both in the world of action and in the world of thought, we find men laying down certain maxims which must needs be granted as a condition of procedure. Such a maxim may be called a *dogma* ; that is to say, a principle which, at any rate for the purpose in hand, must not be gainsaid or reversed. As regards action, an illustration or two may suffice to render our meaning clear.

Look at the British House of Lords. Apart from the restraints imposed by public opinion, by the temper of the assembly, by what we have heard called by one of its late members 'its chilling atmosphere,' few constituted bodies of men enjoy greater freedom of debate. The speakers need not pause to consider, as members of the Lower House may have occasion to do, whether constituents will approve of their utterances. Still, however, apart from the vague checks to which allusion has been made, there are distinct limitations on this freedom. Thus, for example, no peer can question the right of the Sovereign to introduce (of course with due observance of the proper forms) a new member into that society. That, from time to time, persons may be created peers who, if the House were a club, would have been black-balled is, we suppose, indubitable. But the right of the Sovereign in this respect, even though it may possibly be sometimes exercised under the almost compulsory sway of a powerful minister, is a *dogma* of the constitution, and no man rises in that House to contradict it.

Even in the matter of amusements the same principle obtains. When the victory of Waterloo had given peace to Europe, yacht clubs (previously all but unknown) were formed for the promotion of pleasure-sailing, and rapidly sprang up around all the coasts of England. A member of one of these associations, having sailed in a fine schooner to the shores of Spain, saw an opportunity of effecting an excellent stroke of business by the purchase of Seville oranges. He returned

¹ 'It was only an unworthy feeling which made him omit the name of Marlborough, and no one could hesitate to add to the list his own. But he spoke of generals who were dead, and of course in adding no other name to this catalogue I am following the same rule.' Arnold, *Lectures on Modern History* (Lect. iv. p. 154). This lecture was delivered in 1842, when Wellington was still alive.

with his yacht laden from stem to stern with this popular fruit, made a substantial profit by the transaction, and—was straightway expelled from the club. To have cutter or schooner, yawl or lugger, to be impelled by steam or sails, all these were open questions; but to employ the yacht for pleasure and not for mercantile profit, this was a *dogma* of the society.

The word itself is one of a large class of terms, in which etymology does not, at first sight, suggest its full meaning. For, as it is undeniably derived from the root *δοκᾶν*, to seem, it might be argued that after all a *dogma* can never be anything more than an opinion, being only that which seems true or good to him who holds or promulgates it. But it is at least conceivable that the man or the society which forms and announces an opinion may possess such claim to be attended to, on grounds natural or supernatural, that a resolution announced from such a quarter is practically a decree from which lies no appeal. And thus the word, which is frequently, no doubt, employed by Plato to signify a mere opinion, rises into a more forceful meaning in proportion as this or that school of philosophy is being mentioned; until, in his latest composition, we find him saying of the reflection concerning those things which look pleasurable or alarming, that, 'having become a common *dogma* of the state, it receives the further title of a law.'¹

It is in this latter sense—namely, as a decree imposed by external authority—that it meets us in the text of Holy Scripture. Thus, for instance, in the Septuagint translation it occasionally stands for the Hebrew word *teem*, as in Daniel iii. 10, 'Thou, O King, hast made a *dogma*,' &c.; and in the New Testament it is twice applied to imperial ordinances: 'There went out a *dogma* from Cæsar Augustus that all the world should be taxed [or enrolled]; . . . these all do contrary to the *dogmas* of Cæsar, saying that there is another King, one Jesus' (St. Luke ii. 1; Acts xvii. 7).

From this sense the transition is easy to the signification of some fixed principle imposed upon the mind by an authority which it reveres; an authority which may not indeed

¹ See the *Latius* (book i. p. 644, D), λογισμός . . . ὃς γενόμενος δόγμα πόλεως κοινὸν νόμος ἐπωνόμασται. Something similar may be traced in Latin, with reference to the terms *placet*, *placuit*, *placitum est*, which, when employed by Cicero and by Cæsar respecting a decision of the senate or the army, mean a great deal more than a mere light whim of pleasure. By a freak of language the substantive *placitum* does not often seem to rise to the sternness of the Greek δόγμα.

possess the kind of coactive power which is wielded by the civil ruler, a Nebuchadnezzar or an Augustus, but which yet may prove more potent, more irreversible than even the commands of such mighty potentates. Thus the Apostle of the Gentiles twice employs it with reference to the ordinances of the law of Moses (Ephes. ii. 15; Coloss. ii.); and though it is true that he is in both places speaking of the vanishing of those ordinances, this does not militate against the principle that dogmas may be irresistible while they last, but only admits that some are of such a nature that they may be repealed by an authority equal to that which originally established them. And thus the *dogmas* (Acts xvi. 4) ordained by the Council of Jerusalem are partly binding for all time, partly liable to modification; provided that the change be effected by the power which imposed them; that is to say, by the Church of Christ.

Dogmas, then, may exist in the region of the pure intellect, in morality, and in religion. Devout men have taught that not only in the moral law has the Almighty bound Himself by an unalterable law of good and evil, but that He has in all probability also made certain mental and material laws which are unchangeable as regards the nature of things. They would teach that in the ordinary kind of space—homaloidal space the non-Euclidean geometers call it—even the Almighty cannot make a rectilinear triangle of which the three angles are not equal to two right angles. They would defend the language of Wordsworth when he speaks of

‘those transcendent truths
Of the pure intellect, that stand as laws
(Submission constituting strength and power)
Even to Thy Being’s infinite majesty!’¹

In mental science take such propositions as ‘I am I,’ or the Kantian one, ‘No change can take place in *phenomena* without a cause,’ or what are called by a large and distinguished school of metaphysicians ‘necessary truths;’ truths, that is to say, which are marked by three characteristics²—namely, that they are recognized as true by all fairly matured and cultured intellects, that they carry their own proof with them, and that we are unable to conceive an universe in which they would not hold good. Such are the following: ‘Things which are

¹ *Excursion*, book iv. lines 96–99.

² This school includes Kant (*Critic of Pure Reason*), Sir William Hamilton (*Lectures on Metaphysics*), Mansel (*Prolegomena Logica*), McCosh (*On Intuitions*), Dr. George Ward (*Nature and Grace*); to whom we may now add, in his latest volume, Professor Max Müller.

equal to the same thing are equal to one another ; ' the whole is greater than its part ; ' ' two added to two makes four. ' In the region of morality consider such assertions as these : ' I am bound to restore to my friend, or to his lawful representative, the jewel and the money which he entrusted to my care. ' We read in Herodotus¹ a striking narrative touching a Spartan—Glaucus, son of Epicydes—who was told by the oracle at Delphi that, for merely having thought of violating this maxim (though he was penitent and did not ultimately carry out his first dishonest intention), he and his race should perish utterly ; a judgment said to have been thoroughly fulfilled. Even the Roman satirist, Juvenal, whose sneer at the exaggerations of Greek historians is so well known, stamps this episode with the note of most emphatic approval.² Of dogma in religion we must speak presently.

Philosophy has been called ' reasoned truth. ' Now in all attempts to set forth truth thus drawn out, and to arrive at firm conclusions, we are almost inevitably compelled to start from admitted principles. Such principles are either essentially, or at least provisionally, dogmas : essentially, if they rest upon some firm basis, as, *e.g.*, that of intuition ; provisionally, if they are adopted as an hypothesis for want of any better starting-point. Even Cicero, from whom we should hardly have expected it, seems to be with us here. ' But philosophy itself, by what reasonings ought it to proceed ? what issue shall it attain ? What is the future of wisdom ? It ought neither to doubt concerning itself nor about its own decrees, which the philosophers call *dogmas* ; of which none can be surrendered without crime. '³ Not very dissimilar is the language of a later philosopher, Seneca : ' Moreover there is no art conversant with theory but has its own decrees, which the Greeks call *dogmas* : we may venture to term them decrees, or maxims, or resolutions. '⁴

¹ Lib. vi. cap. 86.

² Sat. xiii. 202.

³ ' Ipsa autem philosophia, quæ rationibus progredi debet, quem habebit exitum ? Sapientiæ verò quid futurum est ? quæ neque de seipsâ dubitare debet, neque de suis decretis, quæ philosophi vocant *δόγματα* : quorum nullum sine scelere prodi poterit ' (Cicero, *Academica Priora*, lib. ii. cap. 9, § 27, ed. Tauch. In some editions these treatises are called *Quæstiones Academicæ*).

⁴ ' Præterea nulla ars contemplativa sine decretis suis est, quæ Græci vocant *δόγματα* : nobis decreta licet appellare, vel scita, vel placita ' (Seneca, *Epist.* xcv.). The passages from Cicero and from Seneca are both cited by Drs. Wetzer and Welte in their *Encyclopædia of Theology* ; and that from Cicero by Messrs. Addis and T. Arnold in their *Catholic Dictionary*. In the articles on *Dogma* in these two Roman Catholic works we find little to quarrel with and much that is suggestive.

Reasoned knowledge may, then, take its start (1) from some hypothesis which, if not absolutely proven, has at any rate not been disproved; or (2) from some axioms which cannot be denied without absurdity; or (3) from conclusions demonstrated by the agency of another science. Thus, for example, (1) large tracts of physical science start from the assumption of the uniformity of nature, a principle justly, we believe, described by Bishop Temple in his *Bampton Lectures* as 'a good working hypothesis' and nothing more; (2) metaphysical science and geometry are based upon a certain number of axioms which reasonable men can hardly deny without proclaiming themselves at variance with the general convictions of mankind; (3) astronomy takes for granted certain laws concerning numbers and figures which have been demonstrated by the student of arithmetic and pure geometry.

It is, therefore, by no means in a spirit of alienation from other departments of knowledge that theology strives to start from admitted principles. There is at least as much of assumption on the part of many votaries of the sciences which vaunt their certitude as on the part of theologians.¹ Theology is the science which treats of the Being of God and of His creatures in regard of their relations to Him. That His existence is an article of faith, that it can be denied without intellectual absurdity, is admitted. That He has made a revelation of Himself to His creatures is also matter for argument, though many sceptics and even atheists have granted that to believe in God almost involves, to say the least, a high probability that He would not allow the silence between heaven and earth to remain for ever unbroken.² In the framework of theology thus built upon religion, natural and revealed, the dogmas as distinguished from sentiment and from merely pious opinions have been not inaptly likened to the bones of the animal creation. True it is that in both cases the skeleton is not the complete animal; but, nevertheless, the molluscs, which have no bones, occupy but a poor and subordinate place in zoology.

By a dogma we understand, then, 'a fundamental article

¹ On this subject may be consulted the essay on *Philosophic Doubt* by the Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, M.P., now Secretary for Ireland; also a paper read before the Victoria Institute by the late Bishop of Edinburgh, Dr. Cotterill. Many votaries of physical science have made similar admissions; among them, if we mistake not, may be numbered Sir James Paget and Sir Andrew Clarke.

² Both James Mill and his son, John Stuart Mill, regarded Bishop Butler as triumphant against the only opponents specially attacked by him—namely, the Deists.

of saving truth, expressed or implied in Holy Scripture, taught by the Church Universal, and consonant to sound reason.' There are many other topics connected with dogma on which we should like to touch. Thus, for example, there is the distinction between Christian dogmas and the *dicta* of heathen philosophers, a point well handled by Bishop Martensen in his valuable treatise on Christian dogmatics; or, again, the fatalistic element suggested by Fichte, which has been well exposed by Drs. Wetzer and Welte.¹ But we feel that we are in danger of making our preface disproportionately long. Let us be content to refer readers who need more proof of the necessity of dogma to Mr. Garbett's *Bampton Lectures*, to a sermon on 'Undogmatic Christianity' by the late Professor Shirley, to Mr. Meyrick's volume written expressly upon this theme,² to an article in the *Christian Remembrancer* for July 1855, and to the admission of an Agnostic, Mr. Leslie Stephen, that 'an undogmatic creed is as senseless as a statue without shape or a picture without colour.'³

If there have been, even within the pale of Christendom, some earnest religionists who have been comparatively indifferent to this province of thought, such peculiarity may have arisen partly from the limitations of the human intellect, which is rarely found to be equally interested in the abstract and in the historical elements of knowledge. Thus, for example, to take illustrations from various quarters, we may observe how little fitted for abstract disquisition are such historians as Sismondi and Macaulay; while on the other side even great admirers of the rare powers exhibited by Aquinas have admitted that his was not a mind historically trained. Of course it is easy to name exceptions. Little as we care for the memory of David Hume, it must, we think, be owned that he has not only left a weighty impress upon the course of metaphysical science, but that for a considerable period he also powerfully influenced the views of English history adopted by the average British student.

But in the domain of theology another factor, by no means a purely intellectual one, at this point comes into marked and emphatic prominence. We have heard an eminent statesman remark—and the remark seems to us undeniably correct—that, as a general rule, a keen sense of personal sinfulness, and of the existence of sin around as well as within, leads—at any

¹ *Ubi supra.*

² *Is Dogma a Necessity?* By the Rev. Frederick Meyrick, M.A. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1883.

³ *Plain Thinking and Plain Speaking.* London, 1872.

rate within the pale of Christendom—to the adoption of a dogmatic form of religion. It does not follow that such a conviction is any guarantee for the absolute wisdom of the choice. A person deeply impressed with the sense of sin may become an earnest Calvinist, a devout Anglican of an Evangelical or a Catholic school, or a fervid Jansenist, or a thorough Ultramontane. But he is not likely, unless his convictions of sinfulness grow faint and dim, to wander into the tracks of mere scepticism, to adopt any phase of hazy Germanism, or of what, for want of a better name, we are compelled to call Broad-Churchism.¹

Such a religionist, if desirous of intellectual food, will find abundant pastures to satisfy his cravings. The treatises of St. Athanasius against Arianism, the *De Trinitate* of St. Augustine, the sermons of St. Leo, the works of St. John of Damascus may be named as specimens for the patristic period. The *Book of Sentences*, by Peter Lombard, the *Summa Theologiæ* of St. Thomas Aquinas, and the volumes of Scotus furnish examples of the medieval treatment of dogmatic theology. The Calvinist turns to the institutions of Calvin, to Turretinus, to Limborch, to Hodge, and many more. The modern Lutheran may mention the great names of Dörner and of Martensen. The Roman Catholic appeals to Suarez, to Vasquez, to Estius, to Klee, perhaps above all to Petavius; while in our own Church we gratefully turn to Bishops Bull and Pearson, to Jackson, to Waterland and Mill. Nor can we possibly forget that several of the most valuable contributions to the dogmatic theology of our age were made by John Henry Newman in his Anglican days, and that some of the additions made by him since that time bear deep imprints of the influence of his earlier teachers.

With all this it must be admitted that our libraries of Anglican theology have been lacking in the matter of a continuous treatise on dogmatic theology. Of course we do not forget that the noble treatises of a Pearson or a Jackson upon the Creed, or the valuable commentaries of Bishops Harold Browne and Forbes upon the Articles, do contain a large mass of teaching on the fundamental principles of dogmatics. Nevertheless considerable tracts are left entirely untouched. To have not merely observed this want, but to have striven to find a remedy for it, is in itself a title to high praise. And

¹ The statesman to whom we refer instanced the Genevese Amiel (the author of the now well-known *Journal Intime*) as a real specimen of a man who possessed a keen sense of sin, but whose religion, nevertheless, remained undogmatic.

if the endeavours of Mr. Owen have not received the attention which they deserve, it is at any rate something that, after a lapse of years, a second edition has at length been called for. This new issue is considerably enlarged, not indeed by the insertion of any additional chapters, but by the introduction of fresh matter, frequently derived from recent sources, into the treatment of a large number of the disquisitions. We propose, within our somewhat scanty limits, (1) to call attention to some of the subjects treated in the volume before us, more especially such as are not discussed by any of our great theologians, who have mainly confined their attention to the Creeds or the Thirty-nine Articles; (2) to specify what seem to us possible improvements on our author's way of stating this or that problem in theology; (3) to indicate at least one almost necessary addition to the thirty-one chapters of the work, which may yet perhaps be supplied in some future issue, if, as we trust may happen, a third edition of Mr. Owen's volume be demanded.

1. Such subjects as the rule of faith, the existence and attributes of God, the Persons of the ever blessed Trinity and the Incarnation of the Eternal Son, Predestination, Justification, and the Sacraments—these solemn themes, and not these alone, have been treated by some of the Anglo-Catholic divines whose names have been already mentioned. There is, however, scarcely one of these subjects on which the student of theology may not derive new light from the fresh and learned pages of our author. He treats them in a manner which displays marked individuality, and which, if it displays occasional defects—and who is free from them?—possesses substantial merits of its own. If, as we proceed, we criticize freely, it must not be supposed that we mean thereby to retract any portion of the praise and gratitude which we sincerely accord to his labours. And when we turn to the chapters which embrace such topics as the Holy Angels and the Fallen Angels, the Government of the World, Paradise and the Fall of Man, and the Preparation for the Coming of Christ by the Law of Nature and the Law of Moses, we feel that we have placed before us disquisitions on matters treated indeed by English theologians here and there, but not, so far as our knowledge extends, brought together in one *conspectus* in the pages of any single volume. Dean Alford, if we recollect aright, expressed a hope that the study of *exegesis* might hereafter make such progress that his edition of the Greek Testament might be utterly superseded. The aspiration reflects honour upon his memory. But in all such

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cases gratitude is still due to the earlier labourer ; and it not unfrequently happens that some one element remains as his special contribution to theology. The *De Trinitate* of St. Augustine may probably have obscured the glory of the earlier treatise on the same subject by St. Hilary of Poitiers ; yet not only does St. Hilary remain in possession of the eulogy awarded him by Sulpicius Severus of having been the Athanasius of Gaul and the West, but he has also received in our own age the hearty recognition of the Lutheran Dorner for parts of his *De Trinitate* ; and the praise of this Protestant theologian at least implicitly received the assent of the Bishop of Rome, the late Pontiff Pius IX. If in a later day some new treatise on Dogmatic Theology should diminish the attention due to Mr. Owen's volume, let us hope that such an event may not be permitted to deprive him of the credit which is really his due.

Readers who desire thoroughly to master the work before us will do well to begin by a careful study of the author's two introductory statements, reading in the first place the preface to the earlier division, and afterwards the one prefixed to the new issue of the work. The earlier preface furnishes us with a very candid and thoughtful statement of the nature of our author's *data* and of his use of them. It specifies the points of agreement or of disagreement with the methods pursued by earlier doctors, patristic, medieval, or modern, and thus, in part at least, intimates what we are to expect. In the main we find ourselves with Mr. Owen throughout this earlier preface. He first names certain Fathers (as we have done) as specimens of dogmatic theologians ; and if it seems that he deals rather hardly with the reputation of the later schoolmen, such treatment cannot any longer be ascribed to merely Anglican prejudice, inasmuch as we find the Roman Catholic editors of the *Catholic Dictionary*, Messrs. Addis and T. Arnold, expressing their views upon this matter in language very similar to that of Mr. Owen.¹ Then, after showing the naturally polemical character of the divinity on both sides, the reformed and the unreformed, in the age immediately succeeding that of the Reformation, he gives sound reasons for not limiting his own work to the discussion of the topics contained in the Creeds, a limitation which would exclude all treatment of doctrine concerning the Holy Eucharist and the conditions of justification. After pointing out how far he has been able to follow, how far compelled to

¹ Article 'Schoolmen' in their Dictionary.

quit, the footprints of St. John of Damascus, he proceeds to show the impossibility of adopting the watchword of 'the Bible and the Bible only,' and he gives his reasons for basing his conclusions mainly, though by no means exclusively, on the works of the Fathers who lived within the period of the four General Councils, and also for occasionally following Mabillon in choosing a single Father as the recognized exponent of a particular branch of theology, as, *eg.*, St. Augustine, as the doctor of Grace. A temperate protest against the anti-patristic and anti-sacerdotal teachings of the late Baron Bunsen, and an appeal to the anticipatory counter-manifesto of the late Professor Blunt, form the conclusion of this earlier preface.

The preface to this second edition of Mr. Owen's volume is of a somewhat different character. Its tone is perhaps slightly despondent. In one direction the action of the Vatican Council seems to him, with but too much reason, to confine the corporate action of the Roman Church to witnessing the decrees of a chief who claims to be infallible. The Greek Church is, in his judgment, content to live upon the honey stored up within its ancient hives. The exceeding stress laid by some Anglican bishops and divines upon the Articles, as distinguished from the Book of Common Prayer, he regards, also naturally enough, as a great discouragement to such as would fain adhere to historic Christianity. After frankly acknowledging the debt which we owe to Gibbon, to Walter Scott, and to Cardinal Newman, he takes up anew the defence of Augustinianism against Bull and Thorndike, and glances at the present dangerous tendency to Universalism, with some sighs for more of thought and study, and less dependence upon mere professional activity, and even upon ritualistic energy.

2. In all this, and in the bulk of the chapters which compose the work, we find abundant ground for sympathy and assent, and would gladly specify instances, if our space permitted. The points on which we are about to express hesitation are not such as have been ruled by the Church Catholic, or by our own portion of it. And in such matters not only do we think that Mr. Owen has at least as good a right to his opinion as we have to ours, but we should prefer that our suggestions be received rather as the lucubrations of an individual critic than as definite conclusions formulated by the *Church Quarterly Review*.

In chapter v. (on the Holy Trinity) our author justly cites Aquinas (p. 113) as accusing Arius of saying that 'the

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Son proceedeth from the Father as *His first creature*.' Yet somehow, though this may be our own fault, we do not gather from Mr. Owen's presentation of the case so complete an impression as we do from Cardinal Newman's *Arians*, that this was, after all clearing away of haze and subtlety, the real point at issue between Arius and St. Athanasius—namely, whether our Lord was, though the highest, noblest, earliest, grandest, purest of creatures, still a creature only, or the Very and Eternal God.

The chapters on the Creation and the Fall, and on cognate subjects (viii.-xii.), leave on us an impression that the entrance of evil into the universe may be due to the imperfection of the creature. If we are right, it must be asked whether such a theory is not a rather dangerous one. God created all, and saw that it was good; the holy angels are imperfect, but yet sinless; and at least one Creature is absolutely sinless, having His sacred Humanity for ever united to the Godhead. May we not fairly sum up the judgment of orthodox theologians as running somewhat in this wise? Why the existence of evil was permitted, no religion can explain; it must ever, at least during his life on earth, remain to man an unfathomed mystery. But thus much we can perceive: that many virtues and graces would seemingly have no existence, had evil never been permitted. Where would be patience, endurance, long-suffering, forgiveness, and many other forms of goodness, especially among the passive virtues? Moreover we Christians know that God has not—with reverence be it said—held Himself aloof from this great mystery, but has condescended, in the Person of the Eternal Son, to meet and to grapple with evil, and to undergo its direst penalties in almost every form, sin alone except. Dante has spoken of it as a truth deducible from even a heathen poet, that the more perfect and elevated any creature is, the more is it capable of sorrow.¹ And this is evidenced even in the case of the brute creation. The dog in his wild state has no bark; he is a mere beast of prey, and may be starved by absolute failure of the food he seeks, or fall a victim to some combatant of greater strength. Thousands of his brethren, domesticated by man, have known what it is to enjoy a happy home, where food and comforts of all kinds have abounded, and where the members of a human family have vied with each other in making him a friend and in protecting him as far as possible from every mischief. Yes! but in showing him all this kindness man has increased the dog's capacity for sorrow.

¹ *Inf.* vi. 106.

Admiral Rodney had a dog which used to refuse food for two or three days on every occasion when his master left his home to go to sea.¹ A northern capital has preserved in bronze an effigy of a dog who could not be persuaded to leave his master's grave in a well-known churchyard, and for whom sympathetic strangers made a kennel and brought food. And from the animal creation we ascend upwards to noble mourners and sufferers among men and women, until from their griefs and martyrdoms we may form some faint and imperfect notion of the grounds for applying to the highest of all creatures the language of the prophet: 'Behold and see if there be any sorrow like unto My sorrow.' And yet, again, it is possible that those may be right who imagine that without the permission of evil no test of the truth of their allegiance to the Creator—at least no test visible to created understandings—could have been devised for creatures endowed with conscious intelligence and will.

In the profoundly difficult question concerning the addition of the 'Filioque' to the Nicene Creed, Mr. Owen inclines towards the Eastern side of the discussion. He is perhaps less pronounced in favour of the Orientals than Mr. Ffoulkes or the late Dr. Neale, and he might perhaps maintain that he has not said much more than Bishop Pearson in his famous treatise on the Apostles' Creed. We are far from thinking that such a view as that which Mr. Owen here supports is anyway a divagation beyond the bounds of lawful liberty. Still we should recommend a student of the matter to consult the remarkable letter of Dr. Pusey to Dr. Liddon on this question concerning the double procession of the Holy Spirit. We the more feel bound to recommend this course, inasmuch as this last contribution to dogmatic theology by that saintly teacher by no means displays an extreme or partizan-like treatment of the subject.

On another theme the present writer has a slight divergence of sentiment from Mr. Owen. It concerns the question, What place is to be assigned to St. Augustine as a teacher? We say as a teacher, because we have not space to go into the consideration of his character as a man, though, just *en passant*, we may observe that Mr. Lecky seems to have been led into injustice by not realizing the keen sense of sin which was felt by the great Bishop of Hippo. The language in which Augustine, for example, deplores in the *Confessions* his juvenile theft of some pears suggests the meaning which

¹ Stated in Lord Stanhope's *History of England between the Peace of Aix and that of Utrecht*.

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we ought, in fairness, to assign to his comment on more serious breaches of the moral law.¹ But to turn to him as a teacher. We are deeply conscious in this respect of his wonderful range and versatility. The *Confessions* is a book which in itself is the parent of a vast amount of intellectual and spiritual introspection; not always, indeed, conducted with like honesty and judgment. The *De Civitate Dei* is one of the baptisms of a department of heathen lore which the patristic Church so frequently achieved. His *exegesis*, if uncritical and not always consistent, is yet replete with spiritual insight. His letters are often valuable tractates. Both Dr. Pusey and Archbishop Trench place him at the head of instructors (by example) for the youthful preacher, and in Spain a proverbial distich refers to the universal use in the pulpit of that wondrous store-house.² As a controversialist he smote both pagan presumption and Donatistic spiritual pride and exclusiveness; and single sentences, couched in his felicitous expressions, have often formed the key-note for an entire meditation. Of his contributions to dogmatic theology, as contained in the Creeds, it must for the moment suffice to mention again the *De Vera Religione*, the *De Doctrina Christiana*, the *Enchiridion*, and the *De Trinitate*.

But was St. Augustine equally wise, equally successful in the famous contest against Pelagius? 'Yes and more so,' rejoins a host of thinkers. So speak not only Calvin and the descendants of Calvin down to Mr. Spurgeon in our own day, but likewise Mabillon, Tillemont, and all the Jansenists. But the recalcitrants are also numerous and formidable. In southern Gaul there existed thinkers, contemporary with Augustine, who were not prepared to accept all his positions. That some of these were inclined to Pelagianism, or at least to semi-Pelagianism, is true; but this cannot be said of all.³ In a later day, at the commencement of the Reformation epoch, we find Erasmus publishing that remarkable preface

¹ For this suggestion, and for much of what immediately follows, the writer must express his indebtedness to a departed friend, the most learned member of the Scottish presbyterate, the late Rev. George Hay Forbes, of Burntisland, in Fife.

² 'No hay olla sin tocino,
Ni sermon sin Agostino.'

Thus Englished by Mr. Ford in his *Handbook for Spain*: 'There is no olla without bacon, nor a sermon without a quotation from St. Augustine' (Preface, section i. London: Murray, 1845).

³ We can, we think, herein claim some support from the present Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History, the Rev. Canon Bright. See his volume of Church History.

to his edition of the works of St. Hilary of Poitiers which won such hearty admiration from—it must be owned—the questionable judgment of Gibbon. Now Erasmus expressly states it, as a general impression in his age, that St. Augustine, warring with all his strength against Pelagius, had assigned less to the free agency of man than was generally accepted in the sixteenth century. And when we descend to Calvin, after granting all that may be said respecting the many grave and serious differences between Augustinianism and Calvinism proper, yet can we hold that the Bishop of Hippo is in no wise responsible for some of the extravagances of the Genevese Reformer? Or turn to Jansenism. We know its courage, its unworldliness, its sanctification of intellect, its protests against one side—a dangerous side—of casuistry; yet are we prepared to assert that in questions of theosophy the Jansenists were entirely in the right, the Jesuits entirely in the wrong? Such would not, the present writer ventures to believe, be the verdict of a disciple of Hooker and of Butler. Such was not the verdict of Samuel Johnson, a representative man for his day, as Erasmus for an earlier date.

Hence while we can fully understand the reasonableness of Mr. Owen when he suggests that Bishop Bull and Thorndike have underrated the value of the theological literature on predestination; and have, through such lack of appreciation, somewhat diminished their own unction and general effectiveness, we ask whether it is not possible that a slightly deeper shade of hesitation than is exhibited in the volume before us concerning certain decisions of Augustine may not be lawful and even desirable; whether there are not in his anti-Pelagian treatises propositions to which it were wise (for the sake of the youthful student) to append to the side of the page the warning that on these points even our greatest doctor of the West is at moments to be *cautè legendus*.

3. It is possible that further study of the work before us may reveal some topics of difference that have escaped our notice. Possibly 'sentiment' and 'Ritualism' might fairly ask for more ungrudging concession to their claims than our author seems disposed to make. But it is a duty as well as a pleasure to return to the expression of gratitude and sympathy. Yet, just because Mr. Owen's volume gives us so much that we cannot readily find elsewhere, especially if we are to confine our attention to English authors, we should like to see an *extra* chapter in addition to the present amount of introductory matter.

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It is becoming the fashion for assailants of such a form of Anglicanism as is exhibited—let us say in Sir William Palmer's *Treatise on the Church*—to assert that it is unhistorical. Now we by no means assert that Mr. Owen has not given many valuable hints concerning the way in which this charge ought to be met; but we do not find in his book a chapter expressly devoted to the subject. A few remarks of our own may perhaps tend to elucidate the sort of assistance of which we should be glad.

When this assertion is made—and frequently it is nothing but an assertion—the speaker or writer may mean one of two very different things. He may mean that Christianity, take what form of it you will, is essentially an unhistoric religion. He may point to such papers as those recently contributed by Mr. Mivart to the *Nineteenth Century*, and ask whether such concessions as that gifted essayist makes concerning Judaism do not go far to imperil the historic claims of the religion which has sprung out of Judaism. Or he may mean that he considers what is commonly called High Church Anglicanism to be unhistoric, and that though he (the speaker) is not a Roman Catholic, he is inclined to grant in this respect a position to which he will not allow to Lambeth.

To criticize the first-named of these two positions would require a separate article. On the second let thus much be said. Placed side by side with the position of modern Dissent, Rome does by comparison become historical; and we can readily understand the assertion of our contemporary the *Guardian* when, in a recent leader upon Mormonism,¹ it suggested that the historic element in the Roman system had probably saved Rome's humbler adherents from becoming victims to those hallucinations of Joe Smith and his followers which have allured, to their souls' peril, so many a votary of Welsh Dissent. But when it is implied that Anglicanism has difficulties in connexion with history, and that modern Romanism has none, we are compelled to remind such speculators that the greatest living student of Church history, Ignatius von Döllinger, has been compelled to break with Vaticanism on the avowed ground of its unhistoric character, and that when Dr. (not then as yet Cardinal) Newman proceeded in his letter to the Duke of Norfolk to comment on this charge, he did not venture on a direct counter-issue. He maintained—and we are not blind to the subtlety and ingenuity of the plea—that history was only one of the *loci*

¹ See *Guardian*, August 3, 1887.

theologici, and that not only in regard to the decrees of the Vatican Council, but to many other decisions of the Church in various ages, the evidence from the historic side must be allowed to fall short of proof. Still we admit that a *tu quoque*, though it has in cases of this sort a real force of its own, is not enough; and that is why we desire to see Mr. Owen (or some other students stimulated by his example) consider this subject from our Anglican point of view. But if the author of the volume before us is unwilling or unable to attend to our request, we shall not forget that we cannot reasonably expect everything from one source. *Non omnia possumus omnes* still holds good in every domain of toil, and we shall not allow the lack of anything for which we seek, to make us forget our gratitude for the real benefits which we have received from our author's devout, long-continued, and honourable exertions. That they may be more appreciated than they have been, and that younger successors may not only inherit but add to their valuable results, is our earnest hope and prayer.

ART. X.—INGRAM'S HISTORY OF THE UNION.

A History of the Legislative Union of Great Britain and Ireland. By T. DUNBAR INGRAM. (London, 1887.)

THE history of the Irish Parliament for its eighteen years of nominal independence has this peculiar and pathetic interest, that it is a history not of achievement but of development—of development again and again thwarted, again and again renewed; until at last, with its passion for true existence still unsatisfied, the Irish nation was forced bodily into the frame of a larger political organism, there to work such effects as might have been expected.

England, in 1782, renounced, at the bidding of the volunteers, all control over Irish legislation, except such as lay in the veto of the Sovereign of the two countries. Not even the commercial unity of the empire was preserved. But much was preserved which, if all else was abandoned, had better have been abandoned too. That Ireland could remain a portion of the British dominions if governed by an executive responsible to its own and not to the British Parliament—

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this was a conception which the example of the colonies has made familiar to us, but which seemed utterly impracticable to statesmen of the eighteenth century. The Irish ministry must not cease to be what it had always been—simply an extension of the English one. The latter always represented a majority in Parliament, for if it ceased to do so, it ceased to be a ministry. To the Irish ministry a majority was no less essential, but since the majority could not, as in England, create the ministry, the only resource left was that the ministry should create the majority. And this it did both before and, more extensively, after the concession of 1782, by means of systematic and sustained corruption.

The forthcoming seventh volume of Mr. Lecky's *History of England in the Eighteenth Century* will deal with the period of Irish history in which the conflict between the forces of corruption and of reform culminated in the Rebellion of 1798 and the passing of the Act of Union. No writer, perhaps, was ever more fitted to guide us through this confused and calamitous period; no epoch in English history has more need to be handled—above all during the present political crisis—with the delicate sense of historical rectitude which he possesses in so unusually high a measure. Of the Act of Union, or rather of the means by which it was carried, he has already spoken incidentally, and in terms of the deepest condemnation.¹ But it may be said that a truly large and historical treatment of that measure is still to seek, though we may confidently look to his forthcoming volume to supply it.

Few and imperfect, however, as are the attempts to give some rational account of what the Act of Union was, and from what real or supposed necessities it sprang, there is no lack of accessible information of a more or less trustworthy kind as to the methods by which the Irish Parliament was induced to adopt it. Dr. Ingram wishes to add to this information, or rather to show us the utter falsehood of all that the world has hitherto believed on the subject, and believed mainly on the explicit testimony of the persons who were directly concerned in carrying the measure. His work is not what it calls itself, a 'History' of the Act of Union. It does not discuss the provisions of the Act; it does not even tell us what they were. From the beginning of the book to the end there is not, for instance, a word of information about the manner in which the Union was intended to affect the commercial or financial relations of the two countries. Dr. Ingram

¹ *Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland: Grattan; and History of England*, vi. 458.

has limited his aims to arguing that the Irish Parliament never did anything excusable (until it terminated its own existence) except the oppression of the Catholics by the Penal Laws, and that the Union was passed by methods 'free from any taint of corruption,' 'with the hearty consent and concurrence of the vast majority' of the Irish people.¹ The political purpose of this book, though not avowed, is marked on every page; nor can we imagine any other which it is in the least capable of serving. That purpose would have been far better served, in our opinion, by a demonstration that the legitimate bearing on the present Home Rule controversy of the circumstances of the Act of Union belongs to the category of the infinitely little. At any rate we must protest against the grave misuse of the title of 'history' to capture the confidence of the public in a work which is in fact—we were about to say, a large political pamphlet, but that would be casting a very injurious reflection on a class of literature in which we reckon some valuable and a few imperishable works. But our readers can decide for themselves what Dr. Ingram's book is to be called when we have laid before them some examples of its contents.

The author, in his first chapter, adduces certain early opinions in favour of a legislative union between England and Ireland, and attempts of the Irish Parliament to bring about such a union. Had the first of these attempts (in 1703) succeeded, the Penal Code, he thinks, need never have been enacted.

'It is remarkable,' he writes, 'that the Penal Code was enacted by the Irish Parliament after their ineffectual attempts to obtain a legislative union with England.'²

Again—

'When England refused, or made no answer to the Irish request for a legislative union in 1703, the Irish Parliament, despairing of their power of maintaining themselves among a hostile people, resolved to reduce their opponents to political impotency by the enactment of the penal laws.'³

Now the first Irish petition for a Union was framed, as he rightly says, on October 20, 1703.⁴ Does he imagine that there were no penal laws before that date?

In 1695 it was made felony for a Roman Catholic in Ireland to exercise the calling of schoolmaster.

¹ Ingram, Preface, vii.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 50, 51.

² *Ibid.* p. 8.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 10, 11.

In the same year another road to education was cut off—it was forbidden to send a papist child abroad for education.

In 1697 it was enacted that 'all popish archbishops, bishops, vicars-general, deans, jesuits, monks, friars, and all other regular popish clergy' should, before May 1, 1698, depart out of Ireland. To remain after that date entailed imprisonment, as a preliminary to transportation to any spot of the globe the Government might select. To return was death.

In the same year it was enacted that no papist could be guardian to a child. The child was to be taken from his kin, and brought up at the direction of the court in the Protestant religion.

In 1703, *before* the Petition of October 20, the terrible Act 'for preventing the further growth of Popery' was introduced.¹ It aimed at the utter beggary and social degradation of the Catholics, and must have achieved its aim had not one species of property been to some extent rescued by kindly Protestant neighbours, who agreed to become the legal, yet merely nominal, owners of lands and leases forbidden to Catholics by this cruel Act.

This painful recital might be prolonged. But it is enough for our purpose to point out that *all* the penal laws enumerated by Hallam as specimens of the Code, and described by him as little less 'repugnant to justice and humanity' than extermination by the sword,² had either been in operation for years, or were actually in progress through the House, when that petition was framed whose rejection, Dr. Ingram informs us, gave the first stimulus to their enactment.

But even the petition itself is quite wrongly described by Dr. Ingram:—

'On October 20 they [the Commons] framed their most serious discontents and desires into a direct address to the Crown. After enumerating their distresses they implored the Queen to concede *the only means which could remove them—a firm and strict union with England*.'³

These are not Dr. Ingram's own words; he quotes them, adopting their sense, from Mr. Froude. He found them in that writer's history of *The English in Ireland*;⁴ that is to say, he had good *prima facie* evidence of their incorrectness, and yet he seems never to have taken the trouble of checking them by reference to a work which in other places he shows

¹ September 28; committed October 14.

² *Constit. History*, pp. 868, 869.

⁴ Vol. i. pp. 300, 301, 302.

³ Ingram, p. 6.

himself to know the use of—the Journal of the Irish House of Commons. Turning to that Journal *sub dato*, we find Mr. Gladstone's view, that the early movements towards a union were prompted by a desire to escape from the 'ferocious persecution' of England's commercial laws,¹ amply verified in this case:—

'Our foreign trade and its returns are under such restrictions and discouragements as to be now become in a manner unprofitable, although this kingdom hath of late, by its blood and treasure, contributed to secure the Plantation trade to the people of England.'

Corruption in the administration, from want of frequent Parliaments, is then noticed:—

'... So that we, your Majesty's dutiful subjects, are fully convinced that nothing but frequent Parliaments, with a permission for them to sit *and do the work of the nation*, can prevent or reform so great and notorious abuses.

'We cannot despair of your Majesty's goodness being extended towards us in such prudent and gracious methods as may afford us relief according to the exigency of our condition, and by *restoring us to a full enjoyment of our constitution*,² or by promoting a more firm and strict union with your Majesty's subjects of England, which will be to the advantage of that kingdom, nothing being more certain than that whatever riches the people of Ireland may acquire must at last necessarily centre in the seat of the government.'³

So far, therefore, from representing a union as the 'only' way out of their distresses, the Irish Commons merely named it as an alternative to the 'restoration' of their legislative independence. What they prayed for in 1703 was the very same thing that eighty years later they again desired, and gained. But how different *then* was the alternative, inspired by the neglect and oppression of eighty years!⁴

Dr. Ingram has touched nothing that he has not, in a certain sense, adorned; but we cannot delay to deal with such secondary matters as his treatment of the Act of Attainder under James II., or the Regency Bill, or the Catholic Relief Bill of 1793. But his account of the Commercial Resolutions of 1785⁵ is too extraordinary an instance of misrepresentation to be passed over in silence.

¹ *Nineteenth Century*, October, 1887, p. 452.

² 'Restoring.' The Irish Parliament always spoke of the English claim of control as a usurpation.

³ Address of October 20, 1703.

⁴ 'FREE TRADE, OR—' was the legend hung round the muzzles of some of the Volunteer cannon, 'free trade' meaning, of course, not what we now understand by that term, but freedom for the Irish Parliament to regulate Irish trade as it chose.

⁵ Ingram, pp. 62-69.

In that year it was resolved to establish a kind of *Zollverein*, or commercial union, between England and Ireland, for the purpose of cementing the unity of the empire and avoiding all future possibility of a war of tariffs. At that time England maintained heavy or prohibitory duties on Irish goods (except linen), while her own were admitted into Ireland nearly free. Prohibitions were now to be abolished and all duties equalized, the higher being reduced to the lower; the Colonial trade, which since 1799 had been opened to Ireland by acts passed from year to year, was now to be granted in permanence; and the Irish were to be admitted to all commercial privileges enjoyed by Englishmen. In return (Dr. Ingram does not mention this) Ireland was to contribute a fixed subsidy to the naval defences of the empire. These proposals were drawn up in eleven resolutions, and submitted by the Ministry to the Irish Parliament, by whom, with Grattan's cordial approval, they were gratefully accepted; and taxes for the subsidy to the extent of 140,000*l.* were at once imposed.

The resolutions were now 'sent over to England to be there re-examined and considered.'¹ But the English manufacturers dreaded the free admission of Irish goods, and a strong agitation against these proposals was set on foot. 'Pitt, however,' says Dr. Ingram, 'was not to be moved.' Twenty resolutions were drawn up, embodying a commercial treaty between England and Ireland, and were agreed to by the English Parliament.

'These resolutions differed in number from those of Ireland, but they were practically the same. The additions referred to patents, or copyrights in books, or to regulations intended to guard against smuggling.'²

Unaccountably, however, the Twenty Resolutions, on being presented in this form to the Irish Parliament, met with the fiercest opposition there. 'They were received,' writes Dr. Ingram, 'with an Irish howl.'³ The howl, led by Grattan, was directed mainly against certain provisions enforcing 'the same principle of similarity in the laws of trade and navigation' which, according to Dr. Ingram, had been already embodied in an Act passed in 1782, 'drawn up by Grattan, Yelverton, and Fitzgibbon.'⁴ Did these provisions appear in the Eleven Resolutions? From Dr. Ingram's statement, it would appear that they did, since they related neither to

¹ Ingram, p. 62.

² *Ibid.* p. 64.

³ *Ibid.* p. 63.

⁴ *Ibid.*

patents, nor copyrights, nor smuggling. But from his narrative it is clear that they did not. The Irish House of Commons, at any rate, considered them equivalent to a surrender of Irish legislative independence, and though it was provided in the Bill 'that the treaty should not bind Ireland a moment longer than she pleased,'¹ it was rejected—that is to say, leave was given by a majority of only nineteen; the Bill was dropped, and, in Dr. Ingram's words, 'a Legislative Union loomed into sight.'²

And now let us have the truth of the matter. Dr. Ingram conceals the fact that the Eleven Resolutions, on being received in England, were formally placed as a Government measure before Parliament, and that (such was the clamour against them) the 'not to be moved' Pitt withdrew them for alteration. When they were again presented in the form of twenty resolutions, Lord North moved the adjournment of the debate on the ground that the resolutions had been 'so materially changed' that time must be given for their consideration.³ Fox supported the motion, urging that the new proposals 'directly changed the whole tenor and absolutely subverted the main principle of the original system.'⁴ Let us see whether the view of North and Fox, or that of Dr. Ingram, is the correct one.

In the Twenty Resolutions described by Dr. Ingram as 'practically the same' as the Eleven, and containing no addition except some regulations about patents, copyrights, and smuggling, we find—

1. That as long as the *British* Parliament chose to continue the charter of the East India Company Ireland was to be debarred from trading with all places lying east of the Cape of Good Hope, as far as the Straits of Magellan; and from importing, except through Great Britain, any goods of Indian growth or produce (Resolution 9). [But for this clause the East Indian trade would have been open to Ireland on the expiration of the charter in 1793, unless her Parliament were granted inducements to consent to the renewal of the monopoly. Even if the charter were discontinued Ireland was to be limited to trade with the *British* East Indian settlements.]

¹ Ingram, p. 65.

² *Ibid.* p. 66. Nothing can better show the character of the Irish House of Commons than the fact that a Government majority of 19 in a house of 235 was thought equivalent to a decisive defeat.

³ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.* xxv. 588.

⁴ *Ibid.* 591.

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2. That either country might prohibit or place duties at pleasure on corn, meal, malt, flour, and biscuits coming from the other (Res. 10). [England was then becoming a corn-importing and Ireland a corn-exporting country,¹ so that this clause pressed against Irish agriculture. It is said to have been directly due to the Scotch dread of competition with Irish oats.]
3. That while Ireland was prohibited from giving bounties on the exportation to England of beer and spirits, England might give them on the exportation of these products to Ireland (Res. 15).
4. That Ireland should at once enact, without deliberation or modification, all laws already passed, *or which should hereafter be passed*, by England regulating or restraining the trade of Great Britain with the British or foreign colonies, Africa or America² (Res. 4 and 5).

Of the above provisions, some of them of enormous, some only of great importance, not one was included in the eleven resolutions first laid before the Irish Parliament. They may have been equitable, or they may not—but certain it is that, in Mr. Lecky's words, they 'modified the plan most seriously, to the detriment of Ireland.' That providing, by Ireland's absolute subservience, for rigid similarity in the laws of trade, Dr. Ingram tells us was accepted in principle by the 'Yelverton Bill' of 1782. It was nothing of the kind. That Bill applied only to English laws already in existence—it did not bind Ireland to impose future restraints, 'undefined, unspecified, uncertain, at the arbitrary demand of another State.'³ This distinction was strongly urged, not only by Grattan in the Irish, but also by Lord Beauchamp in an able speech in the British House of Commons. He pointed out how under the Twenty Resolutions Ireland would have to follow England's example in the taxation of American produce. This would apply to articles so important as 'iron, indigo, tobacco, rice, cotton.'

'By regulating the imports we, in effect, command the exports of Ireland in every branch for which these articles are admitted in return. . . . It may also be doubted whether the artificial system of restraints and monopolies which our debts have rendered necessary, if applied to an infant country, as Ireland is, in a commercial point

¹ See Lecky, *Hist. Engl. Eighteenth Century*, vi. 356 *et seq.*

² For the Twenty Resolutions, see *Cobbett*, xxv. 707, 934; for the Eleven, *ibid.* 312.

³ Fox, on the Twenty Resolutions. Quoted by Lecky, vi. 401.

of view, with her natural resources undeveloped, may not totally damp all future industry and commercial enterprise.¹

Ireland, Dr. Ingram urges, might abandon the compact when she chose. It is true—and with a reformed parliament such a provision would have been an important one. But as things were, it simply added a new and powerful motive to the Government's hostility to reform. Nor is an intricate commercial system of doubtful benefit to be lightly entered upon because we are theoretically at liberty to abandon it when we choose.

That it would have been wise in Ireland to accept the Commercial Resolutions even in their altered state seems to us very probable. And if opposed by Grattan, they were supported by other persons about whose sincere desire for Ireland's welfare there could be as little doubt. Fox, for instance, was known to entertain generous feelings towards Ireland: what was his view? Dr. Ingram's research has brought it to light:—

'Grattan' (writes Dr. Ingram²), 'affected to believe that the acceptance of the treaty by Ireland would have been a subversion of her legislative independence. Charles James Fox took a very different view of the position which Ireland would occupy. Here are his words: "The whole tendencies of the proposals appeared to him to go the length of appointing Ireland sole guardian of the laws of navigation and grand arbitress of all the commercial interests of the empire"'³

What a position for Ireland to throw away, and what 'fanatical' folly was Grattan's in advising her to do so! But stay—is not this opinion of Fox's inconsistent with some of his other utterances on the subject? We turn to the parliamentary reports—and what do we find? That Dr. Ingram has actually applied to the Twenty Resolutions which Grattan rejected, a passage from a speech of Fox upon the Eleven Resolutions which Grattan heartily approved! Nay, more, we find that Fox's recorded and reiterated opinion upon the Twenty Resolutions (*quâ* their bearing on Irish independence) was exactly the same as Grattan's; we find him closing a vehement denunciation of them with the words, 'I will not barter English commerce *for Irish slavery*; that is not the price I would pay, nor is this the thing I would purchase.'⁴

And this is the account of an important political transac-

¹ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.* xxv. 736; and see his discussion of the East Indian question, *ibid.* 949.

² Ingram, p. 66.

³ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.* xxv. 333.

⁴ *Ibid.* 778.

tion laid before us as *history* by a writer who, in his Preface, makes claims of impartial and exhaustive study of original authorities which would sound a little presumptuous if uttered by a Hallam or a Carlyle.

It remains to add that eight years later the results aimed at by Pitt in the commercial revolution of 1785 were found to have been almost attained without any infringement of Ireland's independence, by gradual and discreet legislation. 'Mr. Pitt's plan,' writes Hobart, the Chief Secretary, to Nepean,¹ 'for settling the commercial intercourse between the two countries is now, I believe, in all the most difficult points, nearly accomplished.' And as a helper in the work of settlement, as a statesman willing to face unpopularity in order to carry it to its end, he names no other than Grattan—the man to whom, in Dr. Ingram's words, the 'title of statesman' has only been 'awarded by the superstition of a noisy and ignorant multitude.'²

One more example, while we are on the subject of Grattan, of Dr. Ingram's singular qualifications to be a rebuker of ignorance. Grattan had once said that the Protestant religion 'is the religion of the State, and will become the religion of the Catholics if severity does not prevent them. Bigotry may survive persecution, but it can never survive toleration.'³ This 'extraordinary statement,' as Dr. Ingram calls it, is made the subject of a criticism a good deal more extraordinary. 'It furnishes,' he tells us, 'perhaps the only example in the world of a public man declaring openly that the convictions of four millions of his fellow-subjects rested on obstinacy or bigotry.'⁴ That was not what Grattan declared; but if it were, it would surely be only too easy to find parallels for it! But it is the prophecy in Grattan's deliverance which chiefly moves the historian's pity and astonishment. 'Outside the pages of Partridge's almanacs,' he writes, 'it would be difficult to find such a combination of the folly of prophecy and the ignoring of patent facts.' 'Outside the pages' of Dr. Ingram's book, it would be difficult, we say, to find, in any work claiming the title of history, so signal an example of the lack of that general information regarding an epoch out of

¹ July, 1793. Quoted by Mr. Lecky, vi. 604.

² P. 82. Dr. Ingram entertains a ludicrous personal antipathy for Grattan, apparently because he was the chief defender of Irish nationality in the past. To his loyalty was largely due the frustration of the rebellion of '98, and consequently the fact that Ireland is now part of the British dominions.

³ In a speech delivered in 1782.

⁴ Ingram, p. 141.

which alone its history can be written. The belief of Grattan was fundamentally a reasonable one. 'Popery,' as our great-grandfathers understood it, can hardly be said to have existed on the Continent since the French Revolution. Whether it exists in Ireland or not is a question which the obscuring influences that have been at work ever since the Union puzzle the best observers to answer; but certainly the forces which so profoundly changed Catholicism on the Continent were not unfelt there. At any rate, whether Grattan's belief was a reasonable one or not, it is certainly not to Partridge's almanac that we shall turn to find other instances of its currency. It was, as the ordinary authorities for the epoch would have shown Dr. Ingram, one of the commonest speculations among the most sagacious men of the time. It was entertained by Edmund Burke, who thought the Irish Catholics might shortly become Protestant Dissenters.¹ Pitt, Dundas, and Hobart thought the Emancipation question would probably settle itself in this way, and very speedily.² Shelley, in his addresses to the Irish people in 1812, spoke as if the change were already accomplished. His opinion, as his, is worth nothing, but it reflected the aspect of thought among educated Englishmen of his day. It is difficult to understand how Dr. Ingram could have even begun to read the political literature and debates of the period without coming across this speculation in connexion with names which certainly do not suggest the idea of Partridge's almanac. And though Pitt, Burke, Grattan, Day, Edgeworth, and the rest of them were undoubtedly misled, Dr. Ingram's merciless contempt for their forecast provokes us to bethink ourselves whether it is, after all, quite so intolerable an offence to utter mistaken prophecy as to publish perverted history.

Dr. Ingram's two main theses are: (1) that the Act of Union was carried without 'any taint of corruption,' and (2) with the 'heartly consent and concurrence' of the Irish people, Catholic and Protestant.³ He adds, in the course of his work, that the Opposition, on the contrary, did resort to corruption; and even asserts that a member had only to walk across the floor of the House in order to receive from them 5,000*l.* in ready money for his vote against the Union!⁴ Mr. Gladstone has replied to Dr. Ingram in the *Nineteenth Century* for October. His attack is characteristically vehement and not always perfectly just; he occasionally accuses

¹ *First Letter to Langrishe, &c.*

² See Lecky, *Hist. Engl. Eighteenth Century*, vi. 497, 510, &c.

³ Ingram, Preface, vii.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 218.

Dr. Ingram of suppressing references to the authorities where those references were duly given in their proper places. But, on the whole, it must be said that he successfully refutes his opponent on every point. Indeed, as our readers might expect, this is no difficult task. Dr. Ingram's contention implies that corruption, the avowed¹ instrument of English Government in Ireland, was abjured at the very crisis when there was most need for its exercise. It implies that he knows better how the Union was passed than Cornwallis and Castlereagh, both of whom have, in the clearest way, admitted the use of corrupt and corrupting methods.

'The political jobbing of this country,' writes Lord Cornwallis, 'gets the better of me. It has ever been the wish of my life to avoid all this dirty business, and I am now involved in it beyond all bearing, and am consequently more wretched than ever. I trust that I shall live to get out of this most cursed of all situations, and most repugnant to my feelings. How I long to kick those whom my public duty obliges me to court. If I did not hope to get out of this country, I would most earnestly pray for immediate death.'²

How does Dr. Ingram get over an acknowledgment of this kind? It is very simple. He quotes as much of it as he can explain, and suppresses the rest. 'It was Lord Cornwallis's duty,' says Dr. Ingram, 'during the Union struggle to conciliate the wavering and timid, and to avoid changing into irreconcilable enemies the self-seeking trimmers whom such a time brings forth. We know the disgust which his interviews with these jobbers caused him.'³ Then follows our quotation; Lord Cornwallis's hope that he might live to get out of his 'cursed situation,' and his allusion to 'immediate death,' being omitted. That an old and practised politician could be brought to long for immediate death through the causes adduced by Dr. Ingram, is of course inexplicable, and so indeed Dr. Ingram appears to have found it.

But Lord Cornwallis, it seems, denied the use of bribery. 'The enemy, to my certain knowledge, offer 5,000*l.*, ready money, for a vote; if we had the means, and were disposed to make such vile use of them, we dare not trust the credit of the Government in the hands of such rascals.'⁴ This alludes to what

¹ Thus Fitzgibbon, when the Government was threatened with defeat on the Regency Bill in 1789, cynically begged Parliament not to compel it to spend half a million of public money, as Lord Townshend had once done, in order to re-create its majority.—*Irish Parl. Deb.* ix. 181.

² Cornwallis to Ross, May 20, 1799; *Corn. Corr.* iii. pp. 100, 101.

³ Ingram, p. 229.

⁴ Cornwallis to Ross, *Corn. Corr.* iii. p. 184. Quoted by Ingram, p. 192.

another writer has called 'metallic corruption.' That such was employed is not demonstrably certain, though there is very much to make us suspect that it was. But if it was, there is no reason to conclude that Lord Cornwallis must have had cognizance of it. It would have been highly politic in Lord Castlereagh and his Under-Secretary, Mr. Cooke, to keep it secret from him, and highly in accordance with the 'tortuous skill' with which the whole business was managed. Thus the Lord Chancellor (Fitzgibbon), the very chief of the instruments of the Government in all its affairs for the last ten years, was kept in ignorance throughout of the fact that the ministry was negotiating with the Catholic leaders and pledging its faith for their emancipation in return for their assistance in carrying the Union. He was vehemently opposed to Catholic emancipation under any circumstances whatever, and afterwards complained bitterly of the 'deception' thus practised on him.¹

But if Lord Cornwallis was shocked at the notion of bribing a member of the House of Commons in bank-notes, he seems to have had no objection to bribing a bishop, or a borough proprietor, with offers of corresponding magnitude. We find in the *Cornwallis Correspondence* some unedifying details of his proceedings. Thus he writes to the Duke of Portland in July 1799:—

'It was privately intimated to me that the sentiments of the Archbishop of Cashel were less unfriendly to the Union than they had been, on which I took an opportunity of speaking to his Grace on the subject; and, after discussing some preliminary topics *respecting the representation of the Spiritual Lords and the probable vacancy of the see of Dublin*, he declared his great unwillingness at all times to oppose the measures of the Government.'²

Lord Cornwallis dealt in bishoprics and peerages, Lord Castlereagh in places and pensions. The Government held Parliament in a grip from which there was no escape, for it steadily refused to appeal to the constituencies by a dissolution, and at the same time contrived to reconstitute a great part of the representation in its own sense. A law had been

¹ *Castlereagh Correspondence*, iv. pp. 47, 51.

² *Corn. Corr.* iii. 113. The Archbishop of Cashel (Agar, Baron Somerton) was duly made Archbishop of Dublin in 1801, and afterwards Earl of Normanton. 'His Grace had my promise, when we came to an agreement respecting the Union, that he should have a seat in the House of Lords for life' (*ibid.* 209), and accordingly we find him one of the representative Irish peers elected in 1800. Until Lord Cornwallis effected his conversion, he had been a declared enemy of the Union.—*Corn. Corr.* iii. p. 35.

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passed in 1793, by which members who accepted any place under Government thereby vacated their seats. With a popular constituency this law would certainly act as a safeguard against corrupt influence on the part of the Government. But in the case of a private borough whose proprietor was in the hands of the Government, it had exactly the opposite effect, and over two-thirds of the House of Commons represented private boroughs.¹ When the proposal was first brought before Parliament (in 1789), Buckingham, the then viceroy, believed that the reformers would not have supported it had they clearly seen its operation, and dwelt, in his letter to England, upon the 'manifest advantage of such a power to be lodged in the Crown'²—the power, that is, of packing Parliament. Members for constituencies which the Government could control, and for whom open apostasy was inconvenient or too shameful, were accordingly induced to accept places under the Crown, such as the escheatorships, which corresponded to the Chiltern Hundreds of the British Parliament, and thus to leave their seats open for nominees of the Ministry. By bribery of one kind or another, or by their obligations to the borough proprietors to whom they owed their seats,³ no fewer than sixty-three members of the House of Commons were induced to resign in the interval between the session of 1799, in which the Union had been rejected, and that of 1800, in which it was accepted.⁴ At the same time members who held anti-Union seats, but were unable to serve in Parliament, were not permitted to vacate them. Lieutenant-Colonel Cole was one of these; he was ordered to join his regiment abroad, and refused the escheatorship when he applied for it, because he acknowledged, on being questioned by Lord Castlereagh, that his place was to be supplied by a declared anti-Unionist.⁵ How, it may now be asked, does Dr. Ingram explain this reconstitution of Parliament? He does not explain it; he never mentions it at all.

The Government, says our author,⁶ invariably denied the accusations of the Opposition, that the measure was being forced through by illegitimate means, and challenged them

¹ See Lecky, *Hist. Engl. Eighteenth Century*, vi. p. 323.

² Quoted by Mr. Lecky, *Hist. Engl. Eighteenth Century*, vi. 601.

³ For an instance of the binding nature of these obligations, see Phillips's *Curran and his Contemporaries*, p. 150.

⁴ Ponsonby, in the Irish House of Commons, March 6, 1800.

⁵ This and a similar instance are admitted unreservedly by Lord Cornwallis, *Corn. Corr.* iii. 97, but the affair caused great scandal, and he was told by the Duke of Portland that he had gone too far. *Corn. Corr.* iii. p. 100.

⁶ Ingram, p. 226, &c.

to prove their assertions. And because this challenge was never taken up, we are to conclude that there was no bribery. This is a very shallow argument. There are a dozen ways in which a Government can bribe which would permit the technical denial of both parties to the transaction that anything of the kind took place. The Archbishop of Cashel would probably have repudiated with indignation the charge that he was bribed. The Government so managed their affair with the Catholics that they could at any moment have denied that any compact as to emancipation existed between them, and it would have been absolutely impossible to prove the contrary. Yet the resignation of Pitt and his colleagues makes it clear, if other evidence were wanting, that the faith of the Government was really and deeply pledged. And as to these denials, where are they? In the debate of February 5, 1800, which was followed by the largest division ever known in the House of Commons, Mr. Dobbs, in the course of a very able speech, said:—

‘Sir, if I am well informed, this foul measure has been attempted to be supported by as foul means. Will the noble lord [Castlereagh] get up and say upon his honour that it has not? Will the noble lord get up and say upon his honour that the Church establishment, the revenue establishment, the military establishment, and every dependant on Government, were not employed to procure subscribers, by threats and promises, to the few addresses that have been obtained in favour of a Union? Will he declare upon his honour that he does not believe there is a man in the House who has the people’s money in his pocket, paid him out of the public treasury to vote for this Union? Will he declare upon his honour that no money has been paid to any man to vacate his seat who could not be brought to vote for this measure, in order that a Unionist might be returned in his place? . . . Will he declare upon his honour that all who hold places under Government are free to vote as they please without fear of dismissal?’²

‘Lord Castlereagh,’ writes Dr. Ingram, ‘Lord Hawkesley,³ Sir John Blaquiere, the Prime Serjeant, and Chancellor Corry

¹ Which it is not. *Corn. Corr.* iii. 237–8.

² At this time there were 116 placemen and pensioners in the House (Sheridan, in the British House of Commons, February 7, 1799). The Government had opened its campaign by a string of dismissals, *pour encourager les autres*.

³ Who is ‘Lord Hawkesley’? There was no such person in the Parliament of either kingdom. Lord Hawkesbury (Liverpool) dealt with the charge of corruption in the British Parliament, but in a most evasive and reserved manner.—*Cobbett*, xxxiv. 302. Dr. Ingram has apparently conveyed his statement, misprint and all, from Lord Brabourne’s *Facts and Fictions in Irish History*, p. 29: ‘Lord Castlereagh, Sir J. Blaquiere,

in their places in Parliament, always met with a direct denial this charge of corruption.¹ Here we should have been glad of references. We have found challenges to the Opposition to prove their case, but not denials. On the occasion of Mr. Dobbs's speech just quoted, the noble lord is not recorded to have made any answer to his appeal. No Government speaker on the occasion denied Mr. Dobbs's charges, unless we are to call Sir John Blaquiere's remarks a denial. This gentleman, of whom Lord Cornwallis gratefully records that he 'kept the friends of the measure together by his constant conviviality,'² and of whom Lord Castlereagh writes that he had 'waived his representative peerage for *more substantial* objects,'³—this gentleman said, in reply to Mr. Dobbs, that 'he was as independent as any man in the House, because he held a position that the Government could not take from him,' and added that 'many gentlemen on his side were as independent as any who opposed the Union.' That is all the denial Mr. Dobbs got from Blaquiere. And if it is a fair specimen of the Government defence, we do not wonder that Dr. Ingram has avoided going into detail on this branch of his subject. And against such vague denials as we are aware of, we have to set a very explicit and public admission. Mr. Windham was Secretary at War in Pitt's administration. He had held that office for five years, and was one of the intimate allies of Pitt, who followed him into retirement in 1801. On February 7, 1799, Sheridan having charged the Government with the use of corrupt means to press the Union in Ireland, Mr. Windham said :—

'Government was charged with the imputation of corrupting the Parliament of Ireland. Corruption was not a solitary vice—it required two parties to constitute the crime, the corruptor and the corrupted. Now if it were true that the Parliament of Ireland were of a nature to be corrupted, what would be the consequence of the Government's abstaining? Corruption disappointed might degenerate into faction, and its tendencies ungratified might be more mischievous *than if directed into the line of duty.*'⁴

With what despair must Sheridan, who knew the historic memory, the brooding imagination of his countrymen, have listened to such an avowal of the means by which it was in-

Lord Hawkesley, and others in their places in Parliament strongly denied the charge of corruption.' This, it seems, is the way to write history from 'original and contemporaneous authorities.'

¹ Ingram, p. 191-2.

² *Corn. Corr.* iii. 253.

³ *Ibid.* 278. The 'objects' were a pension of 1,000l.

⁴ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.* xxxiv. 379.

tended to incorporate the two nations against the will of one! But surely the exquisite euphemism which we have italicized must have made him realize that fruitless argument with a master of forty legions is not always without substantial consolations for the avenging sense of humour.

But what need to accumulate evidence on this head? Mr. Ross, the editor of the *Cornwallis Correspondence*, has discovered and stated the fact—which Dr. Ingram has thought it consistent with the good faith of an historian entirely to suppress—that ‘almost all the persons officially concerned in carrying the Union’ destroyed their papers.¹ One damning document, however, fell into Mr. Ross’s hands, which he shrinks from printing in detail. It is a list of Lord Cornwallis’s yet unredeemed pledges, sent on February 19, 1801, to the Duke of Portland. A large number of legal appointments and salaried places or pensions are there presented for ratification. ‘Thirty-five of the persons mentioned in the list were members of Parliament, and had voted for the Union.’ Three of the pensions, really for members of Parliament, *were to be paid under the cloak of another name.*²

In spite of the wholesale destruction of evidence, enough remains to confute Dr. Ingram, even out of the mouths of the very persons whom he undertakes to defend. In January 1799 Lord Castlereagh sent to the Duke of Portland an analysis of a division on the Address containing the proposition of the Union. The division had been unfavourable to the Government. In this analysis we find the entries:—

Against, or absent enemies, . . .	129
Of these, <i>might be bought off</i> . . .	20 ³

On February 27, 1800, Lord Castlereagh applied for money to the Under-Secretary of State (John King):—

‘I see no prospect of converts. The Opposition are steady to each other. I hope we shall be able to keep our friends true. A few rats might have a very injurious effect. We require *your assistance*, and you *must be* prepared to enable us to fulfil the expectations which it was impossible to avoid creating at the moment of difficulty. You may be assured we have rather erred on the side of moderation.’⁴

Dr. Ingram, who condescends to discuss this letter, thinks it suspicious, as well he may; but he ‘affects to believe’—if

¹ *Corn. Corr.* Preface, vi.; and see Phillips’s *Curran*, p. 143.

² *Corn. Corr.* iii. pp. 339, 340.

³ *Ibid.* iii. p. 45.

⁴ Dr. Ingram (p. 213) has taken this letter from the Public Record Office in London. It had previously been known as abstracted (with a few immaterial inaccuracies), in the *Corn. Corr.* The italics are in the original.

we may adopt a favourite expression of his own—that the 'assistance' applied for was intended as compensation for certain manufacturers who were threatened by the proposed commercial conditions of the Union, and whose discontent might have influenced Parliament. He grounds this view on what he describes as the 'answer' to Lord Castlereagh's letter, also copied by him from the Record Office, as it was very much abridged in the *Cornwallis Correspondence* :—

Mr. Cooke to Lord Castlereagh.
'Secret.'

'London, April 5, 1800.

'My dear Lord,—I have seen the Duke of Portland and Mr. Pitt a second time. The Duke is anxious to send you the needful. Mr. Pitt was equally disposed, but fears it is impossible to the extent. He will contrive to let you have from 8,000*l.* to 10,000*l.* for five years. He will make no alterations. However, the woollen manufacturers press that, as the raw material is to be given, all the duties on woollens should cease. Mr. Pitt wishes you could let him know the sense of the Irish manufacturers on this point, in case they should wish the abolition of duties. He will, however, keep things as they are, but doing so may occasion delay. I hope to find out to-night what sum can be sent.'

Now, the stipends here mentioned are certainly connected with the woollen manufacturers. The 8,000*l.* to 10,000*l.* were not intended for the corruption of Parliament. So much Dr. Ingram has made out. But it is equally certain that this letter is something more than what he describes it to be, the 'answer' to that suspicious one of Lord Castlereagh's. Two payments are here dealt with—one of a single sum of undefined amount; the other of an approximately defined yearly stipend. Down to the word 'extent,' Mr. Cooke appears to be dealing with the request contained (doubtless reiterated, as the *extent* is not there mentioned) in Lord Castlereagh's letter of February 27. The main body of the letter refers to some now undiscoverable application on behalf of the manufacturers, and in the last sentence the suspicious demand is again recurred to. Pitt was uncertain whether the latter could be complied with in full. If, as Dr. Ingram asserts, it *was* complied with in the stipend of 8,000*l.* to 10,000*l.* for five years, where was the room for uncertainty? Not, surely, in the exact fixing of the sum thus roughly indicated. It seems plain that the allusion to this subsidy introduces a new subject, and that the evidence from Lord Castlereagh's letter of February 27 is not shaken by Dr. Ingram's publication of Mr. Cooke's answer.

During the recess, in which the Ministry reconstituted Parliament, Lord Cornwallis wrote to General Ross :—

'We have certainly been gaining ground in Parliamentary recruiting. . . . If Lord D[ownshire] declares against us many of our recruits will insist on higher bounty. Nothing but a conviction that a union is absolutely necessary for the safety of the British Empire could make me endure the shocking task which is imposed on me.'¹

In June 1800 there seems to have been some reluctance on the part of the English Ministry to fulfil the whole of Lord Castlereagh's pledges, and we find him writing to his Under-Secretary :—

'If they [the Ministry] imagine they can take up popular grounds by disappointing their supporters, and by disgracing the Irish Government, I think they will find themselves mistaken. It will be no secret what has been promised, and by what means the Union has been secured. Disappointment will encourage, not prevent, disclosure, and the only effect of such a proceeding on their part will be to add the weight of their [the supporters'] testimony to that of the anti-Unionists in proclaiming the profligacy of the means by which the measure has been accomplished.'²

The Union, Dr. Ingram believes, 'was carried by fair and constitutional means.'³ People who think otherwise have 'neglected or wilfully avoided' 'the original sources of information.'⁴ He, however, has come to the investigation in a scholarly and candid spirit. He has 'examined closely and in detail the original and contemporaneous authorities.'⁵ A hostile critic could scarcely have brought against him a more serious charge than that which this fact would imply. But we hasten to add that, even upon his own confession, we do not entirely believe it.

The case of the borough proprietors is undisputed, as far as facts go. They got 15,000*l.* a borough, or 7,500*l.* a seat. This was no bribery, Dr. Ingram holds, because boroughs were practically a form of property—seats having been always bought and sold by persons of acknowledged probity. It is true; but if the Union had miscarried, nothing could have resisted the movement for reform which must then have taken rise. And the reformers were not likely to deal so tenderly with the borough proprietors as Pitt. The six proprietors who took part in the Volunteer reform movement all declared their readiness to abandon their privileges without compensa-

¹ *Corn. Corr.* iii. 103-4, June 19, 1799.

² *Castlereagh Corr.* iii. 330.

³ Ingram, Preface, vii.

⁴ *Ibid.* v.

⁵ *Ibid.* vi.

⁶ *Ibid.* vii.

⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

⁹ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* vii.

¹¹ *Ibid.* vii.

¹² *Ibid.* vii.

¹³ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* vii.

²⁰ *Ibid.* vii.

²¹ *Ibid.* vii.

²² *Ibid.* vii.

²³ *Ibid.* vii.

²⁴ *Ibid.* vii.

²⁵ *Ibid.* vii.

²⁶ *Ibid.* vii.

²⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

²⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

²⁹ *Ibid.* vii.

³⁰ *Ibid.* vii.

³¹ *Ibid.* vii.

³² *Ibid.* vii.

³³ *Ibid.* vii.

³⁴ *Ibid.* vii.

³⁵ *Ibid.* vii.

³⁶ *Ibid.* vii.

³⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

³⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

³⁹ *Ibid.* vii.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* vii.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* vii.

⁴² *Ibid.* vii.

⁴³ *Ibid.* vii.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* vii.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* vii.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* vii.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* vii.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* vii.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* vii.

⁵² *Ibid.* vii.

⁵³ *Ibid.* vii.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* vii.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* vii.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* vii.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* vii.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* vii.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* vii.

⁶² *Ibid.* vii.

⁶³ *Ibid.* vii.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* vii.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* vii.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* vii.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* vii.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* vii.

⁷¹ *Ibid.* vii.

⁷² *Ibid.* vii.

⁷³ *Ibid.* vii.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* vii.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* vii.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* vii.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* vii.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* vii.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* vii.

⁸² *Ibid.* vii.

⁸³ *Ibid.* vii.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* vii.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* vii.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* vii.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* vii.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* vii.

⁹¹ *Ibid.* vii.

⁹² *Ibid.* vii.

⁹³ *Ibid.* vii.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* vii.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* vii.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.* vii.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁰² *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* vii.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* vii.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* vii.

¹¹² *Ibid.* vii.

¹¹³ *Ibid.* vii.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.* vii.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.* vii.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.* vii.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.* vii.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.* vii.

¹²¹ *Ibid.* vii.

¹²² *Ibid.* vii.

¹²³ *Ibid.* vii.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* vii.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.* vii.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.* vii.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.* vii.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.* vii.

¹³¹ *Ibid.* vii.

¹³² *Ibid.* vii.

¹³³ *Ibid.* vii.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* vii.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.* vii.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.* vii.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁴² *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁵² *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁶² *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.* vii.

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¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

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¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁸² *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

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¹⁹¹ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁹² *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.* vii.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.* vii.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.* vii.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.* vii.

²⁰² *Ibid.* vii.

²⁰³ *Ibid.* vii.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.* vii.

tion. We do not learn that the Union excited any self-sacrificing enthusiasm of this kind. The normal price of a borough, according to Mr. Lecky, was from 8,000*l.* to 10,000*l.*¹ Pitt gave 15,000*l.* Doubtless a scheme of reform would have included some compensation to the borough proprietors; but there is a vast difference between the nation paying for the resumption of its own constitutional rights and having to pay their usurpers for resigning them to another State. Dr. Ingram elaborately worked out argument that the compensation of the borough proprietors was not bribery, because those of them who opposed the Union were compensated as well as the others;² is not worthy of his pains or his intelligence. To compensate the Unionists alone would have been an outrage on public decency such as no Parliament that ever met in England could have tolerated.

On the question of bribery on the part of the Opposition, Dr. Ingram has brought forward a good deal of inconclusive evidence.³ It consists of positive statements on the part of Lord Cornwallis and Lord Castlereagh that the Opposition had collected a large sum for purposes of bribery, and had (this is the only detail given) bought the vote of one Mr. Whaley, who had been a supporter of the Government, for 4,000*l.* These statements Dr. Ingram corroborates by references to Barrington,⁴ and the younger Grattan's *Life* of his father.⁵ He adds that 'the editor, through whose hands all Lord Cornwallis's papers and correspondence passed, declares it certain that large sums were spent in bribery by the Opposition.' 'On one occasion, in February, 1800, twelve of their supporters, of whom Mr. Whaley was one, left the Government,'⁶ and Dr. Ingram's inference is that they were bribed.

The statements of Cornwallis and Castlereagh stand or fall with their account of the case of Mr. Whaley. But the younger Grattan describes this affair in a manner which leads one to believe that the efforts of the Opposition to meet the Ministry on this field (if they made any at all) were of a very feeble character. Whaley was one of those whom Lord Cornwallis named 'unwilling supporters'⁷ of the Union. He had paid, or promised, 4,000*l.* for his seat, and it is to be presumed that the Government meant to reimburse him at least this sum. The Opposition had, according to Grattan *filis*,

¹ *Hist. Engl. Eighteenth Century*, vi. 323.

² Ingram, pp. 186 *et seq.*

³ *Ibid.* p. 128 *et seq.*

⁴ *Rise and Fall*, &c. p. 460, 488 note.

⁵ *Grattan's Life*, v. 70 *et seq.*

⁶ Ingram, p. 129.

⁷ Whom Lord Cornwallis declares to have numbered *half his majority!*—*Corn. Corr.* iii. 228.

received contributions, or rather promises of such,¹ to a fund for purchasing seats from borough proprietors for staunch anti-Unionists. This was, of course, as legitimate an object as the payment by a party fund of election expenses in the present day.² One Mr. Goold promised to get Whaley's seat paid for out of this fund if he joined the Opposition, and Whaley agreed, Mr. Goold advancing the sum at once out of his own resources. But when the latter now turned to the exchequer of the Opposition for reimbursement, it was found to be completely exhausted, and Ponsonby and a couple of wealthy friends met Mr. Goold's claim out of their private means, in order to save him from serious embarrassment. This explanation of the alleged purchase of Mr. Whaley takes away much of the credit which might otherwise belong to the *ex parte* and unsupported statements of Lords Cornwallis and Castlereagh.

As for the declaration of the editor of the *Cornwallis Correspondence*, one can only say that he gravely erred in making such an assertion without supporting it by the smallest particular or proof.³ There is no reason to think that he had other grounds for it than *ex parte* statements of the kind we have just discussed, and in the utter absence of corroboration Dr. Ingram's opponents are fairly entitled to disregard it.

The references to Barrington are inconclusive. He asserts that he was deputed by the Opposition to find out on what terms Mr. Bingham would sell his two seats. Mr. Bingham accepted 8,000*l.*, and, adds Barrington, promised to oppose the Union himself. 4,000*l.* was no unusual price for a seat during the Union contest, so that Mr. Bingham's personal support seems to have been gratuitous. Seeing, however, that Mr. Bingham did, in point of fact, give his seats and his vote to the Government, taking a peerage (Clanmorris) in payment for them, the instance is hardly one which it was prudent in Dr. Ingram to call attention to.

The case of the twelve seceders is a striking example of the manner in which Dr. Ingram uses his 'original and contemporaneous authorities.' His imagination is as 'forgetive' as Falstaff's. His twelve bribed men in buckram, on the tes-

¹ *Corn. Corr.* iii. 174 note.

² Not so, of course, the defrayment of such expenses by *public* money in the interests of a party. Lord Downshire is mentioned by Castlereagh as a contributor of 4,000*l.* to this fund. Being challenged on the subject by Lord Clare, he gave an absolute and indignant denial to the allegation that he was in any way connected with a scheme of bribery (House of Lords, Feb. 10, 1800).

³ *Corn. Corr.* iii. 174 note.

timony of Lord Castlereagh himself, shrink to three, or even, to speak more correctly, to *one*,—Mr. Richard Bagwell, of Tipperary. And Mr. Richard Bagwell's account of his secession, and that of the two other Bagwells whom he controlled, is not to be set down as false because Dr. Ingram chooses to think it so.

Lord Cornwallis mentions the desertion of 'twelve' of the Government supporters in a letter written after the great division of February 5, 1800.¹ That he was misinformed should have been obvious to Dr. Ingram.² In a letter to the Duke of Portland, written on February 7 and printed immediately before that of Lord Cornwallis in the *Cornwallis Correspondence*, Lord Castlereagh, whose means of knowing the exact truth were, of course, far superior to those of the Viceroy, states the number of seceders as *seven*.³ Three of these were the Bagwells, one of the remainder was Mr. Whaley. The latter, Lord Castlereagh states, with what accuracy we can judge, to have been 'absolutely bought by the Opposition stock purse.' Against the three remaining seceders Lord Castlereagh makes no such charge—he believes that they were 'taken off by county cabals' (i.e. influenced by public opinion in their constituencies) 'during the recess.' The action of Mr. Bagwell, he attributes, 'partly to fear, partly to expectations given him by the leaders of the Opposition in the event of their influence being established.' Lord Cornwallis writes that this gentleman 'endeavoured to excuse his desertion by stating that the principal part of the respectable freeholders of the county of Tipperary have signed resolutions against the Union, many of whom had before instructed him to support that measure.'⁴ It certainly was not for want of bribery on the part of the Government that Mr. Bagwell left its ranks, since Lord Castlereagh states, as part of the general unaccountability of his conduct, that 'the objects he solicited were promised.'⁵ What could the Opposition have done more for him?

That the Opposition collected a fund for the purchase of seats is undenied. That they may have been induced by the example of the Ministry to misuse it in one or two instances is

¹ *Corn. Corr.* iii. p. 183.

² And, indeed, it was so, for in a subsequent passage (p. 167), where he was not dealing with the charge of bribery on the part of the Opposition, Dr. Ingram states the number of the seceders correctly.

³ *Corn. Corr.* iii. p. 182. Lord Castlereagh gives the names of all these seceders, and in a subsequent letter reiterates the statement of their number. *Castlereagh Corr.* iii. 328.

⁴ *Corn. Corr.* p. 180.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 182.

not in itself unlikely. But the strongest proof of the fact remains its likelihood. Nor could there ever have been the least question of serious competition with the resources of the Government.

We now come to Dr. Ingram's second thesis. How he can believe, or even 'affect to believe,' that the Union was passed 'with the hearty consent and concurrence of the vast majority of the two peoples that dwelt in Ireland' it is difficult to understand. When the measure was first brought before Parliament on January 22, 1799, in a debate on the Address, the division showed a majority of two for the Government, 107 to 105. In 1785, it will be remembered, a majority of nineteen on the Commercial Treaty had been reckoned a decisive defeat, and that at a time when the corrupt influence of the Government was not so strong as now. On January 24, when the address was reported, the Opposition had increased its strength and showed a majority of five, 109 to 104. Under ordinary circumstances the measure would have been abandoned. But it was 'His Majesty's fixed and unalterable determination to direct, session after session, the proposition of the Union, to be renewed to Parliament until it is adopted by the good sense of the nation.'¹ Parliament was reconstituted in the manner described, and when it met again, on January 15, 1800, the Government had a majority, which, when the House was tolerably full, it henceforth maintained, of over 40. The Opposition, on the decisive debate of February 5, 1800, reckoned 115, so that it showed an absolute, though not a relative, increase in strength since the introduction of the measure.

Again and again the Opposition demanded a dissolution, arguing that the Legislature was not competent, without a special mandate from the constituencies, to vote away the independence of the nation. Can it be doubted that the Government would have accepted the challenge if it saw a prospect of success at the polls? Forty-six petitions at the lowest estimate (Dr. Ingram's) were presented to the Commons against a Union, and only two in its favour.² In 1799 Lord Cornwallis, however, made tours through the north and south of Ireland, expressly, as he states, to procure declarations in favour of the Union,³ and received a number of addresses (thirty-six), nearly half of them being from small and exclusive bodies. Lord Castlereagh stated⁴ that seventy-four declara-

¹ Portland to Cornwallis, February 12, 1800.—*Corn. Corr.* iii. p. 191.

² Ingram, p. 123.

³ *Corn. Corr.* iii. p. 118.

⁴ Ingram, p. 121.

tions entirely had been made by public bodies in favour of a Union. But such declarations, most of them mere personal addresses to Lord Cornwallis, cannot of course compare in weight with formal and open petitions to Parliament, and there were many extra-parliamentary declarations against the Union too. No doubt illegitimate means to procure signatures were employed on both sides.¹ But the Government had immense advantage in a competition of this kind. In a debate already alluded to, on February 5, 1800, Mr. Tighe said :—

‘If it were not notorious and not worth proving he would prove that to one set of resolutions in favour of the Union sixty names had been forged, that to another which he would name, Waterford, numberless respectable names had been forged. Several persons had protested, in the public papers, against impudent forgery of their names—*inter alios*, Mr. Savage, an official of the corporation of Waterford. . . . The names signed to a single petition against the Union would outnumber the whole obtained in its favour by nine months’ labour and expense. He could prove that in that part of the country where he had lately been, the county of Wicklow, emissaries had come, not he believed with the knowledge or under direction of the noble lord, but persons had come from Dublin who spread reports among the farmers and Roman Catholics that their signing such a petition would be looked on by the Government as rebellious ; nay, he had even been informed that handbills were shown to the people stating that such signatures would be considered by the Government in the same light as signatures of United Irishmen. Nay more, that loyal persons in that county who had suffered from the Rebellion were afraid to sign such a petition lest they should be deprived of the compensation granted for their losses by the Legislature, and he called upon the noble lord to declare why those compensations had been so long delayed.’

That intimidation of the kind complained of by Mr. Tighe was really used is, *a priori*, highly probable, and it is highly probable, too, that the noble lord knew all about it, for after the defeat in 1799 the Duke of Portland had directed the lord-lieutenant ‘to take care it should be understood that it [the Union] neither is nor ever will be abandoned, and that the support of it will be considered as a necessary and indispensable test of the attachment on the part of the Irish to their connexion with this country.’²

In spite of all the efforts of the Government Mr. (afterwards Lord) Grey was able to assert, without challenge or contradiction, in the British House of Commons, that, ‘though there were 707,000 who had signed petitions against the measure, the total number of those who declared themselves

¹ Ingram, p. 133 note.

² Corn. Corr. iii. 47.

in favour of it did not exceed 3,000, and many of these only prayed that the measure might be discussed.¹ The younger Grattan—including, we suppose, extra-parliamentary declarations—places the number of signatures to the Unionist addresses and petitions at 7,000; but this is probably too low.²

Dr. Ingram takes much pains in his sixth chapter to prove, what no one ever doubted, that the Catholic hierarchy and aristocracy supported the Union. When he looks for evidence that the ordinary laity followed them he has to be thankful for very small mercies. The Catholic hierarchy and aristocracy, down, one may say, to the last decade, have been traditionally subservient to the English Government in all political matters. The laity swept them aside when the Catholic committee was re-organized in 1791; and some seventy prelates and peers seceded from it. At the very time we are considering, four archbishops and six bishops endorsed with their names a proposal to the effect that the British Government should have a right of veto in the election of Catholic bishops in Ireland.³ It was understood that emancipation would be granted, with a State provision for the clergy, subject to this condition. When in 1808 the emancipation question came before the British Parliament, and the existence of this agreement became known, a storm of indignation broke out among the Catholic laity at the proposal to place their Church under the control of the English Government. The very bishops who had signed the agreement were compelled to denounce it, and because the aristocracy, as a body, persisted in supporting emancipation coupled with the veto, the conduct of the Catholic movement was once more, and for ever, taken out of their hands. Why there could be no such expression of public feeling at the part the bishops took on the Union question is clear enough to anyone who realizes the condition of Ireland at that time. The country, in Bismarck's terrible phrase, was *saignée à blanc* after the Rebellion of '98. It was actually under martial law while the Union was being discussed, and that law was administered

¹ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 60; and compare Lords Cornwallis and Castlereagh:—"I have most earnestly recommended it to the friends of Government to exert themselves during the summer in their respective counties, and have urged them, *without risking popular meetings*, to obtain declarations similar to those of Cork and Galway favourable to the measure."—Cornwallis to Portland, *Corn. Corr.* iii. 105. "The [anti-Unionist] petitions presented to Parliament have been more numerously signed than the addresses and declarations in favour of the measure, which in general were studiously confined to a superior description of persons."—Castlereagh to King, April 12, 1800, *Corn. Corr.* iii. 224.

² *Grattan's Life*, v. 51.

³ Butler's *Historical Memoirs of the Catholics*, iv. 479, &c.

with a frantic ferocity which Lord Cornwallis strove in vain to check. 'The vilest informers,' he wrote, 'are hunted out from the prisons to attack, by the most barefaced perjury, the lives of all who are suspected of being, or of having been, disaffected, and, indeed, every Roman Catholic of influence is in great danger.'¹ How any Catholics at all could venture to raise their voices against a Government measure, their attitude on which was to be taken as a test of loyalty, is astonishing; but they did so. Thus, on January 13, 1800, a large Catholic meeting was held in Dublin, Mr. Ambrose Moore in the chair, and a resolution was passed affirming the Irish legislature to be the only true and permanent foundation of Irish prosperity and of British connexion. An explanation was added:—

'That, having heretofore determined not to come forward any more in the distinct character of Catholics, but to consider our claims and cause not those of a sect, but as involved in the general fate of our country, that we now think it right, notwithstanding such determination, to publish the present resolutions in order to undeceive our fellow-subjects who may have been led to believe, by a false representation, that we are capable of giving any concurrence whatever to so foul and foolish a project.'²

Charles Coote, an enthusiastic Unionist, whose *History of the Union* was published in 1802, writes that 'the Ministers and their friends [in the interval between the session of 1799 and that of 1800] exerted all the arts of persuasion in favour of the scheme, and endeavoured to promote it by intrigue or enforce it by intimidation.'³ In another place he speaks of the measure as having been imposed 'on a reluctant people.'⁴ Mr. Edgeworth, father of the famous novelist, and himself a man of high ability, delivered on Feb. 5, 1800, a speech which Dr. Ingram justly styles 'remarkable.' In his hands it becomes most truly so; for the series of inconsequences in which he professes to give its purport would lead a confiding reader to suspect that Mr. Edgeworth was qualifying for Swift's Hospital.⁵ The speaker's drift was that he was ardently desirous of a union, yet could not bring himself to vote for the present measure in consequence of the iniquitous means by which it was being forced upon the country. Lord Cornwallis seems at times to have persuaded himself, or to have been persuaded by those who manipulated public opinion for him, that the country could not 'in general be said to be adverse to the

¹ To Gen. Ross, November 16, 1799.—*Corn. Corr.* iii. p. 145.

² *Irish Pamphlets*, 86, vi., National Library of Ireland.

³ *History of the Union*, p. 289.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 508.

⁵ Ingram, p. 168.

Union.¹ But in the early part of 1800 he had observed that 'the Roman Catholics are joining the standard of opposition,'² and he elsewhere declares unreservedly that the Union would be 'impracticable' but for the vices and oppressions of the existing government.³ On the other hand, Dr. Ingram has no admissions of this kind to adduce on the part of the Opposition. He makes as much as he can of the complaint of a certain anti-Unionist, that 'the people had deserted them,'⁴ but his authority, Lord Cornwallis, describes the speaker as one of the 'violent' members of the Opposition—that is, one of those who, like O'Donel and others, declared for instant insurrection if the measure passed. The word 'desertion,' in the mouth of such a speaker, obviously cannot bear Dr. Ingram's interpretation.

But Dr. Ingram has himself furnished us with evidence of the feeling of the nation entirely contradictory of his theory. He argues⁵ that one of the reasons which made the Union desirable was 'the hostility of the Catholic community,' and quotes Wolfe Tone to the effect that 'in Ireland the name of England and her power' were 'universally odious.' Now Mr. Gladstone is (superficially at least) in error where he argues, in his reply to Dr. Ingram, that because the 'mass of the people' (according to Cornwallis) were engaged in treasonable conspiracy they must therefore have been anti-Unionists.⁶ The corrupt and tyrannous nominee Parliament which represented neither Irish aristocracy, nor property, nor Protestantism, nor any one broad Irish interest, was detested by the United Irishmen; and after vainly trying to reform it they set all their hopes on Separation. Living in daily expectation of a French invasion, most of them cared little about the abolition of their mock Legislature. But they certainly cannot be claimed as friends of the Union, nor is it for this purpose that Dr. Ingram notices them. It would have been unsafe, he considers, for England to leave a people animated by sentiments such as theirs in possession of any kind of national independence. Perhaps it would; but on which argument does he mean to challenge our verdict—that the Union was right because the Irish people cordially approved it, or expedient because they loathed the name of England? For it is not admissible in the court of

¹ *Corn. Corr.*, iii. 235, May 18, 1800.

² *Ibid.* p. 175.

³ Such as the Tithe Laws (*ibid.* iii. 56), which, however, were not amended for nearly forty years after the Union.

⁴ Ingram, p. 108; *Corn. Corr.* iii. 250.

⁵ Ingram, pp. 49, 50 n.

⁶ *Nineteenth Century*, October 1887, p. 455; *Corn. Corr.* iii. p. 81.

history to plead: 'We deny that we assaulted the deceased; and if we did, we maintain that we did it in self-defence.'

No; the Union was carried perhaps with the purest motives, but certainly by the basest means, nor could it then have been carried by any others. Had Pitt spoken truth in the fine Virgilian quotation which he applied to the measure—

'nec Teucris Italos parere jubebo,
Nec nova [*sic*] regna peto; paribus se legibus ambæ
Invictæ gentes æterna in fœdera mittant'—

with how different a gaze might England at this day look upon her past and her future! But a shameful and calamitous reality lay hid behind those stately lines. Ireland was not *invicta*, she was conquered. But *that* is nothing. She was conquered by weapons that have left a malignant poison in the deathless memory of her race. Yet amity between the two peoples is essential to the wellbeing of each, and in time it cannot fail to knit them in closer bonds than those forged by Pitt and Castlereagh. One condition of the growth of this amity is that honourable acknowledgment of the wrongs she has worked in the past which has not been hitherto wanting on the part of England, nor unrecognized on that of Ireland. And one influence that must blast and kill that precious growth would be the shameless denial of any reason for repentance or reparation which this deplorable *History of the Union* is written to justify and encourage.

As to the form which reparation should take, but two alternatives seem to us to exist. The history of the last eighty-seven years has made it clear that Ireland, on a different plane of civilization, and with different racial characteristics, was incapable, whether she desired it or not, of true incorporation with Great Britain. And she is incapable still. A distinct and single-hearted Government, a Government unmoved by the intrigues and fluctuations of English parties—that was her need then, and it is her need now. Whether this end is to be attained by the concession of a National Legislature, or through the disfranchisement of Ireland and the personal rule of some natural king of men, some modern Perrot or Cromwell, this is a question which there is instant need that England should fairly face while deliberate choice is yet within her power.

NOTE.—Since the foregoing pages were in type, Dr. Ingram's reply to Mr. Gladstone has appeared in the *Nineteenth Century* for December 1887. That reply has quite the same

unhistorical character as the original work. The reader has only to study its treatment of *e.g.* the destruction of evidence mentioned by Ross, or the character of the Unionist petitions, or the refusal of escheatorships by Lord Cornwallis, and compare Dr. Ingram's statements with the references which we have appended to our account of these transactions, in order to convince himself that either Dr. Ingram's study of his authorities has been of a most superficial character, or else that he has made inexcusable use of the resource of *suppressio veri*.

In Memoriam

A. J. B. BERESFORD-HOPE.

'WHEREVER Anglican Churchmen are to be found, there will be mourning for the death of Mr. Beresford-Hope.'

These words, with which the *Times* newspaper, in a leading article of October 21, 1887, heralded the announcement of Mr. Beresford-Hope's lamented death at Bedgebury Park on the previous day, might fitly be placed as an epitaph on his grave. They would at least be free from the faintest suspicion of exaggeration—not to say mendacity—with which epitaphs are too often, and not always unjustly, taxed. For surely all 'Anglican Churchmen' are bound to mourn the loss of one who through a long and blameless career marked his sense of the privilege involved in belonging to the Church of England, as a branch of the Holy Catholic Church, by acts of munificence which in the present century are probably without precedent or parallel, and by the still nobler homage of a consistent, 'sober, honest, and religious' life. St. Augustine's, Canterbury, and All Saints', Margaret Street, are memorials of his work and worth which will last throughout all generations.¹

It would be foreign to our purpose and incompatible with our

¹ In connexion with All Saints', Margaret Street, the honoured name of Triton, so dear to all Churchmen, must be coupled with that of Mr. Beresford-Hope, as must also that of Mr. Benjamin Lancaster. It must not be forgotten that in these and all his other numerous efforts at church building and church restoration—for architecture was the passion of his life—Mr. Beresford-Hope was guided by the cardinal principle, which he shared with his dear friend Benjamin Webb, that public worship was primarily intended, not for the convenience of worshippers, but for the greater glory and honour of the Worshipped—*ad maiorem Dei gloriam*—and that, accordingly, nothing short of the very best and most perfect of its kind, whether in architecture, in music, or in the surroundings generally of the sanctuary, was worthy of being offered to Almighty God. It is to be regretted that this principle of 'paying the Lord the honour due unto His Name' has not in these days of 'shortened services,' a larger number of adherents.

space to attempt on the present occasion so much as even a sketch of the life of our departed friend. That life is so bound up with the development of the Church of England, that his biography would assume the proportions of a history. Of such a biography and of such a history, his friends had hoped he might himself have been the author. To one of them he wrote last summer: 'Shall I ever live to complete that history of the Church Revival in its various aspects, including Ecclesiology, which has since my calamity [the death of Lady Mildred] been my day-dream to accomplish?' Some way had been made in the undertaking, but 'completion'—no doubt for wise purposes—was denied to him. Is there any chance of that completion being made by other, though, of course, less competent, hands?

With Mr. Beresford Hope, we fear, has become extinct a type of layman which was the exclusive possession of the Church of England. Broad with all the breadth of a wide culture, and of warm and generous sympathies, identified with all great Church movements of the time, but losing his identity in none, a Churchman first, and a Conservative afterwards, serving the cause with singleness of purpose, without hope of advancement, or desire for reward, shrinking from no trouble, shirking no duty, shunning no obloquy, so long as it might be the more in his power to promote the welfare of the Church and the glory of God, Mr. Beresford-Hope concealed beneath a debonair, not to say jocular, exterior, a depth of feeling, and an earnestness of purpose, and a seriousness of conviction, and a loyalty of devotion to the Bride of Christ, compared with which the spasmodic feverishness and 'faddism' of a fussy, foolish Ritualist is 'as moonlight unto sunlight, and as water unto wine.'

And if from this wider area—'wherever Anglican Churchmen are to be found'—we pass on, as pass we must, to the inner circle of his more immediate friends and fellow-workers and colleagues, we may well exclaim, '*Quis desiderio sit pudor aut modus tam cari capitis?*' In the founding of this *Review* Mr. Beresford-Hope took a leading part. In view of the revived energy of the Anglican Communion in all parts of the world, he felt, as all the co-proprietors felt, the importance of starting a high-class periodical which might set forth the results of real study and reflection on the highest of all subjects, so as to be worthily representative of the teaching and position of the English Church. While he scrupulously abstained from any interference which he thought might not improperly be resented, his wise counsels were ever at the command of those who sought them, and were all the more readily followed because they were never obtruded. The loss of these wise counsels will be sorely missed. But he 'being dead yet speaketh,' and we trust that those who may hereafter have the responsibility of conducting a *Review* which was launched under his auspices may never relax that loyal attachment to the Church of England and to that Church's Book of Common Prayer, on behalf of which Mr. Beresford-Hope was ever ready to spend and to be spent, turning neither to the right hand nor to the left, neither yielding to the blandishments of Rome, nor allured by the cheap popularity of a creedless and undogmatic Christianity.

SHORT NOTICES.

Christ or Ecclesiastes: Sermons preached in St. Paul's Cathedral.
By the Rev. H. S. HOLLAND, M.A., Canon and Precentor of
St. Paul's. (London: Rivingtons, 1888.)

IN April of last year we noticed Canon Holland's volume of sermons entitled *Creed and Character*. Those who have read that book, and therefore, assuredly, have recurred to it with increasing appreciation of its richness and suggestiveness, will gladly welcome a new instalment, though a much smaller one, of the author's preaching committed to printed form. We do not know whether any persons still imagine that this preaching is too 'exuberantly rhetorical,' or too fully charged with religious passion and emotion, to be solidly helpful in the troubles that come with thought. If so, they will do well to read the volume before us. Its title is, perhaps, a little too *frappant*, but suggests an idea which the preface states, and the last of the five sermons especially draws out, that Christian faith is the true remedy for a joyless 'pessimism,' such as would dwell on 'vanity' without looking on to 'hopes.' Now we do not intend to give any specimens of Mr. Holland's eloquence; whatever he writes must needs glow; he speaks as one who has vision; *that* goes without saying, and these pages—less than a hundred and fifty—abundantly verify it: there is pathos, brilliance, power at every turn. We prefer to show, however briefly, the value of his present contribution to Apology by tracing out the line of thought pursued from the opening of the second sermon to the close of the book. Physical science is introduced to us, objecting to 'miracle' as involving a break, a shock, an exception. But she is reminded that her criteria cannot be of universal application; they must needs avoid some 'regions of nature, omit' some 'sections of man's being;' and, since man is a whole and nature is a whole, methods which isolate parts of either must 'at some point terminate with a shock,' which is no 'interference' with, or suspension of, nature, but the fitting Divine treatment of a great spiritual crisis. But is it not the mere wondering of ignorance which looks for such crises, or 'enjoys the miraculous' as so treating them? No, it is our sense of profound spiritual need in the presence of Eternal Goodness. Here is a point of cardinal importance, that 'intellectual perplexities, in the matter of faith, lie very close to our moral and spiritual experience . . . it is in view of us, of our moral situation, that God acts; to measure His methods, we must weigh our own needs; to understand Him, we must understand ourselves' (p. 56). But if science grants that the belief in miracle has thus a more respectable origin than mere 'curiosity' or 'ignorance,' she still suggests that it grows out of an 'infirmity,' and fosters a lower conception of God than that which is supplied by her 'unalterable sequences.' The reply is, that uniformity of order is most absolute where there is least of real life; the higher we mount in the scale, the

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more do we find of growth, movement, change—most of all in the highest or human area. The charge of 'anthropomorphism' is, of course, ready; so is the answer—given with an energy which reminds one of a magnificent passage in Dr. Mozley's essay on Blanco White—that, since man is the crown of God's earthly creation, 'we are intended to make him the interpretation of God . . . we are, in this sense, rightly anthropomorphic' (p. 76). And this world of human life 'is a world that invites miracle; it is familiar with surprises, convulsions, reversals; . . . it need not recoil' from a Divine intervention responsive to its struggles, adapted to its necessities. But then comes in 'Scientific History': she studies, tabulates, interprets the multiform changes in human movement; she protests against the intrusion of a supposed supernatural force, yet more, against the expectation of 'a Divine consummation' in some mysterious Hereafter. She takes up the parable of the secularist, and bids us be content with the 'intelligible task' of earthly life, and recognize in that life a sufficient roundness of completion. But 'we Christians challenge every syllable of that retort; in our ears, it is a mere tissue of idle words' (p. 98). Human life is *not* intelligible, not harmonious, not integral, not satisfactory in any sense, unless we view it as preparatory to a Hereafter. It is a stage of education, a period of pilgrimage, an ante-room: thus regarded we can 'rationalize' it—thus, and not otherwise. Apart from this belief, the progress of civilization brings perplexity, for it heightens the 'contrast' between possibilities and capacities: 'ever it increases the task, without lengthening the time in which to accomplish it.' Instead of 'abolishing the argument for immortality,' it does but 'intensify its appeal.' But if we look for the life of the world to come, we gain cheerfulness, when new changes seem to 'antiquate' us—'hope, in face of base and bad conditions,' for all who here have made even a beginning in the right direction—and, 'what is near akin to this last, joy in the face of failure,' since failure is seen to be part of 'our schooling' and 'of our spiritual growth.' This belief will enable men to do their work in this world with a 'hope, zeal, tenderness, and love,' that are simply impossible for secularism. The first sermon in this volume is on that second theological virtue, which Dean Church has called 'the energy and effort of faith;' and the whole of it might be called an expansion of St. Paul's great dictum, that 'Hope maketh not ashamed, *because* of the effusion of God's love.'

A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. Edited by PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D., LL.D., Professor in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. Vols. II. and III. (Buffalo: The Christian Literature Company, 1887.)

LAST year, in reviewing some recent works on St. Augustine, we noticed the appearance of the first volume of Dr. Schaff's great patristic series. The second and third are now before us; both of them, like their predecessor, devoted to the works of St. Augustine. The second volume contains the 'De Civitate Dei' and the four books 'De Doctrina Christiana.' The third includes fifteen treatises

classed under the two heads of Doctrinal and Moral. The Doctrinal are headed by the great treatise on the Trinity, followed by the 'Enchiridion,' the 'De Catechizandis Rudibus,' the 'De Fide et Symbolo,' &c. The Moral give us with others the four essays upon continence, marriage, virginity, and widowhood. The translations of these works are those which have already appeared in the Oxford *Library of the Fathers*, and in Clark's series of the works of St. Augustine, revised, and in some cases supplied with additional notes. Of the more important translations the 'De Civitate' appears to be that which has undergone the least alteration, and the 'De Trinitate' the most. The latter rendering was made by a friend of our lamented fellow-churchman, Rev. A. W. Haddan, who revised the work, and made himself responsible for it. But Dr. Shedd, who has had charge of the present edition, appears to us to be a very competent scholar, and his notes, which are chiefly of a metaphysical character, add to the value of the book. In one case, however, we notice an assumption that the Reformation conception of justification is an advance upon the patristic: a disputable judgment. Dr. Schaff might in our opinion have better omitted the last paragraph of his preface to vol. iii., in which he appears to be alarmed lest the publication of St. Augustine's ascetic views should render his Protestant subscribers suspicious of a covert doubt cast upon the universal necessity of getting married. The more entirely the Fathers are left to speak for themselves, without either reconciliations or apologies offered from a modern standpoint, the better, in our opinion, it will be, and the more likely will the series be to meet with support beyond the Protestant circle. We give this hint with a real desire for the success of this admirable and spirited undertaking, and we must say that we have not found the slightest reason to suspect the translations of any doctrinal bias whatever. The books are wonderful value for their cost. Their form has been most happily chosen, the print clear, the paper good, and the binding sightly. The volumes, though each contains as much matter as two or three of Clark's series, are not too weighty to be read in the hand. The publishers have concluded arrangements with Messrs. Clark and the proprietors of the Oxford series by which the books can be sold in this country. For the present, communications must be made direct to the publishers at 35 Bond Street, New York, but they hope within a year to open an office in London or Edinburgh.

Gnosticism and Agnosticism, and other Sermons. By GEORGE SALMON, D.D., Chancellor of St. Patrick's Cathedral, and Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Dublin. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1887.)

THE series of Professor Salmon's sermons abide upon our shelves close to those of Dr. Newman, with which they range, and we earnestly hope he may live and preach till his volumes equal in number those of the older divine. There are qualities, to be sure, in which the great Oxonian is far ahead of the Irishman. But the latter has the singular advantage among the theologians of our time of a first-rate scientific

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eminence. We do not know that the present volume excels its predecessors, but it is exceedingly interesting. We think that we prefer, on account of their expository value, as well as their spiritual importance, those entitled 'Union with Christ,' and 'The Keynote of the Epistle to the Hebrews,' and we are sure that we like least that upon 'Ill Success in Searching after Righteousness,' which was preached at Great St. Mary's, Cambridge. The eponymous sermon has a very effective conclusion, in which it is shown that 'Agnosticism is the highest point of Gnosticism. For who can venture to say what cannot be known but one who thoroughly knows all that can be known?' But we doubt the fairness of connecting the poor Schoolmen with the Gnostics. They assumed too soon to be sure that they had data for systematizing their knowledge. But knowledge either human or divine can be systematized if it be really knowledge. And there seems no reason to accuse them of having pretended to know what is impossible to be known by man. The volume is worthy of Dr. Salmon's reputation.

Christ and Christianity. Vol. I. *The Light of the Ages* (Asia, Africa, Europe). By the Rev. H. R. HAWEIS, M.A., Incumbent of St. James's, Marylebone. (London: Charles Burnet and Co., 1887.)

WE have already given our opinion of the part of this work which deals with Christianity. We are glad to be able to say that the heathen section appears to us much better done. Mr. Haweis knows how to make his work bright and interesting. To be sure, it is impossible that anything very deep could be said upon the religions of India, Persia, China, Egypt, Greece, Rome, Scandinavia, and Palestine, at the rate of twenty-seven widely-printed pages to each. But the idea will be conveyed to many people who if they did not get their religious information easily would not take it at all, that religion has been a supreme object of human thought and search all the world over and in every age. And that, we need not say, is a fact which sincere Christians ought to be very ready to recognize. For though they differ from the rest of mankind upon the form of true religion, they agree with them on the principle that we must have a religion. And while they disagree with all religions except their own, the difference of the Agnostic is from all religions without exception. He is a dissenter from the general agreement of mankind. Mr. Haweis, when he estimates the cost of converting a Jew at an average of 30,000*l.*, has apparently never heard of the work of Mr. Rosenthal at St. Paul's, Haggerston, where many Israelites have sacrificed all earthly prospects and faced sore persecution for Christ's sake.

Wellington College Sermons. By E. C. WICKHAM, M.A. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1887.)

THE master of Wellington College presents us with a volume of good sermons to boys, dedicated to the Archbishop of Canterbury as the father and founder of the spiritual life of the school. The doctrinal

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teaching of the boys we clearly perceive is left to other occasions. These sermons are, each of them, meant to impress some one great moral and spiritual principle. They are of course very short, and we prefer those in which there are few divisions or none, but the whole is uttered as it were in one breath, such as the beautiful sermon on Purity of Heart, in which the love of an affectionate father of his boys pours itself out in earnest entreaty, as if he felt that the whole future of many a young life might depend upon the event of his pleading.

Martin Luther, his Life and Work. By PETER BAYNE, LL.D. Two vols. (London, Paris, and New York: Cassell and Co., 1887.)

DR. BAYNE assumes that Luther has a specific relation to what he calls 'Anglo-Saxondom'—in which he includes the United States of America, Canada, and Australia. He tells us that 'The resemblance between the Saxons and the British'—by which term he means the English and Scotch—'has not escaped the sure eye of Prince Bismarck.' He would have done well to give the exact words of the German Chancellor, which were never intended to serve as a foundation for Dr. Bayne's odd assumption that the English, Scotch, Californians, Canadians, and Australians have 'a still clearer right to claim to be one in blood with Luther' than the Germans have to 'be of the kindred of Shakespeare.' Does he think that the Saxons are less German than the 'Anglo-Saxons'? All this talk, and much more equally rhapsodical and haphazard, is taken to be a justification of Dr. Bayne's own claims to write the latest—and the worst—of the many lives of Luther. As a matter of historical fact, English Protestantism—and still more Scottish and American Protestantism—owes infinitely less to Luther than to Zwingli and the Swiss, whom Luther hated much more bitterly than he hated the Papists, and of whose salvation he doubted. Dr. Bayne is no son of Luther, but a son of Zwingli and Calvin.

Dr. Bayne ventures once only to differ from Luther, and to represent him as in the wrong. The solitary error of the infallible reformer—the 'Pope by Divine right' as Dr. Bayne enthusiastically calls him—was his disagreement with 'the lucid Zwingli' and the Swiss on the real presence in the Eucharist. Everywhere else Luther must be upheld as in the right at all hazards. In his apology for the secret dispensation to Philip of Hesse to commit bigamy, Dr. Bayne exceeds in light-hearted and defiant presumption all previous biographers of Luther. They all have had the decency and piety to lament it, and to confess its terrible wrongfulness. They have sought excuses for it in the system of dispensations already in use, and so freely conceded to princes: they have contended that Luther did not originate, but inherited, the superstition that for political or other reasons a greater degree of sexual licence might be conceded to a prince than to a common man. Prof. Köstlin, the latest and ablest of the modern German biographers of Luther, boldly condemns Luther's part in the wretched business; he shows that Luther himself afterwards rejected the arguments which he then used. The Swiss Hagenbach cites the

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incident as a proof that the reformers did not understand, or did not oppose, 'all the moral abuses needing reformation.' Every well-read English theologian will be acquainted with the laboured treatment of this unpleasant episode by Archdeacon Hare. But Dr. Bayne has no misgivings. He glories in the ugly event. He allots a whole chapter to 'Philip of Hesse's Two Wives.' He seems to delight in Luther's grudging consent to the bigamy, and to regard it as one of the most glorious incidents in his career. The chapter might have been written by a Mormon 'apostle.' The subject, he tells us, 'interests the wise world more than theology,' though he adds no note to tell us whether we are to take his jaunty words sarcastically or seriously. 'Philip was one of the noblest men of his time': we are told of his 'native intrepidity,' and that he had 'the instinct of a high soul for the true and the right.' He is compared to David 'in his quick and impassioned response to generous impulses.' We are then informed that he was like David in other impulses; that he was, in fact, a man who sank readily into a beast; he indulged in 'vagrant profligacies.' If Dr. Bayne, who is constantly affecting a prophetic *afflatus*, instead of Nathan, had visited David after his sin, what would he have said to the adulterous King of Israel? Would he have told him, as he tells us of Philip of Hesse, that 'he was a sincerely religious man'? Philip's apologist thinks that his 'religion' was shown by the fact that, though 'he lived in unfaithfulness to his wife,' he 'was tormented by conscience.' Such an argument goes to prove that Judas was 'a sincerely religious man.' Philip's conscience could, or would, only be liberated from its torment, it seems, by allowing him to take a second wife. Dr. Bayne cruelly blackens Christina of Saxony, in order to whiten her adulterous husband. Luther—though Dr. Bayne omits to say it or does not know it—vainly tried to turn aside Philip from his lust for another wife, by reminding him that Christina was the mother of his 'fair young princes and princesses.' What of that? exclaims Philip's modern Scotch advocate, 'her person was repulsive to him, and she developed an afflictive propensity to the bottle. His own Christina, honest woman, cheered by the friendly bottle, scrupled not to signify in black and white, that she did not object to the arrangement.' This is bad enough, and one would like to hear Luther's opinion of Dr. Bayne, who seems even more eager to defend Philip himself than Philip's casuistical advisers. The utmost upon which 'the frank doctor,' Luther, could rely, was the concession of polygamy to Old Testament saints—a concession which Luther himself, in his later years, again and again asserted to be contrary to the Christian idea of marriage. But Dr. Bayne holds that the argument from the Old Testament may be powerfully supplemented or superseded by arguments from modern science. 'And here,' says he, 'if we dared do justice to Philip at all hazards'—Luther is for the time quite forgotten by his biographer in his zeal for Philip—'it would be incumbent on us to give patient audience to physiological science: but English refinement is too tyrannous in the delicacy of its sensibilities, to allow one to put physiology in the witness-box on his behalf. *Verbum sat.*'

Dr. Bayne, throughout his two bulky volumes, appears to be much

more anxious to exhibit himself and his opinions of the modern world than to show us Luther and his view of his own age. The closing or constructive period of Luther's life is treated in a very thin, careless, and hasty manner. His biographer has scampered through the years 1534 to 1546 in twenty-five pages, apparently because they provide no occasion for popular rant. The ecclesiastical system of Lutheranism, which was built up during his later years, was the product of a series of historical accidents, and it has not a few instructive likenesses to the ecclesiastical system of Wesleyanism. Luther, like Wesley, committed the stupendous folly—to call it nothing else—of breaking with the hereditary tradition and custom of Christendom, by himself consecrating a bishop. After the consecration of Amsdorf, Luther addressed him as his own superior, his 'lord,' 'reverend father in Christ,' 'honoured superior in the Lord.' It is worth observing that Amsdorf was chosen to the new Lutheran episcopate for four reasons: because he was 'unmarried,' 'gifted,' a 'scholar,' and a 'nobleman.' This 'consecration' was one of the turning-points in the Lutheran reformation, it offended many Catholics who had been favourable to Luther, and had great weight upon the subsequent conduct of the emperor. Dr. Bayne has not made the slightest attempt to understand it, and is probably incapable of realizing what it meant in the estimate of Luther's contemporaries. Possibly he thinks that the consecration of Dr. Coke as a bishop was the noblest incident in Wesley's career. It is only just to Amsdorf to say that he was not a servile follower of his elevator to the new episcopate. He boldly declared himself against the bigamy of Philip of Hesse. Dr. Bayne's confused chatter about 'National Churches' generally, and about 'the New Saxon Church' in particular, is a medley of mere guess and nonsense. He makes the egregiously unhistorical assertion that 'Luther was the father of national churches. Persons who have never breathed the atmosphere of other ages' (such, for instance, as Bishop Stubbs, Mr. Freeman, or the late Mr. Brewer and Mr. Haddan) 'talk with glib assurance of the continuity, the historical unity of this or that modern church. These people start from a misconception. Until the Reformation there was no Church of Saxony'—Dr. Bayne seems to think that Saxony was a 'nation'—'no Church of France, no Church of England. During the mediæval time'—a charmingly vague phrase—'there was the Church *in* Saxony, not the Church of Saxony, the Church *in* England, not the Church of England.' Those persons who trace the Jesuits in the most improbable lurking-places, will fancy that some son of St. Ignatius got into Dr. Bayne's study, and wrote the above sentences. It is evident that Dr. Bayne has never made a personal scrutiny of a dozen ecclesiastical documents of 'the mediæval time.' He talks of Luther as 'a member of the Church of Rome,' he wonders why Luther 'stayed in the Church of Rome so long.' It is a pity he does not clearly show us by what act Luther came out of the Church of Rome. If he had been made a cardinal he would have called himself 'a member of the Church of Rome,' but Dr. Bayne is attributing modern and post-tridentine language to 'the mediæval time' when he makes a German monk call himself a member of the Church of Rome. Luther, both

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before and after his break with the Papacy, believed that he had been planted into the one and only universal Church by the sacrament of baptism. He never taught that he was in one Church when he was a papist, but in another Church when he ceased to be a papist. He had no conception that he was making a new Church. His view seems to have been that the parishes in Saxony, as congregations of baptized persons, had never been anything else but parts of the true visible Church, even when they were under the Papacy. 'In the parish church,' said he, as early as 1520, 'you can have baptism, sacraments, the gospel, and the fellowship of your neighbours. Neither angel nor pope can provide you with so much as God has already provided for you in your parish church.' From this position he never departed. His difficulty was the maintenance of a right union of these parish churches with one another, and with the whole Catholic Church. His attempt to solve this by the erection of a pseudo-episcopate was disastrous and short-lived, and it ended in the concentration of ecclesiastical authority in the hands of the secular ruler as *summus episcopus*. If he had taken as firm a stand for the tradition of the whole Church as to the priesthood and episcopate as he did against the Sacramentarians for the Eucharist, and against the Anabaptists for Holy Baptism—in both which cases he appealed to the Christian tradition—Luther might have been indeed the reformer, instead of the disintegrator, of the German Church. He was personally in favour of retaining the elevation of the Host in the Eucharist, and even pleaded with the princes to uphold in their integrity some of the monastic communities, both male and female, as Mr. Kettlewell has pointed out in his interesting volumes on Thomas à Kempis. Modern German literature is rich in exhaustive monographs on each important episode of Luther's life; but Dr. Bayne appears to be utterly unacquainted with them.

Introduction to the Catholic Epistles. By P. J. GLOAG, D.D., Minister of Galashiels. (Edinburgh : T. and T. Clark, 1887.)

THE subject-matter of this volume is the same as that of Alford's *Prolegomena* to the corresponding Canonical books, points of special interest or peculiar difficulty being discussed at considerable length in detached dissertations. The Epistles themselves are not printed in the volume, and there is no continuous commentary; so that the book is open to the charge of tending to increase the prevalence of the fault, already too general among our younger clergy, of knowing a certain amount *about* the Bible, but very little *of the Bible itself*. Yet if the Sacred Text be carefully studied *before, together with, and after* the use of such a volume as Dr. Gloag's, no one can reasonably doubt that great advantages may be derived from the four hundred pages of auxiliary information which the Minister of Galashiels has here put together. We know no other book in English, covering the same ground, that is so good; and we heartily commend it to students of this portion of the New Testament. Its gravest omission, in our opinion, is connected with the department of textual criticism. We desiderate, in an *Introduction to the Catholic Epistles*,

some account of the manuscripts which contain those Epistles, the state of the text, the versions, and the patristic quotations; but Dr. Gloag leaves this subject quite untouched, except so far as it affects the questions of authenticity and canonicity. When treating of authenticity, the author refers to the Syriac and Latin versions, but even there he does not take into consideration the Egyptian versions, which we would place in the same category: we hold that these three groups of versions are of approximately equal antiquity, and that they conspicuously excel all others in importance as well as age.

Dr. Gloag takes the Helvidian view of the meaning of the New Testament phrase 'Brethren of the Lord,' and astonishes us by saying that 'the preponderance of evidence is in favour of it' (p. 38), whereas his own account of the history of the three rival theories seems to us to point most clearly to a different conclusion. What 'evidence,' in the proper sense of the word, is there in support of an 'opinion' on this subject 'first advocated by Helvidius, a Roman Christian who lived towards the close of the fourth century'? (p. 38).

We are glad to see that right views of the State after Death are becoming more widely spread. It is hopeful when we find a non-Episcopalian write as Dr. Gloag does at p. 198:—

'In general, the Reformers seem to have overlooked the doctrine of an intermediate state, and to have regarded death as to all intents and purposes the same to every person as the judgment.'

The relation of the foot notes to the body of the book is occasionally somewhat puzzling. For instance, in his text (p. 175) the author says: 'Eschatological allusions are peculiar to Peter among the writers of the New Testament;' and appends a footnote as follows: 'Peter is the only sacred writer, if we exclude certain passages in the Apocalypse, and the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, who directly alludes to the intermediate state.' We ought to have premised that the author expressly includes the doctrine of the intermediate state within the scope of the term 'Eschatology.' Again (p. 367) his text says: 'Certainly the wickedness described in Jude's Epistle is more astounding than that mentioned in the First Epistle to the Corinthians;' whereas the footnote says: 'Not so if we interpret 1 Cor. xi. 21 literally, that the agapæ and the Lord's Supper were actually converted into scenes of drunkenness.'

The First Epistle of St. John. With Exposition and Homiletical Treatment. By the Rev. J. J. LIAS, M.A., Vicar of St. Edward's, Cambridge. (London: Nisbet, 1887.)

WE cannot speak too highly of this new volume of Nisbet's Theological Library, considered as a practical help to the conscientious preacher. It is full of sober piety guided by sound scholarship, and Mr. Lias seems to have acquired from his long study of St. John's writings something of that Apostle's marvellous power of using such language as is simple and intelligible to the plainest folk, while at the same time it expresses the deepest thoughts, and suggests reflections upon which the noblest intellects may worthily exercise their highest

powers. Many of our readers may have already profited by the contents of this volume, which originally appeared in detached papers in the *Homiletic Magazine*; but for the sake of such as have not enjoyed this privilege, we should like to say that the possession of even Canon Westcott's and Dr. Plummer's excellent works on St. John's Epistles would not render Mr. Lias's volume a superfluous luxury. Mr. Lias has written with the special object of assisting preachers, and has with rare self-restraint kept his object ever in view. In our opinion he has been eminently successful, and we should not be surprised if his book became as great a favourite with a large section of modern preachers as was 'Leighton on Peter' with their predecessors half a century ago.

In speaking of the Socinian theory, Mr. Lias very well says (p. 14, lines 7-4 from bottom):—

'So far as it is true, we gladly accept it. But the poet warns us that "a truth which is half a truth is the greatest lie of all." And Socinianism lands us in one of the most dangerous of half-truths.'

We do not happen to recognize Mr. Lias's poetical quotation here; but we can bring to his memory another which is equally good, and equally appropriate to a sermon against Socinianism. Singularly enough, the poet gives it as the summary of part of a parsonic address:—

'... a lie which is half a truth is ever the blackest of lies;
... a lie which is all a lie may be met and fought with outright;
But a lie which is part a truth is a harder matter to fight.'

TENNYSON: *The Grandmother*, stanza viii.

In order to give our readers an idea of the style of this book, we conclude our notice with the following quotation.

'The explanations of some commentators seem to involve a contracted or mistaken notion, not only of the word *ἀφεσις*, but of the English word "atone." As we have seen, men speak of the former as equivalent to forgiveness. But its more natural meaning is "expulsion." That the former idea is excluded we would not contend. But we contend for the inclusion of the latter. As the virus of deadly poison is expelled from the body by the antidote, so the poison of sin is expelled from man's composite being by the life of Christ. Sin is first forgiven, no doubt, but it is afterwards destroyed. Its power over the man is taken away, and he stands, not only justified, but purified, sanctified, victorious, by the indwelling of Jesus Christ. So, again, the expression "atoning blood" is not used at the present day in its Scriptural and strict English sense as equivalent to "reconciling blood," but involves in modern English ears the idea of reconciling through the endurance of vicarious punishment. That the sufferings and death of Christ were those of the one sacrifice for sin is not denied. But we lose sight of half the virtue of that bloodshed, if we merely regard it as offered for us. As the sixth chapter of St. John and the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper most plainly teach, that blood circulates in the veins of every redeemed man. Thus it is not enough to regard it as simply pleading for the forgiveness of our sins. It "atones" by becoming the very life of our life, and its revivifying power effects the expulsion of sin from within us. Thus, then, Jesus came by water and blood. The one typified the removal of the curse

from mankind, the free access of all to a gracious and loving Father, no longer estranged from us by sin, the quickening and inspiring effects of the new relation between God and man in stirring us up vigorously to live the new life. The other is no type at all, but the plain literal foundation of the Christian religion. The life of Christ is our life. His blood mystically, yet really, flows in our veins, uniting us in the first instance to His humanity, and through it to the Divine nature itself' (2 Pet. i. 4; pp. 371-2, on 1 John v. 6).

Handbooks for Bible Classes and Private Students. Edited by DOPS and WHYTE. *The Gospel of St. Luke*, Chapters I-XII. By T. M. LINDSAY, D.D. (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1887.)

THIS appears to us quite an unnecessary and superfluous publication. It contains little or nothing original, and never improves what it borrows from others. It is a poor specimen of mere modern book-making. It sometimes repeats itself—e.g. a note of eight lines on iii. 23, concerning the prayers of Jesus, is repeated *verbatim* on vi. 12. It occasionally is demonstrably in error, as when it says on i. 39 (p. 49) that 'Luke has omitted between the 38th and 39th verses what Matthew tells us in i. 18, 19.' The words following this mistake are to us quite unintelligible:—'The white lily of the annunciation had been stained with the heart's blood of the Virgin Mother.'

Dr. Lindsay gives, as the derivation of the word 'Gospel,' '*God* or *good* ; *spell*, discourse or tidings,' and we wonder what he means by it. Does he mean that the words 'God' and 'good' are equivalent, cognate, identical? If so, the best authorities on English etymology are against him. Does he mean that he is uncertain whether the first syllable of 'Gospel' is derived from 'God' or from 'good'? If so, he need not be ashamed to confess his ignorance, seeing that very many well-educated men share his uncertainty on this particular point. Or does he mean to imply, by putting 'God' before 'good,' that he is inclined to adopt the new view of the etymology of Gospel, but not altogether prepared to drop the time-honoured theory which alone he found in his familiar Farrar? In this case, we wish he had been more explicit; he might here, at least, have done his readers a little service.

The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges. The First Book of the Kings. With Introduction and Notes by the Rev. J. R. LUMBY, D.D., Norrisian Professor of Divinity. (Cambridge: University Press, 1886.)

THIS little volume has been long looked for, will be eagerly welcomed, and is calculated to give general satisfaction. It is exceedingly well done, and, like some others of the series, will become a recognized manual for advanced Biblical students as well as 'for schools and colleges.' Not only to readers of the English version, but also to such as are going through the Hebrew original or any of the ancient versions, Dr. Lumby's learned labours will afford substantial assistance. Until this book appeared there did not exist any

English commentary on the Books of Kings which worthily represents the present condition of Biblical science. Such a deficiency gives special value to the present volume, which is the first instalment of a work which will go far towards removing this stigma from English theological literature. The fact that Dr. Lumby makes frequent references to the Masoretic text and the Septuagint, giving occasionally the Greek and more rarely the Hebrew forms, need not cause any alarm to schoolmasters, even where Greek is not taught; all the notes are quite intelligible enough to those who merely read English. We are in a position to state that many teachers have long desired a satisfactory handbook for this portion of the Old Testament, and we congratulate them upon the fulfilment of their desire in the little text-book before us. The Introduction is a very model of clearness, and keeps closely to the point. In the summary of the contents of 1 Kings, pp. xviii-xxiv, the author adds to the brief analysis of each section one or two pithy suggestions for giving some religious instruction in connexion with the historical narrative. The notes are of course very condensed, and we sometimes wish a line or two more had been added. Thus, on x. 8 it might have been shown how suitable on the lips of the Queen of Sheba would have been the exclamation, 'Happy are these thy wives!' which is the reading of LXX, Syriac, and Arabic. Again, on xxii. 34, we are told that Josephus names 'the certain man who drew his bow at a venture,' calling him Aman; but we are not told that the Midrash Tehillim calls him Naeman or Naaman, thus probably guiding us to the true reading of Josephus, and to a satisfactory explanation of 2 Kings v. 1, where we read that by Naaman 'the Lord had given deliverance unto Syria.'

Studies in St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians. By W. S. WOOD, M.A., Rector of Ufford, Northamptonshire. (London: Rivingtons, 1887.)

THIS neat little volume of 163 pages, small octavo, contains ten essays on the following themes:—1. The First of St. Paul's Epistles; 2. St. Paul's Complaisance; 3. Was Titus Circumcised? 4. Destruction and Reconstruction; 5. Law and Promise; 6. The Past and the Present; 7. Freedom in Christ; 8. The Adversaries of Truth; 9. The Two Burdens; and 10. Last Words in the Apostle's Handwriting.

Much learning is shown, as might be expected from a man who was a triple 'first,' besides getting a second in a fourth tripos and carrying off sundry University prizes: but we are afraid that Mr. Wood has too little respect for his seniors to allow him to judge quite fairly either their work or his own. Much of his work on Galatians takes the form of opposition to Bishop Lightfoot, and we instinctively mistrust a man who pronounces one of Lightfoot's notes to be 'neither logic nor sense' (p. 57, note). We are reminded of the reply of an old German Jew to a pupil who complained that Ewald's Hebrew Grammar seemed a complete muddle: 'Ah! my dear sir, don't you think it just possible that the muddle may be subjective?'

The Seven Sayings from the Cross. Addresses by WILLIAM BRIGHT, D.D., Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. (London and Oxford: Parker and Co., 1887.)

As a poet, a scholar, and a divine, Dr. Bright's Good Friday Addresses stand altogether on a higher level than a large majority of those which are delivered from year to year on the most solemn of all days in the Christian calendar. Hysterical rhetoric, we may be sure, finds no place in his pages, which unfold to us the mystery of the Atonement, the love of the Crucified for sinners, the 'incommunicable suffering' which made the 'spiritual Cross harder to bear than the physical,' the keen sense of pain evinced in the cry 'I thirst,' the consciousness of 'victory' to which the *τετέλεσται* witnessed in the midst of seeming 'collapse,' the duty of 'saying every day "Father, into Thy hands I commend my spirit,"' and of spending 'each day as those who are wont to say it and to mean it'—such are the topics on which Dr. Bright invites us to ponder with all seriousness, not looking upon sin as 'merely a defect or "moral misfortune,"' but looking 'at the Cross as the "measure of sin,"' as exhibiting the virulence of the moral disease which required so awful a remedy.' Not the least valuable part of this volume will be found in the Notes which give emphasis to the theological points involved in the Passion of our Lord, and references to the works of divines in which they are further illustrated or substantiated. We are not ourselves very greatly enamoured of what is known, we believe, as the Three Hours' Service—Dr. Bright, by the way, seems to intimate it ought to be six hours—but if all the addresses then delivered were as sound and as sober as those now before us we might be of a different way of thinking. Dr. Bright has the power of packing into a sentence or a note an amount of theology which would furnish material, when expanded, for a whole series of addresses for Good Friday or for the entire Holy Week. We strongly recommend this book as a mine of suggestions for the clergy this coming Lent.

Selections from the Sermons of Padre Agostino. Edited by CATHERINE MARY PHILLIMORE. (London: The Church Printing Company, 1888.)

GREAT was the sensation produced at Florence last Lent by a course of sermons preached in the Duomo by a Franciscan whose impassioned eloquence has won for him the title of the 'Modern Savonarola.' From the course of thirty-two sermons Miss C. M. Phillimore, at the instance of Viscountess Ossington, has selected fourteen for a translation which she dedicates to the Council and Members of the Church of England Working Men's Society, 'in token of respect for the past, and with every earnest wish for the future welfare of the Society.' The translation is made, not from any carefully edited and authorized publication, but from a series of what we may call broadsides, issued by an enterprising Florence newspaper (*L'Elettrico*), which employed two shorthand writers to take the sermons down from the lips of the preacher. These broadsides were hawked about the streets a few hours after the sermons had been delivered to an audience composed

of some seven or eight thousand persons (chiefly of the working classes), who had thronged the church hours before the time, in order to have a chance of being within earshot. Those who have flocked to St. Paul's when it is Dr. Liddon's turn to occupy the pulpit may form some conception of the affluence of listeners. The impressiveness of the scene was enhanced by the fact that the preacher had to be carried to the pulpit in a litter on account of his being too ill to walk. The sermons selected by Miss Phillimore are, in the main, addressed to those who are 'minished and brought low through oppression, through any plague or suffering,' and who are urged to look upward and onward for consolations which this world can neither give nor take away.

Italy has always been famous for pulpit oratory: great has always been 'the company of the preachers,' and these sermons of the Florentine Padre will add fresh lustre to the annals of Italian Homiletics. In some respects a greater than Savonarola is here, for Savonarola, as Miss Phillimore very justly remarks, 'was a politician as well as a priest,' and as such had 'an easier task to attract the people . . . than if he had confined himself to purely spiritual topics.'

We can understand Miss Phillimore's desire to reach a larger circle of readers by the exclusion of matter distinctly Roman; but for our own part we should much prefer seeing the entire course in an English dress. The sermons she has selected are on the following subjects:—Sermons I. and II. (Introductory). III. God. IV. The Soul. V. The Spirituality of the Soul. VI. The Immortality of the Soul. VII. The Purpose of Life. VIII. The Claim of God upon our Lives. IX. Family Life. X. Pain. XI. Hope. XII. The Observance of Sunday. XIII. Liberty. XIV. The Working Classes.

The Bishops in the Tower. A Record of Stirring Events affecting the Church and Nonconformists from the Restoration to the Revolution. By HERBERT MORTIMER LUCKOCK, D.D., Canon of Ely. (London: Rivingtons, 1887.)

The Bishops in the Tower is the somewhat fanciful title of a set of lectures, written, like everything of Dr. Luckock's, pleasantly and clearly, which form a continuation of the author's *Studies in the History of the Prayer-Book*. As the former series closed with the last actual revision of the Prayer-Book, so these find an appropriate conclusion in the last attempted revision by the Royal Commission of William III. But beyond this there is not very much resemblance between the plans of the two books. The one was wisely confined to the single subject of the development of the reformed Liturgy; the other is a general sketch of the Church history of the time, and only reverts in the last chapter to the history of the Prayer-Book. Thus, while the earlier lectures cover a period of more than a century, the later occupy as much space in dealing with less than thirty years.

The first two lectures in the book under review deal mainly with the relation of the Church to the Nonconformists in the early years of

the reign of Charles II., and Dr. Luckock's object is to show that it was not the clergy so much as the laity to whom Nonconformity owes the imposition of those disabilities which Churchmen of all parties concur now to deplore. The third, fifth, sixth, and seventh lectures show us the position of the Church of England in the struggle against Rome under the second Charles and James, culminating in the episode of the Seven Bishops which gives the title to the whole. Dr. Luckock makes a curious slip when—was he thinking of the Nonconformist historian?—he substitutes the name of Stoughton for that of Hough as the lawfully elected President of Magdalen. But perhaps the most interesting of all are the two lectures which are confined more closely to the internal history of the Church—Lecture IV., on the social status of the clergy, and Lecture VIII., on the Nonjurors. We shall say something on each of these.

Nothing in Lord Macaulay's works—and this is saying a good deal—has met with more strenuous or more well-deserved animadversion than his description of the state of the clergy in the justly celebrated third chapter of the *History of England*. First, the *Quarterly Reviewer*, the unfortunate Croker, of the failure of whose criticisms it was said that he had 'contemplated murder and committed suicide;' then Dr. Churchill Babington, whose dissection of the historian was complete at every point in the argument—we are delighted to learn (from Dr. Luckock) that it is hoped that he will consent to publish his interesting researches in a fuller form; and lastly, Dr. Luckock himself; all put the case convincingly on the other side. Macaulay defends himself somewhere in his *Diary* by the complacent statement that no one who has not steeped his mind in the transitory literature of the day is qualified to judge. But this is one illustration of a tendency in which some modern writers are too prone to indulge—the neglect of straightforward and obvious evidence in favour of the indirect and the inconclusive. If Macaulay were to be the historian, not of the Church of the seventeenth in the nineteenth, but of the Church of the nineteenth in the twenty-first century, we are confident that he would devote himself to theatrical pieces and popular novels, and having lighted on Mr. Trollope's *Barchester Towers* and Mr. Hawtrey's *Private Secretary*, would gravely conclude that all our bishops resembled Dr. Proudie, and all our clergy the Reverend Robert Spalding.

For arguments, Macaulay rests his case on the low social extraction of the clergy, their position as domestic chaplains, and the nature of their matrimonial connexions. 'During the century which followed the accession of Elizabeth, scarce a single person of noble descent took orders.' But the century from 1560 to 1660 is not that in question: the year in point is 1685, and, in fact, under the later Stuarts we find that, taking the five great Bishoprics, Nathanael Crewe, afterwards Lord Crewe, was Bishop of Durham from 1674 to 1721; Henry Compton, brother of the Earl of Compton, Bishop of London from 1675 to 1713; Sir Jonathan Trelawney, Bishop of Winchester from 1707 to 1721; and Sir William Dawes, Archbishop of York from 1714 to 1724. Then we are told that the position of a

chaplain 'tended to degrade the priestly character,' and Laud is introduced to prove it because he issued injunctions against the system. But beyond doubt Laud's object was to punish the Puritan gentry for the protection they afforded to Puritan chaplains; he was acting, not in the interests of clerical independence, but of episcopal control. Lastly, we are sent back to Queen Elizabeth again for the view that 'a waiting woman was generally considered as the most suitable helpmate for a parson.' But Macaulay must have known that long after the Reformation a prejudice against the marriage of the clergy was in certain quarters in active operation, and with no one more decidedly than with Elizabeth herself. It has even survived to our own day in the curious restriction that alone among married ladies the wives of bishops do not share the precedence of their husbands. To some extent it may have affected the social position of the parson's wife even in Charles II.'s reign; but if so, this would prove nothing for the position of the parson, and in any case evidence is requisite more nearly contemporaneous than injunctions already a century old.

Dr. Luckock's treatment of the *Protest of the Nonjurors* is very far superior to that of most historians who have preceded him. He calls attention to a new aspect of the question, for, in face of the serious danger to the Church of England in William's Presbyterian tendencies, it was, we believe, the defiant attitude of the Nonjurors which really defeated the plan of comprehension and the debasement of the Prayer-Book. Opinions, indeed, may differ upon the former, but we do not suppose there are two views about the merits of a liturgy in which the collect 'Lighten our darkness' emerged from the crucible of revision at the hands of Patrick, Burnet and Stillingfleet in the following form (p. 209):—

'Almighty God, who hast hitherto preserved us safely this day, by Thy great mercy defend us from all perils and dangers of this night. Pardon whatsoever we have done amiss, and settle our holy purposes to do better for the time to come: that laying ourselves down to sleep with these godly resolutions in our hearts, they may awaken with us in the morning, and we may daily grow more watchful in all our ways; for the love of Thy only Son our Saviour Jesus Christ.'

The one charge of which Dr. Luckock thinks the Nonjurors cannot be acquitted is that of creating a schism by the consecration of bishops. Yet we doubt whether this is not really better capable of defence than their original action. After all that can be said for it under the circumstances, the refusal of allegiance was primarily the outcome of a theory of political government and of the nature of political oaths which no sane man would in these days think of defending. But, once granted the refusal, it seems to us that the action of the dominant party left only one course open to the Nonjurors. Six bishops (by the way, Trelawney is wrongly given for White on p. 202) were deprived by Act of Parliament without anything that bore even the faintest resemblance to an ecclesiastical judgment. We are not, indeed, by any means so certain as Dr. Luckock that good Bishop Turner was not after all implicated in a Jacobite plot, but that cannot affect

the conclusion that no Churchman of principle, juror or nonjuror, could possibly recognize the depositions. When, then, the continuance of the separation was justified by its adherents with appeal to the case of the 'invalidly deprived Fathers,' as they loved to call them, there is much to be said for their view, and Dr. Luckock omits to mention that Hickes and Wagstaffe were only consecrated as suffragans. At the same time the offer of Queen Anne to reinstate Ken at Wells ought undoubtedly to have been welcomed as a confession and a reparation on the part of the Government, and the occasion taken to heal the schism.

Work like Dr. Luckock's is a standing defence of the cathedral system as it ought to be and can be, and we only wish that every bishop and every chapter would follow the example of Ely by multiplying lectures on some of the subjects in which Churchmen feel, or should feel, an intelligent interest. A lecture needs only to be attractive in style and instructive in matter and it is its own justification, for many will listen who would not read. In *The Bishops in the Tower* we have, of course, specimens above the average, and not only admirable lectures, but also a very readable, even if not very profound, book.

Fragmentary Records of Jesus of Nazareth, from the Letters of a Contemporary. By FREDERICK R. WYNNE. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1887.)

THIS is a very pleasantly written little book. The author begins by sketching the phases of thought which many people at the present day go through in search for a creed. Dissatisfaction at science, a yearning after some spiritual life, but an absence of definite belief and a vague feeling that religion may not be true. He then builds up for such a person an historical basis for accepting Christianity. He takes the four universally accepted letters of St. Paul (1 and 2 Cor., Gal., and Rom.), and analyses their contents. He collects the testimony they give to the life and works of Christ, the belief of the early Christians, the organization of the Christian Church. He shows how the life recorded created an epoch in human thought, and that the testimony of these letters is corroborated by various other authentic and early documents. The work ends with 'the attitude of inquiry changed into one of happy confidence.'

There is nothing very original in the line of argument; we have not discovered any novel thoughts or acute criticism. But the work is attractive in style, free from mistakes, and exactly fitted for a large class of persons at the present day. It has the further advantage of not presupposing any acquaintance in its readers with theology or criticism—two things of which the religious amateur has a great horror.

The two main defects are, firstly, that in analysing the teaching of St. Paul, especially concerning the Person of Christ, the writer contents himself with vague generalities, and does not attempt to arrive at the exact tenets of the Four Epistles; and secondly, that the book is written like a sermon, and not in the judicial style that

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befits an apologetic work. We mean that the critical points of the argument are assisted by appeals, not merely to reason, but also to emotions. We are not certain, however, that a certain amount of flabbiness will not make the book more attractive to the majority of readers.

The Gospel and Philosophy. Six Lent Lectures. By MORGAN DIX, S.T.D., D.C.L., Rector of Trinity Church, New York. (London: Wells Gardner, Darton and Co., 1887.)

THE author of these lectures has two objects. The first is to assert that Christianity is a dogmatic, sacerdotal and sacramental system. This he does with considerable vigour and ability. We believe that he is right, and that so far his position is thoroughly sound. But as he advances further, we find it less easy to agree with him. For his further object is to assert that all evil comes from reason, and to represent reason as the antithesis of faith. Hence he is the determined foe of all philosophy, and contrasts the comfortable position of the believer with the wavering position of the sceptic, in a manner which would seem to many offensive. We believe that such teaching is both erroneous and dangerous. For it lends some support to the charge of 'irrationalism' brought against the Truth, and, as he himself is obliged in one place to admit, reason must ever be the basis of faith. The truer idea of faith is that it is the ally of reason against sense, and the truer view of philosophy is that it is the preparation for Christianity. Reason clogged by the senses becomes degraded; philosophy materialized becomes unspiritual; but both these are unhealthy developments of what is good, not normal conditions.

Help on the Way. By the Rev. JOHN S. SHEILDS, D.D., Vicar of Coolock, Ireland. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1886.)

THIS book consists of a number of unconnected sermons which the author has published as a series of chapters without texts. They are written from a cultivated evangelical point of view, are simple and straightforward in tone, pleasant in style, and will be useful to those of the author's way of thinking, whose difficulties arise only from misunderstanding a passage of Scripture, and whose doubts can always be quieted by a judicious quotation of a text from the Bible.

Bar-Jonah, the Son of the Resurrection. By the Rev. ARTHUR BEARD. (London: George Bell and Sons, 1887.)

'ONE new idea makes all our knowledge new,' is the motto of this work; and the new idea that the writer has discovered is that Bar-Jonah means the 'Son of Resurrection.' He has discovered it by the application of the laws of 'continuity' and 'integration.'

'Simon saith to Jesus: "Thou art the Son of the living God." Jesus saith to Simon: "Thou art the son of Jonah"—the Son of Resurrection. We know the meaning of "the sign of Jonah." It has just been given to the Sadducees as a token of warning of Resurrection: it is now given to Simon as a token of promise of the same' (p. 18).

This conclusion is supported by the discovery that the correct reading in John i. 42 is John, not Jonah.

We may add that the style of the author is as bad as his exegetical skill and linguistic knowledge, and that he intends to proceed with the integration of the 'Spirits in Prison,' 'The Two Trusts,' 'The Two Crosses,' &c. We can only express a hope that his future writings will not be dedicated by permission to the Bishop of London.

The Doom of Sacrilege and the Results of Church Spoliation. By JAMES WAYLAND JOYCE. (London: J. Masters and Co., 1886.)

THE object of this book is the defence of the Church of England against Disestablishment. The writer (whose recent death all English Churchmen will deplore) begins with an introduction in which he sums up with considerable force and vigour the current arguments on the subject: so far we agree with him and can commend the ability with which he writes. The remainder of the volume consists of a collection of instances, extending through English history, of the 'Doom of Sacrilege,' i.e. the misfortunes which have attended those who have pillaged or violated the property of the Church. The instances are taken from Sir Henry Spelman's books and other well known works, and are, we believe, thoroughly trustworthy, and to a reader with sufficient sympathy and sufficient credulity the book will appear absolutely conclusive. But this is just one of those cases where the maxim of Bacon ought to be applied, 'Major est vis instantiæ negativæ.' It is quite true that many persons who have committed sacrilege have died by violent means or without offspring; but how many who have done so have lived to an old age and died in their beds? Have not other persons died by violent means in the middle ages? Have not the most pious of families had no offspring? William the Conqueror is selected as an example of the doom of sacrilege. Edward the Confessor was certainly a devoted son of the Church, but which led the most prosperous life? which has enjoyed the greatest fame after death? which had the largest family? No son of Edward ever sat on the throne. We do not wish to defend the spoliation of Henry VIII., but we cannot hide from ourselves the fact that when the disturbances which attended the changes he made were over, this country enjoyed a prosperity which it had never known before, under a Queen who, curiously enough, has been selected as a type of the misfortune which attends the families of the sacrilegious—the reason, we believe, being that she had no children; a result which is usually ascribed to the fact that she never married.

We have no space to consider more of the instances given, but we must remind Mr. Joyce that his method of proof (that of collecting only the 'positive' instances) makes it possible to prove the reality of omens, the effectiveness of holy images, the power of heathen idols, astrology, and any other superstition you will. If helped by rhetorical power or vigorous language the proof is still more conclusive; and of these gifts Mr. Joyce is not destitute.

In saying this we do not for a moment wish to deny that there is a moral government of the world which is more powerful in the end than the proverbial prosperity of the wicked. But we do not believe it is possible to separate sacrilege from other crimes; and we do not

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think that the cause of the Church is likely to be helped by a form of argument which begs the main question at issue, viz. whether Dis-establishment would be sacrilege, or might be for the benefit of the Church and country.

Sundays at Balmoral: Sermons preached before the Queen in Scotland.

By the late Very Rev. JOHN TULLOCH, D.D., LL.D., &c.
(London: James Nisbet and Co., 1887.)

THIS volume of sermons of the late Principal Tulloch, which has been edited by his son, is an admirable memorial of him. They are characterized by all the clearness and attractiveness of style, by the literary skill, and the knowledge of his hearers, which made him a popular Court preacher. They are characterized, too, by great moral earnestness and spiritual fervour. They are also as vivid in doctrine as might be expected from the divine who preached them, and the place where they were preached. We may illustrate this last characteristic by one quotation: 'The true Church is evangelical in fervour, historical in doctrine and ritual, and wise and broad and critical in sympathy.' An admirable definition, but unfortunately one which will never assist anyone who has difficulties which refuse to be lulled to sleep by specious platitudes. For Christian teachers 'who settle the nature of God and the fate of their fellow-creatures according to their own dogmas'—which we may presume would include many who teach dogmas which they look on as part of their sacred tradition—he utters the contemptuous prayer of the Pharisee, 'God pity them.'

But it is more important to point out, for the benefit of those who may be orthodox, and are certainly dull, the points on which the success of sermons like these depends. In the first place the preacher uses a language his hearers understand, and not one inherited from the past; and secondly, he takes his start from ideas which his hearers can share. In all men there is a vague longing after the higher life, a sense of human instability and mortality, a desire for practical religion. And many sermons would attract their congregation far more if the preacher was to start with these vague ideas which are floating about in the popular mind. He need not stop there.

The History of St. Cuthbert. By CHARLES, ARCHBISHOP OF GLASGOW. Third edition. (London: Burns and Oates, 1887.)

EVER since the publication of the first edition of Monsignor Eyre's *St. Cuthbert*, in 1849, this and Dr. Raine's quarto have ranked together as the two principal works on the life and subsequent history of the great northern Saint. The merits and the blemishes of both are well known to many; we are now concerned only with the work of the Roman prelate. The new edition is not, and does not profess to be, much more than a reprint of the first and second, which have been long out of print, but even as such it is a valuable work, written in a reverent and, on the whole, in a scholarlike manner. The author discusses successively the life, decease, and miracles, the wanderings of the body during 124 years, the state of it from A.D. 687 to 1827, and the different monuments erected in honour of the Saint. He has drawn his information as far as possible from original sources,

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including, of course, the Life by the anonymous monk and that by Bede, both written within a generation of Cuthbert's death. Now and then, however, he strains a point, no doubt unconsciously, in support of later Roman usages. For instance, in the first edition, p. 20 (third edition, p. 22), he speaks, as if quoting Bede and the Lindisfarne monk, of 'a boy whom he took with him to serve his Mass, and assist while he administered the sacraments.' The boy may possibly have occasionally been employed in some such way, but we are not aware that either of the original authorities anywhere says anything of the kind. In what he says about the 'St Cuthbert window' in York Minster (first edition, p. 272, second edition, p. 287), the author simply follows Browne in saying that about thirty of the subjects can yet be made out. It is unfortunate that he should not have seen an elaborate account of the window (*Yorkshire Archaeol. Journal*, iv. 249-376) in which more than sixty of the subjects are identified, and the glass carefully described. In the same article may be found much more complete and correct copies of the couplets in Carlisle Cathedral than those which are here printed from Jefferson's *Carlisle* in the third edition as in the first, with (among other blunders) the extraordinary substitution of 'Myda . . .' for 'Aidans' in the couplet

'Her saw he aydans savl vp go
To hevyn blys w^t angels two.'

Nevertheless, Archbishop Eyre's history is a book which should be in the hands of all interested in St. Cuthbert, and although it is a pity he has not been able to revise the new edition more carefully, he has done well to bring it out, and the twelfth centenary of the death of St. Cuthbert has seemed to offer a fitting opportunity.

Historical Scenes in Durham Cathedral. By J. L. Low, M.A.
(Durham : Andrews and Co., 1887.)

No one was better qualified to describe these scenes than the author of the *Diocesan History of Durham* (S.P.C.K.), and he has done his work extremely well. In the unpretending little volume now before us he describes *con amore*, and from the original sources of information, many a stirring episode in the history of St. Cuthbert's minster, from the fire in Aldhune's Church, the predecessor of the present cathedral, to the consecration of the first Bishop of Newcastle. He also gives a great deal of information about the monastic buildings, services, and life generally, which cannot fail to be of interest to many, even to such as have no special interest in Durham. And notwithstanding all we are told about the dissolution of the monastic establishment, the new foundation, and the unhappy period of Puritan ascendancy, we rise from the perusal of Mr. Low's little book with a strong sense of that continuity of the Church of England which was so long lost sight of, but is now becoming better understood as more of the history of our Church is made generally accessible.

BRIEF NOTES OF NEW BOOKS, NEW EDITIONS, PERIODICALS, &c.
MESSRS. CLAY AND SONS have issued from the Cambridge University Press two very beautiful editions of the *Book of Common Prayer* (Cambridge University Press, London : C. J. Clay and Sons) in pearl

32mo and foolscap 8vo respectively. The first, or smaller of these two editions, is an exquisite specimen of what the University Press can effect in combining at once smallness, blackness, and clearness of type. The book is embellished with border lines and initials in red, and is to be had in various bindings. In the larger edition, which is also richly ornamented with woodcuts of initials and of headpieces, &c., the ink seems to us rather pale. How long will printers go on perpetuating the error of one of their predecessors by prefixing *Deus laudum* to Psalm cix.?

The appearance of a fourth edition of *The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, by Alfred Edersheim, M.A. Oxon., D.D., Ph.D. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1887), bears out the encomiums which we passed on this remarkable work when it first appeared, only four years ago. We are glad to find in the Preface intimation of a design to embody 'further results of reading and study' in prosecution of the work here completed. We are sorry that Dr. Edersheim has not seen cause to modify his lax view—if he will allow us to call it so—respecting the 'brothers' of our Lord. In the little volume of *Addresses*, &c., noticed above, p. 506, Dr. Bright lets drop the pregnant remark that the words from the Cross, 'Woman, behold thy son,' ought themselves to be sufficient to dispose of the Helvidian theory. Dr. Edersheim has evidently felt the difficulty, but to our mind he disposes of it very lamely (vol. ii. p. 602 *n.*). We have further to congratulate Dr. Edersheim on the completion, by the publication of the seventh volume, of his valuable and laborious work, *The Bible History* (London: Religious Tract Society, 1887), commenced more than ten years ago. The object of the undertaking was to make a fresh study of Old Testament History (from the Creation to Zedekiah) 'from the original text, with such help as was to be derived from the best criticism and from cognate sciences.' In this last volume in particular the results of Assyriological studies have been incorporated. Dr. Edersheim is not one of those who consider, as too many do, that Old Testament history is of comparatively small importance to the Christian. 'Without it the New Testament would want its historical basis, and the historical Christ offer what would seem an absolutely unintelligible problem.' In presence of the current views of Kuenen and Wellhausen as to the Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch legislation, it is refreshing to read from the pen of a Hebrew scholar who is more than their match:—'The present writer has not seen any reason for departing from the old lines of the Church's faith, but rather everything to confirm our adherence to them' (Pref. p. 5). We warmly recommend these volumes to the classes whom the writer had primarily in view, viz., 'those who teach and those who learn, whether in the school or in the family.' We regret to find that the Index to the entire work, at the end of this seventh volume, does not extend to the 'Notes,' which are both numerous and of the highest value.

The two latest numbers of the *English Historical Review*, Nos. 7 and 8, July and October 1887 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1887), amply sustain the reputation of that learned and scholarly

publication, to which we heartily wish 'a happy New Year, and many of them,' as the phrase goes at this season. The names of Bryce, Gardiner, Freeman, and of that highly accomplished traveller, scholar, and archæologist, Mr. Theodore Bent, are a sufficient guarantee for the quality of the 'Articles.' Among the 'Notes and Documents' we single out, as of special interest, 'Spanheim's Account of the English Court,' recently discovered at Berlin and hitherto unedited. While of the 'Reviews of Books' it may be sufficient to mention that one is by Mr. Freeman and two by Lord Acton, who, as usual with him, shows that he knows infinitely more of the subject than the authors of the books reviewed. These two reviews, on Creighton's *Papacy* and on two biographies of Napoleon I., deserve and will repay careful study.

The January number of the *London Diocesan Magazine* (London: Griffith, Farran, Okeden and Welsh, 1888) exceeds in interest any that has previously appeared. The gem of the number is a paper by that learned liturgiologist, Mr. Wickham Legg, F.S.A., 'On some Ancient Liturgical Customs now falling into Disuse,' with five beautiful illustrations from ancient service-books. Most cordially do we endorse the words (p. 261), 'It is a scandal to see some boy . . . serving the most sacred mysteries of the Christian religion, while men in Holy Orders loll in the choir, or are *too lazy to come into church except just in time to distribute the Holy Communion to the faithful who are present.*' Or take the following: 'One of the greatest liturgical misfortunes that have befallen the Church of England since the days of Queen Elizabeth *has been the passing of the Act which allows shortened services.*' We might go on to speak of Mr. Legg's most righteous indignation at the practice adopted in some quarters of sitting at the Psalms! We sincerely hope that Mr. Legg may write more such papers, and that they may find their way into the *London Diocesan Magazine* for the instruction of silly, half-educated curates, who fasten upon some contemptible foreign piece of 'ritual' (so called!) without a single good reason for its adoption.

In a handsome royal octavo volume Mr. Joseph Foster (a name well known to genealogists) has published the Matriculation Register of the University of Oxford, which he has alphabetically arranged, revised, and annotated. It is entitled, *Alumni Oxonienses: the Members of the University of Oxford, 1715-1886; their Parentage, Birthplace, and Year of Birth, with a Record of their Degrees* (London: Joseph Foster, 21 Boundary Road, N.W., 1887). The first volume only is now before us. Mr. Foster does not say why he begins so late as 1715, seeing that the Matriculation Registers commence as far back as 1564.

Those who have coveted the possession of Dr. Geikie's *Life and Words of Christ* and of Mr. Hodder's *Life of Lord Shaftesbury* will be glad to know that they have recently been reissued in a cheaper and more compact form. 1. *The Life and Words of Christ*, by Cunningham Geikie, D.D. (London: Cassell and Co, 1887). 2. *Life and Works of the Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury, K.G.*, by Edwin Hodder (same publishers).

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